


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# **In the Person of Christ the Servant**

**A Theology of the Diaconate Based on the  
Personalist Thought of Pope John Paul II**



**Deacon Dominic Cerrato, Ph.D**

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# IN THE PERSON OF CHRIST THE SERVANT

*In Persona Christi Servi*

**A Theology of the Diaconate Based on the  
Personalist Thought of Pope John Paul II**

**Deacon Dominic Cerrato Ph.D.**



**St. Ephraem Press**  
Bloomington, Ohio

Published by St. Ephraem Press, Bloomingdale, Ohio

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*Imprimatur:* ✚ Most Rev. Jeffrey M. Monforton  
Bishop of Steubenville

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Copy Editors: John and Gail Miller

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The author is deeply grateful for the support of Richard and Joyce Ferris

ISBN: 150253486X  
ISBN 13: 9781502534866  
Library of Congress Control Number: 2014917500  
CreateSpace Independent Publishing Platform  
North Charleston, South Carolina

Printed and bound in the United States of America

*Dedicated to the priest who taught me to be a deacon  
Msgr. William R. Cornelius  
Confessor, Spiritual Director, Role Model, Friend*

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## Acknowledgements

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In the writing of this study, I am indebted to certain individuals who, each in their own way, have shaped my thoughts. There is, of course, Saint John Paul II and his teachings. His work not only provided the interpretive key to unlock aspects of the diaconate, it also shed new light on the entire tradition as it struggles to creatively engage the world with the Good News of Jesus Christ. I am also indebted to my dear friend and Professor of Scripture at Franciscan University of Steubenville, Deacon Stephen F. Miletic, Ph.D who guided me through portions of this study. His penetrating questions and astute counsel forced me to look deeper and articulate better the mystery of *diakonia*. In a similar way, the insights and suggestions provided by Deacon James Keating, Ph.D., Director of the Institute for Priestly Formation on my earlier drafts proved invaluable. Particularly, I found his advice on meditating on the servant mysteries a great source of inspiration as I refined my thought.

Beyond this, I was blessed with great examples of the diaconate in Msgr. William R. Cornelius, and Deacon Earl F. Barr. As my spiritual director and confessor, Msgr. Cornelius, to whom this work is dedicated, continually pointed me back to Christ as the model of

all deacons. He challenged me and encouraged me both in season and out. In my darkest moments, he picked me up, brushed me off, and sent me on my way. This proved vital not only in this work, but in living out my diaconate in often difficult circumstances. As a deacon, I could not have had a better mentor than my father-in-law Deacon Earl F. Barr. Deacon Barr, or Dad as I fondly called him, was for me the model of diaconal humility in the spirit of St. Francis of Assisi. Though he now rests in the arms of our Lord, while he was with us, a peace and loving patience pervaded his ministry. He exuded Christ the Servant in a subtle but nonetheless profound way by his simple demeanor and reassuring countenance.

Finally, this study and my ministry would be absolutely impossible were it not for my wife of 32 years, Judith Ann Cerrato. She not only reflected much of her father's peace in being a wife and mother of our seven children, she believed in me when I did not. Her unconditional love helped me to recognize the gift of God's love. It is this love, reflected in the service she unselfishly gives to our family that inspired me to stretch well beyond myself and in doing so discover what it really means to act in the person of Christ the Servant.



## Foreword

---

**Most Reverend Jeffrey M. Monforton**  
Bishop of Steubenville

The Church with Vatican Council II renewed the “lower level” of Holy Orders, the permanent diaconate. Although it is clear that we can find the origins of the diaconate in the Acts of the Apostles 6, and some of the earliest deacons of our faith were also martyrs, in the West the diaconate declined beginning around the fifth century. It did not thrive in the ecclesiastical-political events of the times. But that would be another study.

*Lumen Gentium* mandated the revival of the diaconate in the Church today. The renewal of this “lower level” of Holy Orders was part of the Church's *aggiornamento* – an opening of the Church's windows in dialogue with the modern world – by a *resourcement* – a look to the future by re-appropriating the early traditions of the Church found primarily in the Church Fathers. This is what makes the Church such a thing of beauty; that it renews itself by looking to its origins in the freshness of the faith.

When the Church once again put forward the ministry of the diaconate, it did not do so with an abundance of theology for this particular ministry. The Church used the language it also used to describe the priesthood: For deacons, “the sacrament of Holy Orders marks them with an *imprint* (“character”) which cannot be removed and which configures them to Christ, who made himself the ‘deacon’ or servant of all” (CCC 1570). If a priest is an “*alter Christus*,” then the deacon is, as Cerrato tells, “*in Persona Christi Servi*.” As with so many other areas of doctrine, it is left to theologians to mine the depths of this mystery with the help of philosophy and any of the other sciences in its service.

The *Catechism of the Catholic Church* notes however, that unlike the ordination of priests, only the bishop lays hands on the deacon at his ordination, denoting the special relationship between the bishop and the deacon. While this highlights the unique relationship of bishop and deacon, it is not meant to undermine the unique place of the deacon in the life of the Church today.

Even though the Second Vatican Council concluded about 50 years ago and the ministry of a permanent diaconate is the case in many dioceses, a proper understanding of this level of Holy Orders has a home to find in many areas of the Church’s pastoral life. Just as a priest must come to grips with the reality of his personhood as a priest – as a man who is in a unique identity with Christ the priest rather than someone who merely functions as a priest – so the Church in leading its clergy and laypeople must find the language for exploring and defining the diaconate, not so much in terms of its function but as an identity related to Christ the Servant.

To this end Deacon Cerrato gives us a thorough grounding in Aristotelian metaphysics interpreted through the Christian lens of St. Thomas Aquinas. To those unschooled in classical philosophy, this

part of his study can be daunting, and one might easily scratch one’s head at the ontological definition that Cerrato ultimately gives to being an ordained deacon using the language of classical metaphysics (“a supernatural universal accidental predication that stands in an inherent relation to a primary substance”). Gratefully for our benefit and for the good of this study, Cerrato’s exploration does not end there, but rather uses this as a basis for further studies using Pope John Paul II’s philosophy of Personalism. Here we see St. John Paul’s turn to the acting subject, but never to the exclusion of a thoroughly Catholic sense of ontology. To avoid the ontological grounding of an acting subject would be to place the dignity of the human person on very shaky grounds.

Our modern world is awash in functional and utilitarian ways of looking at the human person, to its detriment. It is not a long jump to see the ordained ministry as merely a function that somehow escapes the mystery of the human person and gender. Cerrato’s study therefore benefits from the ontological realism of Thomism, while at the same time it enjoys precisely the dialogue with the modern world that our St. John Paul the Great gave us in his phenomenology of the human person, his grace-filled understanding of the person. The Christian Personalism of Pope John Paul II, and his eminently intelligent and practical understanding of sexuality given in his “Theology of the Body,” are precisely what is needed for us in this modern world. Cerrato applies these admirably to the first steps of developing a theology of the diaconate.

*The Directory for the Ministry and Life of Permanent Deacons* in its opening line tells us that “the origin of the diaconate is the consecration and mission of Christ, in which the deacon is called to share.” Sophisticated philosophical language can tell us what this means; but the lived reality is what deacons are called to do. Deacons are not simply church decorations understood by their functional placement at the altar. They share in the very servanthood of Christ our Savior.

We are grateful that Deacon Cerrato has given us such a thorough and engaging study of the theology of the diaconate.

---

**Deacon James Keating, Ph.D.**  
Creighton University, Omaha NE

The community of deacons requires a profound spirituality because of the call we receive to serve the needs of others in faith. The foundation for such service is communion with Christ, which we progressively possess as our own defining reality. Only the theologian and psychologist Thomas Acklin, OSB, speaks of God as ‘omni-kenotic’: God is not only all-knowing and all-present, but God’s very being is ordered toward self-emptying, toward self-donation (*kenosis*). If man shares in the mystery of Christ, he comes to see that he is only fully himself when he makes his life a gift of self, a life of self-donation in service to others. It is this truth of who God is, which Christ revealed, that is symbolized in the public ministry of the deacon.

The deacon’s life is a sacrament because he embodies this mystery of Christic self-donation in and through his ordination. It is this objective mystery that the deacon must enter every day, so that by the end of his life his subjective character reflects the truth of what Christ called him to embody through ordination. The charism of self-donation, of eager availability, then, lies near the heart of diaconal spirituality. The deacon is sacramentally entrusted with the service of Christ in a way analogous to, but not in the same exclusive fashion as, the way a priest is entrusted with presiding at the Eucharist. Here we see the fullness of the interpenetration of the traditional spiritual fonts of priesthood and diaconate: The Last Supper reflecting apostolic identification with the cross (priesthood), and the Last Supper of John’s Gospel wherein Christ left us the challenge of ministerial service (diaconate).

“I understood that if the church had a body made up of different members, the most necessary and most noble of all members could not be lacking to it, and so I understood that the church had a heart and that this heart was burning with love. I understood that it was love alone that made the church’s members act, that if love ever became extinct, apostles would not preach the Gospel and martyrs would not shed their blood.”--- St. Therese of Lisieux

Holy Orders keeps love alive in a sacramental way, assuring against its ‘extinction’. If no others were to love the poor, the deacon would keep the hope of such service alive. Within a spirituality of the diaconate, the very act of serving takes on a sacramental cast. In these acts by this cleric, grace is communicated in a characteristic way, in a way that establishes the hope that charity will never become ‘extinct’.

Here is where Dominic Cerrato’s work breaks open new ways of imagining diaconal formation and identity as he puts the diaconal identity in dialogue with Personalism. The apex of Personalism is the truth that we only first possess ourselves so that we can enter communion and service with and to others. What Deacon Cerrato has accomplished is to pioneer a more creative approach to diaconal identity beyond the ready ecclesial documents which, while indispensable, do not contain all that the faith-filled intellect wants to ponder and receive from the truth of the diaconal mysteries. Let this work of Deacon Cerrato open your imagination and coax us all to think anew.



## Introduction

# The Need for a Renewed Diaconate

---

When the call to become a permanent deacon in the Roman Catholic tradition came, I was a young man and newly married. According to the discipline of the Church, I had well over a decade to wait before I reached the canonical age of ordination. It was at that time, convinced of my vocation, that I set myself on a rather long and arduous path of preparation. After some self-study, I pursued a thirteen year journey that would see undergraduate, graduate and post graduate studies in theology. It would see lay work on both the parish and diocesan levels. It would see a remarkable marriage and seven children. Finally, on the Solemnity of the Annunciation, March 25, 1995, by the grace of God, I was ordained the first permanent deacon in the Diocese of Steubenville.

Although I never set out to become a theologian, I was swept up by my studies to a place I could scarcely imagine. I began to appreciate more and more that theology is, as St. Anselm of Canterbury so succinctly put it, “*fides quaerens intellectum*” (faith seeking understanding). As I advanced further, the words of the Swiss theologian Fr. Hans Urs von Balthasar became evermore relevant to me. Echoing the

tradition, he noted that authentic theology is properly done on our knees. From this perspective, I could see that the teachings I studied were not cold dispassionate doctrines, but truths that mediated the Truth. Theology for me was not simply the search for something, but the discovery of Someone. It was about falling in love with God. As one formed within the pontificate of Pope John Paul II, I was profoundly influenced by his teachings and in particular his personalist philosophy. The nature of personhood as an image of the Trinity and love as a gift-of-self occupied my thoughts. They permeated my marriage and fatherhood. They penetrated my pastoral and liturgical ministry. They found their way into my teachings and homilies.

My broad academic training enabled me to grasp the diaconate within the wider context of the Catholic theological tradition. From this particular vantage point, it became clear quite early on that there were wide differences among the faithful, clergy and laity alike, over the ministry of the diaconate. These differences often manifested themselves in liturgical practices that seemed, on the face of it, inconsistent with the tradition. One of the most common of these, for example, is the prohibition in certain diocese of the distribution of the Sacred Host by the deacon at Mass. This restriction arises out of a very narrow interpretation of the *General Instruction to the Roman Missal*.<sup>1</sup> Concerned by this interpretation and desiring clarity, I submitted the following *dubium* to Antonio Cardinal Llovera, the then Prefect of the *Congregation for Divine Worship and the Discipline of the Sacraments*.<sup>2</sup> I wrote:

August 25, 2009

Dear Cardinal Llovera:

With great respect, I submit the following *dubium*:

**In accordance with GIRM 182, “if communion is given under both kinds, the deacon himself administers the chalice to the communicant.” Is it the intention of the *Missale Romanum* to forbid the practice of deacons distributing the Sacred Host when both species are distributed and when there are a number of extraordinary ministers distributing the Sacred Host?**

While the tradition certainly bears witness to the deacon as minister of the Precious Blood, that same tradition also has him distribute the Sacred Host. Indeed, in one of the oldest accounts of the Mass, Justin Martyr writes, “When he who presides has given thanks and the people have responded, those whom we call deacons give to those present the “eucharisted” bread, wine and water and take them to those who are absent (Apology 1, 65-67).” The concern here is not so much whether the deacon can distribute the Sacred Host, but whether the GIRM 182 prohibits him from doing so when there are extraordinary ministers distributing at that same Mass. Such a practice would seem to accord an extraordinary minister of the Eucharist a greater breath of ministry than an ordinary minister based on a very narrow interpretation of the tradition.

Thank you for your time in this matter.

In Jesus and Mary,  
Rev. Mr. Dominic Cerrato, Ph.D.

A response came back in less than six weeks through the office of the then *Apostolic Nuncio* Archbishop Pietro Sambi. The letter read:



CONGREGATIO DE CULTI DIVINO  
ET DISCIPLINA SACRAMENTORUM

Prot. N. 957/09/L  
Rome, 3 November 2009

Reverend and Dear Sir,

This Congregation for the Divine Worship and the Discipline of the Sacraments acknowledges receipt of your letter dated 25 August 2009, in which you raise a question about the interpretation of no. 182 of the *Institutio Generalis Missalis Romamum*.

The Code of Canon Law stipulates that the "ordinary minister of Holy Communion is a bishop, priest or deacon" (Can. 910 §1 CIC). When a deacon is present at the celebration of Holy Mass, he should exercise his ministry, which include, among other things, assisting the priest celebrant in the distribution of Communion (cf. *IGMR*, no. 171 e).

The passage noted in your letter, indicating that, "if Communion is given under both kinds, the deacon administers the chalice to the communicants" (*IGMR*, no. 182), can certainly not be interpreted in the sense of prohibiting the deacon from distributing the Sacred Host when, in addition to ordinary ministers of Communion, there should be a need for extraordinary ministers to distribute the Sacrament to the faithful.

With every prayerful good wish, I am

Sincerely yours in Christ,  
Fr. Anthony Ward, S.M.  
Undersecretary

It is significant to note that the *Congregation* grounded its response in the identity of the deacon; in who he is. In this regard, given the liturgical nature of the question, he is described as an "ordinary minister of Holy Communion" by virtue of his ordination to the diaconate (Can. 910 §1). With this established, the *Congregation* rendered a judgment that interpreted the *General Instruction to the Roman Missal*

no. 182 as not restricting the deacon's Eucharistic ministry at Mass to only the distribution of the Precious Blood. Returning again to the wide differences among the faithful over the ministry of the diaconate, the *Congregation's* decision implies that identity precedes ministry. In other words, if you want to know what a deacon should do (*diakonia*), you need to understand first who he is (*diakonos*).

The differences over the exercise of diaconal ministry are not just limited to liturgy. Certain diocesan guidelines, impacted by theological trends disconnected from the tradition, revealed a new relativism exercised and expressed through what can best be described as a form of religious pragmatism. The deacon did this liturgical thing or that ministerial practice because it was the most efficient way to meet this particular liturgical need or that particular ministerial requirement. As noble as this pragmatism sounds, alone it had the tendency of reducing the diaconate to its functionality emptying the office of its sacred meaning and purpose. This "reduction to the pragmatic," and its ultimate conclusion, is exemplified in the work of the Augustinian theologian Fr. George H. Tavard who wrote:

Vatican II decided to restore a permanent diaconate, to be conferred on married as well as single men. This was clearly the start of an attempt at a minor restructuring of ministry. Yet this decision, I believe, was not carefully weighed. For the problem of ministry does not reside on aligning future practice on ancient theory. . . . In keeping with Parkinson's Law, superfluous work had to be created for the deacon. What a deacon is officially habilitated to perform can be adequately performed by a member of the laity. I would therefore suggest that the diaconate could be altogether abandoned both in practice and theory.<sup>3</sup>

Fr. Tavard casts the diaconate exclusively in terms of functionality such that anyone physically capable of performing these same functions accomplishes these same things. But does this really hold

true? Does it really matter if a sick child is cared for by her mother or by a stranger? Both perform the same outward function, but are they really doing the same thing? Does it really matter if the words of consecration are said over bread and wine by a priest or a layperson? Both perform the same outward function, but are they really doing the same thing? I submit that the mother and the stranger, as well as the priest and layperson, simply share an accidental likeness in their outward actions. This acknowledged, they are in fact doing substantially different things. The stranger and the layperson are merely simulating what the mother and priest are really doing. Moreover, by adopting the flawed premise that, “what a deacon is officially habilitated to perform can be adequately performed by a member of the laity,” Tavad arrives at an equally flawed conclusion, “that the diaconate could be altogether abandoned both in practice and theory.”

Where Fr. Tavad takes this functionalism to one extreme arguing against the diaconate, others take it to the other extreme. In extemporaneous remarks to members of *Carollo*, an Italian association of broadcasters, Pope Francis speaks of the sin of clericalism. Within this context, he recalls that in Argentina he was often approached by priests who, in praising a layman asked, “Eminence, why do we not make him a deacon?” The Holy Father observes that because the layman fulfills certain functions in a praiseworthy manner in the Church, there was an immediate call by some clergy to clericalize him. In response to these kinds of requests, the then Cardinal Bergoglio said, “Is he a good layman? He should continue so.” In sharing this observation with the press, the Holy Father was not repudiating the diaconate. He was merely asserting that the conferral of this sacred office is not a matter of function. For him, such an approach amounts to clericalism as it fails to take into account that the diaconate is a vocation, not the sacramental elevation of a lay function.

Fr. Tavad’s approaches to the diaconate, along with the approach taken by some Argentinian priests, imply that there is a primacy of

the things we do over the persons we are. This way of thinking, which fails to take into account the mystery of the person as a “human being” not a “human doing,” finds its way into many liturgical abuses. It is not at all unusual to see an extraordinary minister of the Eucharistic impart a “blessing” in a clerical fashion to a small child as he accompanies his parents to Communion. Using personalist language, this is a “lie in the language of the body,” as the minister cannot give what he or she does not possess; no more than the stranger over the mother when it comes to maternal love, no more the layperson over the priest when it comes to confecting the Eucharist. Lost in this “reduction to the pragmatic” is the beauty and grandeur of sacred service as an incarnational mystery rooted in divine love in which the deacon becomes what he is, the person of Christ the Servant.

The distinction between “pragmatism” and “mystery,” though often overlooked, was not lost on many of the bishops of the Second Vatican Council as they sought to restore the diaconate. Of particular note, and counter to Fr. Tavad’s pragmatism, is the contribution of the Belgian prelate Leon-Joseph Cardinal Suenens. Grounded in the mystery of the person, Cardinal Suenens resisted the common objection that the restoration is unnecessary since the ministry of the diaconate can be assumed by the laity. In a series of talks given in the United States in 1964, he refutes this notion by saying:

No one seriously proposes taking a certain number of functions... and then bestowing them, as it were from above, in haphazard fashion and on any and all members of the faithful. What is proposed is to entrust such tasks solely to those who give objective and sufficient evidence that they have received the interior graces indispensable to the exercise of these functions. The reason for this, quite simply, is to insure that such exercise will possess the supernatural efficacy without which a true community cannot be created. For unless it possesses this, I repeat, the Church cannot be a

supernatural society, cannot be the true Mystical Body of Christ, erected and built upon the ministries and graces which the Lord foreordained and bestowed upon His Church for this end.<sup>4</sup>

The overemphasis of pragmatism to the near exclusion of mystery has led to other factors contributing to a fragmented understanding of the diaconate. These factors are largely sociological, though at their root they are deeply theological. The Second Vatican Council was marked by a new spirit of openness. This openness extended the role of the laity which, until that point, had a largely passive part to play in the ministerial life of the Church. The *Dogmatic Constitution on the Church* defines the goal of human life as holiness and the source of that holiness is Christ. The faithful were identified using an Old Testament image as the “People of God” and recognized, because of their Baptism, as sharing in Christ’s mission as priest, prophet and king. This meant that like priests and religious, the lay faithful also had an authentic vocation and that vocation could be manifested in various liturgical, catechetical and pastoral ministries within the Church. At this very same time, the Council Fathers restored the permanent diaconate. While lay involvement began to grow soon after the Council, it took three years for the actual implementation of the diaconate and another few years before the first deacons began to appear in the United States.

At first, the diaconate went largely unnoticed by many of the faithful as the implementation process was slow with only a minority of diocese choosing to establish formation programs. Consequently, many Catholics did not see much less hear of deacons until the late 1970s. In the meantime, lay involvement in parish ministry began to grow with some of these fulfilling the non-sacramental functions of deacons. As a result, when the newly ordained deacon assumed his first ministerial assignment, he was often met with suspicion and resistance among the faithful. He was seen as taking over the role of the laity displacing them in carrying the book of the Gospels, the distribution of Holy Communion, exercising social ministry and teaching

catechesis among other things. Some perceived the implementation of the diaconate as a return to the past which they characterized as paternalistic. Nowhere was this more evident than by certain women religious, particularly those with more radical feminist leanings, who viewed the diaconate as just another form of male-dominated clericalism. This was compounded by some pastors who, following Tavad’s view of the diaconate, saw no real need for deacons or felt that married clerics would eventually erode priestly celibacy. In addition, some bishops and pastors did not want to offend the sensibilities of the laity and therefore diminished the role and place of the deacon in parish life. In all of this, there occurred what can best be described as a “pastoral squeeze” where the diaconate struggled to find its voice in the wake of Vatican II. In its extreme, this had the effect of “laicizing” the diaconate in the sense that the order assumed a kind of recognized lay state stripped of any external sign such as the title and attire proper to clergy. All of this is not to suggest that the “pastoral squeeze” was universal. In many places the diaconate was welcomed and integrated. Nonetheless, in other places it was diminished and even suppressed. This situation has clearly improved over the last couple of decades; however its remnants persist to this day impacting the diaconate in a negative way. While many of these factors are sociological, they nonetheless reveal two things: the need for a more complete theology of the diaconate which emphasizes mystery over pragmatism and, with this firmly in place, the need to catechize the faithful (clergy and laity alike) on the identity and mission of this sacred office.

Given all that has been said, the distinction between Tavad’s pragmatism and Suenens’ mystery implies that, at its essence, there exists an identity crisis of the diaconate within the Church; a crisis based on an impoverished theology of *diakonia*. Intuitively, I knew there had to be a corrective and that corrective, because of the depersonalized approach espoused by Tavad and others might well be found in Personalism. Beyond this, given the current state of diaconal theology and its entrenchment in certain pastoral practices, this corrective would have to be far more extensive than using old wineskins (Mt 9: 14-17). It would require new wineskins; wineskins that would

have to accommodate the supernatural efficacy expressed in Suenens' understanding of mystery. That said, it is one thing to sense that Personalism might be used to provide a corrective and an entirely different thing to demonstrate that it actually does provide this corrective. Nonetheless, if these observations of an impoverished diaconate are true, and I am convinced they are, then a great challenge lie ahead; one which I, with my rather modest theological background, am ill-suited to take up. Still, as G. K. Chesterton once observed, "Even a bad shot is dignified when he accepts a duel."

The task is daunting. How does one penetrate mystery? How does one articulate the inarticulable? As the finite encounters the Infinite, he is reduced to babble, settling for a kind of relative adequacy whose precision rivals that of baby-talk. Nonetheless, baby-talk is the first and necessary step in developing the skills that eventually allow not only the exchange of ideas, but with those ideas, the discovery of truth.

This study is an attempt to use Personalism, or more specifically Lublin Thomism and the *Theology of the Body* as a kind of interpretive key to begin penetrating the mystery.<sup>5</sup> In this regard, it represents not an end, but a beginning; a lifelong pursuit of which I have only taken the first steps.

In setting out to take these first steps, I struggled to identify my audience. If my audience is to be the theological community, then my presentation should be more technical. If, on the other hand, it is to the diaconal community, it should be more practical. In the end, I decided that this work had to be both. It had to bridge the technical with the practical, though admittedly it is more technical than practical. To appreciate why I chose this initial path, consider the building of a new house. No clear thinking person begins building a new house without a set of architectural plans. The plans provide things like the orientation of the new structure on the property, general layout of the rooms, and the placement of windows and doors. Without these plans, the contractor lacks real direction never truly knowing

whether the house he is building corresponds to the requirements of the owner. Beyond this, where plans embody established building codes grounded in sound engineering, the lack of these mean that the house may not withstand the winds that will blow and the rains that will flood. Just as the house cannot be properly built without a set of plans, the opposite is also true. A set of plans, no matter how complete, does not a house make. While both the plans and the house are necessary to fulfill the owner's requirements, the relationship between the two admits to a necessary order. The plans must precede the house and only together do they fulfill the dream of the owner.

The same can be said for the pursuit of a new theological approach to the diaconate. Here the building represents the place where deacons dwell; that is the diaconal community and its pastoral ministry. The plans, on the other hand, represent the place where theologians dwell; the theological community and its ecclesial task of unfolding God's revelation in service to the Magisterium. While both are essential to a new approach to the diaconate, the relationship between the two admits to a necessary order. The theological with its primary focus on what a deacon is (*esse*) must precede the practical with its focus on what the deacon does (*agere*). It is for this reason that I chose to begin this work by establishing, at least in its preliminary form, the set of architectural plans for a new approach to the diaconate followed by the building of a small house in the form of some practical and pastoral considerations. Because of this, the reader expecting a popular text on the diaconate may come away somewhat disappointed. This work is first and foremost a theological endeavor using all of the technical language and constructs proper to this discipline. Its purpose is to establish the necessary theological grounding for subsequent pastoral works which can then be written in a more popular format.

This approach, with its emphasis on the technical, straddles two distinct but related audiences, deacons and theologians. Because of this, it carries some inherent challenges. In writing to one audience, it is quite possible to inadvertently alienate the other. While

theologians, particularly those classically trained, may find the philosophical foundations essential in developing a new diaconal theology, some deacons with limited philosophical formation may find it superfluous and unnecessary. To address this concern, I have sought to provide these readers sufficient background and explanations in the more complex portions of this study. Likewise, where deacons may draw inspiration from the pastoral implications of this work, some theologians may find the explanations leading to these implications as redundant and excessive. To deal with this issue, I have made a considerable effort to demonstrate the continuity between the theological and the pastoral in an attempt to bridge the gap.

Beyond deacons and theologians as primary audiences, priests can also benefit from reading this book. They too are ordained deacons. I say “are” and not “were” because ordination to the priesthood does not remove the indelible character imprinted upon them at diaconal ordination. In fact, as this study will demonstrate, there is an inextricable relationship between *diakonos* and *sacerdos*; between deacon and priest such that one is incomprehensible without the other. In many respects, the priest is still deacon, albeit in a different way. His priesthood, though distinguished in kind and degree from the diaconate, must still bear the mark of sacred service if it is to be meaningful and effective. As Pope Benedict XVI observed:

Every priest, of course, also continues as a deacon and must always be aware of this dimension. For the Lord Himself became our minister, our deacon. Recall at the act of washing of the feet, where it is explicitly shown that the teacher, the Lord, acts as a deacon and wants those who follow Him to be deacons and carry out the ministry for humanity, to the point that they even help us to wash the dirty feet of the people entrusted to our care. This dimension seems to me to be of paramount importance.<sup>6</sup>

Finally, in offering this work to the theological and diaconal communities, it is my heartfelt desire to give back to the order that has so blessed me. In doing so, I hope to help my brother deacons appreciate more fully the gift of our ordination and to serve others more effectively as we incarnate Christ the Servant to a wounded world in desperate need of His healing love.

Deacon Dominic Cerrato



## Chapter One

# Laying the Groundwork

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### I. Problem and Purpose

There is general agreement within the Church that the diaconate requires greater theological development.<sup>1</sup> According to the Vatican Congregation for Catholic Education, “the almost total disappearance of the permanent diaconate from the Church of the West for more than a millennium has certainly made it more difficult to understand the profound reality of this ministry.”<sup>2</sup> This difficulty became more apparent with the restoration of the diaconate by the Second Vatican Council.<sup>3</sup> Here the Council Fathers, in an attempt to provide a theological basis for the revival, found little in the way of a diaconal theology *per se* within the wider sacramental tradition. Writing just prior to the Council, the Benedictine scholar Dom Augustinus Kerkvoorde observed:

there is, as far as we know, no independent theology of the diaconate. The number of authors and the works we cite should not delude us. None of them deals with the diaconate exclusively, say, to help deacons correctly understand and exercise their function in the Church.

What we are left here with will only be individual fragments (*membra disjecta*) scattered throughout the various writing on orders in general, the priesthood, the sacraments or the Church.<sup>4</sup>

As later noted by the International Theological Commission, this *membra disjecta* can be clearly observed in both the conciliar and post-conciliar documents on the diaconate. Of these, the commission wrote, “with reference to the pastoral priorities and in what concerns objective doctrinal difficulties, the Council text show diversity of theological nuances which it is quite hard to harmonize.”<sup>5</sup> In a similar manner, with regard to the 1983 revision of the Code of Canon Law, Fr. James Provost commented that there is, “still no coherent treatment of the permanent deacons as a ‘proper and permanent rank in the hierarchy’ comparable to the treatment given presbyters and bishops in the code; rather they are treated as exceptions to the norms for presbyters.”<sup>6</sup> As a result, both before and after the Second Vatican Council, theological consideration of Holy Orders focused almost exclusively on the episcopate and presbyterate.<sup>7</sup>

Fifty years after the restoration of the permanent diaconate, there is still a sense among many contemporary theologians that the theology of the diaconate requires significant development.<sup>8</sup> This view is also shared by the U.S. Bishops who, after their 1994-1995 national survey of the diaconate concluded that, “The challenge of the next decades will be to make these developments more theologically rich and thus to expand the deacons sense of ministry, evangelization and service continually, even beyond the parish.”<sup>9</sup> In 2003, the International Theological Commission (ITC) published a research document entitled: *From the Diakonia of Christ to the Diakonia of the Apostles*. The five year study is a carefully nuanced theological exposition that traces the history of the diaconate from the time of Christ to the present. Despite the scope and complexity of the material, and the clear and concise manner in which it is written, Fr. Richard Lennan observed:

For all its good points, the document might well leave readers somewhat frustrated, as it tends to list the challenges rather than address them. Perhaps addressing them was not the Commission’s brief, but while they remain unaddressed - to say nothing of unresolved - the place of the diaconate in the contemporary Church will continue to be problematic.<sup>10</sup>

Lennan’s comments notwithstanding, the ITC did recognize the impoverished nature of diaconal theology and while it did not advance the state of the question, it did provide the criteria for further development within the Roman Catholic tradition.<sup>11</sup> Drawing upon these criteria, and taking up the ITC’s challenge, this study will seek to advance a new theology of the diaconate. In doing so, we will attempt to creatively engage the future of the Church with the person of Christ the Servant while at the same time remaining faithful to our rich Catholic tradition.

In order to achieve our objective, it will be necessary to define it in more precise terms. Here, we would do well to begin with what our objective is not. Our objective is not about developing a completely systematic and fully integrated approach to the diaconate. Such an effort would be bold, ambitious, and well beyond the scope of any single study. These theologies, where they do exist, are rarely the work of any one theologian, but instead the work of the theological community as it grapples with the *questio disputata* over time. Our objective, by comparison, is both modest in scope and restricted in scale. It is to advance, in its most elementary form, a new theology of the diaconate by beginning a fresh conversation concerning the nature and mission of this sacred office.

With this objective in mind, and in order to provide a clear and cogent approach, our effort will advance in five distinct steps tied respectively to the five chapters of this study. First, we will lay out the fundamental presuppositions directing our pursuit. Second, through

a consideration of world views and their impact on theological development, we will identify the point of departure for a new theology of the diaconate. This will enable us to select an embarkation point in order to begin our journey while, at the same time, suggesting a particular theological direction. Third, we will identify this particular theological direction as Lublin Thomism exploring some of the major themes found in the work of the Lublin Thomist, Karol Wojtyła (Saint John Paul II). Following this, we will continue by examining what these major themes reveal about the nature of the diaconate. Next, we will consider the implications of Personalism as it relates to the institution of the Seven and what it means to “serve at table (Acts 6:2-3).” Finally, through what I have termed the “Establishment Hypothesis,” we will see how all of these insights lead to a more integrated and organic understanding of Holy Orders.

## II. Three Fundamental Presuppositions

Earlier, we noted that in providing a corrective to an impoverished theology of the diaconate what is needed is not old wineskins, but new ones (Mt 9:17). In Jesus’ time, liquids were kept in bags made of animal skins. Overtime, the skins would become dry and brittle. When new wine was poured into old skins, the wine would ferment, expand and rupture the skins. New skins, conversely, were pliable enough to stretch without bursting. Like new wine, a new theological approach poured into the old skin of a fragmented theology of the diaconate could have the effect of bursting the theological bag. This is not to suggest that these theologies are not without merit. Quite the contrary, many of these provide profound insights into the nature and ministry of the diaconate. However, as we have seen, they lack a kind of organic unity and, as such, are not sufficient on their own if the diaconate is going to creatively engage the world with the person of Christ the Servant. Consequently, new wineskins require that we begin our pursuit by establishing at the outset three fundamental presuppositions that lie at the heart of our study. These presuppositions are “first principles” which reflect the basic assumption upon

which we will pursue a *novum theologia diaconati*. They are: (1) *ressourcement* which grounds any theological approach in the narrative of the Catholic tradition, (2) sacramental character which concerns the ontological beginnings of the diaconate in the deacon and, (3) world views which shape theological development. All three of these, each in its own way, will help contextualize our pursuit establishing at the start certain parameters that will guide our study.

**The Essential Place of *Ressourcement*:** The restoration and implementation of the permanent diaconate arose out of the Second Vatican Council. A fundamental characteristic of that Council is summed up in the term, “*aggiornamento*.” *Aggiornamento* literally means, “to bring up to date.” The term was used to describe a spirit of change, openness, and open-mindedness as the Church sought to creatively fulfill her mission in the modern world. During the Council, it became clear among some of the bishops and *periti* that two distinct theological approaches were being used to fulfill the mandate of *aggiornamento*. In his memoirs, Joseph Cardinal Ratzinger notes that, while working on a schema for the Dogmatic Constitution on Divine Revelation (*Dei Verbum*), he and the preeminent German theologian Fr. Karl Rahner found that they, “lived on two theological planets.”<sup>12</sup> While they were in substantial agreement on a good many issues such as liturgical reform and biblical interpretation, they reached their conclusions from entirely different lines of thought. Of Rahner, the future pope would later note:

Despite his earlier readings of the Fathers, his theology was totally conditioned by the tradition of Suarezian scholasticism and its new reception in the light of German idealism and of Heidegger. His was a speculative and philosophical theology in which Scriptures and the Fathers in the end did not play an important role and in which the historical dimension was really of little significance. For my part, my whole intellectual formation had been shaped by Scripture and the Fathers and profoundly historical thinking.<sup>13</sup>

Ratzinger was not alone in his thought. Other European philosophers and theologians such as: Emil Mersch, Dom Odo Casel, Romano Guardini, and Carl Adam recognized the limitations of neo-Scholasticism and the need to recapture the sources as a means for authentic theological development.<sup>14</sup> This group, along with such distinguished scholars as Henri de Lubac, Jean Daniélou, Hans Urs von Balthasar and Yves Congar, led principally by the Jesuits of the Lyons province and the Dominicans of Le Saulchoir, came to be known by their detractors as, “*la nouvelle théologie*.”<sup>15</sup> This movement was by no means new to the Council. It had emerged in certain German and French theological circles decades earlier in response to the dry logic based polemic of neo-Scholasticism. *La nouvelle théologie* sought the recovery of a legitimate theological pluralism by, among other things, reading scholastics like Thomas Aquinas in light of the entire tradition. According to the contemporary American theologian Marcellino D’Ambrosio, what united *la nouvelle théologie* were the convictions that:

1) theology had to speak to the Church’s present situation and that, 2) the key to theology’s relevance to the present lay in the creative recovery of its past. In other, words, they all saw clearly that the first step to what later came to be known as *aggiornamento* had to be *ressourcement*—a rediscovery of the riches of the Church’s two-thousand-year treasury, a return to the very headwaters of the Christian tradition.<sup>16</sup>

Intrigued by the *la nouvelle théologie* movement, and convinced of the essential value of *ressourcement*, Ratzinger maintained that the Church over the past few centuries had theologially and spiritually shrunk itself and that it was the mission of the Second Vatican Council to, “usher Catholics into a larger room.”<sup>17</sup> Commenting on this same observation, the American theologian George Weigel writes that Ratzinger believed *ressourcement*, “would liberate Catholic theology from the cold logic and bloodless propositions of the neo-Scholastic system; and having been liberated in that way, theology

would revitalize Catholic life.”<sup>18</sup> For Ratzinger, the problem arises when *aggiornamento* severs its connection from *ressourcement*; when the updating intended by the Fathers of the Second Vatican Council did not begin with a return to the sources. Of this he writes:

the whole point of *ressourcement* was to empower a Catholic updating that put the people of the Church into steady contact with the vast riches of the tradition which they would gradually make their own in order to serve the world in a distinctive way.<sup>19</sup>

In this regard, the young Fr. Ratzinger did not view *ressourcement* and *aggiornamento* as distinct and opposed realities, but rather as two parts of the same whole each complementing the other.<sup>20</sup> They provided, for him, a dialectic tension between fidelity to the tradition and creative freedom. Here, true freedom, which is necessary if the Church is to advance her mission, is not possible without fidelity. Conversely, true fidelity, which is necessary if the Church is to maintain her continuity, is not possible without freedom. Influenced heavily by the writings of Henri de Lubac, the future pope held to the conviction that the treasury of Patristic theology does not erode as it passes through history and that the Church cannot meet the exigencies of modern times without a return to its sources. Capturing this concept in a pithy phrase, Ratzinger spoke of, “going backward into the future.”<sup>21</sup> Thus, understood correctly, *ressourcement* and its recovery of the ancient sources represent a vital and dynamic force that is not regressive, but progressive.

Later, as Pope Benedict XVI, he would again revisit *ressourcement*. This time however he would consider it in terms of the difficulties involved in implementing the Council’s reforms.<sup>22</sup> For him, these challenges were the result of two competing hermeneutics that clashed head-on. In describing these, he observes that on one side is a *hermeneutic of discontinuity and rupture*. This hermeneutic maintains that the conciliar and post-conciliar documents failed to express the true spirit of the Council arguing that the text merely reflects the many compromises

necessary to move the documents to a successful vote. Therefore, its proponents argue, the real intentions of the Council are not to be found in these concessions, but in the “impulses toward the new” implied in the documents. Thus, for authentic theological development to take place, it would be necessary to courageously move beyond the text to reveal the Council’s true spirit. However, as Pope Benedict points out, this begs the question of how to define and interpret this spirit.<sup>23</sup> This “need to interpret,” precisely because it is not tied to the very words of the Council and because these words are not contextualized in the living Tradition, allows for a subjective reading of the Council creating a second unofficial magisterium who, when in conflict with the Magisterium, becomes the only magisterium. This, the pope notes, has the effect of obscuring the true nature of the Council and her teachings.<sup>24</sup>

Counter to the *hermeneutic of discontinuity and rupture* is the *hermeneutic of continuity and reform* which maintains the essential connection between *ressourcement* and *aggiornamento*. In describing this hermeneutic, Pope Benedict cites Pope John XXIII who wrote that the mandate of the Council is, “to transmit the doctrine, pure and integral, without any attenuation or distortion.”<sup>25</sup> He goes on to say:

Our duty is not only to guard this precious treasure, as if we were concerned only with antiquity, but to dedicate ourselves with an earnest will and without fear to that work which our era demands of us. . . . [It is necessary that] adherence to all the teaching of the Church in its entirety and preciseness. . . . [be presented in] faithful and perfect conformity to the authentic doctrine, which, however, should be studied and expounded through the methods of research and through the literary forms of modern thought.<sup>26</sup>

In as much as the detachment of *ressourcement* from *aggiornamento* had a disruptive effect on theological development as a whole, it also impacted a new approach to the theology of the diaconate. Nowhere is this more evident, and nowhere is Ratzinger’s general critique of

Rahner more apparent than in Rahner’s own work on the diaconate. Where *ressourcement* saw itself deeply rooted in scripture and tradition as a basis for authentic theological development, Rahner’s approach was far more concerned with modern exigencies. In this respect, he creates a false dichotomy between the past and the present severing, so to speak, the root from the tree. Demonstrating this dualistic approach, Rahner writes:

We cannot, properly speaking, define the meaning and content of the diaconate of the future on the basis of the New Testament, the ancient practice of the Western Church, or of course on the basis of the Eastern Church’s conception of the diaconate. . . . Today, therefore, what is properly in question is not a restoration of the diaconate in its ancient form, but a creative conception of the diaconate of the future.<sup>27</sup>

Pope Francis would later affirm the observations of his predecessor regarding the *hermeneutic of continuity*. In his 2013 letter to Cardinal Walter Brandmüller on the 450th anniversary of the closing of the Council of Trent, Pope Francis explicitly cites Pope Benedict XVI’s 2005 address to the Roman Curia as the key moment and concept underlying Benedict’s pontificate. This letter comes shortly after Francis said that “the best hermeneutic of the Second Vatican Council” has been done by Archbishop Agostino Marchetto. In 2005, Archbishop Marchetto wrote a book entitled, *Vatican Council II: Counterpoint for Its History*, in which the prelate strongly advocates the *hermeneutic of continuity* against the “Bologna School” which espouses the *hermeneutic of discontinuity*.<sup>28</sup>

In advancing a new approach to the theology of the diaconate, whether looking at the Council documents or other sources, it will be essential to stay continually linked to the Scriptures, the Fathers, and indeed the whole of the tradition. Here, in keeping with *ressourcement*, the key to authentic theological development, and thus the key to the development of a diaconal theology, lies first in a creative

recovery of its past. As the French Thomist Étienne Gilson writes, “if theological progress is sometimes necessary, it is never possible unless you go back to the beginning and start over.”<sup>29</sup> This “going back and starting over” is not simply a historical review of the diaconate as helpful as that might be. The *ressourcement* theologians had a much wider view of sources. For them, and now for us, the sources consist of Sacred Scripture, Sacred Tradition, the Creeds, the Councils, liturgical rites, along with the Fathers and Doctors of the Church. These are understood as avenues of the one Source that is the Mystery of Christ which provides, “a new and deeper sounding of ancient, inexhaustible, and common resources.”<sup>30</sup> By plunging ourselves into the many sources that make up the ancient diaconate, in both its diversity and concrete specificity, we hope to encounter and take-in their common inspiration and Source. Such an approach also ensures continuity with the trajectory of the tradition resulting in a theological development of the diaconate that builds successively upon the foundation of the past. In doing so, we are responding to the call of Pope Leo XIII in his 1879 encyclical *Aeterni Patris* to “*vetera novis augere et perficere*” (“strengthen and complete the old by aid of the new”).<sup>31</sup>

**The Essential Role of Sacramental Character:** The second fundamental presupposition that will enable us to fashion new wineskins is the essential place of sacramental character in any new theology of the diaconate. Though it may seem rather obvious, it nonetheless bears stating that a deacon becomes a deacon at his ordination. The rite of ordination to the diaconate takes place within the context of a Eucharistic liturgy typically presided by the local ordinary. After the candidates are called, presented, and elected, they are examined and individually promise obedience to the bishop. At that point, after the litany of the saints, the bishop lays hands on the candidates and then prays the prayer of consecration using the following words:

Almighty God, be present with us by your power. You are the source of all honor, you assign to each his rank, you give to each his ministry. You remain unchanged, but you watch over all creation and make it new through

your Son, Jesus Christ, our Lord: He is your Word, your power, and your wisdom. You foresee all things in your eternal providence and make due provision for every age. You make the Church, Christ’s body, grow to its full stature as a new and greater temple. You enrich it with every kind of grace and perfect it with a diversity of members to serve the whole body in a wonderful pattern of unity. You established a threefold ministry of worship and service for the glory of your name. As ministers of your tabernacle you chose the sons Levi and gave them your blessing as their everlasting inheritance. In the first day of your Church under the inspiration of the Holy Spirit the apostles of your Son appointed seven men of good repute to assist them in the daily ministry, so that they themselves might be more free for prayer and preaching. By prayer and the laying on of hands the apostles entrusted to those chosen men the ministry of serving at tables.

Lord, send forth upon them the Holy Spirit, that they may be strengthened by the gift of the sevenfold grace to carry out faithfully the work of the ministry.

May they excel in every virtue: in love that is sincere, in concern for the sick and the poor, in unassuming authority, in self-discipline, and in holiness in life. May their conduct exemplify your commandments and lead your people to imitate their purity of life. May they remain strong and steadfast in Christ, giving to the world the witness of a pure conscience. May they in this life imitate your Son, who came, not to be served but to serve, and one day reign with Him in heaven.<sup>32</sup>

By the time the bishop completes the prayer of consecration, the candidates are no longer candidates, but deacons. They have been

radically changed on the deepest level of their being. The Church has long maintained that one of the effects of ordination is sacramental character.<sup>33</sup> According to the *Catechism of the Catholic Church*, “Deacons share in Christ’s mission and grace in a special way. The sacrament of Holy Orders marks them with an imprint (‘character’) which cannot be removed and which configures them to Christ, who made Himself the ‘deacon’ or servant of all.”<sup>34</sup> Sacramental character, because it permanently and irreversibly “marks” the soul, is a metaphysical reality. As such, it bears witness to both an ontological and Christological configuration; in this case configuring the candidate to Christ the Servant. Just as diaconal ordination serves as the ontological and Christological basis upon which a man becomes deacon, it also serves, by that very fact, as the basis for a theology of *diakonia*. That said, sacramental character, because it stands at the beginning of diaconal life, and because it deals with “first things,” also stands analogously at the beginning of any new approach to the theology of the diaconate.<sup>35</sup> Though the precise place of sacramental character and the extent of its prominence are a matter of debate, its omission undermines the ontological and Christological basis of any theology of *diakonia*. At this point in our study, however, it is sufficient to acknowledge the place and importance of sacramental character as it relates to our objective. Character will be taken up in greater detail in Chapter Two when it is considered and interpreted within the world views that shaped its development.

**The Essential Influence of World Views:** The final presupposition enabling us to fashion new wineskins for a new theology of the diaconate concerns the influence of world views and their impact on theological development. In large measure, “world views” or “consciousness” (the terms are used interchangeably) shape the manner in which reality is perceived and interpreted. In its most basic sense, a world view is a way of apprehending the world consisting of key assumptions that provide a more or less coherent, though not necessarily accurate way of thinking about reality. Strictly speaking, world views cannot be proven in a logical sense, though their consistency and integrity can be examined and questioned. They are axioms or

what Aristotle called “definitions” and, by that fact, represent something so clearly evident as to be accepted as true.<sup>36</sup> In this regard, world views represent a premise or starting point of reasoning which are typically argued from rather than argued for. The importance of world views is well illustrated by the great author and apologist, G. K. Chesterton who wrote:

But there are some people, nevertheless — and I am one of them — who think that the most practical and important thing about a man is still his view of the universe. We think that for a landlady considering a lodger, it is important to know his income, but still more important to know his philosophy. We think that for a general about to fight an enemy, it is important to know the enemy’s numbers, but still more important to know the enemy’s philosophy. We think the question is not whether the theory of the cosmos affects matters, but whether, in the long run, anything else affects them.<sup>37</sup>

Chesterton’s observation taps into something basic about the understanding and interpretation of anything from “soup to nuts.” What can be more important than the way someone or some group conceptualizes reality? How can we truly comprehend these individuals or groups unless we comprehend their universe, grasp their presuppositions and assumptions, apprehend their world view? The comprehensive nature of these world views enable us to understand, on a fundamental level, the major influences as to why certain beliefs are held and certain choices are made. Based on this understanding, and applied to sacramental character, by examining the dominant world views at any given time, influencing factors can be observed as to why a doctrine developed in the manner it did. The assumption here is that, by understanding the influence of world views on the theological development of sacramental character which stands as the ontological beginning of the deacon becoming deacon, we can better see how a fresh consideration of these same world views can lead us to

a point of departure for a new theological approach to the diaconate. What follows then is a general consideration of world views which does not propose to treat the subject exhaustively, but only in what seems relevant to our pursuit. Before proceeding, however, we must clear the ground by laying out four guiding principles.

First, although there is an assumed relationship between a particular world view and a particular theological development, this does not imply either a direct or an indirect cause and effect relationship. Thus, while it can be said that a particular world view influenced this doctrine or that teaching, it cannot be said that this same world view is the only influencing factor. Beyond the fact that various world views tend to overlap such that the impact of a previous world view can often be identified in later theological development, other influencing factors may also intervene. Thus, for example, while the classical world view strongly influenced the Council of Trent and its subsequent doctrinal teachings, these teachings were also influenced by such things as: the abuses in the Church, the Reformation, and the politics of the day. Nonetheless, unlike these other influences which tend to have a particular historic significance; world views represent a kind of overarching approach to a specific situation. In this respect, they possess a certain universal quality and by that fact make a major contribution to doctrinal development.

Second, world views, because they are a form of consciousness, arise as a pre-thematic phenomenon and manifest themselves in various human endeavors.<sup>38</sup> Here one does not typically begin by selecting a world view and then, as a result, develop a particular approach from it. In most cases, world views are not so much directly chosen as indirectly appropriated. Thus, insofar as one freely chooses to follow a particular theological approach or philosophical thought or social structure, and insofar as these approaches, thoughts, and structures embody one or more world views; then one appropriates aspects of those world views in and through these approaches, thoughts, and structures. Regardless of how world views are manifested, commonalities emerge allowing them to be categorized into three dominant

forms as we shall see. Once discovered, however, they can be refined and applied more rigorously in the further development of a particular approach, thought, or structure.

Third, world views are, in a certain sense, universal abstractions and do not exist in the world apart from a particular expression.<sup>39</sup> In this respect, world views are analogous to color. For instance, as we perceive the world around us, we cannot help but notice that it is populated by colored objects such as pens, cars, and hats. Colors enable us to identify these objects, locate them in space, and then identify these same objects at a later time. In this respect, color is so essential to an object's outward appearance that any visual account of an object, without an account of its color, is incomplete at best. Understood this way, and from an ontological perspective, the color red is a form or universal. Red does not exist in this world apart from its particular instantiation.<sup>40</sup> One can observe a red pen, a red car, or even a red hat, but one cannot find an instance of red apart from something else. "Pure red," as such, is an intellectual abstraction, an ideal or form. The same can be said of world views. One can observe the classical world view in theology, philosophy, medicine, or even politics, but one cannot find an instance of this world view apart from something else. Thus, like color, world views depend upon particular instantiations to manifest themselves. This analogy can also serve to illustrate another aspect of world views. We call the pen, the hat, and the car by the same color, red. Yet, close observation of these objects reveal that, while sharing the same color, they are not identical in color. The red we perceive from these objects admit to a wide variety of reds from deep reds to light reds. Nonetheless, despite these shade variations, we somehow share a consensus of the basic form of redness as it applies to them. What is true of color, in this respect, is also true of world views. World views, though distinct, admit to a certain level of variation within this distinctness. These variations occur when a particular characteristic of a world view is emphasized over another characteristic of that same world view. Thus, within the symbolic world view, if one were to emphasize one typology over another, then a particular variation or expression of symbolic world view would be

manifested. In this manner, each world view, though distinct, can express itself in diverse ways.

Finally, because the substance of this study as a theological work is grounded in Divine Revelation, the premise that world views influence the development of doctrine presupposes that the Holy Spirit is operative in, through, and beyond these world views. Indeed, revelation as God's self-disclosure of who He is and His plan for our salvation, always finds itself expressed within a cultural and historical context which, as noted earlier, embodies one or more world views. Therefore, world views do not stand in opposition to Divine Revelation, but instead provide the necessary language and structures to express this revelation in a number of ways and on a number of levels. Yet, even here, there are inherent limitations. Because revelation discloses something of the infinite God, no finite world view alone can adequately express this mystery. While each of the three dominant world views that we will explore express an aspect of this mystery in a way the others do not, even if it were possible to create the most perfect synthesis of the three, it would only achieve a relative adequacy. Consequently, even though such a synthesis would likely reveal new insights, it would continue to struggle to articulate the inarticulable. Nonetheless, as even the most minuscule unfolding of this revelation represents profound insights, the endeavor is worth the struggle; a struggle aided by the Holy Spirit (Jn 16:7-15).

Having established the understanding that world views condition the way we interpret reality and because of this, influence the development of doctrine, it is now necessary to consider the three dominant world views. This consideration will provide the necessary criteria in Chapter Two to analyze sacramental character in four historic periods enabling us to identify our point of departure for a new theological approach to the diaconate.<sup>41</sup>

World views are rivers, so to speak, upon which the lives of individuals and societies flow throughout history. In modern times, however, they have emerged as conscious realities formulated within

philosophical frameworks. One of the first to identify them as such was the Canadian born Jesuit philosopher-theologian, Fr. Bernard Lonergan.<sup>42</sup> Through a specific application of his general transcendental method, Lonergan labored on renewing Catholic philosophy and theology by moving it away from a traditional static approach, what he called "classical consciousness," to a more contemporary dynamic approach, what he called, "historical consciousness."<sup>43</sup> While this shift in critical thinking was already taking place well before he put his pen to paper, Lonergan can be said to have awakened and advanced the conversation in Catholic philosophical and theological circles.

Lonergan held that classical consciousness, a consciousness conditioned and shaped by Greek metaphysics and revived by Scholasticism, is characterized by a static notion of history. Such a notion rejects the evolutionary development of knowledge in exchange for normative universal principles that are objectively true.<sup>44</sup> As vivid examples of this world view, he points to positivistic approaches to philosophy and theology present in the manualist tradition prior to the Second Vatican Council.<sup>45</sup> These, Lonergan argues, emphasize the factual while, at the same time, ignoring the very historical and cultural contexts of these facts. For him, classical consciousness equates truth with being and interprets reality through deductive reasoning abstracting essences. In this regard, truth is so objective that it resides in a platonic-like realm of forms. Classical consciousness sees nature as static and immutable having reached a state of perfection. Thus, any change represents a loss of perfection and a diminishment of the truth. Applied to Church doctrine, Lonergan views the classical world view as problematic in two ways. First, because it fails to take into account the historic dimension, it is unable to provide the necessary contemporary framework to understand these doctrines.<sup>46</sup> Second, by emphasizing the knowing of truths as expressed in the doctrines of the Church, it is incapable of adequately taking into account the understanding of the knower. Here Lonergan points out that, "No repetition of formulas can take the place of understanding."<sup>47</sup>

By contrast, historical consciousness, initially influenced by such social theorists as Martin Heidegger, Michael Polanyi, and Hans Georg Gadamer, equate truth with facts. Here one stands within the flow of history allowing the many influences of the world to impact his or her judgments. Marked by progressive development and growth, historical consciousness assumes incompleteness about things and thus, as more data is available, the possibility of change. It interprets reality through inductive reasoning beginning with experience and deriving principles from the accumulation of this experience. Based on his analysis of the conciliar documents of the Second Vatican Council and theological trends of his time, Lonergan concludes that there is a shift away from a classical consciousness to historical consciousness.<sup>48</sup> In this regard, he viewed humanity as:

a concrete aggregate, developing overtime . . . on this view intentionality is not fixed, static, immutable, but shifting, developing, going astray, capable of redemption; on this view there is in historicity, which results from human nature an exigence for changing forms, structures, methods . . . .<sup>49</sup>

Where Lonergan and many of his contemporaries saw the subjective emphasis of historical consciousness as a corrective to the objective emphasis of classical consciousness,<sup>50</sup> others argued that the pendulum had swung too far in the subjective direction.<sup>51</sup> In his consideration of world views, moral theologian Msgr. David Bohr argues that there are actually three dominant world views. Recognizing both classical and historical consciousness, he adds to this “symbolic consciousness.”<sup>52</sup> As with Lonergan before him, Bohr recognized the deficiencies of a purely classical world view particularly as it was expressed in various theological methods whether in the speculative or the practical domain. Unlike Lonergan however, Bohr was critical of the historical world view particularly as it gave rise to certain teleological methodologies that denied the received tradition of moral absolutes.<sup>53</sup> For Bohr, left uncorrected, the classical world view tends toward objectivism, legalism, and

authoritarianism, and the historical world view tends toward subjectivism, utilitarianism, and relativism.

In his presentation on symbolic consciousness, Bohr begins with the observation that both the classical and historical world views are similar with respect to their rationalist approach to reality. Although they use different starting points, they essentially employ the same scientific methodology. Prior to the advent of classical Greek philosophy, the dominant world view was *mythos*. For virtually every ancient culture, myth was the primary means of explaining the origins of the world, humanity, and the very processes that surround everyday life. The emergence of Greek philosophy and its classical world view afforded a new appreciation of the human reason. While this rationalist (*logos*) approach did not completely replace myth (*mythos*) as a world view, it did eventually displace it as the primary means of explaining reality in many parts of the ancient world. Myth with its images, allegories, symbols, and narratives lacked the intellectual precision necessary to state, in a concise and systematic manner, how things are. As Greek thought spread, especially during the Hellenistic Period and later within the Roman Empire, so too did its philosophical influence. Nevertheless, *mythos* continued to survive and even flourish in many cultures, though it was often considered unsophisticated and even superstitious by those who embraced the classical world view.

Early Christianity, because it was rooted in Semitic thought, continued to express reality in the form of *mythos* despite the Hellenization of Palestine.<sup>54</sup> That said, neither the Old nor New Testaments present themselves as mythological works, but rather incorporate mythological elements consistent with Israel’s ancient near east neighbors while, at the same time, maintaining a historical groundedness. This is clearly evident in the rich rabbinic imagery used by Jesus in His parables. These parables are extended narratives that symbolically move the listener beyond the descriptive images to reveal profound truths. Commenting on this movement, New Testament scholar Craig Blomberg writes, “A mixture of parable and allegory was both common and well-liked in ancient

Judaism ... Standard metaphors (most notably the king standing for God) ... were so frequently used by the rabbis that Jesus' audiences almost certainly would have interpreted them in fairly conventional ways."<sup>55</sup> Blomberg goes on to say,

The parables regularly contain not only common, down-to-earth portraits of Jewish village life but also 'extravagant' and unrealistic features which point to more than one level of meaning ... Although these features appear implausible as descriptions of normal events, they make excellent sense when interpreted allegorically.<sup>56</sup>

Mythos reaches its ultimate expression in New Testament apocalyptic literature. Here eschatological truths are conveyed through the use of figures, symbols, and types to reveal deeper realities; albeit still cloaked in mystery. Writing on the Book of Revelation, the French Jesuit scholar Jean-Louis Aragon points out:

The book as a whole fully confirms what the title announces: Symbols, so cherished by apocalyptic writers are evident everywhere; their presence is explicitly signaled, and their meaning is sometimes explained. The predilection for symbolism connects the Apocalypse in general with the Semitic tradition (I Kgs 11:30-32; Is 20: 2-4; Jer 13: 1-11; 19:1ff, 10ff). Apocalyptic reveals itself, here again, as the heir of prophetism, in developing and in adding precision to the use of symbols.<sup>57</sup>

Even through the post-apostolic era, *mythos* was still the predominant approach as is witnessed by the image of the "two ways" found in the *Didache*<sup>58</sup> and the description of sacramental character (as it would later be called) as a kind of tattoo or seal by the author of the Pastor of Hermas.<sup>59</sup> However, it would not be until the Middle Ages that, by adopting and adapting Aristotelian and Platonic cognitive discourse, western theology and philosophy would move away from *mythos* to *logos*;

from a symbolic world view to a classic world view. Despite this shift and the predominance of *logos*, Christianity never really lost its *mythos* roots. In the Latin Church, sacramental and mystical theology, while influenced by *logos*, still employs symbols and images to describe reality and transmit truth. Eastern Christianity with its great iconography has maintained *mythos* as a primary world view to this day.

With the advent of the Enlightenment and its stress on empiricism, the classical rationalist approach with its emphasis on objectivity took a decidedly subjective turn within academia.<sup>60</sup> By separating faith from reason, the classical world view began a slow fade and in its place emerged a new rationalism with a historical world view, albeit undeveloped. This new rationalism in the form of empiricism would eventually go on to become the dominant methodological tool for the natural and physical sciences in the modern era. While the gains brought by both a classical and a historical world view must be acknowledged, the limits of a purely rationalistic approach emphasizing almost exclusively either the objective or subjective dimensions present certain limitations as well.

Unlike the classical and historical world views, symbolic consciousness moves beyond a rationalistic grasp of reality and taps into the human imagination.<sup>61</sup> It depends on *mythos*, powerful symbols, images, and narratives to give intellectual expression to profound truths. Symbolic consciousness equates truth with mystery such that truth can only be grasped indirectly. This is to say that truth is primarily mediated (not obscured) through figures, images, and types. Symbolic consciousness understands nature as a relational order of opposites consisting of the symbol itself and the reality it reveals. Consider, for example, a natural symbol like water. Regardless of the historic situatedness or cultural context, water, as a relational order of opposites, points to and makes present the realities of life and cleanliness. Its physical presence mediates this deeper reality in a way that no word can, touching us on the most fundamental level. Likewise, and from a religious perspective, few symbols are as powerful as the crucifix. In its many variations, this powerful image of Christ on the

cross evokes levels of meaning culminating in divine love outpoured. As a relational order of opposites, the crucifix points beyond itself making present, in a spiritual sense, that to whom it points.

Understood this way, symbolic consciousness is the basis of the Church's sacramental life. As, "efficacious signs (symbols) of grace, instituted by Christ and entrusted to the Church by which divine life is dispensed," sacraments signify and make present the reality to which they point rendering the invisible visible.<sup>62</sup> Whether it is water or oil, bread or wine, sacramental symbols enable us to not only penetrate mystery, but participate in it as well. The same is true with sacramentals, albeit to a lesser extent. Symbols such as ashes or incense, icons or statues, have a way of sweeping us up and taking us to another place.

One of the most striking scriptural examples of *mythos* can be found in the first three chapters of Genesis. These narratives use sweeping images of epic proportions to describe, in figurative language, the creation and fall of humanity.<sup>63</sup> Where the rationalist approaches speak of creation *ex nihilo*, and while this certainly captures aspects of the truth; symbolic consciousness, which views humanity as made in the *Imago Dei*, adds a depth, dimension and texture to this revelation. It moves beyond a mere cognitive grasp of a truth and, through symbols, allows a kind of participation in the truth. Bohr explains this phenomenon in the following manner:

The etymology of the word "symbol" reveals that it comes from the Greek *symbolleîn*, which means literally to fall together, to throw together. It refers to the two corresponding halves of a ring or tablet that were used as tokens of identities for guests, messengers or partners of a treaty. A "symbol" is something that points to its complementary other half creating mutual recognition and unity. Symbols, like signs, point to another reality, but unlike signs, they also participate in the reality

to which they point. A symbol makes present that to which it points: it is, in other words, sacramental.<sup>64</sup>

Before considering how world views shape the theological development of sacramental character, two final observations are in order. First, though each of these world views brings something the others do not; all three can exist in a complementary relationship. Far from being three distinct approaches artificially united, they can be understood as parts of the same whole describing three aspects of truth arrived at from three different perspectives. Thus, no single world view grasps truth in its entirety. Instead, each world view reveals a new access point grasping truth in its own particular way. Indeed, insofar as each of these three perspectives can obtain a particular grasp of universal truth within its world view, they are, by that very fact connected by means of the universal truth. Consequently, insights revealed from a particular world view can be taken up and further developed through another world view. In this "taking up" one discovers a kind of mutual interdependence within and among the world views such that, in addressing a particular aspect of reality, one world view can be used to interpret, illustrate and extend another.

This interdependency was well known in antiquity. In Plato's consideration of form and matter, he uses structures and terms drawn from classical consciousness. However, to illustrate better what he means, he creates a fictional dialog between his former teacher Socrates and his older brother Glaucon. In the *Analogy of the Cave* found in Book VII of *The Republic*, he turns to symbolic consciousness using vivid imagery caught up in a compelling narrative. The images of the immobile prisoners, the dark cave, the fire, the shadows, the wise man, and the sun are rich symbols which, when taken together, evoke a deeper understanding of form and matter. This shift from classical to symbolic consciousness seems quite natural advancing Plato's treatment in a complementary and synergistic way. Similarly, Aristotle's description of virtue found in his *Nicomachean Ethics* begins with terms and concepts rooted in classical consciousness. It is, he says, "the mean

between extremes.” However, to nuance his treatment in the practical, as was Aristotle’s practice, he turns to a rudimentary form of historical consciousness. Here he insists that for one to know what this “mean” between “extremes” is, he must prudentially take into account the circumstances and the person. For instance, courage is the mean between the extreme of deficiency (cowardice) and the opposite extreme of excess (recklessness). Here, a warrior who flees from the battlefield would be a coward and a warrior who charges at an overwhelming force would be reckless. In this regard, the historic situatedness makes a difference in determining whether a seemingly virtuous act is, in fact, virtuous. Where Aristotle typically works within the framework of a classical consciousness with its more objective approach to reality, he shifts almost imperceptibly to historical consciousness with its more subjective approach to reality. In doing so, he moves from an unchanging world view to a subjective world view conditioned by the historic exigencies of situation and persons. Had Aristotle remained ridged in his classical world view, his presentation would lack the necessary constructs to nuance his treatment of virtues. It would remain locked, so to speak, in the extremes never able to find the mean.

Where classical consciousness represents a more objective view of reality, historical consciousness represents a more subjective view of that same reality. These two dimensions are held in tension by symbolic consciousness which sees reality as a relational order of opposites consisting of the symbol itself (in this case the subjective view) and the reality to which it points (in this case the objective view). It is a contention in this study that a theological approach tied to a single world view is bound to develop and expand along particular lines reaching only the conclusions limited by its presuppositions and assumptions. Though, for consistency’s sake, this single world view approach is more common among theologians and philosophers, it possesses certain inherent limitations. While each world view does not exhaust the reality it seeks to express, taken together and in right measure, they can complement their strengths and correct their weaknesses. This mutually inclusive approach has the effect of opening up new possibilities not limited by the presuppositions and assumptions of a single world view. If it is possible to advance a new approach to

the theology of the diaconate, that process of advancement is liberated and enhanced by freeing it from the constraints of a single world view. Consequently, this study will attempt to draw from classical, historical, and symbolic consciousness as it seeks to discover and explore a new approach to the theology of the diaconate.

A second and final observation is that, when we say that the influence of world views shape a particular doctrine, we are using the term “influence” in a carefully nuanced manner. It can be debated by scholars whether world views casually shape doctrine in the sense of contributing to its development or whether the shape of doctrine is simply expressed in a particular world view. In other words, do our hermeneutical presuppositions influence our conclusions, or are our conclusions merely articulated through our hermeneutical presuppositions? I believe the answer is “both.” This is to say that world views are operative and influential prior to the theological process of the development of doctrine, as the doctrine is being developed, and when the developed doctrine is articulated at a particular stage. Indeed, while the influence of a world view may surge or wane throughout this period, and while a different world views may jockey for dominance overtime, their contributions are not limited to a specific period, but permeate and penetrate the entire process. Thus, in this study, to say that world views influence the shape a particular doctrine assumes, as a kind of hermeneutical presupposition, that they are operative throughout the whole process.

This chapter has been an attempt to layout three fundamental presuppositions in an effort to fabricate new wineskins into which we can “pour” the wine of a new theology of the diaconate. *Ressourcement* with its insistence that we must go backward before we go forward, sacramental character as the ontological grounding of Holy Orders, along with the influence of world views are all essential to ensure that the “bag” is pliable enough to develop and sustain this new theology. In the following chapter, using a *ressourcement*, we will take up sacramental character and consider its development within the context of world views. From here, we will identify a beginning point from which we can formulate a new theology of diaconate.



## Chapter Two

### Identifying the Point of Departure

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A journey is distinguished from aimless wandering by means of a single destination. This is to say that we always begin with an end in mind; the place where we want to be. This end motivates us to travel, renders our journey intelligible, and drives us to completion. Once this destination is firmly established in the order of intention, we work backwards to discover the order of execution; that is, our point of departure and the route we must follow to achieve our goal. Referring to Figure 1 below, when we depart on a journey, we use point A to get to point B, point B to get to point C, and point C to get to point D.<sup>1</sup> However, for this to be possible, we must first identify D, our destination. Applied to our study, D is a new approach to the theology of the diaconate. With this now identified, we work in reverse to decide the best means to move from where we are to where we want to be. Eventually, after planning, we close the loop on the order of intention at point A which we call, “the point of departure.” Establishing this point of departure is just as critical as establishing our destination since a journey always takes place between two clearly defined points. From these two points, we can now determine the best route between them. This route will, by necessity, have a series of

milestones (B through C) each one marking our progress toward our ultimate destination.




Figure 1. Order of Intention and Execution

In arriving at a point of departure for a new approach to the diaconate, we return the fundamental presuppositions cited in the last chapter. There, we identified sacramental character as essential to a theology of the diaconate as it is its ontological beginning. Sacramental character was also recognized by the *Congregation for Catholic Education* as one of the “authoritative points of reference” for a new theology of the diaconate.<sup>2</sup> Further, we made the claim that world views shape theological development by providing the analytical language of discourse through which we do theology. Given these presuppositions, it follows that by examining how world views have shaped the development of sacramental character in the past we can, by examining today’s dominant world view, discover how it might shape a fresh approach and, in doing so, identify our point of departure.

In our consideration of how world views have shaped the theological development of sacramental character, we will examine the Patristic Era, the Scholastic Period, the Reformation and finally, the Modern Era. This examination will not be exhaustive, but only focus on that which is relevant to our pursuit either intrinsically or

historically. Before beginning however, it is important to note that what follows, while a chronological, is not an exercise in historical theology, but *ressourcement*. By plunging ourselves into the past through a return to the ancient sources, we will reestablish, in the consciousness and imagination of our study, a sense of continuity with the tradition. This, in turn, will enable us to confront the challenge of a new approach to the diaconate by demonstrating that it is an organic outgrowth of that very same tradition. Therefore, in the spirit of Henri de Lubac, Jean Daniélou, and Hans Urs Von Bathasar, we acknowledge that for theological progress in the diaconate to be authentic, for it to speak with relevancy today, it must creatively rediscover its past, it must return to its sources. That said history is always sloppy. It always suffers from a certain incompleteness resulting from the diverse and fragmented witness of the past. Consequently, any attempt to harmonize these fragments runs the risk of “connecting the dots” in a way contrary to the actual events. Yet, without taking this risk, without trying to make sense out of the past, we can never appreciate its value both in its own situatedness and for our time. Thus, in what follows great care will be taken to present these fragments as they exist and from them derive reasonable conclusions recognizing in the process the imperfect, but nonetheless essential part *ressourcement* plays in any new theological approach.

## I. The Patristic Era

The Patristic Era is derived from the Latin word *patres* (Fathers) and is used to describe the writings of theologians who formulated the doctrines of the early Church. Although scholars are divided on the precise historic period, most hold that it began in the late first century (excluding the New Testament) and ended in the eighth century. It is early within this period, as the Church began to grapple with the implications of Christian faith across a wide range of issues that the doctrine of sacramental character began to take shape emerging as a result of a convergence between

two distinct events, the Diocletian persecution (303-313 A.D.) and the rise of Donatism. Gaius Diocletianus (commonly known as Diocletian), a Roman military commander and imperial consul, became emperor in 284 A.D. upon the death of Numerian. Although Christianity was illicit within the empire, Diocletian, like his predecessors before him, allowed the faith to exist as long as it did not threaten imperial sovereignty. For more than two generations, Christians enjoyed relative peace. They built churches and distributed copies of the Sacred Scriptures throughout Rome and the surrounding regions.

By the third century, the empire had undergone significant decline. Small barbarian tribes who opposed the empire earlier now banded together to become more powerful. They frequently invaded the outlying territories threatening Roman authority and creating disunity. Beyond this, the relatively weak rule of Diocletian's predecessors led to political and social chaos. Decisive action was necessary to keep the empire from further decay. A competent soldier and administrator, Diocletian set out to stabilize his rule by implementing many social, economic and military reforms. Because of these sweeping changes, he paid little attention to Christianity for the first ten years of his reign. However, as his power and influence expanded, Diocletian's self-perception underwent a transformation. The emperor took on a divine-like *persona*. Spiritually, he linked himself with the gods by declaring he was the son of Jupiter adopting the title *Jovianus* and demanding that his subjects worship him. Diocletian soon began to rule as if by divine authority. To strengthen his god-like status, he revived the worship of the old Roman gods. As a result, foreign cults, of which Christianity was numbered, were perceived as a threat to his authority; a threat to be dealt with quickly and decisively.<sup>3</sup>

According to the Christian apologist Lactantius (d. 320 A.D.), Diocletian became angered when he learned that certain court officials were making the sign of the cross at pagan sacrifices. Considering

this an act of idolatry, he issued a series of decrees. As the historian Eusebius records:

It was in the nineteenth year of the reign of Diocletian, in the month Dystrus, called March by the Romans, when the feast of the Savior's passion was near at hand, that royal edicts were published everywhere, commanding that the churches be leveled to the ground and the Scriptures be destroyed by fire, and ordering that those who held places of honor be degraded, and that the household servants, if they persisted in the profession of Christianity, be deprived of freedom. Such was the first edict against us. But not long after, other decrees were issued, commanding that all the rulers of the churches in every place be first thrown into prison, and afterwards by every artifice be compelled to sacrifice.<sup>4</sup>

Shortly after the first edict, a fire broke out in the city of Nicomedia followed by insurrections in both Syria and Armenia. Blaming these on Christians, though they took no part, Diocletian issued two further edicts. The first ordered the torture and death of all Christians living in Nicomedia for the arson. The second edict commanded all bishops, priests, and deacons throughout the empire be thrown in prison and tortured until they made sacrifice to the gods. In 304 A.D., a final edict was issued requiring all Christians to either make sacrifice to the gods or face the same fate as their leaders.<sup>5</sup> The persecution lasted intermittently until the promulgation of the Edict of Milan by Constantine I and Licinius in 313 A.D.<sup>6</sup>

Although many refused Diocletian's decrees and were martyred, many more acquiesced.<sup>7</sup> When the persecution ended, questions arose as to the state of those who renounced their Christian faith. These people were known as "*traditors*" (people who had *banded over* the Scriptures).<sup>8</sup> After a suitable penance, the bishops allowed the *traditors* to return to the Church and, if they were clergy, assume their prior office. However,

some found the *traditors'* apostasy so great that, even after their reconciliation, they refused to accept their spiritual authority. This group maintained that, in order to remain pure and holy, the Church could not accept the ministry of the *traditors*. A split began when in 311 A.D., Archdeacon Caecilian was ordained Bishop of Carthage. At the ordination, one of the three consecrating bishops, Felix, bishop of Aptunga, had previously handed over copies of the Scriptures to the Romans. Although reconciled to the Church, a synod of African bishops questioned Felix's episcopal validity and, because of this, the validity of Caecilian episcopal ordination. Protesting the election, the matter was appealed to Rome. Pope Miltiades upheld Caecilian ordination declaring him the rightful bishop of Carthage, though did not rule directly on the state of Felix. This infuriated those African bishops who questioned the validity of Felix's orders and, by extension, that of Caecilian's. Dissatisfied with Pope Miltiades' decision, the African bishops appealed to the new Christian emperor Constantine who wisely refused to become involved, but instead arranged for a council of Gallic bishops to consider the matter. They too upheld the Caecilian ordination vindicating Felix. In response, the African bishops elected their own parallel bishop of Carthage, first Majorinus in 311 A.D. followed by Donatus in 315 A.D. It was for Donatus that the schism was named.

As time went on, the split became more entrenched as the number of Donatists grew. By 316 A.D. parallel structures were set up formalizing the schism. Among their many beliefs, Donatists argued that the efficaciousness of sacraments depended on the sanctity of the agent who administered them. They were concerned that any departure from proper ritual might alienate them from God in much the same way that the Jews of ancient Israel had angered God by their disobedience. As a direct result, Donatists would not accept baptisms performed by clergy who were not members of their own sect. Converts to Donatism had to perform penances and were required to be re-baptized before admittance.

The Donatist practice of rebaptizing was particularly abhorrent to the orthodox Church. It was condemned by the Council of Arles

(314 A.D.) which recognized the validity of the election of Caecilian of Carthage, and confirmed the excommunication of Donatus. Nonetheless, Donatism continued to attract adherence so that by 350 A.D. they outnumbered orthodox Christians in North Africa. By that time, a parallel hierarchy was in place so that each major city had opposing bishops.

By the early fifth century, the use of the Latin term *sacramentum* was fairly widespread. Initially, it was used to describe the oath of allegiance soldiers swore to their commanders in a sacred place. The first one to employ *sacramentum* in a technical sense to describe Baptism and possibly other rites of the Church was the Christian apologist Tertullian (d. 230 A.D.).<sup>9</sup> After him, it continued to be used in this general sense by such Fathers as: Cyprian of Carthage (d. 250 A.D.), Hilary of Poitiers (d. 367 A.D.), Gregory of Nazianzus (d. 389 A.D.), and Ambrose of Milan (d. 397 A.D.) who was instrumental in Augustine's conversion. However, unlike those who used the term before him, St. Augustine (d. 430 A.D.) gave serious consideration to sacraments in general and how they related to the various rites administered by the Church.<sup>10</sup> For him, sacraments are a visible sign of an invisible grace; the sign having some resemblance to the invisible reality it points.<sup>11</sup> With regard to sacramental character, as it would be later called, he argued that it is the office of priest, not his moral standing that gave validity to the celebration of the sacraments. In his debate against Parmeniani (d. 392 A.D.), the Donatist bishop of Carthage, Augustine maintained that clergy who received and administered sacraments merely strove imperfectly to realize the holiness and that the sacraments were made efficacious by the power of Christ. Comparing Baptism with Holy Orders, he argued that, just as Baptism imparts a character that cannot be removed even if the recipient repudiates the faith, so too does ordination. Of this, Augustine wrote:

And as the baptized person, if he departs from the unity of the Church, does not thereby lose the sacrament of baptism, so also he who is ordained, if he departs from the unity of the Church, does not lose

the sacrament of conferring baptism. For neither sacrament may be wronged. If a sacrament necessarily becomes void in the case of the wicked, both must become void; if it remain valid with the wicked, this must be so with both. If, therefore, the baptism be acknowledged which he could not lose who severed himself from the unity of the Church, that baptism must also be acknowledged which was administered by one who by his secession had not lost the sacrament of conferring baptism. For as those who return to the Church, if they had been baptized before their secession, are not rebaptized, so those who return, having been ordained before their secession, are certainly not ordained again; but either they again exercise their former ministry, if the interests of the Church require it, or if they do not exercise it, at any rate they retain the sacrament of their ordination; and hence it is, that when hands are laid on them, to mark their reconciliation, they are not ranked with the laity.<sup>12</sup>

Augustine argued that, in Baptism and in Holy Orders, there is something indelible and unrepeatable impressed upon the recipient. Derived from the Greek word *charassein*, character describes an image or inscription engraved in a permanent way on a medal, coin, or piece of stone.<sup>13</sup> In a certain sense, the reception of these particular sacraments leaves something behind like an impression. This “something,” which Augustine describes as *dominicus character* (the mark of the King), is so radical that it impacts the recipient on the deepest level and cannot be effaced.<sup>14</sup> Despite apostasy of the worst kind, the Spirit is preserved to him, not in a moral sense, but in an ontic sense; not in what he does, but in who he is. In short, Augustine held that a sacrament achieves its validity and efficaciousness by its very working *ex opere operato* (by virtue of their objective performance).<sup>15</sup> Conversely, Donatists maintained that a sacrament achieves its validity and efficaciousness from the holiness of the minister confecting

it *ex opere operantis* (from the work of the one doing the working). Consequently, for Augustine, this character (an effect of ordination) once impressed upon an ordained man remains with him, and the sacraments administered by him retain their force.<sup>16</sup> To illustrate this point, he wrote:

For the wandering of the sheep is to be corrected in such wise that the mark of the Redeemer should not be destroyed on it. For even if anyone is marked with the royal stamp by a deserter who is marked with it himself, and the two receive forgiveness, and the one returns to his service, and the other begins to be in the service in which he had no part before, that mark is not effaced in either of the two, but rather it is recognized in both of them, and approved with the honor which is due to it because it is the king's.<sup>17</sup>

This understanding of the permanence did not originate with Augustine who refers to this quality as the *sacramentum manens* (the sacrament which remains). Occasioned by the Donatist heresy, he merely developed that which was long held and extended it to the sacrament of Holy Orders. There was already a growing sense among the early Greek Fathers that the radical nature of Baptism entailed a certain ineffaceable mark or seal. In his second letter to the Corinthians, Clement of Rome (d. 100 A.D.) warned: “For of those who do not preserve the seal unbroken, [the Scripture] says, “Their worm shall not die, and their fire shall not be quenched, and they shall be a spectacle to all flesh.”<sup>18</sup> Likewise, in his discussion of baptism, the Pastor of Hermas (c. 140 A.D.) wrote:

Accordingly, those also who fell asleep received the seal of the Son of God. For, he continued, before a man bears the name of the Son of God he is dead; but when he receives the seal he lays aside his deadness, and obtains life. The seal, then, is the water: they descend into the water dead, and they arise alive. And to them,

accordingly, was this seal preached, and they made use of it that they might enter into the kingdom of God.<sup>19</sup>

In a collection of notes made by Clement of Alexandria (d. 211 A.D.) concerning the Gnostic teachings of the Valentinian Theodotus, Clement reflects on the nature of Baptism. Here he uses two distinct but related images to describe the permanence of the sacrament. First, commenting on, “rendering unto Caesar (Lk 20:21-25),” he compares the imprint on the Roman coin to the imprint on the soul by the Holy Spirit. Just as the imprint on the coin demonstrates a kind of belonging, so too the imprint on the soul demonstrates a belonging to he whose image it bears. Second, as if to reinforce the first image in a more organic sense, Clement likens this imprint to a brand burned into animals to indicate that they bear the mark of their owner.

In the case of the coin that was brought to him, the Lord did not say whose property is it, but, ‘whose image and inscription? Caesar’s,’ that it might be given to him whose it is. So likewise the faithful; he has the name of God through Christ as a superscription and the Spirit as an image. And dumb animals show by a seal whose property each is, and are claimed from the seal. Thus also the faithful soul receives the seal of truth and bears about the ‘marks of Christ.’<sup>20</sup>

The martyr and presbyter St. Hippolytus of Rome (d. 236 A.D.) writing in the third century juxtaposes the mark of Baptism with the mark of the beast observing, “The Lord gave a seal to those who believed on Him. . .”<sup>21</sup> In the fourth century, St. Cyril of Jerusalem (d. 386 A.D.) expands on this by exhorting believers to, “Come for the mystical Seal, that you may be easily recognized by the Master; be ye numbered among the holy and spiritual flock of Christ, to be set apart on His right hand, and inherit the life prepared for you.”<sup>22</sup>

By the time Augustine begins to write in the fifth century, there are multiple attestations among both the Greek and Latin Fathers as to some kind of permanent effect of the sacrament of Baptism. This effect is spoken of as a seal, mark or brand suggesting a lasting and indelible quality. Augustine’s primary contribution, which was precipitated by the Donatist heresy, is a further development and expansion of this belief in the sacrament of Holy Orders. Like Baptism, he saw Holy Orders as so radically impacting a man as to leave him changed in some mysterious way. However, Augustine does little more than describe a spiritual phenomenon. It would be left to later generations to define more precisely what this character is along with its mode of operation.

**Summary and Conclusion:** During the patristic era, the predominant world view was symbolic consciousness. The Fathers of the Church used *mythos* as a means of interpreting Scripture and developing doctrine.<sup>23</sup> Throughout their writings, they made frequent use of symbols, images, and typologies. They interpreted these as revealing the hidden link between two aspects of reality witnessing to their underlying unity. The use of symbolic consciousness can be clearly seen in the Patristic approach to Scripture. Influenced by the Greek interpretation of myths<sup>24</sup> and certain rabbinical schools<sup>25</sup>, the Fathers assumed that, in many passages, God intended something other than what was literally expressed in the text. What would come to be known as the allegorical sense was first introduced to Christianity from the Alexandrian catechetical school by St. Clement (d. 215 A.D.).<sup>26</sup> Clement maintained that Scripture contains hidden meanings and that these meanings are meant to move the believer to discover the words of salvation. Clement’s contributions notwithstanding, it would be one of his students, the Alexandrian scholar Origen (d. 254 A.D.) who, because of his prolific use of allegory would be called the Father of Allegory. Origen held that some Scriptures are to be interpreted only literally, others only allegorically, and still others both literally and allegorically. While, in some cases, the result of his approach would put him at odds with the Church having been declared

a heretic by two councils, his method of interpretation, apart from its unorthodox views, was nonetheless widely adopted throughout the fourth and fifth centuries.<sup>27</sup>

Derived from the Greek “*alla*,” meaning “other,” and “*agoreuo*,” meaning “proclaim,” allegory originally described a manner of speech that Cicero called a “continuous stream of metaphors” in which one thing is understood by another.<sup>28</sup> This approach sought to discern, in the rituals, events, and figures of the Old Testament, a hidden reference to similar realities in the New Testament that fulfilled those earlier images. Allegory, as both an interpretive method and an example of symbolic consciousness, moves beyond the literal meaning of the text to discover the deeper or fuller meaning that God Himself, acting through the Holy Spirit, wished to convey.

While the influence of symbolic consciousness dominated this period as expressed in the image on a coin and the brand on a sheep, classical consciousness was also present albeit to a lesser degree. This is evidenced by the Platonic thought found in Augustine’s work. Prior to Augustine, Platonism laid side-by-side with theology as exemplified in the writings of Origen; however Augustine was one of the first to attempt a kind of integration between Christian faith and Platonic philosophy. He found Platonism, or more accurately neo-Platonism, interesting and compelling though inadequate in many ways to explain the Christian mystery. Although Augustine demonstrated great dexterity with philosophy he was, from start to finish, a theologian. This means that certain Platonic structures had to be modified to accommodate his Christian faith. While his work on what would later be called “sacramental character” does admit to symbolic consciousness as exemplified in the “mark of the King,” there is still a strong neo-Platonic undercurrent. For Augustine, the outward sign of the sacraments, in this case the laying on of hands, points to a deeper inward reality which is more real than the sign itself. In this explanation, one hears echoes of Plato’s understanding of form and matter such that the outward signs are but flickering shadows on the cave wall. This greater reality, which represents a kind of Platonic ideal,

is expressed in an unrepeatable permanence which must be grasped not by the senses, but by the intellect.<sup>29</sup> Nonetheless, there appears a kind of complementary overlap in Augustine’s thought between two distinct world views. If symbolic consciousness consists of an order of relational opposites expressed in analogies, metaphors, and narratives; classical consciousness can express these opposites in a new analytical language of form (ideals) and matter. Still, we must be cautioned not to make too much of this tenuous and undeveloped overlap. That said, and in hindsight, we can say that it anticipated and perhaps even signaled a shift in dominant world views that would be centuries away.

With regard to sacramental character, there were two significant developments during the patristic era. The first of which is that, like Baptism, Holy Orders produces an enduring effect upon the recipient; an effect which the Fathers described as a “seal” or “character.” While there is evidence that this belief, at least in some seminal form, pre-existed the Fathers, the rudimentary inception of sacramental character as a doctrine can clearly be fixed in this era as already demonstrated.<sup>30</sup> The second development, which flows from and builds upon the first, is that this effect is so permanent that it cannot be effaced regardless of whether or not the recipient falls from the state of grace. Indeed, not only does this effect remain, but the spiritual power associated with this effect also remains. Consequently, Donatist priests could validly baptize and that Baptism was recognized by the Church.

Symbolic consciousness as the predominant world view strongly influenced the development of doctrine during this period. The Diocletian Persecution and the subsequent rise of Donatism produced a situation that called into question the nature of Baptism and Holy Orders. The Fathers, in an attempt to safeguard what they saw to be an essential aspect of both sacraments, drew upon the analytical language developed within a world view rooted in symbolic consciousness. Having employed this world view in their interpretation of Scripture, it was only natural that they apply these same kinds of

typologies and images to articulate the effects of Baptism and Holy Orders. This application begins with the appropriation of the secular term *sacramentum* signifying an oath and then spreads to other symbolic images such as: the mark of the King (*dominicus character*), an insignia of rank, the imprint of a coin and, the juxtaposition of the mark of Christ and the mark of the beast. This symbolic language, as typified in the definition of a sacrament as a visible sign of an invisible grace generates a second level of meaning in addition to the literal sense. As such, it expresses and conveys a deeper truth in a way that no literal sense could express or convey.

The Patristic era was followed by the Dark Ages, a period of cultural and economic deterioration resulting from a collapse of the Roman Empire lasting from about 500 to 1000 A.D. Characterized by frequent wars and a relative scarcity of historical documents, it was a period of intellectual darkness. During this time, no appreciable advancement was made in the development of sacramental character.

## II. The Scholastic Period

Scholasticism dates from the early twelfth to the late fifteenth century and describes a method of teaching that attempts to reconcile the philosophy of the ancient Greeks with the theology of the Fathers to produce a new synthesis. During the early part of this period, most theologians accepted and reiterated Augustine's definition of sacraments. However, the theological masters at this time were inconsistent in their treatment of the particular sacraments. For example, Peter Abelard (d. 1142 A.D.), examined only Baptism, Marriage, and Eucharist and these he spread out in three different works. There was no consensus as to how to classify the sacraments and the order in which they were to be treated. Some, such as the French priest Alger of Liège (d. 1131 A.D.) and the Benedictine monk Johannes Gratian (d. 1159 A.D.), divided the sacraments into two distinct categories; that of necessity and those of dignity. Where the sacraments of necessity are required for

salvation, the sacraments of dignity are not. Others, such as the Saxon philosopher Hugh of St. Victor (d. 1141 A.D.) categorized the sacraments into three categories, those necessary for salvation (Baptism and Eucharist), those helpful for sanctification (ashes distributed on Ash Wednesday and holy water) and those necessary to administer the sacraments (Holy Orders). Given Augustine's rather broad understanding of a visible sign of invisible grace, a great many things could fit into this definition multiplying the number of sacraments along with their requisite categories. Beyond lacking specificity, there was a growing concern that Augustine's definition, taken broadly and out of context, could be used to support a purely symbolic view of the Eucharist; an approach that ran counter to belief in the Real Presence.

In his *Dialogus de Sacramentis Legis Naturalis et Scriptae*, Hugh of St. Victor initially accepted Augustine's definition of a sacrament. However, in his later work, he found it far too general to be of any real theological use. In *De Sacramentis Christianae Fidei*, Hugh attempted to enhance Augustine's definition by making two important contributions. First, he maintained that sacraments must have a natural likeness to the sacred things to which they point. Here the external form resembles the internal thing (*res*) which Hugh saw as divine power (*virtus*). For example, wine resembles blood and bread resembles flesh. Second, he held that sacraments contain the grace they signified and that through their external form they convey that grace to the recipient for the purposes of sanctification. Hugh summed up his definition in the following manner:

Now if anyone wishes to define more fully and more perfectly what a sacrament is, he can say: 'A sacrament is a corporeal or material element set before the senses without, representing by similitude and signifying by institution and containing by sanctification some invisible and spiritual grace.' This definition is recognized as so fitting and perfect that it is found to befit every sacrament and a sacrament alone.<sup>31</sup>

It was Hugh's second contribution that sacraments "contain" what they represent, that drew the attention of his contemporaries. In much the same way as a vase contains water; sacraments are carriers of grace for the sanctification of souls. Thus, these visible signs do more than point to some invisible grace, but they effect what they signify. This efficaciousness arises because Christ instituted the sacraments and because, through the invocation of the Holy Spirit by the minister, the faithful are sanctified.<sup>32</sup> These contributions by Hugh cannot be understated. While still embracing Augustine's definition, he emphasized sacraments as efficacious channels of grace that bring about sanctification. In doing so, he shifted the theological spotlight from what a sacrament is (sacred signs), to what it does (effect what they signify). This will prove to be a critical advancement.

In 1150, the Italian theologian Peter Lombard (d. 1160 A.D.) wrote his great work, *Sententiarum Quatuor Libri*, more commonly known as the *Sentences*. By this time, Europe had undergone significant changes. It was the era of the great universities and systematic thought was the order of the day. Prior to the Middle Ages, dogmatic theologians primarily used Scripture and the Fathers to establish doctrine. The *lectio*, as it was called, was merely a spiritual reading of the Scriptures, with the writings of the Fathers used to elucidate specific passages. Although Scripture and the Fathers were still used in the twelfth century, the primary mode of theological investigation shifted to embrace a more systematic and integrated approach. Doctrine was formulated within a wider philosophical framework in an attempt to produce a coherent system of belief. Peter Lombard had already been preceded by such systematicians as Hugh of St. Victor, Peter Abelard, and Gilbert of Poitiers, all of whom, to a greater or lesser degree, influenced Lombard's own work. The *Sentences* represented a sweeping compilation of theological thought to date. Although Peter provided a systematic organization of his work, he relied far more on tradition and authority than rational speculation. Thus, his great contribution lies not so much in his originality, but in his presentation. Beyond this, he summarized the controversies of his time and provided a sampling of the various theological opinions

on a number of doctrinal issues. Peter's work was widely distributed in major universities around Europe and served as a standard theological text for nearly two centuries. He ended his third book of the *Sentences* and opened his fourth book with a clear and unambiguous definition of the sacraments. Later, he summarized this definition when he wrote:

That is properly called a sacrament which is a sign of the grace of God, and a form of invisible grace in such a way that it bears the image thereof, and exists as a cause (*et causa existat*). Sacraments, therefore, are instituted for the purpose, not merely of signifying, but also of sanctifying. For things that are merely instituted for the sake of signifying are only signs and not sacraments, as were the carnal sacrifices and ceremonial observances of the old law.<sup>33</sup>

Following Augustine, Peter began by acknowledging two fundamental aspects of the sacraments as the *sacrum signans et sacrum signatum*. This is to say, the thing that is doing the signifying (the visible reality), and the thing being signified (the invisible reality). Relying on Hugh of St. Victor, Peter maintained that sacraments effect what they signify and are thus efficacious signs. He argued that the power of these signs is not an automatic consequence of their resemblance to the thing they signify, but rather a consequence of their divine institution. In general, he understood sacraments have a twofold effect, a remedy for sin and a means of personal sanctification. These effects recover man's image which was deformed by sin and make him holy. Thus he wrote, "*Non igitur significandi tantum gratium sacramenta instituta sunt, sed et sanctificandi*" ("it was not just to signify grace that therefore the sacraments were instituted, but to sanctify").<sup>34</sup>

Although he touched upon the unrepeatability of Baptism and Confirmation, Peter does not address sacramental character in his treatment of either of these sacraments. His only consideration comes in his examination of Holy Orders. However, even here there is but a

scant acknowledgment except to say that sacramental character is the seal of the Church whereby spiritual power is conferred on the person ordained.<sup>35</sup> Here the recipient receives a permanent and spiritual character empowering him to perform with efficacy those sacramental actions proper to his office. Beyond the effect of character, Holy Orders has two other effects, to sanctify the minister and to enable him to function as a channel of grace for others.<sup>36</sup> In itself, Peter's treatment of sacramental character is minimal. He merely restated the consensus to date and his lack of attention indicates that there was little theological interest among his contemporaries. However, because the *Sentences* was arguably the most commented upon work of the Middle Ages,<sup>37</sup> Peter's section on Holy Orders would be picked up and advanced by others. It would influence all the major scholastic thinkers, from Albert the Great and Thomas Aquinas to William of Ockham and Gabriel Biel. Thus, quite accidentally, Peter catalyzes the thought of his time by providing a systematic framework for others to follow.

During this period, one theory of sacramental causality began to gain favor among theologians. It was advanced by Alexander of Hales (d. 1245 A.D.) and St. Albert the Great (d. 1280 A.D.), both who were strongly influenced by the Islamic philosopher Avicenna (d. 1037 A.D.) and his commentaries on Aristotle. This theory separated causality into two distinct but related categories: disposing cause and perfecting cause. Disposing cause readies the matter for a form in the sense that it makes the soul receptive to the grace of the sacrament. Perfecting cause accounts for the actualization of a form in the sense that grace is imparted to the soul. Where the sacraments are a disposing cause, God and God alone is the perfecting cause. Thus, for Alexander and Albert, sacraments either prepare the recipient for God's action in our soul or take away any obstructions to grace. This not only affirmed the patristic concept regarding the intrinsic efficacy of the sacraments, but it also safeguarded the Augustinian maxim that, "Only God causes grace, only God gives the Holy Spirit."<sup>38</sup>

Responding to the notion of disposing causality as a power subsisting in the sacraments, the Franciscan St. Bonaventure (d. 1274 A.D.)

offered two alternate possibilities. Relying somewhat on Alexander of Hales, the Seraphic Doctor held that the sacraments are direct efficient causes of the sacramental character and sanctifying grace. However, he went on to note that grace is infused by God whenever the sacraments are received and that the sacraments themselves merely occasion this event having no intrinsic power. In his commentary on the *Sentences*, Bonaventure used the analogy of a signet ring to illustrate the imprinting of sacramental character. In mediaeval Europe, signet rings generally bore the coat of arms of a nobleman or bishop. They were used to seal and authenticate documents by applying melted wax and then embossing the ring so as to affix the particular coat of arms on the document itself. Insofar as the ring attests to the authority of its bearer, the document, now bearing the image of his ring, also attests to this same authority. Bonaventure saw this imprinting as a fitting way to illustrate, in an analogous sense, the manner in which the sacrament of Holy Orders is efficacious. Like Augustine before him, he made direct reference to the sacrament of Holy Orders and speaks of the seal of the King.

Therefore just as the royal letters sealed with ring of the king are of a great dignity and virtue and value and are said (to be documents) great both to be able and to do, nevertheless in them there is no absolute virtue, but only an ordination through the assistance of the royal virtue which is clear, because, with the king dead, there is no more care of his letters than of others, however, they have lost nothing absolute thus must it be understood in the Sacraments, and thus do the authorities speak of the Holy Things according to the common usage.<sup>39</sup>

By the thirteenth century, a threefold set of distinctions known as *sacramentum tantum*, *res tantum* and *res et sacramentum* began to take shape that would have a direct impact on the development of sacramental character.<sup>40</sup> They had their beginnings in the *Summa Sententiarum* whose author is lost to history and whose thought influenced both

Hugh of St. Victor and Peter Lombard. The impact of these scholastics notwithstanding, arguably the greatest contribution to these distinctions can be found in the work of St. Thomas Aquinas (d. 1274 A.D.). Although the Angelic Doctor treats the sacraments in both his *Commentaria in Libros Sententiarum* and his *De Veritate*, it is the Third Part of his *Summa Theologica* that directly considers the question of sacramental character. For Thomas, sacraments are sensible signs which express something sacred; that something being outside the grasp of the senses.<sup>41</sup>

The first of these distinctions is the *sacramentum tantum* (sign alone) which describes the liturgical action itself or more specifically the *elementa* (matter) and *forma* (form) of the sacrament. Where the matter pertains to the material or physical elements of the sacrament, the form pertains to the confecting prayer. Thus, in Holy Orders the matter is the laying on of hands by the bishop to the ordinand, and the form is the prescribed prayer of ordination.<sup>42</sup> The *sacramentum tantum* is the outward or external material sign of the sacrament and, because of this is, *id quod significat sed non significatur* (that which signifies but is not signified). The second distinction is the *res tantum* (reality alone) which describes the religious effect of the sacrament or, more specifically, the imparting of sanctifying grace. Thomas speaks of this as *et primo, de effectu eius principali, qui est gratia* (the first effect is grace). For him, this grace incorporates the recipient into Christ and the Church. In this regard, God is the principle cause of grace with the sacraments being instrumental causes of that same grace.<sup>43</sup> This grace perfects the essence of the soul allowing the virtues to flow to its powers; each sacrament having its own particular perfection.<sup>44</sup> It is considered, *id quod non significat, sed significatur* (that which is signified, but does not signify). This is to say that the grace, conferred through the sacrament, is not a sign of anything further. Thomas understood grace as a supernatural gift of God bestowed through the merits of Jesus Christ to rational creatures for salvation. This gift is “supernatural” inasmuch as it is beyond the capacity of human nature and thus admits to divine causality. It is “free” in that it is completely unmerited and thus undeserved. When received by one who

is properly disposed, sanctifying grace confers on the soul a new life that is, a sharing in the life of God Himself. The necessity of proper subjective disposition means that not everyone who receives the sacrament receives the grace. In this respect, grace is dispensed *ex opere operantis* (from the action of the doer). Free will makes it radically possible to reject this offer of grace. In other words, it can be hindered by sin on the part of the one receiving the sacrament. When grace is freely accepted, it possesses a lasting or abiding quality enabling the recipient to grow in a life of holiness.

After his consideration of the religious effect of the sacrament, Thomas moves to examine the *alio effectu sacramentorum* (other effect of the sacrament). This ecclesial effect is known as *res et sacramentum*.<sup>45</sup> Using Augustine as his point of departure, Thomas identified this second effect as character which is a seal or distinguishing mark imprinted on the soul deputed the recipient to worship. Because the soul is spiritual, this seal is likewise spiritual and is imparted as a power of the soul.<sup>46</sup> Thomas described this seal as the character or mark of Christ. He wrote:

A character is a distinctive mark printed in a man's rational soul by the eternal Character, whereby the created trinity is sealed with the likeness of the creating and re-creating Trinity, and distinguishing him from those who are not so enlivened, according to the state of faith.” But the eternal Character is Christ Himself, according to Hebrews 1:3: ‘Who being the brightness of His glory and the figure, or character, of His substance.’ It seems, therefore, that the character should properly be attributed to Christ.<sup>47</sup>

For Thomas, character configures the recipient to Christ. It does so by impressing upon the soul a kind of resemblance to Christ enabling a type of participation in His eternal priesthood which empowers him to do something.<sup>48</sup> Because the priesthood of Christ is perpetual and enduring, so too is the character, by virtue of this

priesthood, perpetual and enduring. This lasting effect is therefore indelible, permanent, and cannot be effaced.<sup>49</sup> By this fact, Holy Orders can be received only once by the same person.<sup>50</sup> Although every sacrament of the New Law has an ecclesial effect, character is only proper to Baptism, Confirmation, and Holy Orders. This is because these particular sacraments are ordained for divine worship and give the recipient the power to receive or confer other sacraments.<sup>51</sup> In this respect, where Baptism and Confirmation are passive inasmuch as they empower the recipient to receive the other sacraments, Holy Orders is active inasmuch as it empowers the recipient to dispense these same sacraments. Unlike the *res tantum* which requires for its reception a properly disposed soul, the *res et sacramentum* occurs regardless of the recipient's disposition. Assuming the sacrament of Holy Orders is validly celebrated, sacramental character is efficaciously imparted *ex opere operato* (from the work done).

Thomas does take up the question of whether orders other than the priesthood receive sacramental character. From his treatment, it is clear that the matter is unresolved although he points out that the common belief among the masters of his time is that all orders, major and minor, receive character. This, of course, would include the diaconate. In his *Summa* Thomas writes:

*I answer that,* There have been three opinions on this point. For some have said that a character is imprinted only in the Order of priesthood; but this is not true, since none but a deacon can exercise the act of the diaconate, and so it is clear that in the dispensation of the sacraments, he has a spiritual power which others have not. For this reason others have said that a character is impressed in the sacred, but not in the minor Orders. But this again comes to nothing, since each Order sets a man above the people in some degree of authority directed to the dispensation of the sacraments. Wherefore since a character is a

sign whereby one thing is distinguished from another, it follows that a character is imprinted in each Order. And this is confirmed by the fact that they remain forever and are never repeated. This is the third and more common opinion.<sup>52</sup>

Care must be taken not to see in Thomas' presentation a doctrinal development which formally establishes the diaconate as having sacramental character. While expressing his opinion, he is merely reflecting the thoughts of his time within the larger theological community. As such, it can only be viewed in hindsight as kind of anticipation; a seminal idea whose time has not yet come.

**Summary and Conclusion:** During the scholastic period, the predominant world view was classical consciousness. While this was by far the most influential world view as witnessed by the voluminous literature still in existence, symbolic consciousness was also present albeit to a limited degree. Where symbolic consciousness with its focus on *mythos* explored sacred signs, classical consciousness with its focus on Greek metaphysics explored being and change. In reconciling ancient philosophy with writings of the Fathers, the scholastics produced a new theological synthesis which, while retaining many elements of symbolic consciousness, widely adopted the structures of classical consciousness found in Plato and Aristotle. The shift from a predominantly symbolic world view during the Patristic era to a predominantly classical world view prior to the Scholastic period was slow and subtle such that no clear tipping point can be identified.

There were a number of significant theological developments during the scholastic period. Building on Augustine's definition, the scholastics maintained that sacraments must have a natural likeness to the things they point and that they effect what they signify. Strongly influenced by a shift to classical consciousness, this new focus on efficacy gradually moved the theological spotlight from what a sacrament is (sacred signs) to what it does (effect what they signify). Where the Patristic era established the indelible nature of

Holy Orders in response to the Donatist heresy, the scholastic period grappled with how to explain this indelibility in a more cohesive and integrated manner within the wider context of sacramental theology.

The initial theological developments during this period were based on Augustine's understanding of sacraments as visible signs of an invisible grace; the sign having some resemblance to the invisible reality to which it points. The language and imagery used in this definition are deeply rooted in symbolic consciousness as expressed in Bonaventure's metaphor of the wax and signet ring. During the early part of this period, with the rise of the European university system, there was a growing sense among theologians that Augustine's definition of sacrament, while still valid, led to certain ambiguities and thus required greater precision. In grappling with this lack of specificity, a number of definitions and categories emerged which, because of their wide diversity, tended to obscure rather than more clearly define what a sacrament is. Insofar as the development of sacramental character is dependent upon the definition of sacrament itself, until a theological consensus could be reached on this matter, there was no significant development of character during the early part of this period. It is reasonable to conclude from this that, given the predominant symbolic world view of the previous era, and given the new historical context, symbolic consciousness alone could not pierce beyond the very mystery to which it pointed. It would require a Copernican revolution to penetrate this mystery on another level and this revolution would arrive in the form of classical consciousness.

The desire to unfold the mysteries revealed under the influence of symbolic consciousness with greater focus and precision gave light to a rediscovery of classical Greek philosophy. As demonstrated earlier in the works of Augustine, the West had already known Plato and adopted some of his thought to better grasp and articulate revelation. However, it would not be until the rediscovery of Aristotle that theologians would systematically appropriate Greek thought. This new analytical language, now applied to the Christian faith, provided the structures and concepts necessary to push beyond the symbols, images,

and typologies to arrive at new aspects of the same truths. It is precisely here that symbolic consciousness begins to give way to classical consciousness. This is clearly demonstrated in the new systematic approach and the adoption of such Aristotelian dualities as: form and matter, substance and accidents, potency and actuality, along with a focus on sacramental causality and its effects. The classical world view, embraced during the scholastic period, would soon become ensconced during the Counter-Reformation and particularly in the Council of Trent.

After the death of Aquinas, development in sacramental theology began to decline. It was replaced by the largely sterile controversies between the Thomists (those who followed the philosophical thought of Aquinas) and the followers of the Franciscan scholar Duns Scotus (d. 1308 A.D.). Each of these schools was reviled and scorned by the rise of nominalism with its rejection of universals. During this period, what passed for sacramental theology was both dry and abstract. Sacraments were understood as spiritual realities disconnected from lived experience and, for all intents and purposes, reduced to their rites. This disconnection stood in stark contrast to scholastic masters who combined their own lived experience with philosophical sources. With this connection severed, theologians merely reiterated the theologies that came before them. Into this creative void entered the canon lawyers establishing their own dominance. Legalism, which one can argue is an extreme kind of classical consciousness, became the order of the day. Gone was the formal philosophical structure that gave rise to penetrating insights unveiling mystery at a deeper level. In exchange were countless debates over how dirty water could be for a Baptism to be considered valid. This legalistic obsession reduced consideration of the sacraments to minimalist rule for validity leaving in its wake a century of theological stagnation.

### III. The Reformation

The next significant development in the doctrine of sacramental character occurred at the Council of Florence (1438-1445 A.D.). During Session 8 on November 22, 1439, the Fathers issued: *The Decree*

on the *Union Between the Armenian and Latin Church*. In order to clarify the doctrinal position of both Churches on the sacrament, they wrote:

All these sacraments are made up of three elements: namely, things as the matter, words as the form, and the person of the minister who confers the sacrament with the intention of doing what the church does. If any of these is lacking, the sacrament is not effected. . . . Three of the sacraments, namely baptism, confirmation and orders, imprint indelibly on the soul a character, that is a kind of stamp which distinguishes it from the rest. Hence they are not repeated in the same person. The other four, however, do not imprint a character and can be repeated.<sup>53</sup>

Although, in many respects, this teaching is simply a reiteration of scholastic sacramental theology, it is significant in that, as a formal decree of an ecumenical council, sacramental character is now magisterialized. In an attempt to clarify and affirm the tradition, the Council Fathers raised this commonly accepted teaching to the level of official doctrine by grounding it in their apostolic authority. Because this authority was understood as guided by the Holy Spirit, the doctrine of sacramental character could now be considered part of the sacred deposit of faith. This “indoctrination” would be further emphasized in the decrees of the Council of Trent.

By the early sixteenth century, new questions began to surface regarding the sacrament of Holy Orders. The Reformation, a religious movement initially aimed at internal renewal of the Church, soon began a revolt against many of the fundamental doctrines. Throughout the years that followed the publication of his Ninety-Five Thesis (1517 A.D.), the former Augustinian monk Martin Luther (d. 1546 A.D.) held that the office of the ministry was instituted by Christ and that ordination was accomplished by the laying on of hands. In his lectures on Paul’s Letter to the Romans (1516-17 A.D.) Luther wrote:

If a layman should perform all the outward functions of a priest, celebrating Mass, confirming, absolving, administering the sacraments, dedicating altars, churches, vestments, vessels, etc., it is certain that these actions in all respects would be similar to those of a true priest, in fact, they might be performed more reverently and properly than real ones. But because he has not been consecrated and ordained and sanctified, he performs nothing at all, but is only playing church and deceiving himself and his followers.<sup>54</sup>

In this respect, Luther recognized the distinction between the lay and clergy. However, he rejected the notion that this distinction took place as a result of a sacrament. He held that only God, not the actions of a bishop, can take an ordinary man and turn him into a minister capable of exercising the functions of his office. Using St. Paul as an example, Luther maintains that God had chosen and ordained him in his mother’s womb precisely for apostolic ministry.<sup>55</sup> Thus, anytime a man was set aside for ministry, it was God who did the setting aside. Ordination, as such, is merely an affirmation of what is, rather than bringing about something new.<sup>56</sup>

Other Reformers also denied the validity of Holy Orders as it was previously understood. In his *Institutes of the Christian Religion*, John Calvin (d. 1564 A.D.) argued against Holy Orders as a sacrament. While he maintained that the office of presbyters is a lawful office instituted by God, the creation of a further set of hierarchical levels is a rejection of Christ’s commands and inconsistent with the Sacred Scriptures.<sup>57</sup> Likewise, in his *Commentary on the True and False Religion*, the Swiss Reformer Ulrich Zwingli (d. 1531 A.D.) held that the sacraments were not ordained to signify and seal grace. Instead, he argued, they were intended to be a sign or symbol of God’s new gospel covenant. While they may point to certain truths and arouse feelings, they are not conduits of grace.<sup>58</sup> Since Holy Orders was most

closely identified with the priesthood, and since priests were necessary for the Eucharistic sacrifice of the Mass, the rejection of Mass as an unbloody sacrifice meant there was no need for a priesthood as such. Consequently, Reformers such as Martin Bucer (d. 1551 A.D.), Menno Simons (d. 1561 A.D.), and John Knox (d. 1572 A.D.) assailed Holy Orders as a papist invention.

Just prior to the English Reformation, King Henry VIII (d. 1547 A.D.) wrote a *Defense of the Seven Sacraments*<sup>59</sup> as a refutation of Luther's publication, *The Babylonian Captivity of the Church*. As a result, in 1521, he was awarded the title *Fidei Defensor* by Pope Leo X (d. 1521 A.D.). Henry staunchly defended the Catholic understanding of the sacraments which included Holy Orders.<sup>60</sup> At that time, he was married to Catherine of Aragon (d. 1536 A.D.) who proved unable to produce a male heir. Henry desperately wanted a son to secure the future of the Tudor dynasty. He petitioned Pope Clement VII (d. 1534 A.D.) to annul the marriage, but was refused on legal principle.<sup>61</sup> Unable to secure an annulment, Henry had the English Parliament pass a number of acts to cut political and religious ties with Rome. In 1534, Parliament passed the *Act of Supremacy* which made Henry "the supreme head on earth of the Church of England" and rejected any "usage, custom, foreign laws, foreign authority [or] prescription."<sup>62</sup> Henry's break with Rome was an act of state largely prompted by personal and political motives. Other contributing factors included Catholic clerical abuses in England and a growing sympathy with the Protestant movement throughout Europe.

The Anglican Archbishop of Canterbury, Thomas Cranmer (d. 1556 A.D.), was deeply influenced by the works of Martin Luther. Cranmer is credited with writing the Book of Common Prayer which established the basic structure of Anglican liturgy and beliefs. With regard to sacraments proper or "Sacraments of the Gospel," the Book of Common Prayer recognizes only two: Baptism and Eucharist. Confirmation, Holy Orders, Matrimony, Reconciliation, and Unction were merely considered common sacraments. These common sacraments are distinguished from the Sacraments of the Gospel insofar as only Baptism and Eucharist were dominical (given by Christ) and

are understood to be necessary for all Christians. According to Article XXV of the *Articles of Religion*:

There are two Sacraments ordained of Christ our Lord in the Gospel, that is to say, Baptism, and the Supper of the Lord. Those five commonly called Sacraments, that is to say, Confirmation, Penance, Orders, Matrimony, and Extreme Unction, are not to be counted for Sacraments of the Gospel, being such as have grown partly of the corrupt following of the Apostles, partly are states of life allowed in the Scriptures, but yet have not like nature of Sacraments with Baptism, and the Lord's Supper, for that they have not any visible sign or ceremony ordained of God.<sup>63</sup>

Unlike the Reformed religions, the Church of England maintained a greatly diminished sense of priesthood. However, by denying the sacramentality of Holy Orders as previously understood by the Catholic Church, they also denied its effects. This, and the abandonment of metaphysics as a form of theological discourse, left no ontological place in Anglican theology for sacramental character.

As a response to the theological challenges of both Anglicanism and the Reformers, Pope Paul III (d. 1549 A.D.) convoked the Council of Trent (1545-1563 A.D.). This was the nineteenth ecumenical council and, in all respects, the most sweeping to date. Among other things, it considered such doctrines as salvation, the sacraments, the canon of the Bible, and standardization of the Mass. On March 3, 1562, during the Seventh Session, the Council Fathers took up the doctrine sacraments in general. There they decreed that:

If anyone says, that, in the three sacraments, Baptism, Confirmation, and Orders, there is not imprinted in the soul a character, that is, a certain spiritual and indelible sign, on account of which they cannot be repeated; let him be anathema.<sup>64</sup>

Insofar as the Trent was far more about defining doctrine than elucidating it, there was a growing sense that its decrees and canons were not sufficient to counter the many popular tracts distributed by the Reformers throughout Western Europe. On February 26, 1562, at the Eighteenth Session, a resolution was passed, “to apply a salutary remedy to this great and pernicious evil, and thinking that the definition of the principal Catholic doctrines was not enough for the purpose, resolved also to publish a formulary and method for teaching the rudiments of the faith, to be used by all legitimate pastors and teachers.”<sup>65</sup> Pope Pius IV entrusted the writing of the Catechism to four distinguished theologians under the supervision of three cardinals. St. Charles Borromeo supervised the editing of the original Italian text and, by 1566, the *Catechismus ex decreto Concilii Tridentini* was complete. By order of the Council, the *Roman Catechism*, as it was more commonly known, was translated into the vernacular and distributed to every nation.<sup>66</sup>

In its general consideration of the sacraments, closely following Thomas Aquinas, the *Roman Catechism* describes both the first and second effects of the sacraments. Affirming the first effect as sanctifying grace, it goes on to say that:

The second effect of the Sacraments - which, however, is not common to all, but peculiar to three, Baptism, Confirmation, and Holy Orders - is the character which they impress on the soul. When the Apostle says: God hath anointed us, who also hath sealed us, and given the pledge of the Spirit in our heart, he not obscurely describes by the word sealed a character, the property of which is to impress a seal and mark.<sup>67</sup>

Neither the Council of Trent nor the *Roman Catechism* explicitly ascribes sacramental character to the diaconate. However, by teaching that the *res et sacramentum* of Holy Orders is character, and by teaching that the diaconate is conferred on by the Sacrament of Orders,<sup>68</sup> both the Trent and the *Catechism* implicitly regard the diaconate as

having receiving the ecclesial effect of character. While this was not dogmatically defined by Trent, this implication was nonetheless doctrinally taught by the *Roman Catechism*.

**Summary and Conclusion:** During this period, the predominant world view was classical consciousness. Strongly influenced by scholasticism, the Tridentine Fathers in their decrees and documents equated truth with being and interpreted reality through deductive reasoning abstracting essences. They viewed religious doctrine as static and immutable having reached a state of perfection. Thus, any change, such as those proposed by the Reformers, represented a loss of perfection and a diminishment of the truth. Here, with the revival of Thomistic thought, basic doctrinal truth and moral norms were considered absolute and universally binding.

Regarding sacramental character during this period, there were no doctrinal developments *per se* except the magisterializing of that which had already been taught. This, in itself, is not insignificant. Sacramental character up to this point has been a long part of the theological tradition. Though well ensconced, it was not established dogma and not universally accepted. This is witnessed by the fact the Fathers saw the need to define it at both the councils of Florence and Trent. Indeed, even among the hierarchy of truths, sacramental character ranked relatively low. However, by dogmatizing the teaching, the Council Fathers simultaneously accomplished two things; they affirmed that much of what was taught in the past was true and to be believed, and they indicated the importance of sacramental character in the bigger theological picture. Properly understood, this affirmation did not simply make explicit what was implicitly believed, but affirmed, under the guidance of the Holy Spirit, that sacramental character was indeed part of the sacred deposit of faith. In doing so, they also revealed the interrelated aspect of a “lesser truth” to a “greater truth” such that, an attack on sacramental character represented an attack on the priesthood, which itself represented an attack on the Real Presence in the Eucharist. In both the Councils of Florence and Trent, sacramental character is elevated and its importance established

as an essential effect in the sacraments of Baptism, Confirmation, and Holy Orders.

Classical conscious as the predominant world view influenced the elevation of sacramental character during this period. Where many Protestant Reformers explicitly rejected sacramental character as an effect of Holy Orders, no Reformer affirmed it. Because the Reformers' objections to previously held truths were so sweeping, the Tridentine Fathers sought to comprehensively clarify and affirm these truths by elevating many of them to the level of official doctrine. To do so, they turned to scholasticism whose analytical language of discourse, deeply rooted in classical consciousness, provided the precision and accuracy they needed to counter the Reformers. This is not only clearly revealed in the decrees of the Council, but also in the *Roman Catechism*. During this period, the classical world view so dominated the theological landscape that it wiped out nearly all vestiges of symbolic consciousness with some minor exceptions. As the seminary system took shape, clerics would be strictly formed in the classical world view predominantly influenced by Thomism. From dogmatics to morality, theological manuals were written influencing generations to come and in turn, influencing the development of doctrine in nearly all spheres of theology. This movement would reach its pinnacle with the promulgation Pope Leo XIII's *Aeterni Patris* in 1879. In response to modern trends in secular philosophy, the encyclical was written to assist and advance the restoration of a truly Christian philosophy through a return to scholasticism and in particular, the work of Aquinas. It would not be until the modern era, that another world view would emerge providing another opportunity to revisit and expand the doctrine of sacramental character.

#### IV. Modern Era

Thus far in our consideration, we have examined the Patristic Era, the Scholastic Period and the Reformation noting the impact of dominant word views on the theological development of sacramental

character. The modern era, which for our purposes begins at the end of the nineteenth century, eventually saw the restoration of the diaconate from a transitional to a permanent office within the three-fold hierarchy. Though the restoration *per se* is not directly related to the development of sacramental character, it is nonetheless a significant event and relevant to the focus of our study. While the diaconate has been an active ministry within the Church from her beginning, the shift to a transitional order meant that Holy Orders in general and sacramental character in particular focused almost exclusively on the episcopate and presbyterate. The restoration of the permanent diaconate and its implementation provides a fresh occasion to examine diaconal theology and, more specifically, the uniqueness of its sacramental character. It is for this reason that we take the opportunity to examine the restoration along with the impact of the prevalent world views during this time. Such an approach will provide the necessary historical context enabling us to better grasp the subtle, but nonetheless important shifts in the development of sacramental character during this period.

**The Dachau Discussions:** Though the diaconate as a permanent office had been suppressed for nearly a millennia, by the nineteenth century talk began to surface in limited quarters about the possibility of a married form of the diaconate. In an 1840 letter to Father Melchior von Diepenbrock, future Prince-Bishop of Breslau and Cardinal, J.K. Passavant, a Frankfurt author and physician writes of the need to enrich the clergy by drawing from the best educated ranks of the laity. This, he reasons, can be done by either allowing priests to marry following the tradition of the Eastern Catholic Churches or by expanding the diaconate to married men in the Latin Church. Passavant concludes by noting that such an approach would provide a pool of excellent ministers for the Church.<sup>69</sup> While this particular citation is somewhat obscure and outside the larger theological community, it nonetheless represents the first recorded reference to a married diaconate.<sup>70</sup> With the passage of time there was a small but growing interest in restoring the permanent diaconate within the theological community

The early part of the twentieth century saw a renewed interest in the permanent diaconate. In the 1930's, a number of articles appeared in the German periodical *Caritas* arguing for the need to restore the permanent diaconate to more adequately address the charitable needs of the Church.<sup>71</sup> While insightful, these articles encouraged efforts among a small segment of the Church to consider the diaconate as a tangible expression of charity within the mystery of the Body of Christ. Along with the articles in *Caritas*, the rise of fascism and the social injustice it brought, gave greater desire to see a restored permanent diaconate. These discussions would begin a growing conversation in and throughout Europe finding a voice at the most unlikely of places, the infamous concentration camp Dachau. Established in March 1933, Dachau was the first regular concentration camp built by the Nazis. Although originally designated to house political prisoners, it also housed religious dissidents which, until its closing in 1945, would include an estimated 2,500 Catholic priests representing the largest religious community in Europe. By the end of the war, 1034 priests would die as a result of their captivity.<sup>72</sup>

Among the many prisoners were two German priests, Father Otto Pies, SJ, (d. 1960) and Father Wilholm Schamoni (d. 1991). Father Pies, considered the spiritual father of the Jesuits at Dachau, began a series of discussions with Father Schamoni and his fellow prisoners concerning the pastoral impact of so many priests and religious in captivity.<sup>73</sup> This, coupled with the disarray of war, meant that the faithful were deprived of the grace and comfort of the Church during the great social upheaval. As part of what the rebuilding efforts might look like after the war, the discussions turned to the restoration of the diaconate. During this time, Father Schamoni kept a journal of these reflections and, after his release, published them in October 1947 in the magazine *Stimmen der Zeit*. Entitled, "Cellblock 26: Experiences of the Priestly Life in Dachau," the article recounts the many discussions among the imprisoned priests, one of which was the restoration of the permanent diaconate. There, Father Schamoni notes the question raised by Father Pies as to "whether or not it was time to act upon the nudges that were apparently being initiated by the Holy Spirit and to permit the diaconate to be reinstated in the Church."<sup>74</sup>

A friend of Father Schamoni and Father Pies, and the author of numerous articles on the restoration of the diaconate, Dr. Josef Hornef compiled a summary of the Dachau discussions after the war. These provide insight into both the perceived pastoral need of the time and how a permanent diaconate might address these needs in a practical way. In relating these discussions, Hornef writes:

1. Overworked and overburdened pastoral priests could be relieved of the catechesis of children and adults, which could be entrusted to specially qualified individuals. Ecclesial office would lend a special sacredness and dignity to the missioning of these individuals.
2. Communities deprived of Mass despite (officially authorized) bination and trination would be afforded the opportunity for prayer services, liturgies of the word and communion services. The establishment of new communities and actual community life would be possible even with the most serious shortage of priests.
3. The preaching of these deacons, who would be involved in the work-a-day world, would be particularly persuasive and down-to-earth. One perceives in current preaching that it is being done by individuals who are "segregati a populo" ("separated from the people").
4. The Church has largely become a Church of authorities and officials. The feudal state and the civil servant state have subbed off on her. The diaconate would be an effective means to return Holy Mother the Church to a Church of the people.
5. The Church has not succeeded in holding its ground among either the leading intellectual classes nor among those classes most easily led astray, the proletariat. In their own milieu, deacons from these classes for these classes could gain influence incomparably

deeper than could any priest, since priests would never develop within this milieu the kind of rapport that deacons would have already established. One could develop the diaconate into a means to win back the de-Christianized milieu. An intelligent deacon from the working-class would, without any special theological training, be able to touch the hearts of his worker colleagues with just the right words.

6. Many vocations to the priesthood would result from the exemplary family life (of married deacons).
7. Deacons could hardly do any harm. If they do not keep their promise, the Church does not need to keep them, as opposed to what it unfortunately must try to do when dealing with priests. The Church does not have to give much, only a measure of trust, and she realizes an enormous gain.
8. Converted protestant pastors could as full-time deacons be given a new, important range of activities.
9. The diaconate could be a bridge to the eastern Churches.<sup>75</sup>

**The Deacon Circle:** After World War II, a group of young men studying as aid workers in Freiburg, Germany advanced the notion of reestablishing the diaconate as a permanent order. Already involved in charitable work as part of the Catholic Social Services Conference, these men asserted that ordination would sanctify their work blessing them and the entire Church. By 1951 a young forest ranger named Hans Kramer, along with Josef Hornef, formed the first “Diaconate Circle” in the city of Freiburg/Bresigau.<sup>76</sup> Though not deacons in the sacramental sense, the Circle was a community of Catholic men dedicated to works of charity. While their initial vision focused on corporal works of mercy, after more intense

reflection, it broadened to include a liturgical and pastoral dimension.<sup>77</sup> At the same, Father Schamoni published his book, *Married Men as Ordained Deacons*, intensifying the discussion and focusing it on the contribution that married men of *virii probati* (men of proven virtue or mature men) could make to the pastoral situation.<sup>78</sup>

Word of the Diaconate Circle and its writings began to spread throughout Europe. In September 1956, at the International Pastoral Liturgical Conference in Assisi, missionary Bishop Von Bekkum of Indonesia proposed the possibility of restoring the diaconate to a permanent order.<sup>79</sup> In his talk entitled, “The Liturgical Renewal in Service of the Missions,” Bishop Von Bekkum, echoing both the Indonesian and Chinese bishops, saw a direct application of a restored permanent diaconate in more effectively carrying out the Church’s missionary activity. From an article in *Nouvelle Revue Theologique* by P. M-D Epagnuel, Pope Pius XII, became familiar with the efforts to restore the diaconate to a permanent place within the hierarchy. In October 1957, at the Second World Conference for Lay Apostolate in Rome, he indicated his support and sympathy for such a movement, but declared that, “the time is not yet ripe.”<sup>80</sup>

By the late 1950s and early 1960s, interest in a permanent diaconate intensified particularly in the German speaking countries. Under the influence of the Deacon Circles and the German Caritas Society, symposiums were held and papers were written to explore the diaconate in terms of the pastoral situation, liturgy, charitable service, and the Church’s missionary activity. While much of this took place on the popular level, interest was also mounting within the theological community. At this time, a small scholarly group gathered under the direction of the noted German theologians Fr. Karl Rahner and Fr. Herbert Vorgrimle. On the eve of the Second Vatican Council, sensing the time may be right to restore the permanent diaconate, Rahner and Vorgrimler edited a 650 page volume entitled: *Diaconia in Christo: über die erneuerung des Diakonates*.<sup>81</sup> The book was a compendium of articles and papers summing up the thought on the diaconate up to that point.

In the years leading up to the Council, Rahner began to take greater interest in the diaconate publishing a number of articles in the journal *Theological Investigations*. In 1961, he was named a *peritus* to the *Second Vatican Council Preparatory Commission on the Administration of the Sacraments*. Though he was sought for his expertise in dogmatics, he was also considered an expert on the diaconate given his publications. As one might expect, unlike the more practical approach of the Deacon Circle, Rahner's method of transcendental Thomism is decidedly theological. Among his many contributions, arguably one of the most prominent is, "The Theology of the Restoration of the Diaconate."<sup>82</sup> Here, Rahner examines the theological justifications for reinstating the diaconate along with such related issues as the association between the individual offices, the opportuneness of restoring the office, as well as celibacy and grace. In doing so, he provides a limited theological basis to the proposed restoration.

In September 1962, just one month before the Second Vatican Council, the original Deacon Circle submitted to the bishops around the world a formal request to restore the diaconate to a permanent order. This, along with a copy of Rahner's *Diaconia in Christo: Über die Erneuerung Des Diakonates* was given to Pope John XXIII in anticipation of the Council's treatment of the diaconate. Consistent with the earlier efforts, the Circle advances an argument in favor of restoring the diaconate based on a perceived increase in pastoral need. Accordingly they write:

Why is such a restoration needed today? Reports on the pastoral situation throughout the world, plus actual apostolic experience, shows that the work mentioned above, namely the administration of the sacraments plus the care of both the supernatural and temporal needs of the souls, have multiplied and diversified to such a degree that they cannot be performed by the bishops and priests alone. Because of the dual nature, both temporal and supernatural, these works require specialized knowledge and intensive training, as well as the grace and authority which flow from sacramental

ordination. Both these requirements would be met by the restoration in the manner described.<sup>83</sup>

It is interesting to note that the Deacon Circle advances an argument in favor of the restoration based on practical considerations or functionality. They maintain that the diaconate should be restored to a permanent office because of increased demands in pastoral ministry; demands that outstrip the capacity of bishops and priests to respond. The difficulty with this argument is that, like a two-edged sword, it cuts both ways. If, because of increased pastoral activity the Church should restore the permanent diaconate, does it not follow that, should there be a decrease in pastoral activity; the Church should revert to a transitional diaconate? Does the Circle's argument not implicitly buy into the very argument that led to the decline of the diaconate as a permanent order in the early Church, only in reverse? Cardinal Suenens, recognizing the weakness of this argument, would later write:

The fact that a number of priests may be equal to fulfilling their role does not at all diminish the duty for lay people to be apostolic since this duty derived from their baptism. In the same way, the diaconate could not be phased out even if tomorrow the crisis of priestly vocations were resolved. . . . The diaconate should be presented for what it is; a distinct sacramental function.<sup>84</sup>

Granting the Deacon Circle's argument for the moment, it seems clear that it was not particularly influenced by Rahner's thought. To be sure, the Circle does address sacramentality, but in a decidedly pragmatic manner. After briefly describing the role of the sacraments in the economy of salvation, the Circle speaks of Holy Orders in terms of a division of labor within the Church.

**Vatican II:** On October 12, 1962, the Second Vatican Council opened with great ceremony. Under the auspice of Pope John XXIII, it would take on a particularly pastoral tone unlike the more

doctrinal councils of the past. Given the intensity of discussions on the diaconate, and the pastoral direction of the Council, the question of the restoration was inevitable. Groundwork had already been laid when, at a 1961 meeting of the *Preparatory Commission on the Administration of the Sacraments*, the question was taken up. Under the influence of Rahner, a *vota* was taken as to whether the restoration of the diaconate should be considered during the deliberation of the Council. The positive vote of the Commission meant that the bishops would officially consider restoring the diaconate to a permanent rank within the hierarchy at the council. However, this initiative was not without its opponents; the most outspoken of which was the Italian Cardinal Alfredo Ottaviani. Ottaviani, along with other members of the curia, feared that the restoration of a married permanent diaconate would eventually open the door to optional celibacy in the priesthood. Others, such as the powerful New York Cardinal Francis Spellman, stated in an October 4, 1963 session of the Council that a restored diaconate would be, “indulging in archaeology,”<sup>85</sup> and told the *New York Times* that, “The reason that I am against it is that it is unnecessary.”<sup>86</sup> Despite this, there was considerable support for a restoration led by the Belgium Cardinal Leo Josef Suenens. Suenens, recognizing the opposition, sought to put forth a compromise that would enable bishops to determine the implementation of the diaconate in their own regions based upon the pastoral demands.<sup>87</sup> In responding to other concerns raised by curial opponents that the tasks of deacons can be carried out by competent laymen, he counters:

It is not a matter of giving external tasks in any way at all or to any one of the faithful. . . . these tasks should be given only to him who objectively and adequately has the necessary grace, so that in building a true community there will be no lack of supernatural efficacy. Unless this is true, the Church cannot be a true supernatural society, the true Mystical Body of Christ, built up harmoniously on those mystery and graces which the Lord has foreordained.<sup>88</sup>

During the Third Session of the Council, on September 29, 1964, four votes were taken on the diaconate.<sup>89</sup> The first vote, which sought to restore the diaconate in principle, passed with an 89 percent majority. This was followed by a second vote which would allow for local bishops to determine the actual implementation in their own diocese. This passed with a 68% majority. The third vote took up the admission of mature married men to the diaconate and passed with a 71% majority. Finally, the Fathers voted on whether young married men might be admitted to the diaconate. This vote failed to win the necessary majority. As a result of the Council’s actions, and despite considerable opposition, the diaconate was restored in the Latin Church to a permanent place in the hierarchy. The decision of the bishops to restore the permanent diaconate found its conciliar expression in the document *Lumen Gentium*. Promulgated on November 21, 1964, the Council Fathers wrote:

At a lower level of the hierarchy are deacons, upon whom hands are imposed ‘not unto the priesthood, but unto a ministry of service.’ For strengthened by sacramental grace, in communion with the bishop and his group of priests they serve in the diaconate of the liturgy, of the word, and of charity to the people of God. It is the duty of the deacon, according as it shall have been assigned to him by competent authority, to administer baptism solemnly, to be custodian and dispenser of the Eucharist, to assist at and bless marriages in the name of the Church, to bring Viaticum to the dying, to read the Sacred Scripture to the faithful, to instruct and exhort the people, to preside over the worship and prayer of the faithful, to administer sacramentals, to officiate at funeral and burial services. Dedicated to duties of charity and of administration, let deacons be mindful of the admonition of Blessed Polycarp: “Be merciful, diligent, walking according to the truth of the Lord, who became the servant of all. Since these duties, so very necessary to the life of the

Church, can be fulfilled only with difficulty in many regions in accordance with the discipline of the Latin Church as it exists today, the diaconate can in the future be restored as a proper and permanent rank of the hierarchy. It pertains to the competent territorial bodies of bishops, of one kind or another, with the approval of the Supreme Pontiff, to decide whether and where it is opportune for such deacons to be established for the care of souls. With the consent of the Roman Pontiff, this diaconate can, in the future, be conferred upon men of more mature age, even upon those living in the married state. It may also be conferred upon suitable young men, for whom the law of celibacy must remain intact.<sup>90</sup>

The reason given by *Lumen Gentium* to restore the diaconate was pastoral necessity. After delineating the deacon's tasks, and affirming their importance in the life of the Church, the Fathers indicate that these tasks can only be achieved with difficulty in certain regions given the prevalent discipline. However, as later pointed out by Rahner, the pastoral need cited as the reason for restoring the permanent diaconate in *Lumen Gentium*, stands in contrast to the reasons given in the Council's document Decree on the Mission Activity of the Church, better known as, *Ad Gentes*. Accordingly the document states:

Where episcopal conferences deem it opportune, the order of the diaconate should be restored as a permanent state of life according to the norms of the Constitution "De Ecclesia." For there are men who actually carry out the functions of the deacon's office, either preaching the word of God as catechists, or presiding over scattered Christian communities in the name of the pastor and the bishop, or practicing charity in social or relief work. It is only right to strengthen them by the imposition of hands which has come down from the

Apostles, and to bind them more closely to the altar, that they may carry out their ministry more effectively because of the sacramental grace of the diaconate.<sup>91</sup>

Where *Lumen Gentium* points to a degree of pastoral lacking<sup>92</sup> as grounds for restoring the diaconate, *Ad Gentes* indicates no such lacking, and instead asserts that these tasks are already being fulfilled by, "men who actually carry out the functions." Because these tasks are already performed with pastoral approval, Rahner argues that they represent an official function of the Church and preexist the restoration. Why then a need for reinstating the diaconate? According to *Ad Gentes*, it is because there is a need to fortify these men with sacramental grace so that they may be more effective.

**Summary and Conclusion:** The Modern Era began ensconced in a classical world view. This was due, in large measure, to the still felt influence of the Council of Trent with its strong neo-Scholastic approach; an approach made stronger with a revival of Thomism in the latter part of the nineteenth century. This world view was further entrenched though a rigid seminary system expressed in the manualist tradition. The realities which doctrine seeks to define are, as a matter of course, eternal, immutable and unchanging. While the classical world view served the past, it seemed unable to accommodate the contingencies of the modern world. Something seemed missing and that something included the historical, the particular, and the contingent. With the emergence of historical consciousness there was a growing sense within the Church that truth cannot exist objectively "out there" without consideration of what is subjectively "in here." This shift is clearly seen in the early impulses to restore the permanent diaconate. The need for such a restoration grew out of the historical situatedness as expressed in the Dachau discussions and in the activities of the Deacon Circle. This is not at all to suggest that historical contingencies in-and-of-themselves gave rise to doctrinal development. Alone and apart from a theological context, they remain only descriptive of what is and only a hint of what can be. Nonetheless, these contingencies do press forward contemporary

questions that are relevant and contextualized in time and culture. The active engagement of theology with these questions gives rise to the possibility of doctrinal development along a different path; one not bound by the static and immutable, but another that is dynamic and changing. In this observation, it is critical to recall that these two paths, classical and historical, properly understood, are not mutually exclusive, but different lines of inquiry leading to a more comprehensive understanding of the same truth. Consequently, the truths expressed in the classical language of Trent are not diminished by the truths expressed in the historical language of Vatican II. They are instead mutually enriched and advanced.

The tendencies toward historical consciousness witnessed by the Dachau discussions and the Deacon Circle find their theological culmination in the Second Vatican Council. In his opening address, Pope John XXIII called the Council Fathers to discern and discover in “the signs of the times” hope for the destiny of the Church and of humanity.<sup>93</sup> This unusual address to what would be an unusual council spoke to the immense need to creatively and actively engage today’s culture. This engagement required that we courageously step out in faith even at the risk of stumbling. Speaking of this courage during one of the council sessions, the English Benedictine Abbot, Basil Butler said:

Let us not be afraid of scholarly and historical truth. . . .  
 Let us not be afraid that our scholars may be lacking in loyalty to the Church and to traditional doctrine. . . .  
 Doubtless some will turn liberty into license - but we must risk this for the sake of the greater good.  
 Doubtless mistakes are made and will be made in this field—but it is one where trial and error are the road to the truth.<sup>94</sup>

Between Trent and the present, little attention was given to the theological development of sacramental character with two slight but notable exceptions. The first of these made the previous dogmatic pronouncements regarding the sacramental character more explicit

as it pertains to the three-fold hierarchy.<sup>95</sup> With regard to the diaconate itself, in his *motu proprio*, *On the General Norms for Restoring the Permanent Diaconate in the Latin Church*, Pope Paul VI taught that the diaconate, “is so adorned with its own indelible character and its own special grace so that those who are called to it can permanently serve the mysteries of Christ and the Church.”<sup>96</sup> This affirmation of sacramental character was reiterated in both the 1983 Code of Canon Law<sup>97</sup> and the 1998 *Directory for the Ministry and Life of Permanent Deacons*.<sup>98</sup> It is summed up in the *Catechism of the Catholic Church* in the following manner, “The sacrament of Holy Orders marks them with an imprint (“character”) which cannot be removed and which configures them to Christ, who made himself the ‘deacon’ or servant of all.”<sup>99</sup>

The second slight but notable development has to do with what can be called the “relational aspect” of sacramental character. Up to this point, character is spoken of in ontological terms; a kind of configuration of the soul. However, for the first time, this configuration is said to bring about a particular relationship; something only implied in the past.<sup>100</sup> In the 1994 *Directory on the Ministry and Life of Priests*, the *Congregation for the Clergy* wrote:

From this, one perceives the essentially “relational” characteristic (Jn 17:11. 21) of the priest’s identity. The grace and the indelible character conferred with the sacramental unction of the Holy Spirit, places the priest in personal relation with the Trinity since it is the fountain of the priestly being and work. Therefore, the priest must live this relationship in an intimate and personal manner, in a dialogue of adoration and of love with the three divine Persons, conscious that he has received this gift for the service of all.<sup>101</sup>

Prior to their ordination, by virtue of their Baptism and Confirmation, priest candidates already have a relationship to the Trinity. As a result of Holy Orders, this previous relationship is now

reconfigured and deepened in such a way as to enable them to accomplish their priestly work. Although this shift is subtle and appears only as a minor thought in a minor post-conciliar document, its implications are nonetheless profound. Beyond moving from a static (classical) to a more dynamic (historical) understanding of character, there is a natural transition from purely ontological language to personalist language, albeit slight. As a result of sacramental character, this new relationship with the Trinity forms the basis for both priestly identity and mission. If this is true of the priesthood, then it is reasonable that bishops and deacons, who also receive character each proper to their office, likewise enter into a new relationship.


## V. Personalism as Point of Departure

In our pursuit to identify a point of departure for a new theological approach to the diaconate, we have considered the impact of world views on the historical development of sacramental character. The underlying assumption here is that, as the ontological basis for the diaconate, sacramental character holds the key to a new approach and that, as world views shaped character in the past, they will continue to shape it in the future. In our investigation thus far, we have observed a shift in terms of dominant world views from symbolic consciousness to classical consciousness and from classical consciousness to historical consciousness. A clue to our point of departure lies in the observation that each of these world views, while distinct, contains within it a commonality so obvious that it is easily overlooked. This commonality stands at the very heart of each world view such that, without it, they cease to exist.

To illustrate what is meant here, consider again the term “world view.” Earlier we described it as a way of apprehending reality consisting of key assumptions that provide a more or less coherent, though not necessarily accurate way of thinking about the world. It is a kind of cognitive orientation or perception possessing certain presuppositions about the structures of reality. Assumed and

implied in this definition is someone capable of possessing an orientation and someone able to hold certain presuppositions. In other words, a world view requires for its very being a “world viewer;” a rational being able to take up a particular position from which he or she can view reality and abstract from that position certain conclusions. We call such a rational being a person. This observation also holds true for the term “consciousness” which we have used interchangeably with “world view.” Consciousness typically describes an interior awareness of our own existence and that of external objects. Assumed and implied in this definition is someone capable of perceiving himself or herself and that same someone able to recognize external objects. In other words, consciousness requires for its very existence a conscious being with the means to grasp reality, a rational being capable of self-awareness. We call such a rational being a person.

Although this underlying commonality of personhood is more readily revealed in historical consciousness with its turn to the subject, it is nonetheless equally present in both symbolic and classical consciousness. Each one, in their own unique way, presupposes a person who stands at a particular point, observes reality, and draws conclusions along certain predetermined lines. In this regard, personhood is the one unchanging commonality among all of the world views and, as such, is a universal and immutable constant. This constant gives rise to a point of convergence among each of the three world views and forms the philosophical and logical basis for their complementarity. That said, this convergence, as illustrated in Figure 2, merely describes what is common and does not create a *quaterium quid* (fourth thing). It does not form a synthesis. It is simply a nexus expressing that which is shared among the three world views. This shared reality of personhood also



*Figure 2. Commonality of Personhood*

corresponds to sacramental character. Character requires for its being someone to whom it is imparted. This someone cannot be anything other than a rational being and we call such beings persons. This understanding of character, which arises out of a modern era influenced by historical consciousness, is evidenced by the relational approach expressed in the *Directory on the Ministry and Life of Priests*. As we have already seen, this configuration is said to bring about a particular relationship between the one being ordained and Christ, between one person and another. In this respect, the *Directory* signals a shift, albeit slight, toward a personalist approach.

Thus far in our investigation we have maintained that sacramental character, insofar as it is the ontological basis of the diaconate, holds the key to a new theological approach. We have also demonstrated that world views, having shaped the development of sacramental character in the past can suggest a point of departure for this approach in the future. We have further observed that sacramental character and world views have, as their convergence, personhood. From this we may conclude that personhood represents a sound point of departure for a new theological approach to the diaconate. This point of departure, insofar as it is grounded in historical consciousness, follows the subtle shifts previously cited in *Gaudium et Spes* and thus stands in continuity with the Second Vatican Council. In this regard, personhood, expressed in a personalist philosophy, takes up the past while, at the same time, having read the “signs of the times,” leans forward into the future.

At the beginning of this chapter, we began our pursuit with the image of a journey. In doing so, we distinguished a true journey from aimless wandering by means of a point of departure that leads to a single well defined destination. We also noted the need to establish intermediate stages between our beginning and our end which serve to measure our progress. It is now possible, having identified Personalism as our point of departure, to identify these stages. As illustrated in Figure 3 and for reasons that will be discussed, they are Lublin Thomism and the Theology of the Body along with four key philosophical foundations drawn from them. When taken together,

these “waypoints” guide us to a new theological approach to the diaconate enabling us, on a rudimentary level, to fulfill the ITC’s charge by beginning a new conversation about what it means to be a permanent deacon in the Roman Catholic tradition.




Figure 3. Progress of this Study



## Chapter Three

### Wojtyla's Personalism

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Having now identified Personalism as our point of departure we have, at the same time, established far more than a start for a new theological approach to the diaconate. To better appreciate this “more,” consider again our analogy of a journey. We began with a final destination and searched for the best point of departure. In finding this point of departure, in relation to our destination, we established two distinct points, a beginning and an end. When we connect these points by means of a vector, we have simultaneously plotted a direct path between the two. This path is the “more,” the very way by which we complete the journey. With respect to our study, our path is the problematic, that is, the operative hermeneutic to get us from where we are to where we want to be. It provides the analytical language of discourse whose structures and concepts guide and, if need be, correct our course ensuring the most effective path to our destination.

Given Personalism as our point of departure, and given that this point of departure orients us to our final destination, consistency requires that our problematic reflect this approach and build upon it. In its most basic sense, Personalism is a philosophical movement that centers on the person as the ontological and epistemological start of

any rational reflection. Here, personhood is understood as that which gives meaning to all of reality and, by that fact, constitutes its supreme value.<sup>1</sup> In this regard, Personalism is merely descriptive of a diverse school of thought rather than a practical philosophical approach.<sup>2</sup> However, from this school, several personalist philosophies have emerged, among which is Lublin Thomism. Lublin Thomism, for reasons discussed in the following chapter, represents for us, the “more.” It is the hermeneutical path that will lead us from our starting point to our destination providing in the end our goal of a new theological approach to the diaconate.

The use of a philosophical problematic to plumb the depths of a particular theological dilemma is well known in the Catholic tradition. One need only call to mind Augustine’s use of Neo-platonic thought or Aquinas’ use of Aristotle to realize the extent of this union. Philosophical concepts such as “consubstantial” and “transubstantiation,” long in the Church’s patrimony, demonstrate the value of philosophy in providing the analytical language required to penetrate, if ever-so-slightly, the mystery under consideration. This penetration, by no means, exhausts the mystery, but provides new and often profound insights. As affirmed in Pope John Paul II’s 1998 encyclical, *Fides et Ratio*, faith (expressed theologically) and reason (expressed philosophically) not only complement one another, but are essential to one another. Where faith without reason, the pope maintains, leads to superstition; reason without faith leads to nihilism and relativism. Philosophy, through the use of speculative reason, brings to the theological table a rigorous mode of inquiry. This rigor, in turn, generates a systematic body of knowledge through the coherence of its logic and the organic nature of its content. In reflecting on the role of philosophy to theology, Pope John Paul II writes:

Philosophy contributes specifically to theology in preparing for a correct *auditus fidei* with its study of the structure of knowledge and personal communication, especially the various forms and functions of language.

No less important is philosophy’s contribution to a more coherent understanding of Church Tradition, the pronouncements of the Magisterium and the teaching of the great masters of theology, who often adopt concepts and thought-forms drawn from a particular philosophical tradition. In this case, the theologian is summoned not only to explain the concepts and terms used by the Church in her thinking and the development of her teaching, but also to know in depth the philosophical systems which may have influenced those concepts and terms, in order to formulate correct and consistent interpretations of them.<sup>3</sup>

In many respects, Pope John Paul’s observations reflect a long-standing tradition whose seeds were planted in the Patristic Era and whose sprouts emerged at the start of the second millennium. St. Peter Damian (d. 1072 A.D.), a Benedictine and Doctor of the Church, held that philosophy should assist theology as a servant serves her mistress. Though he had a certain distrust of philosophy, Damian understood its value in affirming the validity of a theological argument rather than providing insights into the nature of reality. Picking up on this notion and advancing it, later scholastic philosophers would speak of philosophy as the, “handmaiden of theology” (*philosophia ancilla theologiae*). Here, philosophy broke free of the narrow constraints imposed by Damian, and held that the relationship between philosophy and theology was complementary and intelligible. Many of the scholastics understood theology as a science whose content consists of Divine Revelation and whose articulation is often characterized by reasonable arguments. No one would champion this complementarity more than Thomas Aquinas. In his commentary on Boethius’ *De Trinitate*, the Angelic Doctor takes up the question of whether philosophical arguments can be used in a theological pursuit. Arguing in favor of this proposition, he reasons:

I answer that it must be said that gifts of grace are added to those of nature in such a way that they do not

destroy the latter, but rather perfect them; wherefore also the light of faith, which is gratuitously infused into our minds, does not destroy the natural light of cognition, which is in us by nature. For although the natural light of the human mind is insufficient to reveal those truths revealed by faith, yet it is impossible that those things which God has manifested to us by faith should be contrary to those which are evident to us by natural knowledge. In this case one would necessarily be false: and since both kinds of truth are from God, God would be the author of error, a thing which is impossible. Rather, since in imperfect things there is found some imitation of the perfect, though the image is deficient, in those things known by natural reason there are certain similitudes of the truths revealed by faith.<sup>4</sup>

Thomas understood well the value of philosophy as an analytic tool for theological investigation. His thinking is based on the assumption that human knowledge exists on two distinct but related levels: supernatural and natural. Though he regarded a primacy to the supernatural, the natural nonetheless contained certain eternal truths, albeit limited, both of which find their ultimate source in the one God. Where the supernatural is based on Divine Revelation expressed in the Scriptures and Tradition, the natural could be discovered by human reason expressed in such things as the writings of Plato and Aristotle. These could be synthesized in such a way as to diminish neither. At the same time, their combined use would allow the theologian to deduce a complete set of logical consequences from these sources by means of a chain of properly constructed inferences. With great mastery, Thomas employed this approach throughout his own works with profound depth and staggering breath.

Following this tradition, and in pursuit of our limited goal, it would seem appropriate to begin our philosophical investigation with the most fundamental branch of philosophy, that of metaphysics.

However this initial approach, while helpful, will nonetheless prove challenging to those unfamiliar with the ontological categories so common to classical consciousness. In such a case, the full inclusion of metaphysics here may seem confusing and even diversionary. Moreover, while metaphysics is important in establishing the ontological underpinning of a personalist approach to the diaconate, it is not necessary to take it up at this time. It is for these reasons that I included a treatment on metaphysics, but placed it in Appendix 1. The reader may opt to read the appendix before pressing forward with this chapter or read it at a later date. At this point, it is sufficient for our purposes to recognize that metaphysics provides the objective grounding for our examination of sacramental character and the diaconate.\*

While the insights gleaned from a metaphysical perspective reveal something of the ontological nature of the diaconate from an objective point of view, and while these certainly advance us in our pursuit to discover a new theology of the diaconate, alone they are incomplete. This lacking, as we have already seen in our treatment of world views, arises out of a fundamental understanding that any reality has both objective and subjective dimensions each of which conveys a complementary mode or category of thought. Apologist and author Christopher West, referring to Pope John Paul II's *Theology of the Body*, provides an excellent example of this essential complementarity when he explains:

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\* A Summary of Appendix 1. The metaphysics of *diakonia* is based on the premise that, since ordination is the ontological origins of the non-deacon becoming deacon, it represents the beginning of our inquiry and underscores the necessity of a metaphysics of the diaconate. Through a brief analysis of Aristotle's analogies of being, we established: (1) that the substance of *diakonos* is a supernatural universal accidental predication that stands in an inherent relation to a primary substance, (2) that the change from non-deacon to deacon is a permanent supernatural alteration, (3) that, on an ontological level, a relationship has been established between God, who is the Efficient Cause of the change and man in whom the change takes place, (4) that only deacons-in-potency can become deacons-in-act and, (5) based on the maxim *agere sequitur esse*, that an intrinsic relationship exists between what a deacon is (*diakonos*) and what he does (*diakonia*). Though by no means exhaustive, these conclusions provide a rudimentary metaphysics of the diaconate laying the philosophical foundation for a new theology grounded in a personalist framework.

If it is raining outside, metaphysical knowledge would accept this as a given – as an objective reality outside oneself and not determined by oneself. But if it is raining, our experience can and should confirm this. Not only could we look outside and see it, but we can step outside and *feel* it ... John Paul's goal is to get us to step out in the rain, to experience it, and to joyfully spend our lives playing in the rain like a child.<sup>5</sup>

For Wojtyla, the objective and subjective dimensions of any reality are not an either/or proposition, but a both/and. They are not mutually exclusive, but rather mutually inclusive. An objective meteorological understanding of rain as a form of precipitation is, while accurate, by itself incomplete. It explains what rain is, but does not describe the event in a way I can experience and know it for myself. Likewise, the subjective experience of playing in the rain, while descriptive, does not help me to understand the nature of precipitation and its predictability. Both the objective and subjective dimensions of rain are necessary if I am to have a more complete understanding of the phenomena. Thus, properly understood, each dimension confirms, complements, and completes the other. Any attempt to separate the two results in a false dichotomy ultimately devolving into a reductionism. Where traditional theology/philosophy tended toward an objectification of reality to the near exclusion of the subjective dimension, contemporary theology/philosophy tends toward a subjectification of reality to the near exclusion of the objective dimension. As we shall see, in his pre-papal and papal writings, Wojtyla resists both of these extremes, arguing instead for a holistic and organic vision of reality by respecting and integrating the objective and subjective dimensions. As witnessed throughout his philosophical and theological writings, he continues to stress the tension between these two complementary aspects of reality. Because this stress is a constant and reoccurring theme for Wojtyla it will, by necessity, be a constant reoccurring theme in our appropriation of Wojtyla's thought to the diaconate. That said, it must be admitted that Wojtyla is not alone in his avoidance of

objectivism and subjectivism. Indeed, while there are strong tendencies of objectification in the tradition, we can, nonetheless, find examples of this tension in earlier theologies.

A classic example of this holistic integration is the theological distinction between the *fides quae* and the *fides qua*.<sup>6</sup> The *fides quae* is the objective dimension of the faith and concerns what the Church holds in terms of the body of her beliefs. In its most basic sense, it is that which is to be believed by the believer. These beliefs are found in summary form in the *Catechism of the Catholic Church*. Complementing the *fides quae* is the *fides qua*. This is the subjective dimension of the faith and concerns the believer's belief. It is essentially the believer's own personal faith; his or her "playing in the rain." Properly understood, the objective content of the faith ought to form and inform the subjective content of the faith. Put another way, my personal faith is shaped and transformed by the faith of the Church.

The *fides quae* and *fides qua* describe a necessary epistemological relationship between what is objectively available to the believer in an extrinsic sense and what is subjectively accepted by the believer in an intrinsic sense. Critical to this understanding is that both objective and subjective dimensions must be held in tension for each to express their true meaning. In other words, in order for faith to be authentic and its goal of salvation to be realized, one must not simply grasp on an intellectual level what the Church believes (*fides quae*), but internalize that belief so that it becomes a personal lived faith (*fides qua*). This distinction, as we have already seen, is essential. Knowledge of the Catholic faith is not the same thing as believing. An atheist, for example, can be an expert on the goodness of Catholicism. He or she can write hundreds of articles, give lectures around the world, and even write dozens of books. However, these things alone, as accurate or as noble as they are, are not salvific. They cannot, no matter how faithful to Catholicism they may be, substitute for the personal reception of the faith which possesses, at its core, an intimate encounter with Jesus Christ. Simply put, we can know reality, but fail to internalize it. With respect to this insight, Wojtyla distinguishes

“knowledge” from “consciousness.” Knowledge is understood as the receptive faculty because it receives the given, in this case the deposit of faith or the *fides quae*. Conversely, consciousness is the faculty that internalizes that faith (or rejects it) such that it constitutes the inward world of the believer or the *fides qua*. Where knowledge objectively grasps the truth, consciousness strives to give it subjective meaning in one’s own life.<sup>7</sup> Understood this way, the objective content of the faith is meaningless outside of its subjective acceptance. The two form a reciprocal relationship each of which complements and completes the other. Put another way, and using the language of metaphysics, the objective content of the faith possesses potency. This potency is actualized when the non-believer believes, when “the Catholic faith” (*fides quae*) becomes “my Catholic faith” (*fides qua*). Consequently, without the objective content of the faith there is no potency to actualize and without the subjective reception of that objective content, there can be no actualization.

This subject/object relationship admits to an ever-deepening and ongoing dynamic. As the objective content of the faith discloses something to the subject and as the subject appropriates this faith, the subject is, in a certain sense, changed. He or she now possesses a deeper understanding of that which has been disclosed. This deeper understanding allows the subject to reencounter the object and, in the very process, perceive anew that which he or she could not perceive prior to the change. This second encounter repeats, albeit in a more profound way, the initial encounter and the new disclosure prompts a deeper understanding or change in the subject. This phenomenon is quite common to anyone who has made a serious study of the Scriptures. The Scriptures represent the *fides quae* and when first read has the very real capacity to change the reader’s understanding which represents his or her *fides qua*. Once changed, should the reader return to that same passage, it reveals new insights because the reader has been changed by the initial reading.

Just as it is essential to maintain the tension between the objective and subjective dimensions of the faith to grasp its fuller meaning,

so too is it just as essential to grasp the objective and subjective dimensions of the diaconate to advance a new theology. In terms of its philosophical foundations, we have already located the objective dimension of this new theology in a rudimentary metaphysics of the diaconate (Appendix 1). To complete what is lacking, it is now necessary to locate the subjective dimension. Given our point of departure as discussed in chapter two, we will now turn to Personalism in the form of Lublin Thomism as the subjective counterbalance to the objective metaphysics. Before making the shift to the subjective however, one final observation is required. For our study, the nexus between the objective and subjective lies in the space occupied by theological anthropology. Unlike cultural anthropology, which concerns the comparative study of the social characteristics of humanity across times and places, theological anthropology pertains to the study of humanity as it relates to God and one another. It deals with what it means to be human juxtaposed to everything else that exists. Both metaphysics and Personalism share this discipline, though from very different starting points using very different methodologies. While a consideration of the anthropology of St. Thomas might prove helpful here, it is instead placed in Appendix 2 enabling us to advance our study without omitting the Angelic Doctor’s thought.

## I. Lublin Thomism and Wojtyła

**Philosophical Influences:** In considering the contributions of St. Thomas, it is essential to distinguish between his work *per se*, from those who have built upon it. Properly understood, the term “Thomism” is used to describe the philosophical schools that followed the legacy of Thomas Aquinas. One such school is Lublin Thomism. Lublin Thomism arose in Poland after the Second World War when, in 1946, the Catholic University of Lublin established a Department of Philosophy. At this time, there were three leading interpretations or schools of Thomistic thought operative in Europe.<sup>8</sup> The first of these, known as Traditional Thomism, was championed by the great Dominican master Reginald Garrigou-Lagrange and the

French philosopher Jacques Maritain. Traditional Thomism grew out of a revival of Thomistic thought sparked by Pope Leo XIII's 1879 encyclical *Aeterni Patris*. This school followed the earlier tradition of commentaries on Thomas made popular by Thomas de Vio Cajetan and Iberian John of St. Thomas. It is characterized by a distrust of synthesizing Thomism with non-Thomistic thought. Traditional Thomism gained popularity as a means to engage and critique modernism through a strict and rigorous interpretation of Thomas' work. This particular approach greatly influenced Catholic thought in the early to middle twentieth century as witnessed by academic textbooks and theological manuals of that time.<sup>9</sup>

The second Thomistic school, known as Transcendental Thomism, arose out of a response to Kantian and Post-Kantian philosophies. It emerged out of the University of Louvain and advanced by such respected thinkers as Désiré Cardinal Mercier and Joseph Maréchal. Transcendental Thomism sought to synthesize Thomism with a subjectivist approach to knowledge. While not expressly anti-Thomism, the movement understood itself as a, "comprehensive restatement of the plenitude of Catholic thought, coming to grips with modern thought, including that of Protestant and Orthodox theologians . . ." <sup>10</sup> In this regard, Transcendental Thomists such as Karl Rahner and Bernard Lonergan were quite liberal in their interpretation and application of Thomistic thought. As a result, other Thomistic schools saw Transcendentalists as conceding far too much to be considered an authentic variety of Thomism. Nonetheless, Transcendental Thomism was highly influential prior to and after the Second Vatican Council although more so among theologians than philosophers.

The third leading school operative during the emergence of Lublin Thomism is known as Existential Thomism championed by the esteemed French philosopher and historian Etienne Gilson. In his writings, Gilson concluded that much of what is called Thomism is really a misinterpretation of Aquinas' actual thought. He attempted to correct this misinterpretation by a historic reconstruction of the authentic teaching of St. Thomas *ad mentum sancti Thomae* (according

to the mind of St. Thomas) free of the commentaries and glosses *ad corpus litterarum sancti Thomae* (according to the body of St. Thomas' works).<sup>11</sup> In his study of the Angelic Doctor, Gilson became fascinated with Thomas' treatment of man as implied in personhood and his distinctions of substance (*substantia*), essence (*essentia*), and existence (*existentia*).<sup>12</sup> In Thomas' metaphysics, substance is essence (what a thing is) providing existence (that it is). Thus, essence is to existence as potency is to actuality. Existence then, is that by which essence becomes actualized. For Gilson, Thomas was at his core an existentialist. Traditional Thomists like Garrigou-Lagrange, because of the influence of Avicenna and Scotus on the thought of Cajetan, adopted a neo-Platonic bias which focused instead on essence.<sup>13</sup> Because of its focus on existence and the person, this third interpretation of Thomas is called existentialism.<sup>14</sup>

In many respects, these Thomistic schools were responding to a number of modern philosophical trends that called into question classical realism and its focus on existence. John Locke's empiricism, reacting against rationalism, denied that human beings possessed any inherent ideas or that anything is knowable without reference to experience.<sup>15</sup> Empiricism reduced human experience to sense data written upon the mind which Locke considered a *tabula rasa* (clean slate). On the other hand, idealism, influenced by Immanuel Kant, attempted to bridge the gap between empiricism and rationalism.<sup>16</sup> Idealists held that while we can know specific facts about reality only through sensory experience, we can also know the form or ideal they must take prior to any experience. Idealists maintained that reality can be understood in terms of types or categories placing the emphasis not on reality or existence, but on their forms. Another rather new philosophical trend that influenced the Thomistic interpretations was the thought of Karl Marx and his colleague Friedrich Engels. Marxism, or Communism as it is more commonly known, is a socioeconomic theory that reduces human beings to pawns in a larger class struggle. Its radical ideology would force Thomists to reassert and rearticulate their metaphysical anthropology in order to address and counter these extremes arriving at a more balanced understanding of the person.

It is within the philosophical backdrop of Traditional, Transcendental, and Existential Thomism that Lublin Thomism emerged. However, philosophical trends were not the only factors that influenced Lublin Thomism. Rapidly changing social events would play an important role as well. Near the end of World War II, the advancing Soviet forces drove the German Army from Poland. When Franklin D. Roosevelt, Winston Churchill, and Joseph Stalin met at the Yalta Conference in the winter of 1945, they sanctioned the formation of a provisional pro-Communist government in Poland. Now Marxist ideology, which initially made its presence felt through militant force in the 1917 Russian Revolution, swept through Eastern Europe. In its wake, an atheistic totalitarianism took hold imposing its anti-religious ideology on all social structures. As a result, religious institutions and universities were either closed or strictly controlled by the state, although, for reasons still not clear, the University of Lublin (KUL) was the only Catholic university to maintain its religious identity. The imposition of communist ideology and its purging of the Polish intelligentsia left a great intellectual void among the people. In response to this need, in 1946 Father Mieczysław Albert Krapiec founded the philosophy department at KUL.<sup>17</sup> Although the department was quite diverse, its offerings were rooted in the classical realism of Etienne Gilson.<sup>18</sup> Closely following the writings of St. Thomas, and countering the philosophical and social trends of the time, the faculty saw the foundation of their philosophical investigation as grounded in being as existence. They held that much of what is called Thomism had moved away from the existential approach of St. Thomas to one that stressed essence. Where essentialism emphasized abstract concepts as its point of departure, existentialism emphasized real existence. As noted by Piotr Jaroszynski of KUL:

The essentialist approach which infected much of Thomism came from the wrong application of some of Aristotle's works. We find a theory of scientific knowledge in Aristotle's "Posterior Analytics", but this particular theory does not belong to metaphysics, nor did

Aristotle or Thomas apply it to metaphysics. It is not hard to discover why. This theory of science was proper rather to the particular sciences, especially mathematics and geometry. In such areas we use univocal terms, which can be defined according to proximate genus and specific difference. They fit perfectly as subjects and predicates to syllogistic reasonings. Metaphysical terms are, by way of contrast, neither univocal nor strictly limited in their range of denotation and thus cannot be strictly defined. To apply them in syllogistics would be an error.<sup>19</sup>

While existentialists at their core, Lublin Thomists employ a phenomenological methodology. Developed by the German philosopher and mathematician Edmund Husserl in his *Logische Untersuchungen*, Phenomenology studies reality as experienced from the first-person or subjective point of view. By the early twentieth century, Phenomenology was well known in Poland through the writings of Roman Ingarden, a Polish student of Husserl. Where Husserl tended toward a transcendental idealism, the Catholic Ingarden was a phenomenological realist seeing much of his work as a corrective to Husserl's extremes. Teaching at the Jagiellonian University in Krakow, Ingarden influenced a new generation of Polish philosophers. Here Phenomenology was understood not so much as a philosophical school, but a descriptive approach to philosophy that takes the intuitive experience of a phenomena (the thing being reflected upon) and attempts to draw from it the essential characteristics of these experiences from the subjective or first-person point of view. Phenomenology stresses the immediacy of human experience by attempting to isolate it and set it off from all preconceptions (the *epoché*) so as to lay bare its essential structure. This approach restricts the observer's focus to the pure data of consciousness, uncontaminated by other philosophical theories or assumptions.<sup>20</sup> Lublin Thomists are quick to point out that they are not phenomenologists as such, but merely utilize it as a descriptive method of inquiry useful in drawing upon the subjective dimension of human experience.<sup>21</sup> As

existentialists in the tradition of St. Thomas, Lublin Thomists recognized that while insightful, Phenomenology could not, in itself, provide a starting point for metaphysics precisely because being cannot be reduced to a descriptive account. Still, they maintained that Thomistic metaphysics with its objective focus, when supplemented by Phenomenology and its “turn to the subject,” can provide a more holistic approach to philosophical investigations.

**Wojtyla's Contribution:** One of the most prolific contributors to Lublin Thomism is the theologian, philosopher, and future pope, Karol Wojtyla. Wojtyla was first introduced to metaphysics as a young man while attending a clandestine seminary in Nazi occupied Poland run by Archbishop Adam Stefan Sapieha. Like all seminarians at the time, he was required to study the writings of St. Thomas and this came in the form of a textbook written by Fr. Kazimierz Wais. Later, as Pope, Wojtyla would reflect back candidly upon his first encounter with philosophy saying:

I would say that in my life I've had two great philosophical revelations — Thomism and Scheler. So it all really began with Wais' book . . . It was Father Klosak who first gave me Wais and told me to study him for an exam. For a long time I couldn't cope with the book, and I actually wept over it. It was not until two months later, in December and January, that I began to make something of it, but in the end it opened up a whole new world to me. It showed me a new approach to reality, and made me aware of questions that I had only dimly perceived. St. Thomas gave me answers to many problems.<sup>22</sup>

After completing his seminary studies in Krakow, Wojtyla was ordained to the priesthood on the feast of All Saints, 1 November 1946. Following this, he was sent to Rome to study theology at the Pontifical University of St. Thomas Aquinas, also known as

the *Angelicum*. Although he studied under the Traditional Thomist Fr. Reginald Garrigou-Lagrange (aka: the Rigid), Wojtyla was introduced to other Thomistic schools such as Gilson's Existential Thomism. While at the Angelicum, the young Polish priest lodged at the Belgian college in Rome. There, he came in contact with students who studied at the University of Louvain, the center for Transcendental Thomism. The wide exposure to Thomism received in Rome would broaden Wojtyla's understanding of the Angelic Doctor and how his writings have been interpreted over the centuries. While, in his later work, Wojtyla would favor the Existential school of Gilson and Maritain, he also came in contact with contemporary philosophical thought during this time. After completing his studies, he earned a licentiate and later, in 1948, a doctorate in sacred theology.<sup>23</sup> This would be one of two doctorates, the first of which is based on the writing of the Carmelite mystic St. John of the Cross. He then returned to Krakow and, after a brief time as a diocesan priest, was sent to study philosophy at Poland's oldest institution of higher learning, Jagiellonian University. At the Jagiellonian, he was particularly taken with the work of German phenomenologist Max Scheler, whose ethics was the subject of Wojtyla's second doctorate. Like Dietrich von Hildebrand and St. Edith Stein, Scheler was a student of Edmund Husserl and further exposed Wojtyla to Phenomenology along with its potential value.<sup>24</sup> What intrigued the future pope about Scheler and his method was the emphasis on perceiving things as they are. Although Wojtyla was fascinated by this approach, he was also quite critical of Scheler because of Scheler's inability to articulate how moral choices shape the person's interiority. Moreover, Scheler's tendency to emotionalize human experience, to reduce it to feeling, led to an incomplete understanding of the person.<sup>25</sup> Despite this, Wojtyla saw great promise and agreed with Scheler that, properly applied as a descriptive tool, the phenomenological approach can disclose the content of human experience from a subjective perspective.<sup>26</sup> However, it also had its limits particularly in the ethical domain as it had no place for the objective moral order.<sup>27</sup> In a later interview with George Weigel, Pope John Paul II,

commented on the contribution of Phenomenology. Reflecting on the Pontiff's thoughts, Weigel wrote:

Phenomenology, he argued, was an important instrument for probing various dimensions of the human experience. Phenomenology would drift off into various forms of solipsism, however, unless it were grounded in a general theory of things-as-they-are that was resolutely realistic and that could defend the capacity of human beings to get at the truth of things.<sup>28</sup>

Following his studies, Wojtyla was appointed to the philosophy department at the Catholic University of Lublin where he lectured from 1954 to 1962. During that time, he published constantly and became one of the most well-known and respected contributors to Lublin Thomism. It was within the university setting that his thought, influenced by Thomism and Phenomenology, began to develop and take shape. At first, his praise of Thomas seems unqualified.<sup>29</sup> However, as time went on and his thought began to progress, he recognized certain shortcomings in Thomas while, at the same time, acknowledging certain positive aspects arising out of Phenomenology. Where Thomas failed to adequately take into account the subjective dimension of human experience, the phenomenological method allowed for a refocusing on this experience. This is not to suggest that Wojtyla had accepted Phenomenology as a new philosophical method supplanting Thomistic metaphysics. On the contrary, he rejects the Phenomenology of Hegel and Heidegger along with aspects of their thought found in the earlier Kant and later Scheler because it reduced being to consciousness. This was completely untenable for Wojtyla as being is prior to consciousness. The earlier philosophical subject/object split expressed in Descartes', "*cogito ergo sum*," was a turn to the subjective dimension of reality at the expense of the objective dimension of reality. By placing man at the foundation of his philosophical system, Descartes moved away from an objective reality rooted in God to a subjective reality rooted in human consciousness. For him, the

ultimate source of everything is the human mind. Consequently, man and man alone determines such things as meaning, knowledge, and morality. Objectivity and its central place in the philosophical pursuit of truth, beauty, and goodness are abandoned. In their place arises a new subjectivism where truth, beauty, and goodness are established by and reside in the individual. This new emphasis upon subjectivity would seriously impact morality. Gone are universals and moral absolutes, replaced by relativism where each individual decides what is good and what is evil. The impact of Descartes' thought with its emphasis on feelings and opinions could hardly be underestimated. It would significantly influence subsequent generations precipitating the rise of such philosophical schools as existentialism, skepticism, nihilism, along with Freudian psychology and secular humanism. It would affect culture, law, government, and religion. Contrasting Descartes with Thomas, Wojtyla would later write:

How different from the approach of St. Thomas, for whom it is not *thought which determines existence, but existence, "esse," which determines thought!* I think the way I think because I am which I am – a creature – and because He is He who is, *the absolute uncreated Mystery*. If He were not Mystery, there would be no need for revelation, or, more precisely, there would be no need for *God to reveal Himself*.<sup>30</sup>

At his very foundation Wojtyla is a Thomist and, in this regard, there is a primacy of being over consciousness. That said, foundations are meant to be built upon and he does so by turning to the subject, by taking seriously consciousness. However, he does so without ever losing sight of the objective dimension of reality. Thus, Wojtyla's rejection of Descartes, Hegel, and Scheler, lies in a turn to the subject that is simultaneously a turning away from the object. They are, in Wojtyla's view, appropriating the subject at the expense of the object and in doing so offering a fundamentally disintegrated view of the world. In doing so, they fall into the very trap they try to avoid, albeit from different perspectives. This approach creates a dualism, a rip in the fabric of reality that would ultimately devolve into various forms

of relativism.<sup>31</sup> Here there is no place for metaphysics, no place for moral norms and, in its extreme, no place for God.

Wojtyla understood the phenomenological method as subjectively supplementing the overly objectivistic metaphysics of St. Thomas.<sup>32</sup> This “turn to the subject” arose not simply from the limitations of a purely Thomistic approach, nor did it come from his fascination of Scheler’s use of the phenomenological method. Another contributing factor, and perhaps the most significant, came in the form of his love of the Carmelite spirituality. As a young man, Wojtyla was introduced to the writings of Spanish mystic St. John of the Cross by Jan Tyranowski (d. 1947). Tyranowski was a middle-aged tailor, a student of Carmelite spirituality, and lay youth leader. Early in 1940, while Wojtyla was pursuing his studies at the university, he met Tyranowski at his parish of St. Stanislaus in Krakow. At first, the future pope found Tyranowski dense and difficult to understand; however, with some persistence, he was able to enter the mystical thought of St. John of the Cross. A new interior world began to open up within him enabling him, for the first time, to take seriously his own subjectivity. From the study of Carmelite spirituality and the living example of Tyranowski, Wojtyla would learn that union with God (*unio mystica*) requires the cultivation of the interior life leading to a mystical experience of Him. The French poet and scholar, Jean Gerson (d. 1429) captured the meaning of this more subjective approach in the now classical phrase, “*Theologia mystica est experimentalis cogito habita de Deo per amoris unitivi complexium* (mystical theology is knowledge of God arrived through the embrace of unifying love). Unlike natural theology which concerns itself with the objective knowledge of God through reason, or dogmatic theology whose objective knowledge of God is arrived at through divine revelation, mystical theology presupposes and accepts these while at the same time offering a complementary approach grounded in subjective experience. Indeed, the great intellectual master Thomas Aquinas himself understood this well when, toward the end of his own life he experienced God in a profound way.

On the feast of St. Nicholas, Aquinas was celebrating Mass when he received a revelation that so affected him that he wrote and dictated no more, leaving his great work the *Summa Theologia* unfinished. To Brother Reginald’s (his secretary and friend) expostulations he replied, “The end of my labors have come. All that I’ve written appears to me as straw after the things that have been revealed to me.”<sup>33</sup>

While in every respect, the experience of God surpasses any and all attempts to explain Him, explaining Him as Thomas does in his *Summa*, nonetheless still provides valuable insights albeit limited. This is why Thomas’ influence can be seen throughout the writings of St. John even as he progresses toward greater mystical union. The saint well recognized that mystical theology neither repudiates nor undermines its natural and dogmatic counterparts. Instead, it supplements it in much the same way the experience of seeing supplements and surpasses the most accurate explanation of that same sight. Inasmuch as words signify and in their signifying strive to reveal the experience, the explanation remains true despite its inherent limitations. Nonetheless, the great disparity between the subjective experience of God and its various objective explanations remain nearly insurmountable. The young Wojtyla, at the feet of Jan Tyranowski and later as a result of his dissertation on John of the Cross, began to recognize the value of subjective experience in overcoming the inherent limitation associate with metaphysical language. This mystical aspect of Wojtyla’s spirituality with its stress on the interiority would predisposition him to the use of Phenomenology to complement metaphysics later in his life.

The complementary use of Phenomenology and metaphysics is demonstrated in the approach taken to sexual ethics in Wojtyla’s 1960 book, *Love and Responsibility*.<sup>34</sup> While it is not a work based on Thomistic ethics *per se*, it nonetheless grounds itself in Thomistic metaphysics. At the same time, it carefully uses the phenomenological method to describe the human experience of love as a counterbalance

to an exclusively Thomistic approach.<sup>35</sup> Consequently, Wojtyła presents in this work two distinct, but complementary methodologies. In doing so he begins with Phenomenology describing some aspect of human experience thereby addressing the subjective dimension of reality. He then uses Thomistic metaphysics to interpret and more profoundly grasp what has been described, thereby addressing the objective dimension of reality. The order of this approach is neither accidental nor arbitrary. Wojtyła well recognizes that consciousness expresses that which is uniquely human and because of this is a necessary aspect of human nature. Where the phenomenological method tends to describe reality rather than explain it; Thomistic metaphysics tends to explain reality rather than describe it. By “describing” phenomenologists mean observing or intuiting what is immediately given to know in terms of the object before us. This object may be external to them such as the book in your hand or the room that you are in. From an epistemological perspective, Wojtyła maintains “describing” must necessarily precede “explaining.” By explaining before describing, it is quite possible to miss something, perhaps something essential. This is because, in the haste to explain, reality is arranged along a certain line of reasoning which enables the organization of data into categorical “pigeonholes.” If an aspect of reality does not fit into a particular “pigeonhole,” it is considered non-essential and is either ignored or discarded. This is precisely the problem with an anthropology that is exclusively Thomistic. It has no “pigeonhole” for consciousness as understood by contemporary philosophers, at least not in the same way they did. As a result, its significance is never realized in the work of St. Thomas and those who took up his legacy.<sup>36</sup>

The complementary use of Thomistic metaphysics and Phenomenology gave rise to a new kind of Personalism expressed in Lublin Thomism. This is clearly demonstrated in Wojtyła's 1969 work, *The Acting Person*. Here, he advances his understanding of the role of consciousness and its place in developing a more personalist anthropology. While the use of Phenomenology to supplement Thomistic metaphysics is implicit throughout *Love and Responsibility*

serving as a kind of philosophical and methodological undercurrent, it is made explicit in *The Acting Person*. Here he remarks:

The inspiration to embark upon this study came from the need to objectivize that great cognitive process which at its origin may be defined as the experience of man; this experience, which man has of himself, is the richest and apparently the most complex of all experiences accessible to him. Man's experience of anything outside himself is always associated with the experience of himself, and he never experiences anything external without having at the same time the experience of himself.<sup>37</sup>

The most striking characteristic of Lublin Thomism is its stress on the person. In his book, *The Mind of John Paul II*, George Huntston Williams wrote, “Personalism has been generically the self-designation of many a movement that has stressed the primacy and dignity of the person over various kinds of determinism and naturalism. . .”<sup>38</sup> Given their emphasis on St. Thomas, any appropriation of Personalism by Lublin Thomists would, as we have already seen, incorporate the metaphysical anthropology found in the works of the Angelic Doctor. Earlier thinkers, such as the French personalists Maurice Blondel, Emanuel Mounier, and Gabriel Marcel had already begun to synthesize a kind of Catholic Personalism. Much of their work, and that of the Lublin Thomists, would be summarized by Karol Wojtyła in a paper presented in 1961 at the Fourth Annual Philosophical Week at KUL. Entitled, Thomistic Personalism (*Personalizm tomistyczny*), it sought to illustrate how the anthropology of St. Thomas could be enriched by personalist thought. Like many of his colleagues, Wojtyła's focus on the person as the object of philosophical investigation was in response to the violations of human dignity he personally witnessed as a native of Poland under the Nazi occupation and later under Communist rule. Against these, Wojtyła, both as scholar and as churchman advocated an intellectual, cultural, and spiritual effort that upheld both the dignity of the person and human freedom. So

central is personalism to the core of Wojtyla's thought that Cardinal Avery Dulles once wrote that the mystery of the person is, "the concept that could serve as a key to unlock what is distinctive to this pope as a thinker."<sup>39</sup>

In Wojtyla's paper, "Thomistic Personalism," he recognized that although Thomas did not treat the problem of the person in his consideration of man, his anthropology, along with examination of personhood as it related to both the Trinity and Incarnation provides a substantial philosophical basis. Consequently, he viewed Thomas' work as providing, "a whole series of additional constitutive elements that allow us to examine the problem of Personalism in the categories of St. Thomas' philosophy and theology."<sup>40</sup> For Wojtyla, Thomas puts forth an objective Personalism containing the objective characteristics necessary to develop an authentic anthropology. He was satisfied that Thomas correctly interpreted man in terms of the general category of being. However, he became convinced that Thomas' anthropology lacked the necessary subjective characteristics as expressed in human experience. On this he would write, "We can see here how very objectivistic St. Thomas' view of the person is. It almost seems as though there is no place in it as an analysis of consciousness and self-consciousness as totally unique manifestations of the subject."<sup>41</sup> He goes on to say, "In any case, that in which the person's subjectivity is most apparent is presented by St. Thomas in an exclusive - or almost exclusively - objective way."<sup>42</sup> This observation represented the view of Lublin Thomism, which considers Personalism as building upon and completing Thomistic anthropology.<sup>43</sup> By taking up this charge, Wojtyla saw himself and his Lublin colleagues as retrieving from an excessively classical Aristotelian-Thomistic world view an essential element of the human person that remained largely undeveloped in the tradition. Throughout his years at the Catholic University of Lublin, and later as Archbishop of Krakow, Wojtyla would continue to write numerous articles on many aspects of Personalism. The centrality of this focus within his wider thought is summed up when, in 1968, he wrote to his friend and colleague, the future Cardinal Henri De Lubac:

I devote my very rare free moments to a work that is close to my heart and devoted to the metaphysical significance and the mystery of the PERSON. It seems to me that the debate today is being played on that level. The evil of our times consists in the first place in a kind of degradation, indeed in a pulverization, of the fundamental uniqueness of each human person. This evil is even much more of the metaphysical than of the moral order. To this disintegration, planned at times by atheistic ideologies, we must oppose, rather than sterile polemics, a kind of "recapitulation" of the mystery of the person.<sup>44</sup>

## II. Dominant Themes in Wojtyla's Personalism

Although it is well beyond the scope of this investigation to provide an extensive treatment of Wojtyla's personalist thought, it is possible to present some of his dominant themes as they pertain to our pursuit of a new theological approach to the diaconate. In doing so, one is immediately struck by a fundamental challenge. Although his work is Thomistic at its core, his phenomenological approach, by its very nature, resists the strict categorization found in the classical world view of Thomism. Gone are the clean distinctions whose philosophical precision often rivals that of the physical sciences. Instead, one is faced with descriptions of human experience indicative of historical and symbolic world views that, while deeply enriching, lack the kind of specificity to which most western theologians are accustomed. Moreover, this apparent lack of systematization often translates into a writing style that seems to repeat itself; a frequent criticism of Wojtyla's work.<sup>45</sup> This particular approach appears to circle back in on itself such that the reader may well think he or she is returning to an earlier already completed point. For the unfamiliar, this may seem rather redundant or, to use a Latin maxim, *obscurum per obscurius* (explaining something obscure by something even more obscure). In Pope John Paul II's official biography, author George

Weigel relates the story when Fr. Wojtyla and his protege Fr. Styczen took a hike in the mountains to discuss the first draft of Wojtyla's book, *The Acting Person*. When asked what he thought of the work, Fr. Styczen replied, "It's a good first draft. Perhaps it could be translated first from Polish into Polish to make it easier to understand for the reader - and for me."<sup>46</sup>

Despite the challenge of Wojtyla's writing style, upon closer examination, there really is a philosophical method behind his apparent literary madness. Although we touched upon this earlier in our treatment of the *fides quae* and the *fides qua*, it is revisited here to better appreciate his unusual approach. When Wojtyla (the subject) makes an initial pass at a particular topic (the object), he arrives at a certain conclusion. This conclusion modifies his prior understanding. Recognizing that, after the first pass he has not exhausted the mystery of that particular topic, he makes a second pass. This second pass has the advantage of new insight hitherto unavailable in the first pass. Because of this, the second pass reveals even more insights and builds on the first. Wojtyla then repeats this process until he has sufficiently plumbed the depth of the mystery and then moves on. For the casual reader, the new insights revealed in each pass may seem rather insignificant and not worth the effort. This is because, as reader, he or she is not the one being changed, at least not in the same way as Wojtyla. Ironically, the solution to this problem lies within his approach itself. Just as Wojtyla returns repeatedly to penetrate the mystery before him, so too must his readers repeatedly return to his writings to penetrate their mysteries. Thus, when I (the subject) make a first pass at Wojtyla's work (the object), I arrive at some tentative insights. These insights, although incomplete, modify my prior understanding. Recognizing that, after the initial pass I have not exhausted the mystery, I then make a second pass. This second pass has the advantage of newly received insights previously unavailable in the first pass. Because of this, the second pass through Wojtyla reveals even more insights, insights that build upon the first. I then repeat this process until I have sufficiently understood the work before me. Admittedly, it takes a certain level

of tenacity to stick with Wojtyla as he continues to return to the same topic, albeit from slightly different angles. Nonetheless, this persistence will eventually pay off as the once-thought insignificant insights become profound, opening up previously unseen horizons.

Despite this unusual approach in Wojtyla's writing style, it is still possible to abstract certain reoccurring themes whose inherent qualities resolve into quasi-categories for examination and analysis. Even here however, what will be considered is not the whole of Wojtyla's thought, but instead four dominant themes relative to this particular investigation.<sup>47</sup> While the sheer breadth of his work allows for a broader approach, the specificity of this study requires a much tighter focus. Three of the four themes, the irreducible, subjectivity, and the uniqueness of the person, will serve to lay an anthropological foundation for the fourth and most important theme, the primacy of love and the *personalist norm*. While all of these themes capture, to some extent, the essence of Wojtyla's personalist thought, it is his understanding of love that will form the basis of our hermeneutical approach to advance a new theology of the diaconate.<sup>48</sup>

**The Irreducible:** In his paper, "Subjectivity and the Irreducible in the Human Being", Wojtyla observed that contemporary philosophical thought tends to draw a sharp dividing line between two opposing epistemological approaches, subjectivism and objectivism.<sup>49</sup> Although we have already touched upon this matter at the beginning of the chapter, we will take it up again this time within the context of Wojtyla's own thought. For him, subjectivism holds that all knowledge is generated from human experience, denying or significantly downplaying objective reality as such. Conversely, objectivism maintains that all human knowledge is obtained through reason abstracted from objective reality, denying or significantly downplaying subjective reality as such. From the classical world view, this dividing line discouraged any consideration of human subjectivity fearing that it might devolve into subjectivism. While Wojtyla acknowledges that these concerns are not without merit, this reaction against subjectivism ultimately led to an overly objective anthropology in Western

thought, an example of which is found in the writings of St. Thomas. From this perspective, human beings are defined within the larger cosmic order having only the distinguishing characteristics of reason and will to set them aside. For Wojtyla, the understanding that man is merely an object among other objects in the natural world, differentiated only by the intellectual faculties, is certainly valid, but seriously deficient. He fully accepted both Aristotle's hylomorphism and Thomas' adaptation of Aristotle's potency and actuality to essence and existence. However, Wojtyla maintained that the phenomenological method reflecting on human experience can reveal certain truths that are imperative for apprehending a more complete understanding of the human person. This "turn to the subject" (which for him does not mean a simultaneous "turning from the object"), illuminates aspects of the person which, while implicit in the Aristotelian-Thomistic definition of man, is made explicit through reflection on human experience. As he explained in his book, *The Acting Person*, human acts give rise to particular moments of self-apprehension not only about the person's acts *per se*, but about his very self.<sup>50</sup> Concerns for subjectivism notwithstanding, Wojtyla held that this particular approach, which focuses on the subject, is not in danger of falling into subjectivism. He writes, "so long as in this interpretation we maintain a firm enough connection with the integral experience of the human being, not only are we not doomed to subjectivism, but we will also safeguard the authentic personal subjectivity of the human being in the realistic interpretation of human existence."<sup>51</sup> Here Wojtyla expresses supreme confidence that a genuine "turn to the subject" will not only reveal the person to him or herself, but the objective order as well.<sup>52</sup> Indeed, it is precisely through this subjectivity that objectivity is revealed. In *The Person: Subject and Community (Osoba: Podmiot i wspoinota)*, he points out:

In the field of experience, the human being appears both as a particular *suppositium* and as a concrete self, in every instance unique and unrepeatable. This is an experience of the human being in two senses simultaneously, for the one having the experience is a

human being and the one being experienced by the subject of this experience is also a human being. The human being is simultaneously its subject and object. Objectivity belongs to the essence of experience, for experience is always an experience of "something" or "somebody" (in this case, "somebody").<sup>53</sup>

Beyond this fundamental insight, Wojtyla also insists that the phenomenological method itself is inadequate to develop a complete understanding of the person. For this essential element, he appropriates a Thomistic metaphysics providing him with a necessary corrective to a purely subjective approach. Balancing complementary elements of the classical and historic world views, he believes that the Cartesian subject/object split which, when applied to anthropology, led to a dualistic and incomplete understanding of the person, is exposed as inadequate in light of human experience. Of this he writes: "I am convinced that the line of demarcation between the subjectivistic (idealistic) and the objectivistic (realistic) views in anthropology and ethics must break down and is in fact breaking down on the basis of the human experience of the human being."<sup>54</sup>

In order to grasp the person within the context of lived experience, it is essential to take into consideration the aspect of consciousness.<sup>55</sup> Here, the person is revealed not simply in terms of ontological categories, but first and foremost as a self-experiencing subject; as the "I" of his or her own existence. For Wojtyla, a complete understanding of the person requires a, "pause at the irreducible." Where the classical approach tends to reduce the person to Aristotelian-Thomistic categories, the initial datum of human experience reveals the entire concrete self as a whole and thus, by this fact, irreducible to anything else. This fundamental revelation means that the person cannot be boiled down or reduced to objective classifications no matter how insightful these might be. To do so would be to examine the "parts" at the expense of the whole. Thus, for example, while I may identify my will as distinct, it is not my will that is manifested in my choice, but my very self.<sup>56</sup> It is not my love that I give to my spouse, but my very

self. Any anthropology that exclusively reduces the person to general categories of being, passes over that which is most human, "since the *humanum* expresses and realizes itself as the *personale*."<sup>57</sup> The notion of the irreducibility is central to Wojtyla's thought and critical to appreciating his anthropology. By pausing at the irreducible a more complete picture of the person emerges.<sup>58</sup> In developing this fuller anthropology, Wojtyla is careful to avoid the Cartesian subject/object dualism so prevalent in other anthropological approaches. Thus, the subjective apprehension of the person as irreducible, which arises out of historical consciousness, is not sufficient in itself. Properly understood, it must be complemented and enriched by classical consciousness and its insistence on objectivity. However, for Wojtyla, within this complementarity, the irreducible must be accorded a certain primacy. Of this he writes:

Nevertheless, given the variety of circumstances of the real existence of human beings, we must always leave the greater space in this cognitive effort for the irreducible; we must, as it were, give the irreducible the upper hand when thinking about the human being, both in theory and in practice. For the irreducible also refers to everything in the human being that is invisible and wholly internal and whereby each human being, myself included, is an "eyewitness" of his or her own self - of his or her own humanity and person.<sup>59</sup>

**Subjectivity and the Inner Self:** In his analysis of the person, Wojtyla argues that to view the person as merely on a rung on the ladder of being, as simply an object among other objects, is to miss an essential truth. In the first chapter of his book, *Love and Responsibility*, he spoke of the great chasm between persons and non-persons. Adopting Boethius' definitions of the person (*individual substance rationalis naturae*) as a basic starting point, Wojtyla and others within the Lublin school maintain that what separates persons from non-persons is rationality.<sup>60</sup> However, instead of using objective categories such as the will and intellect, Lublin Thomists turn to the subject; to human

experience as the most immediate datum of human existence. Here, what is discovered is that human beings are not mere objects among other objects in the world. Where persons experience other objects from the outside-in, they experience themselves from the inside-out, such that they are present to themselves in a way that no other object is. What is revealed in this self-reflection is not simply the capacity to reason and choose, but an interiority; a self-conscious-self that revolves around truth and goodness revealing in its very exercise the uniqueness of the person. As pointed out by the French philosopher Jacques Maritain, this interiority, which manifests as a self-presence, lies at the heart of what it means to be a person.<sup>61</sup> Where everything else can be examined as external objects, human beings experience themselves, and the world around them, from the inside-out; from the viewpoint of the person.<sup>62</sup> Even the most advanced animals show no awareness of an interior life or a self-consciousness. This subjectivity is unique and exclusive to persons and sets them apart from other non-personal entities in the world.

In this subjectivity, the person is not simply made aware of the world within, but it is through this subjectivity that he or she engages in the world of objects; that the person transcends the solitude of self and connects to the external world. As Wojtyla points out, "A person is an objective entity, which as a definite subject has the closest contacts with the whole (external) world and is most intimately involved with it precisely because of its inwardness, its interior life."<sup>63</sup> This contact with the external world is not merely on the visible level, which all animals share, but on the invisible level; on the level of concepts and ideas and most importantly God. In this way, the human person bears a fundamental similarity with the Trinity, and a fundamental dissimilarity with the rest of the created order.

For Wojtyla, persons never exist in isolation. To be is to be with and for another. It is to be in a relationship with others so as to form a community of persons (*communio personarum*).<sup>64</sup> This community is a gathering of "I(s)" whose purpose is not simply to co-existence, but to co-acting with one another.<sup>65</sup> Following the Jewish philosopher

Martin Buber (d. 1965 A.D.), Wojtyla describes this relationship as the “I-Thou” relationship between two subjects.<sup>66</sup> It is within the context of this relationship that each party reaches out to the other forming communities that mutually reveal themselves to the other.<sup>67</sup> Here persons manifest themselves as acting persons. In doing so, they disclose themselves in their deepest structure of self-possession and self-governance. As the “I-Thou” relationship matures, it becomes a “We” relationship moving from a broad social dimension of community to a deeply interpersonal dimension. Where the “I-Thou” relationship bespeaks persons who stand apart from one another, the “We” relationship manifests a deeper interpersonal union. Here the “We” relationship does not destroy the individual person, but rather the individual person discovers him or herself more fully in the relationship and as such realizes a certain self-fulfillment. According to Wojtyla:

A “we” is many human beings, many subjects, who in some way exist and act together. Acting “together” (i.e., “in common”) does not mean engaging in a number of activities that somehow go along side by side. Rather it means that these activities, along with the existence of those many I’s are related to a single value, which therefore deserves to be called the common good.<sup>68</sup>

In this “turn to the subject,” it might be concluded that Wojtyla states the obvious since all examinations are conducted by persons using their interiority or rational faculties. While this is true in a certain sense, this is not what he means by an examination from the inside. Historically, both the physical and natural sciences have considered the human person as an object that can be empirically known rather than a subject who knows. St Thomas’ appropriation and expansion of Aristotle’s classical world view is a perfect example. This approach examined human beings as objects in order to abstract certain universals in the pursuit of what is essential. What was abstracted could then be applied to all human beings. Despite the fact that this approach reveals what the person is, missing is any real consideration of the individual

human person as such. Thus, while this objective examination of the human being is necessary and capable of revealing great truths, taken alone, it is incomplete and represents only a partial truth.<sup>69</sup>

To better illustrate the essential nature of subject/object approach by way of an analogy, consider Austrian composer Franz Schubert’s *Ellens dritter Gesang*, better known as the *Ave Maria*. One way to describe this classical piece of music would be to examine the score. There, certain objective truths are revealed such as the key, the time signature, the notes, along with various dynamic and tempo markers. Looking through the piece, it is possible to get a sense of its complexity appreciating the subtleties and nuances. Despite the fact that this examination reveals objective truth such that it can be talked about and even passed on to other musicians, somehow, taken by itself, it fails to do justice to Schubert’s work. However, once it is played by a full orchestra, and sung with an exceptional voice, it is experienced on the subjective level. Now the music resonates within such that it is known in a qualitatively different manner. In this illustration what is important is not so much that the objective perspective (the score) and the subjective perspective (listening to the music) are different, but instead how their complementarity reveals a more complete picture of the beauty of the music. Although this analogy is limited, it conveys the essential and unique value of the subjective dimension of human experience in relation to the objective dimension; an experience which, when focused on the human person illuminates more fully what it means to be human.<sup>70</sup>

**Uniqueness of the Person:** The most cursory reflection on human experience reveals that each person is unique and utterly unrepeatable. Indeed, the most fundamental experience of “the self” discloses that I am different. Not only am I different from those around me; those around me are very different from one another. Even in the case of identical twins, upon closer inspection, unique aspects emerge that set the two apart in distinctive ways. These differences are not only apparent on the visible level, but on the invisible level as well. Persons not only look different, they exhibit different personalities. Where each person manifests a uniqueness and unrepeatability, non-persons represent a

single countable specimen interchangeable with any other member in their species. This is not to suggest that non-personal entities of the same species are identical to one another in every respect, but rather they don't exhibit the kind of irreplaceability proper to persons. A cow, for example, can be replaced by another equally good cow. She will provide just as much milk and eat just as much hay. However, a person is such an utterly unrepeatable and unique entity that he or she cannot be replaced. If one were to try, it would result in a mere substitution. This is to say that one unrepeatable person with his or her own unique qualities would be replaced by another totally different unrepeatable person with his or her own unique qualities. Where non-persons, because they are "repeatable" take on the status of specimen; persons, because they are "unrepeatable" exist for their own sake. Making this same observation, the Swiss theologian Fr. Hans Urs von Balthasar wrote, "Few words have as many layers of meaning as *person*. On the surface it means just any human being, any countable individual. Its deeper sense, however, points to the individual's uniqueness which cannot be interchanged and therefore cannot be counted."<sup>71</sup> The "deeper sense" spoken of by von Balthasar illustrates that persons, while sharing the same human nature, are so radically different that they represent "apples" and "oranges;" that, in a certain sense, they differ in kind, not degree. Thus, properly understood, because human beings possess a certain absoluteness, they cannot be reduced to some type of common denominator whereby they can be quantified. Where a metaphysical anthropological approach captures what is common and universal, an personalist approach captures what is singular and particular. On the metaphysical level, human beings can be counted because that which is common and universal can be quantified. Thus, a census can be taken of a country's citizens, attendance can be conducted in a classroom. However, on a the personalist level, persons are so utterly unique that they cannot be counted because that which is singular and particular exhibits an certain absoluteness that resists quantification.<sup>72</sup> As observed by the American philosopher John F. Crosby:

Each rather has personhood as so incommunicably his own that, though he is not the only person, he

nevertheless "appears in being" as if he were the only one. If we must speak of persons in terms of number, then it would seem to be vastly more appropriate to introduce infinite numbers, and to say that each person represents "infinitely many," so that when one person is added to another it is like adding one numerical infinity to another numerical infinity: just as the second infinity adds infinitely much to the first, and yet, paradoxically, adds nothing, since there is nothing more than infinitely many, so one person adds infinitely much to another, and yet in a way adds nothing.<sup>73</sup>

As Crosby points out, the utter uniqueness and transcendence of the person, along with his or her intrinsic value, reveal the incommunicability of the person. As an inner mystery proper to all persons, incommunicability is expressed in the Latin maxim, *persons est sui iuris alteri incommunicabilis* (a person is a being which belongs to itself and which does not share being with another). St. Thomas Aquinas rooted this incommunicability in rationality which, for Wojtyla, expresses subjectivity. This subjectivity, which makes me *me* and nobody else, admits to a self-governance such that in my freely chosen acts, I assert myself in the world in a unique and unrepeatable way. It is here, in the exercise of the will, in the assertion of the "I," that incommunicability is fully realized. For Wojtyla, "The incommunicable, the *inalienable*, in a person is intrinsic to that person's inner-self; to the power of self-determination, to free will. No one else can want for me. No one can substitute his act of will for mine."<sup>74</sup> Thus, for Wojtyla, incommunicability is not merely the uniqueness of the person alone, but instead the uniqueness of the acting person.

**The Primacy of Love and the *Personalist Norm*:** As an interpersonal reality, love presupposes and assumes a particular understanding of the person.<sup>75</sup> To that end, the three prior themes of the irreducible, subjectivity, and the uniqueness of the person provide the necessary anthropological basis to examine the primacy of love within a personalist context.<sup>76</sup> With these established, Wojtyla begins

his analysis by making some fundamental distinctions regarding the verb, "to use." In one sense, he defines "use" as an object of an action employed as a means to an end. Here the "end" is understood as the intention, goal, or purpose of the act (*finis operantis*). As such, it represents the motivation for acting. Of its very nature, an "end" always implies a "means" (*finis operis*) in the same way that an "effect" implies a "cause." The "means" is understood as the instrumentality by which something, the "end," is accomplished. According to Wojtyla, this means-ends relationship describes the reality between persons and things, where things are understood as non-personal entities. For example, one may use an ax to cut down a tree. Where using the ax represents the "means," cutting down the tree represents the "ends."<sup>77</sup> It is accepted that persons may use things as a means to a particular end. Because things are non-persons, Wojtyla extends this use to animals. Thus, a horse can be used as a means of transportation. In both things and animals, this first meaning of the verb "to use" is not license and therefore restraint must be shown and the moral order respected. One cannot gut rainforests without regard for the larger ecosystem, and one cannot physically push a horse without regard for the animal's health.

Wojtyla next points out that, while the means-ends relationship pertains to persons and things, it cannot rightly be applied between persons. This is based on the fact that, as we have already seen, persons are not things and, as such, ought not to be treated as objects of use. In other words, because persons possess subjectivity and an inner-self, because they are unique and utterly unrepeatable, the very nature of personhood precludes being used as *merely* a means to an end. As the German philosopher Immanuel Kant (d. 1804 A.D.) pointed out nearly two centuries earlier, this form of manipulation violates the dignity of the person as a free self-determined being who can reason and choose.<sup>78</sup> Even if the person were incapable of exercising the will and intellect, as in the case of an unborn child or Alzheimer patient, these powers of the soul nonetheless remain *in potentia*. As such, these people still possess complete personhood in an objective ontological sense and this personhood must be respected along with all of the rights that flow

from it. For Wojtyla, this constitutes an absolute moral norm rooted in the very nature of the person such that no person, human or divine, can violate it. Of this he writes:

On the part of God, indeed, it is totally out of the question, since, by giving man an intellect and free nature he has thereby ordained that each man alone will decide for himself the ends of his activity, and not to be a blind tool of someone else's ends. Therefore, if God intends to direct man towards certain goals, he allows him to begin with to know those goals, so that he may make them his own and strive toward them independently.<sup>79</sup>

Rooted in the irreducible, subjectivity, and the uniqueness of the person, Wojtyla, drawing heavily on Kant, formulates what he calls, the *personalist norm* as follows: "a person must not be *merely* the means to an end for another person."<sup>80</sup> This he views as an intrinsic aspect of the moral order universally binding in all times, situations, and cultures. However, this universality raises the question of certain interpersonal relationships that appear to employ this kind of use, such as that of a commander and his soldiers. At some point, a commander may be required to order his soldiers into harm's way resulting in their likely death. While this relationship between a military superior and subordinate can certainly tend toward a form of use, it need not. For Wojtyla, the only corrective to this tendency is love. It may seem odd to speak of love in terms of the relationship between a commander and his soldiers, however at this point it is sufficient to understand love as a respect for the dignity of the person by not treating a person as a means to an end; though later we shall see that it is much more than that. Here the commander reveals to his soldiers the intended end which may include their death. Thus, the soldiers are made fully aware that by charging into harm's way, they may very well die. By revealing this end up front, the soldiers must be able to see the good and freely embrace it as their own. As a result, rather than imposing his will, either by force or ignorance, upon his subordinates (a violation of the *personalist norm*), the commander

is “inviting” them to share in that end by adopting it as their own. This, of course, presupposes that both their actions and the end are good and in accord with the moral order. By adopting this end as their own, the commander and his soldiers establish a common bond rooted in a common good (the end sought). They do not merely seek the same end individually, but rather do so within the context of an interpersonal relationship in which they subordinate themselves to each other for the good of that end. In this common subordination, the commander does not relinquish his command, but subordinates himself by respecting the dignity of his soldiers in the pursuit of a common goal. They cannot be cannon fodder reduced to mere objects of use. Instead, a relationship that respects the *personalist norm* makes it possible for both parties to realize and affirm their equal dignity, albeit exercised in different ways. Of this Wojtyla writes, “When two different people consciously choose a common aim this puts them on a footing of equality, and precludes the possibility that one of them might be subordinate to the other.”<sup>81</sup> In this context, the preclusion of which Wojtyla speaks is that of a subordination of dignity, not a subordination of a conventional order. A commander is, by convention, superior in rank to his soldiers and this superiority is necessary to preserve good order and achieve the common end. The superiority of the commander’s rank does not, in itself, violate the *personalist norm*. It is only when the commander abuses his authority by treating his soldiers as mere objects of use thereby depersonalizing them that the *personalist norm* is violated.

Having laid out *personalist norm* and described how it applies to the relationship between a commander and his soldiers, Wojtyla turns his attention to the relationship between a man and a woman within the contexts of sexual ethics. He observes that:

Even here, and indeed especially here, only love can preclude the use of one person by another. Love, as we have said is conditioned by the common attitude of people towards the same good, which they choose as their aim, and to which they subordinate themselves.<sup>82</sup>

Because the two are united in one flesh (Gen 2:24) through a common sexual life in marriage, it is important that neither spouse becomes merely a means to an end for the other.<sup>83</sup> Such is a possibility when, for example, a man marries the boss’ daughter merely to advance his career, or when a woman marries a wealthy man merely to gain material possessions. In either case, they are both seeking other ends, mutually using one another toward those ends. This is contrary to the *personalist norm* and the nature of spousal love. As with the commander and soldier, to preclude such use both must freely choose and mutually subordinate themselves to the same end; which for marriage is the unitive and procreative goods. This mutual subordination creates a bond between the couple uniting them and allowing both to realize their common dignity and find fulfillment together. Thus, the common pursuit of the unitive and procreative ends of marriage, according to Wojtyla, “create in principle the possibility of love and exclude the possibility of treating a person as a means to an end and as an object of use.”<sup>84</sup>

In his consideration of the second meaning of the verb “to use,” Wojtyla begins by observing that authentic human acts are accompanied, either before, during, or after by various emotions or what he calls, “emotional-affective overtones.” These emotions make the act more perceptible and, to a greater or lesser degree, influence the objective structure of human behavior. They may have a positive charge insofar as one may experience pleasure in the form of sensual satisfaction, emotional contentment, and even profound joy. They may also have a negative charge insofar as one may experience pain in the form of sensual disgust, emotional discontent, and even deep sorrow. These emotional-affective overtones encroach upon human acts in great variety and varying intensity especially when it comes to the opposite sex. It is precisely here where the second meaning of the term “use” comes into play. Where the first meaning of “use” involves using a person as a means to an end, this second meaning of “use” (which is a variant of the first) involves seeking the emotional-affective overtones as the end in itself apart from the other. As in the case of prostitution, the “John” uses the prostitute for sexual

gratification. Likewise the prostitute uses the "John" to obtain money to feed her drug habit. In both instances, each subordinates the other as an object to obtain his or her own gratification. This is possible because subjectivity and the inner-self capacitates the person to isolate the emotional overtones such that all else, including the other, is subordinate to that end. Properly understood, emotional-affective overtones that accompany human sexuality must never subordinate the person, but must itself be subordinate to love. As Wojtyla points out:

A person of the opposite sex cannot be for another person the means to an end - in this case sexual pleasure or delight. The belief that a human being is a person leads to the acceptance of the postulate that enjoyment must be subordinate to love. 'Use,' not only in the first, broader meaning, but also in the second, narrower, more subjective meaning (for the experience of pleasure is by its nature subjective) can be raised to the level appropriate to an interpersonal relationship only by love.<sup>85</sup>

The two meanings of the verb "to use" represent, to some extent, a critique of utilitarianism. Utilitarianism is the ethical doctrine that all actions are to be judged in terms of their utility in promoting the greatest happiness of the greatest number. One of the first to advance this theory in a systematic matter was the British jurist and philosopher Jeremy Bentham (d. 1832 A.D.) in his *Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation*. There he writes:

Nature has placed mankind under the governance of two sovereign masters, pain and pleasure. It is for them alone to point out what we ought to do, as well as to determine what we shall do. On the one hand the standard of right and wrong, on the other the chain of causes and effects, are fastened to their throne. They govern us in all we do, in all we say, in all we think.<sup>86</sup>

Bentham's thought was further advanced by British philosopher and political economist John Stuart Mill (d. 1873 A.D.) who maintained that human acts are good insofar as they tend to promote happiness and evil insofar as they tend to produce the opposite of happiness.<sup>87</sup> Utilitarianism, as it has been developed and understood today, can be summed up in three basic tenets. The first holds that the moral quality of an act is determined by the goodness or evilness of the effects that flow from it. This is known as the *consequentialist principle*. The second maintains that, the only thing that is good *per se* is pleasure, and the only thing bad *per se* is pain. This is known as *hedonist principle*. The third and final tenet holds that any moral analysis must take into account the number of individuals affected by the action so as to assess the degree of the pleasure and/or pain. This is known as the *principle of extent*.<sup>88</sup> Wojtyla places the moral concern not so much on the *principle of extent*, but instead on the *hedonist principle*, which both utilitarianism and pure hedonism share. For him, the belief that pleasure, in itself, is the greatest good to which all else must be subordinated fails to take into account the rational nature of the person reducing him to the level of an animal. Of this he writes:

Pleasure is essentially incidental, contingent, something which may occur in the course of an action. Naturally then, to organize your actions with pleasure itself as the exclusive or primary aim is in contradiction to the proper structure of human action. . . . Quite obviously, that which is truly good, that which morality and conscious bid me to do, often involves some measure of pain and requires the renunciation of some pleasure. The pain involved, or the pleasure I must forgo, is not the decisive consideration if I am to act rationally.<sup>89</sup>

Following Immanuel Kant's *Categorical Imperative*, Wojtyla holds that there are moral absolutes which are obliging in all situations. In this appeal to an objective moral order, he demonstrates that utilitarianism, because of its focus on a particular individual's pleasures or

what a particular individual perceives as being the greatest amount of pleasure for the greatest number, ultimately devolves into a subjective form of emotive preference. From this Wojtyla concludes that the utilitarian, "must then look at every person as a possible means of obtaining the maximum pleasure."<sup>90</sup> This, he sees, is contrary to authentic love which understands human relationships not as mutual objects of use, but as two people freely choosing a common good and subjecting themselves to it thereby forming a community of persons. Because utilitarianism treats people as things by reducing them to mere objects of use, Wojtyla understands it to be depersonalizing, antithetical to love, and contrary to the dignity of the person.

Having examined Wojtyla's analysis of the verb "to use," it is now necessary to consider his understanding of love in greater detail. Here he takes as a fundamental starting point the fact that love is always a mutual relationship between persons and that this relationship is rooted in specific attitudes toward a good which is pursued by both of them. Where the *personalist norm* is a negative definition in the sense that it describes what love is not (use), Wojtyla now begins to expand upon that definition in the positive by affirming its relational aspect and the couple's mutual submission to each other and a common good. As a result of this mutual submission, each is affirming the other not as a thing of use, but as a person to be loved. Of this he writes: "So far, we have elicited one fact, namely that love for a person must consist in affirmation that the person has a value higher than that of an object for consumption or use."<sup>91</sup>

Later on, in his discussion of the ethical dimension of love, Wojtyla argues that love is fully integrated only when it is considered as a virtue; when the *personalist norm* shapes the very choices we make. From this perspective, love is not so much a particular choice, but rather love must motivate every choice. It admits to a kind of primacy within the volition; something that shapes and tempers every judgment and decision. Such choices, which are understood not simply in terms of an act of the will, but of the entire person, not only affirms the value of the person, but also subordinates any form of use out of a

deep and abiding reverence for the incalculable dignity of the other. This redirects the focus away from something to be obtained to someone to be loved.

Although Wojtyla reflects upon this within the context of marital love, the principle here can be applied to any interpersonal relationship with certain qualifications. For him, love, "is directed not towards 'the body' alone, nor yet towards 'a human being of the other sex,' but precisely towards a person. What is more, it is only when it directs itself to the person that love is love."<sup>92</sup> This understanding gives rise to a love grounded on a mutual gift-of-self, a reciprocity founded on the pursuit of a common good and based in the nature of the relationship.<sup>93</sup> Here the object of the choice is the other person. This object is "obtained" by gifting oneself while at the same time accepting the gift of the other. Because this choice involves this mutual gift-of-self, the two move from individuals to a community of persons (*communio personarum*). While betrothed love has, as its most decisive characteristic, this total gift-of-self, all human relationships that respect the dignity of the person admit to some gift-of-self. The "kind" and "degree" of this gift-of-self are proportionate to the nature of the relationship. Thus, the gift-of-self proper to spouses is different from that between siblings and friends. Still, it logically follows that love, as a gift-of-self can be applied to all relationships between persons including deacons and those whom they serve.

### III. The Theology of the Body

To better appreciate Wojtyla's personalist understanding of love, we need to turn to his papal works, more specifically his *Theology of the Body*.<sup>94</sup> The *Theology of the Body* is comprised of a series of 129 talks given by Pope John Paul II during his Wednesday audiences between September 1979 and November 1984. These teachings, which make up a systematic catechesis, are distinct from his earlier pre-papal work in that they represent an exercise of the ordinary Magisterium and thus formalize the teaching within the Church proper. Moreover,

they represent a theological development of his personalist philosophy. Reflecting on this theological contribution as it relates to understanding the person, John Paul would later write: “The mystery of the Incarnation lays the foundations for an anthropology which, reaching beyond its own limitations and contradictions, moves towards God Himself, indeed towards the goal of ‘divinization’.”<sup>95</sup> Consequently, the *Theology of the Body* builds christocentrically upon Personalism in the way the faith builds on reason; the way grace builds on nature. Moreover, while John Paul’s focus on marriage and sexuality, the implications of his approach are not limited to spousal love. Indeed, he maintains that the *Theology of the Body* will immerse us into, “the perspective of the whole Gospel, of the whole teaching, in fact of the whole mission of Christ.”<sup>96</sup> As a result, it represents an entirely new theological approach whose full potential remains untapped.<sup>97</sup> While the pope’s work is thoroughly original and its implications sweeping, for our purposes it will suffice to touch only on those aspects relevant to our pursuit. As we have done previously with Personalism, we will give a brief overview of *Theology of the Body* setting the stage for its more extensive application to a new theology of the diaconate in the next chapter.

Pope John Paul’s *Theology of the Body* is grounded in a key passage found in Vatican II’s *Gaudium et Spes* (Pastoral Constitution on the Church in the Modern World). It is a theme to which, throughout his many talks, he returns time and time again. It reads:

Indeed, the Lord Jesus, when He prayed to the Father, “that all may be one. . . as we are one” (John 17:21-22) opened up vistas closed to human reason, for He implied a certain likeness between the union of the divine Persons, and the unity of God’s sons in truth and charity. This likeness reveals that man, who is the only creature on earth which God willed for itself, cannot fully find himself except through a sincere gift of himself.<sup>98</sup>

In his use of this text, the pope focuses on two distinct, but related points.<sup>99</sup> The first is that, of all the creatures on the earth, man is the only one that God willed for his (the man’s) own sake. As Aquinas observed centuries earlier, to will for the sake of another is nothing less than to love.<sup>100</sup> It is simply a restatement of the *personalist norm* although, in this case, it refers to God’s creative love. Here, the person is not willed for the purposes of something else for this would mean that he or she is merely a “means” to an “end,” a violation of the *personalist norm*. Instead, the person is an “end” unto himself. Implicit within this distinction is the understanding that a “means,” by its very nature, is determined. This is to say, it is oriented by necessity toward some “end” and by that fact lacks the freedom to act in a way opposed to that “end.” The ax as a “means” to an “end” cannot act contrary to the will of the woodcutter. God does not wield humanity like an ax, but instead, by willing humanity for its own sake, by seeing it as an “end” unto itself, He leaves us unfettered. This freedom enables us to seek our own end. It capacitates us to love. And it is precisely here where the second point in *Gaudium et Spes* 24 comes into play. This “end” for which man was created can only be realized through a sincere gift-of-self to another.<sup>101</sup> In these two points, we hear echoes of Christ Himself who, in his Gospel, says, “love one another as I have loved you (Jn 15:12).”

John Paul’s Personalism is shaped by what the *Theology of the Body* calls, “a hermeneutics of the gift.” It is essentially a broad and sweeping interpretation of reality in terms of self-donation. He describes this self-donation and its primary effect by saying that the, “love in which the man-person becomes a gift and – by means of this gift – fulfills the very meaning of his being and existence.”<sup>102</sup> Like all gifts, it presupposes a willing giver and a receiver receptive to the gift. As we have already seen in our consideration of Personalism, when the receiver freely accepts the gift from the giver an intimate union is formed; the “I-Thou” becomes a “We.” Understood this way, gift and reception enjoy a mutual, complementary, and reciprocal dynamic. Of this the pope says, “The giving and the accepting of the gift interpenetrate, so that the giving of oneself becomes accepting, and the

acceptance is transformed into giving.”<sup>103</sup> He goes on to say, “The affirmation of the person is nothing but acceptance of the gift, which, by means of reciprocity, creates a communion of persons (*communio personarum*).”<sup>104</sup> Love then, for John Paul, consists of a mutual gift-of-self that wills the good of another for the sake of the other. It is initiated with God’s creative and redemptive love through the gift of His Son Jesus Christ. It is reciprocated when the believer believes or, more specifically, when his or her belief is expressed in concrete acts of reciprocating love. This mutual self-donation establishes what John Paul calls, “the nuptial relationship.” Deeply rooted in the Scriptures, he points out that, among all of the biblical images used to describe the relationship between God and humanity, marriage enjoys preeminence. From the creation of man and woman in Genesis, through the sensual language found in the Song of Songs, to the wedding feast of the Lamb in the Book of Revelation; marriage is repeatedly used to describe God’s intimate relationship with humanity. Beyond this, marriage is the only biblical image elevated to a sacrament and, as such, it is the only one that communicates what it signifies in an efficacious manner.<sup>105</sup> As John Paul explains, the nuptial image “contains in itself a characteristic of the mystery which is not directly emphasized . . . by any other analogy used in the Bible.”<sup>106</sup>

Although the nuptial relationship is typically used in a narrow sense to describe spousal love, it also has for the pope a broader meaning. He sees nuptiality as so inscribed in the mystery of creation and redemption that, in a very real way, it possesses a universal significance. This is precisely St. Paul’s point in his letter to the Ephesians. After explaining the relationship between the spouses, he goes on to say, “This is a great mystery, but I speak in reference to Christ and His Church (Eph 5:32).” Paul, building upon the biblical tradition of the Old Testament, sees marriage as taking on a new symbolic meaning in light of the Pascal Mystery; one which reveals the intimate love between Christ and His Church in a profound way. Later John Paul would write, “The ‘great mystery’ which is the Church and humanity in Christ, does not exist apart from the ‘great mystery’ expressed in the ‘one flesh’.”<sup>107</sup> Indeed, because divine love constitutes the original

and fundamental gift from God, all of creation possesses a nuptial character.<sup>108</sup>

In our consideration of the nuptial image, it is important to keep in mind that, while Pope John Paul sees marriage as first and foremost a theological reality, the analogy between God’s love for humanity and the love of a husband and wife is just that, an analogy. In this regard, divine and spousal love constitute a resemblance or correspondence between two different, but similar realities such that meaning is transferred from one to the other shedding light on both. Nonetheless, in recognizing the singular contribution of this nuptial imagery, the pope is quick to point out the limitations associated with it. That, despite the value of the analogy to penetrate the mystery, in the end, the mystery remains transcendent. Put more popularly, in an attempt to communicate the incommunicable, “All analogies limp.” John Paul describes the strengths and weakness of the nuptial analogy this way.

It is obvious that the analogy of earthly human love of the husband for his wife, of human spousal love, cannot provide an adequate and complete understanding of that absolutely transcendent Reality which is the divine mystery, both as hidden for ages in God, and in its historical fulfillment in time, when “Christ so loved the Church and gave himself up for her” (Eph 5:25). The mystery remains transcendent in regard to this analogy as in regard to any other analogy, whereby we seek to express it in human language. At the same time, however, this analogy offers the possibility of a certain cognitive penetration into the essence of the mystery.<sup>109</sup>

Properly understood, this nuptial image admits to far more than an analogy. It is sacramental in nature and, as such, is a visible sign of an invisible reality. It points beyond itself to a deeper more profound truth precisely because it participates in that truth. Where the first part of *Gaudium et Spes* 24 reveals this invisible deeper truth

that God created man for His own sake, the second part, that man cannot find himself without gifting himself, reveals that first truth visibly. In other words, human reason cannot, by its own power, grasp God's love directly. We cannot know that He created us for our own sake. This fundamental truth is inaccessible to the will and reason since it lies beyond our natural capacities to apprehend and appreciate it.<sup>110</sup> It was made known to us through God's revelation most fully realized in the person of Jesus and His gift-of-self expressed in the Pascal Mystery. He is the primordial sacrament insofar as He is the visible sign of the invisible God entrusted to the Church from which divine life is dispensed.<sup>111</sup> Through His life, passion, death and resurrection, Jesus points beyond Himself to the fuller reality of a Triune God who is Love (1Jn 4:8). He communicates the incommunicable, makes tangible the intangible, and renders visible the invisible. Jesus Christ is God's creative, redemptive, and sanctifying love incarnate; freely given for the sake of the other. This offer of divine love makes possible an interpersonal encounter with each person not by way of the supernatural, but through the natural; through His Body and ours. We understand this intuitively through our participation in the Eucharist. We believe that the bread and wine, the visible matter, once consecrated, makes Christ really present, Body, Blood, Soul, and Divinity. Here, the natural gives way to the supernatural. Without this materiality, without the natural, the supernatural Eucharistic encounter cannot occur. When this sacramental offer of love is freely accepted, true and intimate communion takes place. The nuptial meaning of the body shares in this same incarnate love.<sup>112</sup> It is simply another way, like Christ, like the Church and Her sacraments, to manifest God's love in a concrete existential manner. By gifting ourselves sacrificially to others, we incarnate Him; making the invisible God visible and, in the very process, participate in His divine life.<sup>113</sup>

John Paul points out that, in the visible world, the gift-of-self can only be realized between persons through their bodies.<sup>114</sup> If the body bespeaks the soul, then it possesses the powers of the soul which are revealed in the exercise of the will and reason. These two powers are

essential to love because the gift-of-self is manifest in a free choice (the exercise of the will), and because the ability to receive the gift from the other requires some understanding of the other (the exercise of the reason); for we cannot love what we do not understand. The soul, like God Himself, is immaterial and therefore invisible. Just as God took on materiality in the Incarnation to render the divine person visible, so too does the soul "take on" materiality to render the person visible. This visibility is accomplished exclusively in and through the body. It alone enables the person to enter the world while, at the same time, it enables the world to enter the person. Applied to the dynamic of love, the body capacitates the person to offer the gift-of-self to another while, at the same time, capacitates the person to receive the gift-of-self from another. In doing so, particularly in spousal love, it reveals the divine gift. As Pope John Paul points out, in this regard:

Man appears in the visible world as the highest expression of the divine gift, because he bears within him the interior dimension of the gift. With it he brings into the world his particular likeness to God, with which he transcends and dominates also his "visibility" in the world, his corporality . . . Thus, in this dimension, a primordial sacrament is constituted, understood as a sign that transmits effectively in the visible world the invisible mystery hidden in God from time immemorial. This is the mystery of truth and love, the mystery of divine life, in which man really participates.<sup>115</sup>

From all this, it can be said that the body is the sacrament of the soul. Together, the body and soul constitute the human person created in the Image of God. For John Paul, being a person means being in a relationship with another; that to be (to exist) is to be with and for another. When, through a mutual and reciprocal gift-of-self, two persons form a *communio personarum*, they in turn become the sacrament of the Triune God. This communion is most apparent when it is expressed in the complementarity of the sexes. In the *Theology of the Body*, John Paul considers this revelation of the body within the three

epochs of salvation history: creation, the fall, and redemption. Where creation bespeaks the state of original innocence representing the nuptial relationship in terms of God's original plan, the fall describes the loss of that innocence as a result of original sin. This fall, in which our first parents abused their freedom, had the effect of wounding, weakening and diminishing our human nature thereby disordering the nuptial relationship. Redemption, on the other hand, began the restoration process such that, through grace, the nuptial meaning of the body can once again be realized. While all of this represents a cursory overview of the *Theology of the Body*, it will suffice at this point in our investigation for laying the foundation of a personalist approach to the diaconate.

Having earlier identified Personalism as our point of departure and Lublin Thomism as our problematic, this chapter sought to unfold Lublin Thomism by laying out the philosophical bases for our pursuit. Likewise, in our brief treatment of the *Theology of the Body*, we demonstrated how Pope John Paul built a new theological approach based upon the philosophical foundations of a Personalism, rooted in Lublin Thomism, grounded in Thomistic metaphysics, and shaped by a Phenomenology. In this, the pope provided for us the very means to do our own theology of the diaconate likewise based on a Personalism informed by Lublin Thomism, Thomistic metaphysics (Appendix 1) and Phenomenology. Among other things, this particular approach avoids the limits of a purely classical or purely historical consciousness. Instead, it embraces both in symbolic consciousness thereby satisfying one of the key requirements laid out in our preliminary considerations.



## Chapter Four

### Key Philosophical Foundations

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Though considerable progress has been made in laying out the problematic in both its philosophical and theological forms, it still remains for us to apply this problematic in a way that gives rise to a *novum theologia diaconati*. Before proceeding however, we would do well to determine the objective criteria necessary to arrive at this new theology. This will enable us, after our investigation, to conclude whether we have achieved our goal and, if not, to determine what remains. In doing so, it is important to recognize at the outset the limits of this or any other criteria in such an endeavor. They only reflect the scope, confines, and premises of a particular approach without necessarily excluding others. The divinely revealed office of the diaconate is, by its very nature, mysterious; and the depths of such a mystery cannot be adequately plumbed by any single approach. Consequently, the personalist perspective on the diaconate offered in this study is not intended as “the” new approach, but rather “a” new approach. It is only put forth as a means to advance the state of the question and, in doing so, better understand what it means to be a deacon in the Roman Catholic tradition.

The criteria for our investigation will be five-fold. First, as indicated in our preliminary considerations, any new theological approach to the diaconate must be grounded in *ressourcement* as interpreted within the context of Pope Benedict's *hermeneutic of continuity and reform*. Simply put, our effort must be consistent with the entire Catholic tradition particularly as that tradition has been expressed doctrinally in Holy Orders and the diaconate. Second, all three world views must influence this new theology freeing us from the constraints inherent in the use of any single world view. Because all three world views converge on the person, the use of Personalism (expressed in Lublin Thomism) as our problematic is uniquely positioned to satisfy this criterion. Third, because sacramental character is the ontological origins of the diaconate, any authentic theological development must accommodate character as an essential element. This will necessarily require a metaphysical component which we have already satisfied in Appendix 1. Fourth, both the International Theological Commission (ITC) and the Congregation for Catholic Education (CCE) maintain the centrality of Christology to any new theology of the diaconate. In its report, the ITC noted that, "In order to affirm that the diaconate is a sacrament, it is necessary to state that it is rooted in Christ."<sup>1</sup> Here the question is not whether the diaconate is divinely instituted as a sacrament, for that is already established doctrine, but rather how the diaconate as a sacrament finds its identity and mission in the Person of Christ.<sup>2</sup> This Christological criterion is also affirmed by the CCE in their "points of reference" for a sure theology of the diaconate.<sup>3</sup> This criterion, because of the essential nature of Christ to Catholic theology, is the most fundamental and must impact, to a greater or lesser degree, all of the other criteria. Finally, along with this Christological grounding, the CCE also recognizes our last criterion, the need for a corresponding ecclesiological consideration.<sup>4</sup> The inherent connection between Christ (Christology) and the Church (ecclesiology) is as essential as the Head is to the Body (1Cor 12:27). Consequently, any new theology of the diaconate must not simply address the Christological and ecclesiological dimensions themselves; it must also describe the relationship between the two.

While the five criteria do not exhaust the possible points of reference to establish a new theology of the diaconate, they are, nonetheless, broad in their reach and lay a strong foundation firmly rooted in the Catholic tradition. We will return to these benchmarks at the end of our study to assess whether or not our personalist approach has adequately met the criteria for a new theology of the diaconate.

With our criteria now established, we would do well to return to an earlier consideration before proceeding. As already noted, Lublin Thomism assumes Aristotelian-Thomistic metaphysics as objectively complementing the phenomenological "turn to the subject." It follows then that our use of Lublin Thomism for a new theology of the diaconate also requires an objective grounding in metaphysics. Wojtyla was able to do this in his Personalism and *Theology of the Body* by simply appropriating Thomistic metaphysics and anthropology. The task was not so simple with the diaconate since Thomas did not treat Holy Orders from a metaphysical perspective, at least not systematically.<sup>5</sup> While it is true that he accepts the ontological nature of sacramental character, and while he does see this as giving new powers, he never applies his metaphysics or anthropology to any sacred office, much less the diaconate. Taking up the challenge, in Appendix 1 we deduced from the broader thought of Aristotle and Thomas a rudimentary metaphysics of the diaconate. Insofar as this metaphysics lays the objective foundation for our new approach to the diaconate, we would do well to restate our conclusions before considering the subjective dimension as expressed in Personalism and *Theology of the Body*. These can be briefly summarized in the following five statements. First, the substance of *diakonos* is a supernatural universal accidental predication that stands in an inherent relation to a primary substance. Second, that the change from non-deacon to deacon is a permanent supernatural alteration. Third, that, on an ontological level, a relationship has been established between God, who is the Efficient Cause of the change and man in whom the change takes place. Fourth, that only deacons-in-potency can become deacons-in-act. Finally, based on the maxim *agere sequitur*

*esse*, that an intrinsic relationship exists between what a deacon is (*diakonos*) and what he does (*diakonia*).

As we have already established, if we look to metaphysics to provide a complete picture of the diaconate, or even an adequate one, we will come away disappointed. Our treatment of Lublin Thomism has shown that metaphysics is only one part of a much bigger picture. To be sure, it does explain what it means to be a deacon in strict ontological categories and these categories provide insight into the nature of the order in a way that no other philosophical approach does. Still, the ontological language seems to hide as much as it reveals leaving us in the end rather unsatisfied and desiring more. The need for this “more” arises out of a sense that we have examined the parts at the expense of the whole. The diaconate, as we shall see, is far more than an order restricted to the material cosmos explained in five ontological distinctions. Missing in all of this is the deacon expressed as an integrated whole which, while embracing the metaphysical reality, recognizes a deep interior life made possible by consciousness. Consequently, while sound in its objectivity, our rudimentary metaphysics cannot speak to the lived experiences of the deacon exercising his diaconate. What is missing, and what Personalism and the *Theology of the Body* can provide, is an account of the diaconate from within, one that takes seriously the person as an organic and integrated whole. Having considered in our previous chapter some of the personalist themes found in the work of Karol Wojtyła, we now turn our attention to their implications as a philosophical foundation to a new theology of the diaconate. More specifically, we will consider some of the initial insights that arise out of the diaconate in light of: the irreducible, subjectivity and the inner-self, the uniqueness of the person, along with the primacy of love.

## I. Diaconate and the Irreducible

In contrast to Aristotelian-Thomistic metaphysics where the person sits atop the continuum of being, Lublin Thomism does not view the person as simply an object among other objects in the natural

world differentiated only by the intellectual faculties. Just as Wojtyła maintained that by reflecting on human experience certain truths are revealed that are imperative for apprehending a more complete understanding of the human person, the same can be said for the diaconate. A “turn to the subject,” as long as it is not a simultaneous “turning from the object,” can illuminate aspects of the diaconate which, while implicit in the Aristotelian-Thomistic categories already considered, is made explicit through reflection on human experience. If Wojtyła is correct that human acts give rise to particular moments of self-apprehension not only about the person’s acts, but about his or her very self, then because diaconal acts (*diakonia*) are a particular kind of human act, they too give rise to particular moments of self-apprehension, not only about the *diakonia*, but about *diakonos* as well.

As we have already seen, ontological realities, since they are beyond the senses, cannot be grasped directly by the senses. This indirect apprehension can either come by way of another’s witness as in Divine Revelation or through abstraction based on outward manifestations. Both Aristotle and Thomas understood this well. The soul, for example, being an ontological reality, cannot be apprehended by the senses. For Aristotle, its existence is “proven” by its outward manifestation in much the same way that an effect points to its cause.<sup>6</sup> Thomas likewise considered these manifestations as “proof” of the soul’s existence but, being a Christian, also supplemented his treatment with Divine Revelation. The same can be said of the diaconate, which is first and foremost an ontological reality. Sacramental character, like the soul upon which it “marks,” is beyond the capacities of our senses to apprehend. It cannot be perceived directly in the ordinary manner and, therefore, it must rely on indirect sources for its knowability. These sources, as we have already seen, are either Divine Revelation or an outward manifestation. Leaving aside Divine Revelation for the moment, this outward manifestation is a visible sign pointing to and participating in an invisible ontological reality.

In many respects, this understanding is simply an application of the Latin maxim *agere sequitur esse* (to act is to follow being). Essentially, this means that what a thing is (*esse*) determines how it will act (*agere*).

Put another way, just as a tree is known by its fruits, so too is the ontology of the diaconate known by its outward manifestations or ministry. Understood this way, *diakonia* (service) provides a window on *diakonos* (the servant) precisely because service (*agere*) flows from being a servant (*esse*). Here, every particular task of the diaconate is an expression and concrete actualization of its fundamental essence. Consequently, by reflecting and describing the experience *diakonia*, *diakonos* is revealed.

This is not a one-way process, but a dialectic of sorts. *Diakonia* and *diakonos* stand as two poles whose mutual implication and reciprocity set up an ongoing dynamic, a kind of “back and forth,” that continually reveals what a deacon is and how he should act. Here, as illustrated in Figure 4, we see the influence of




Figure 4. Relationship between the Objective and Subjective Dimensions of the Diaconate

symbolic consciousness which understands reality as a relational order of opposites. This consists of the symbol itself, and the reality it points. In this case, the symbol is *diakonia* and the reality it points is *diakonos*.

With this established, the starting point for our “back and forth” begins with a description of human experience which, in this case, is diaconal ministry. This need not be human experience as expressed in the sense of a particular deacon’s experience, but can be expressed in common or even primordial sense of all deacons. An example of this can be found in *Theology of the Body* where Pope John Paul reflects upon

the experience of creation and the fall as revealed in the sacred text. This experience admits to a kind of universality and, as such, links the paradigmatic experiences of our first parents to our own. Later, in our use of the *Theology of the Body* as the basis for our diaconal theology, we will employ the same methodology using texts proper to the diaconate. However, it is sufficient at this point to simply establish the subjective starting point for our dialectic in the human experience of sacred service. From this subjective description, we then shift to the objective explanation moving, in this case, from *diakonia* to *diakonos*. Here, the metaphysics of the diaconate can be used to interpret and more deeply understand what has been described. This metaphysical explanation, now enriched by the previous Phenomenological description, gives rise to a more holistic sense of the sacred office and corresponding ministry. Such an insight, having changed the deacon’s perception, will inevitably lead him back to re-experience diaconal service which, in turn, leads him back to the metaphysical.

Each cycle through the dialectic discloses to the deacon in a fuller and more profound way what it means to be deacon and, from this, what it means to serve. Within this process, the diaconate now becomes *my diaconate*, not in a purely subjective sense, but in the sense that my subjective experience corresponds to the objective metaphysical truth of sacred ecclesial service. As this process begins to reveal more about *diakonos*, about what it really means to be a sacred servant; this new revelation enhances and strengthens my diaconal identity capacitating me to act more like the deacon I am. Again, in this we hear the echos of the maxim *agere sequitur esse*. This process, which requires for its being the sanctifying grace of Holy Orders, is the very “place” where the deacon discovers both who he is, and how he is to act. Concerns for subjectivism notwithstanding, as long as this dynamic “back and forth” process is ongoing, it is not in danger of falling into subjectivism. Just as Wojtyla expresses confidence that a genuine “turn to the subject” will not only reveal the person to himself, but the objective order as well; so too will a genuine diaconal “turn to the subject” not only reveal *diakonos* to the deacon, but the

objective order as well.<sup>7</sup> Indeed, it is precisely in and through this subjectivity that objectivity is fully revealed.

In order to grasp the diaconate within the context of lived experience, it is essential to take into consideration the aspect of consciousness.<sup>8</sup> Here, the deacon is revealed not simply in terms of ontological categories, but first and foremost as a self-experiencing subject; as the “I” of his own existence. Just as a complete understanding of the person requires a “pause at the irreducible,” so too does a complete understanding of the diaconate require this same pause. Where the classical approach tends to reduce the deacon to the otherwise helpful Aristotelian-Thomistic categories, the initial datum of diaconal experience reveals the entire concrete deacon as a whole. This fundamental revelation means that the deacon cannot be boiled down or reduced to objective classifications nor functions, no matter how insightful these might be. As we have seen, to do so would be to examine the parts at the expense of the whole. Any consideration of the diaconate that reduces the deacon to general categories of being or functionality, passes over that which is most human, “since the *humanum* expresses and realizes itself as the *personale*.”<sup>9</sup> The notion of irreducibility is critical to appreciating the subjective dimension of the diaconate. By pausing at the irreducible, a more complete picture of the deacon emerges. Because he is deacon, everything he does ought to flow from this ontological fact. Whether in the official exercise of his ministry or his secular job, whether as husband or father, he is irreducibly a deacon and his diaconate ought to be manifested in all his actions. This is precisely what Pope John Paul II meant when he said, “The deacon is not a part-time employee or ecclesiastical official, but a minister of the Church.”<sup>10</sup>

In developing this approach to the diaconate, great care must be exercised to avoid the Cartesian subject/object split so prevalent in other approaches. This cannot be stressed enough. Here, either the objective dimension is emphasized to the exclusion of the subjective, or the subjective dimension is emphasized to the exclusion of the objective. In order to achieve the necessary balance, constant tension must be maintained

between the objective and subjective dimensions. This is why the subjective apprehension of the diaconate as irreducible, which arises out of both historical and symbolic consciousness, is not sufficient in itself. Properly understood, it must be complemented and enriched by classical consciousness and its insistence on objectivity. Consequently, the diaconate must be supplemented by a thorough grounding in metaphysics.

## II. Diaconate and Subjectivity

Subjectivity and the inner-self reveal that *diakonia* is lived from the inside out. Since the deacon is irreducible, he experiences the diaconate not as a particular part of his makeup, not as a specific component of who he is, but as an expression of his very self configured to Christ the Servant. Wojtyla points out that, where we experience other objects from the outside in, we experience ourselves from the inside out. Because of this, we are present to ourselves in a way that no other object is. This means that for the deacon to be effective in *diakonia*, he must first develop a greater self-understanding of who he is as revealed in Divine Revelation. Here, as an application of *agere sequitur esse*, we can say that identity precedes mission. This identity, which builds upon the deacon’s more primary identity as a Christian, is conferred on him through Holy Orders. Consequently, as a human act *diakonia* begins in the subject and is experienced internally before it is manifested externally through sacred service. This interiority, which expresses itself as self-presence, lies at the heart of what it means to be a deacon.

In this subjectivity, the deacon is not simply made aware of the world within, the world of a servant called to serve, but it is through this subjectivity that he engages in *diakonia*. In doing so, he transcends the solitude of self and connects to the external world through sacred service. This service is not merely on the visible level, but on the invisible level. It is on the level of concepts and ideas and most importantly God who through Christ Jesus, “did not come to be served but to serve and to give his life as a ransom for many (Mt 20:28).” In this way, the diaconate bears a fundamental similarity with Christ

the Servant, and a fundamental dissimilarity with the episcopal and presbyteral orders.

One of the ways in which this interior self-presence can be fashioned is through ongoing spiritual meditation on the *servant mysteries*. By *servant mysteries*, what is meant is the revelation of Christ the Servant as manifested in the Scripture, Tradition, and Magisterium. This approach, advanced by Deacon James Keating, Deacon Stephen Miletic and others, recognizes that at the heart of the deacon's subjectivity is an ontological configuration to Christ the Servant. This configuration is understood as much less a "mark" and much more an interior "place" of encounter. Through prayer, and in particular *lectio divina* on the *servant mysteries*, the deacon discovers and communes with Christ the Servant thereby further enriching his diaconate. This enrichment is expressed first through a deeper realization of the deacon's own *relationship with Christ*, which in turn fosters a deeper *identity in Christ*, which in turn provides a clearer sense of his *mission for Christ*. These three-fold fruits of *relationship*, *identity* and *mission*, arise from the *servant mysteries* and admit to a dynamic such that, once the cycle completes itself, it can begin again and again drawing the deacon into a deeper more intimate communion with Jesus Christ. Though much more can be said of this particular diaconal spirituality which is thoroughly consistent with a personalist approach, it is sufficient at this time to merely mention it leaving it for others to flesh it out. Nonetheless, because it moves beyond the mere identification of the deacon's subjectivity and describes the quality of that subjectivity, it is worth mentioning here.

### III. Diaconate and Uniqueness

Just as each person is different, so too is each deacon different. In this regard, not only is one deacon different from every deacon he has met, but those deacons he has met are very different from each other as well. This uniqueness is not only apparent on the visible level, but also on the invisible level to which the visible points and reveals. Deacons not only look different, they also display different personalities as well. As a result, each deacon manifests a uniqueness

and unrepeatability, making Christ the Servant present in a way that no other deacon can. This means that, in a certain sense, he cannot be replaced. If one were to try, it would result in a mere substitution. This is to say one unrepeatable deacon with his own unique contribution would be substituted by another totally different unrepeatable deacon with his own unique contribution. Where our earlier metaphysical approach captures what is common and universal to all deacons, Lublin Thomism with its insistence on what is unique and unrepeatable, captures what is singular and particular.

This notion of incommunicability reveals the utter uniqueness and transcendence of each deacon along with his intrinsic value. Subjectivity, which makes a deacon his and nobody else's, admits to a self-governance such that, in the exercise of his ministry, he asserts himself in the world in a unique and unrepeatable way. It is here, in the exercise of his *diakonia*, in the assertion of his "I," that incommunicability is fully realized. This incommunicability is intrinsic to that particular deacon's inner-self. Consequently, in a certain sense, no deacon can be replaced without losing the uniqueness of his particular diaconate. True, another deacon can take on his role in this ministry or that liturgical function, but this "taking on" merely results in a substitution such that new the deacon offers his unique expression of *diakonia* in place of the previous deacon. This is not to suggest a kind of incommunicability that might restrict one deacon from validly covering for another in a ministerial role. Both share in the universality of the order and, by virtue of ordination, both reflect Christ the Servant in sacred service, albeit in unique ways. This is not so with a layperson who attempts the functions associated with diaconal ministry. To be sure, the outward acts may appear similar to that of a deacon and, most certainly, he does bring his own incommunicability to these. However, he does so in a manner befitting his particular state in life as a layperson, not a deacon. Having not been ontologically configured to Christ the Servant, he lacks what is necessary to provide ecclesial service the same way a deacon can.

Incommunicability can not only be demonstrated in those who share a similar vocation, it can also be demonstrated in those of dissimilar vocation who share a common function. For instance, as is often

the case, a toddler's desire for independence exceeds his or her ability to walk. This typically results in an unexpected fall. Arriving first on the scene, the father, in an attempt to comfort his child, scoops up the boy only to hear between the cries of distress, "I want my Mommy." Instinctively, he rushes the child over to his wife where immediately the toddler settles down in the comfort of the mother's arms. Notice that, in terms of function, in terms of the actual service rendered, the father did nothing different than the mother. He held and consoled his son the very same way she did. However, the difference was not so much in what he did, but how what he did related to who he is. Quite obviously, he is the daddy, not the mommy. Mommies and daddies are different at their core (*esse*), and because they are different there will be a difference in what they do (*agere*), even if what they do appears to be the exact same thing. Even if another mommy were to step in, and even if that mommy was tender and compassionate, it still would not be the same for that child. Because of her incommunicability, that child's mommy is so unique that she is utterly irreplaceable.

The same is true with the diaconate. Diaconal service is different from the service provided by laypersons precisely because deacons are different at their core (*esse*), and because they are different, there will be a difference in what they do (*agere*), even if what they do appears to be the exact same thing as laypersons. This incommunicability is why a layperson can never replace a deacon in the exercise of ordained diaconal ministry. The layperson lacks the sacramental character and grace of the office to be a deacon and because act follows being (*agere sequitur esse*), he or she cannot serve in the same capacity as the deacon any more than one mother can replace another. Even if the lay minister is more articulate than a deacon, renders Christian service more lovingly than a deacon, and even relates to others better than a deacon, that service is not diaconal service in the ordained sense. These other *ministri* can, and often do, exercise many of the non-sacramental functions associated with the diaconate; however, they do so in the manner of a layperson, not a deacon. One of the best analogies to express this difference is advanced by James Barnett when he observes:

In a physical body, a particular organ, such as the eye, has been created to fulfill a certain function. It is true that the hands can fulfill some of the function of the eyes, but never so well as the eyes themselves. Although a layperson may assume a function of a clerical office, such as that of a deacon, it does make a significant difference that such a person has neither the authorization nor the grace of the office itself.<sup>11</sup>

To carry Barnett's analogy further, if someone was to lose a hand in an accident, and it was to be replaced by the hand of a cadaver, the transplant no matter how well matched would simply be a substitution. It cannot be what it is not and it is not the hand the man was genetically born with. Thus, in a strict sense, the new hand cannot replace the old hand. Returning to the incommunicability of the diaconate, just as the eye cannot replace the hand, a layperson, for reasons already explained, cannot replace a deacon. Furthermore, just as the new hand cannot replace the old hand, so too one deacon cannot, in a strict sense replace another.

#### IV. Diaconate and the *Personalist Norm*

In our consideration of the impact of love and the *personalist norm* on the diaconate, the three prior themes of the irreducible, subjectivity, and the uniqueness of the person are assumed. With these established, Wojtyla begins his analysis by making some fundamental distinctions with regard to the verb, "to use."<sup>12</sup> In one sense, he defines "use" as an object of an action employed as a means to an end. Here, the "end" (*telos*) is understood as the intention, goal, or purpose of the act. As such, it represents the motivation for acting. Of its very nature, an "end" always implies a "means" in the same way that an "effect" implies a "cause." The "means" is understood as the instrumentality by which something, the "end," is accomplished. According to Wojtyla, this means-ends relationship describes the reality between

persons and things, where things are understood as non-personal entities. Because persons possess subjectivity and an inner-self, because they are unique and utterly unrepeatable, the very nature of personhood precludes being used as *merely* a means to an end.

In applying Wojtyła's *personalist norm*, to the diaconate, the deacon may never use another as a *mere* means to an end. So, for example, in training altar servers, the deacon may never use the servers as *mere* functionaries subordinating them to their liturgical tasks. This would have the effect of "thingifying" them; this is to say, reduce them to mere objects of use. Instead, respect for their inherent dignity requires that he reveal to them the intended end, which is participating in the worship through their service at the altar. In this regard, the servers come to understand the true end, goal, and purpose for serving and, because of this, now have the capacity to freely embrace it as their own. As a result, rather than imposing his will, either by force or ignorance, upon the servers (a violation of the *personalist norm*), the deacon invites them to share in that end by adopting it as their own. By adopting this end as their own, the deacon and his servers establish a common bond rooted in a common good (the end sought). They do not merely seek the same end individually, but rather do so within the context of an interpersonal relationship in which they subordinate themselves to each other for that end. In this common subordination, the deacon does not relinquish his authority, but in a certain sense, subordinates himself by respecting the dignity of his servers in the pursuit of the common goal. Consequently, these servers can never be functionaries reduced to mere objects of use. Instead, a relationship that respects the *personalist norm* makes it possible for both the deacon and the servers to realize and affirm their equal dignity, albeit exercised at the altar in significantly different ways.

Likewise, and applying now the *personalist norm* to himself, the deacon, precisely because he is a person, may never allow himself to be used as a *mere* means to an end. He is neither a functionary of his bishop, nor of the pastor he serves. Such a use would have the effect of "thingifying" him. Instead, respect for his dignity requires that those

he serves reveal to him the intended end, which consists of his particular diaconate assignment as a unique participation in the ministry of the bishop. In this regard, the deacon comes to understand the true end for serving and, because of this, freely embraces it as his own. As a result, rather than having either his bishop or the pastor he serves imposing their will, either by force or ignorance, upon the deacon (a violation of the *personalist norm*), the bishop and his pastors invite the deacon to share in that end by adopting it as his own. Indeed, by adopting this end as his own, the bishop, pastor and deacon establish a common bond rooted in a common good (the end sought). They do not merely seek the same end individually, but rather do so within the context of an interpersonal relationship in which they subordinate themselves to each other for that end. In this common subordination, the bishop and the pastor do not relinquish their authority, but in a certain sense, subordinate themselves by respecting the dignity of the deacon in the pursuit of a common goal. Consequently, the deacon can never be a functionary reduced to a mere object of use. Instead, a relationship that respects the *personalist norm* makes it possible for the bishop, pastor and deacon to realize and affirm their equal dignity albeit, exercised within the Church in significantly different and subordinate ways.

Though this may seem a rather broad generalization, I believe it is fair to say that, in his work with some bishops and pastors, the value of a deacon is often reduced to his ministerial function. This is to say that the worth and worthiness of his office is often appreciated not in terms of who he is (*diakonos*), but what he can do (*diakonia*). This has the effect of "thingifying" the deacon and depersonalizing the relationship between him and his pastor or his bishop. Sadly, it is not unusual for a pastor and his deacon to have no other relationship outside of their ministry such that they are almost strangers working in the same vineyard. Of course, this functionalization is not limited to pastors or bishops or even laity. We deacons are also susceptible to this same tendency ourselves. We can see our value solely in what we do such that, when we are not doing "diaconal stuff," we can lose our diaconal identity. This reducing of the deacon

to his clerical ministry, another example of the reduction to the pragmatic, was recognized by Pope Francis when, exhorting candidates to the priesthood, he said, “You are pastors, not functionaries.”<sup>13</sup> In this simple statement, the Holy Father rooted the identity of the priesthood in who the priest is, not what he does. If this is true of the priesthood, then it is also true of the diaconate as well. This reductionism was also recognized by Deacon William Ditewig when he speaks of functionalism as a tendency to which the diaconate is particularly susceptible.<sup>14</sup> Here, the deacon has value to some pastors only insofar as he can plug the “ministerial gaps” left by a lack of parochial vicars. Consequently, the unique contribution of his office and its place within the larger gift of Catholic ministry rises and falls in direct proportion to a ministerial need as determined by the pastor. If the pastor perceives that there is no particular need (*diakonia*), then there is no need for a deacon (*diakonos*). Here, the diaconate is a *mere* means to an end and not an end unto itself. In such cases, it is not at all unusual to hear a pastor say, “I don’t really need a deacon (means) since between my ministry and the help of lay ministers, we’ve got the parish covered (ends).” This kind of response fails to see the unique contribution of both the diaconate in general and the deacon in particular. Given his sacramental character, to suggest that a deacon is not needed in a parish is ultimately to suggest that Christ the Servant is not needed since the deacon can bring Christ the Servant to the parish in a way that neither the pastor nor laypersons can. By way of analogy, it would be like holding that we don’t really need priests to care for the parishioners as we have bishops and deacons who together can fulfill the same function. Just as this example is absurd on the face of it as applied to the priesthood since it fails to appreciate the unique contribution of the presbyterate, so too is it when applied analogously to the diaconate. This functionalization of ministry, which is a violation of the *personalist norm*, is quite pervasive and arguably represents the most significant factor in the non-acceptance of the diaconate by clergy and laity alike. At its core, clerical functionalism espouses a dualism that separates the material from the spiritual by elevating the pragmatic aspects (*agere*) of sacred service over and above the theological aspects (*esse*) thereby reducing

its import. Because of this, a personalist approach with its insistence on a correct understanding of *agere sequitur esse* and its grounding in metaphysics provides a unique and essential corrective.

## V. Diaconate as a Gift-of-Self

The ministry of the diaconate, precisely because it flows out of the ministry of Christ, is one which finds its truest expression within the context of love (Jn 15:13). Love, as a gift-of-self, presupposes that the deacon first possesses himself before he can give himself to another. This self-possession, in turn, further presupposes that he knows who he is; for if this is to be a true gift, he must know “what,” or more appropriately, “who” it is he is giving away. But this understanding begs the epistemological question: How can the deacon come to this self-knowledge? According to the Fathers of the Second Vatican Council:

The truth is that only in the mystery of the incarnate Word does the mystery of man take on light. For Adam, the first man, was a figure of Him Who was to come, namely Christ the Lord. *Christ, the final Adam, by the revelation of the mystery of the Father and His love, fully reveals man to man himself* (emphasis mine) and makes his supreme calling clear.<sup>15</sup>

In his first encyclical, *Redemptor Hominis*, Pope John Paul II continues this line of thought by observing that man is unknowable as a person outside the mystery of Christ.<sup>16</sup> He points to the related doctrines of the incarnation and redemption as evidence of God’s love for man.<sup>17</sup> This supreme Gift-of-Self, particularly as it is revealed in Christ’s passion, death, and resurrection, unfolded for the first time the true meaning of love and with it, the basis of human self-understanding. In sweeping prose, the Pontiff writes: “Man cannot live without love. He remains a being that is incomprehensible for himself, his life is senseless, if love is not revealed to him, if he does not encounter love, if he does not experience it and make it his own, if

he does not participate intimately in it.”<sup>18</sup> Thus, through being loved (1Jn 4:19) we come to know who we are, and this self-knowing becomes the basis of self-possession.

This need for self-knowledge as a precondition of self-possession, which in turn is a precondition for love, cannot be overstated. For example, an heir to a great fortune who is ignorant of his inheritance cannot spend it or give it away to charity. He is radically unaware of its existence and therefore does not know he possesses it. Though the inheritance does objectively exist, and though it objectively belongs to him, his lack of awareness on the subjective level makes it impossible for him to give away what he does not know he has. However, once he has been made aware of his inheritance (someone has loved him by giving him a fortune), he simultaneously gains a new self-knowledge (I am loved and now wealthy). From this self-knowledge, he in turn gains a deeper sense of his own self-possession. As one who is both loved and wealthy, he now possesses the radical ability to give himself away in the manner he received it. As a result he now is faced with the free choice to spend the money on himself, give it away, or both.

The same is true of the diaconate. The deacon is heir to a great fortune by virtue his Baptism; a fortune further enhanced and enriched by his ordination where he was ontologically configured to Christ the Servant. Should he remain ignorant of the deep meaning of this gift, his ability to give it away would be seriously compromised. While this great gift does objectively exist, and though it objectively belongs to him (*ex opere operato*), his lack of awareness on the subjective level (*ex opere operantis*) makes it impossible for him to give away what he does not know he has. However, once he has been made aware of his inheritance as one configured to Christ the Servant, the deacon gains a new self-knowledge. From this self-knowledge, he in turn gains a deeper sense of his own self-possession in terms of what he can now do. As a direct result, he now possesses the radical ability to act in the Person of Christ the Servant; to give himself away in the manner he received through the exercise of sacred ecclesial service.

This process sets up an ongoing and ever-deepening dynamic. The more we love, the more we gain a deeper sense of our self-knowledge. The more we gain a deeper sense of our self-knowledge, the more we possess ourselves. The more we possess ourselves, the greater our capacity to give ourselves away again and again. Thus, within this dynamic, we continually grow in understanding of who we are, enabling us to increase both in quality and quantity our subsequent gifts-of-self. With regard to the diaconate, the more the deacon serves (understood here as love - a gift-of-self), the more he gains a deeper sense of who he is as Christ the Servant (self-knowledge). The more he understands himself as Christ the Servant, the more he can act *in Persona Christi Servi* (self-possession) by giving himself as a free and unmerited gift to others.

The above understanding is particularly germane given the personalist point of departure established earlier. Based on Wojtyła's treatment of love, it is possible to reformulate his definition to describe diaconal service in the following manner: *Diakonia is grounded in a free unmerited and mutual gift-of-self by the deacon to another for the sake of the other. This gift, expressed in ecclesial service proper to his sacred office, is founded on the pursuit of a common good. In the seeking and realization of this good, the deacon and the other form a unique interpersonal relationship, a communio personarum, that fulfills and enriches both.*

In breaking down our description of the diaconate, we begin with diaconal service as a free, unmerited and mutual gift-of-self. The gift is free in that the deacon gives himself of his own volition unhindered by any necessity. Properly understood, this freedom is expressed in two distinct, but related ways. The first exercise of this freedom came at his ordination when hands were laid upon him. Here he freely chose to follow Christ the Servant by becoming an *altar Christi* expressed in sacred ecclesial service. This is, by far, the most fundamental exercise of diaconal freedom because it brought about an ontological change. Indeed, this freedom is so profound that it can only be exercised once and its choice is completely irrevocable such that, once a deacon, always a deacon. This first freedom is followed by

an ongoing number of secondary or particular freedoms manifested in diaconal ministry. Where the first freedom is an expression of *esse*, the second is an expression of *agere*. In the first freedom, the deacon gifts himself exclusively to God, in the second he gifts himself again to God through service to another (Mt 25:40) each time he exercises his ministry. This second freedom, like the first is unhindered by any necessity. Both mean that it is the deacon and the deacon alone who gives himself making the gift totally his.

This gift-of-self is not just free, but unmerited. The recipient did nothing to earn it. He or she cannot claim the gift by virtue of a right. It was given by the deacon without any expectation of compensation or gratuity. To recognize a gift as unmerited does not mean that there is not a condition attached to its receipt. Only one condition is required; that the gift freely offered by the deacon is freely accepted by the recipient. A true gift can never be forced precisely because such an act is contrary to love and would thus violate the *personalist norm*. Just as freedom must permeate the giving of the gift, it must also permeate the acceptance of that gift. This single condition reveals the mutuality of the gift. The term “mutual” is understood within the context of that which is common to, or shared by, two or more persons. It is a relationship that admits to a certain reciprocity in which each party gives and receives from the other.

In this reciprocity we hear the basic elements of the “hermeneutic of gift” and the nuptial image that Wojtyla will later develop more fully as Pope John Paul II in his *Theology of the Body*. In his pre-papal work, he will limit these themes primarily to spousal love and sexuality. When he takes them up again in his papal work, John Paul advances them in two ways. First, he transitions from a largely philosophical approach to a predominantly theological approach. This is more a matter of emphasis as he is always the theologian/philosopher. Second, somewhere along the line, Wojtyla realizes the universal significance of the “hermeneutic of gift” and the nuptial image as providing essential insights into the Trinitarian God whose gift-of-self is expressed most fully in creation and redemption. The challenge in

moving forward with our application of Wojtyla’s thought to the diaconate is that there is no clear dividing line between his philosophy and theology, between his Personalism and the *Theology of the Body*. He appears to transition almost seamlessly from one to the other and then back again. Where his Personalism anticipates and even points to his *Theology of the Body*, his *Theology of the Body* finds its philosophical grounding in his Personalism. Though quite unusual and at times frustrating for those of us accustomed to a more traditional systematic presentation, Wojtyla nevertheless uses this methodology to great advantage as witnessed by the many insights he gleans. Thus, any attempt to limit the flow by artificially systematizing his thought will likely lose much along the way. We will, therefore, follow Wojtyla’s lead and allow his thought to guide us where it wills. We do so with the confidence that, just as it opened up new horizons with spousal love and sexuality; it will equally open up new horizons with the diaconate.

Returning to the “hermeneutic of gift” and the nuptial image, Wojtyla speaks of this gift-of-self primarily in terms of betrothed love and, as such, it might seem out of place in our discussion of diaconal service. While the gift-of-self, as we shall see, is most fully expressed in spousal love, Wojtyla also recognizes other forms of this self-giving. Of this he writes:

Leaving aside the devotion of a mother to her child, do we not find self-giving in, for instance, the relationship of a doctor with his patient, or in a teacher, who devotes himself with utter dedication to the education of his pupil, or a pastor who devotes himself with equal dedication to a soul entrusted to his care? In the same way great public figures or apostles can devote themselves to many people at once, people for the most part personally unknown to them, whom they serve by serving society as a whole. To determine in any of the cases mentioned, or in others like them, how far genuine dedicated love is involved is no easy matter. For in each

of them no more than sincere goodwill and friendliness may be at work. In order, for instance, to ‘give oneself entirely’ to the vocation of a doctor, teacher or pastor, it suffices simply to ‘desire the good’ of those for whom these duties are performed. And even if this form of behavior comes to resemble a complete surrender of the self and so establishes its claim to be love, it would still be difficult to apply the name ‘betrothed love’ to it.<sup>19</sup>

Given the above distinction between betrothed love and the desire for the good of another, *diakonia* is a particular kind of gift-of-self, though distinct in certain respects from the gift-of-self proper to betrothed love. Understood within the Catholic sacramental tradition, betrothed love requires a total and complete gift-of-self *exclusive* to each of the spouses.<sup>20</sup> Here, through the exchange of consent, both the husband and wife surrender their “I(s)” entirely and unconditionally to the other in Christ (Eph 5:21) becoming an unbreakable “We” (Gn 2:24; Mt 19:6). Unlike betrothed love, *diakonia* does not involve a gift-of-self *exclusive* to a particular person. Instead, it involves a gift-of-self *exclusive* to all expressed in what Deacon James Keating calls, “eager availability.”

It may seem strange and even out of place to speak of exclusivity in the plural. Exclusivity is most often understood as restricted to two persons and not admitting anyone else. However, there is a linguistic sense in which exclusivity can go beyond a single person and be applied to a community of persons. This collective adverb is singular in form, but refers to a group of people expressing particular entities in their entirety. Key to understanding the subtlety of this distinction is the relationship between Christ and His Church.

The communion between God and humanity finds its definitive fulfillment in Christ Jesus. He is the Bridegroom who, through His incarnation, passion, death, and resurrection gifted Himself exclusively to His Bride the Church. This nuptial image, which is reflected in the earlier relationship between Yahweh and Israel (Is 54: 5), is taken up in the New Testament. John the Baptist used the metaphor

of a bridegroom in describing this relationship with Jesus (Jn 3:29), as did Jesus Himself (Mk 2:19). St. Paul, writing to the Corinthians tells the community, “I feel a divine jealousy for you, for I betrothed you to Christ to present you as a pure Bride to her one husband (2Cor 11:2).” Likewise, to the Ephesians, Paul describes Christ as having died for His Bride the Church to make her holy and spotless (Eph 5:25-33). In many places throughout the book of Revelation, the relationship between Christ and the Church is portrayed as analogous to spousal love. “Let us rejoice and exult and give him the glory, for the marriage of the Lamb has come, and his Bride has made herself ready (Rev 19:7).” Thus, the “Bride of Christ” is a well attested metaphor for the Church whose relationship with the Bridegroom is a *total and complete* gift-of-self *exclusive* to each other. Within the context of this relationship between Christ and His Church, it is important to note that exclusivity is not used in the same sense as betrothed love between a husband and wife which can admit to no other. Rather, exclusivity is used in the sense of being restricted to Christ and His Church, the Church consisting of a plurality of persons.<sup>21</sup> Like betrothed love, this relationship is brought about through mutual consent.<sup>22</sup> Christ chose His Church and individual members are invited to choose Him through the sacramental life and by integrating their faith in the very choices they make.

With regard to the diaconate, by virtue of the fact that the deacon has been ontologically configured to Christ the Servant, he acts *in persona Christi servi*. This not only sets up a new relationship with Christ whom he now incarnates through sacred service, but it also sets up a new relationship with the Church. This relationship enables the deacon to participate in the nuptial bond in a manner proper to his configuration; that is, as a sacred servant to the Bride. Just as, “Christ loved the Church and gave Himself up for her, that He might sanctify her (Eph 5: 25-26),” so too is the deacon, through the three-fold *munera* of word, liturgy, and charity, to give himself to the Church. Likewise, just as the exclusivity of Christ’s relationship to the Church admits to a plurality of persons, so too does the deacon, by acting *in Persona Christi Servi*, gives himself in the form of sacred

service to a plurality of persons. Though this is but one of many ways Christ's love is manifested to His Bride the Church, the sacred service exercised by the deacon enables Christ's gift of service (Mk: 10:45) to be perpetuated until He comes again.

Further consideration of betrothed love reveals that beyond a differing notion of exclusivity, diaconal service lacks both the intimacy and intensity of marital love such that, in its exercise, the deacon and the one(s) being served do not become one; their "I-Thou" do not become a "We." Nonetheless, diaconal gift-of-self does involve, to a certain extent, the surrender of the "I" for the good of the other. This surrender is derived from the Christological nature of his office which admits to a two-fold surrender having both a divine (vertical) and social (horizontal) dimension. With regard to the divine dimension, it is Christ Himself who not only redeemed the deacon, but called him to participate in his own redemption (Phil 2:12). This divine initiative, begun at the moment of his conception, set up a unique and progressive interpersonal relationship such that diaconal service is preeminently a service to Christ Himself. The divine dimension of surrender, which is a kind of primary *kenosis*, is characterized by a total gift-of-self proper to God alone (*latria*) that far exceeds the gift-of-self expressed in any other human relationship (Mk 12: 29-30). While God is always manifest to us, and while we have a real and effective access to Him in every moment, He is not personally present to us. As the Fathers of the Second Vatican Council pointed out in the Constitution on the Sacred Liturgy:

Christ is always present in His Church, especially in her liturgical celebrations. He is present in the sacrifice of the Mass, not only in the person of His minister, "the same now offering, through the ministry of priests, who formerly offered himself on the cross", but especially under the Eucharistic species. By His power He is present in the sacraments, so that when a man baptizes it is really Christ Himself who baptizes. He is present in His word, since it is He Himself who speaks when the holy Scriptures are read in the Church. He

is present, lastly, when the Church prays and sings, for He promised: 'Where two or three are gathered together in my name, there am I in the midst of them' (Mt. 18:20).<sup>23</sup>

Since we do not have direct access to God in the current dispensation, this surrender cannot be expressed directly. Our access, though indirect, comes from the liturgy, the Church's ministers, the sacraments (especially the Eucharist), the written Word, and when the Church prays and sings. These represent the certain ways in which we can surrender our "I(s)" to God. Still, surrender to God, which is simply another way of expressing our total gift-of-self, can also be realized in the social dimension. For the deacon, this is accomplished through *diakonia*. Because of its intrinsic connection to the divine dimension, the social dimension possesses a unique character of its own, revealing in its expression not only the ultimate surrender of Christ the Servant, but also the person of Christ Himself. In this surrender, which is a kind of secondary *kenosis*, the deacon gifts himself; a gift that enables him to move beyond himself, beyond the service he renders, toward the one(s) being served for the good of the one(s) being served. When accepted by those being served, this service forms a *communio personarum*.<sup>24</sup>

In the *Acting Person*, Wojtyla offers a reflection on what he calls, "participation." Participation describes how a person is fulfilled within a community of persons.<sup>25</sup> He sees participation as, "a special and probably the most fundamental manifestation of the *worth* of the person himself."<sup>26</sup> Through participation in a community of persons, we recognize the need for relatedness, the need to be *with* and *for* another. As Christopher West points out:

By participation, Wojtyla means, "acting together with others." But this does not simply merely "doing things" in conjunction with others. For Wojtyla, the essence of the person is revealed in the freedom of truly human action. Thus, when we truly act with others we participate in very "*humanness of others*." Participation

takes place when subjects, acting together, experience “inter-subjectivity.” This means living in communion with others (*communio personarum*) and in the broader sense building community. When John Paul speaks about “participating in the mystery of the divine life” he is talking about sharing the very divinity of God. He means participation in the divine nature (2Pt 4) participation in the eternal *Communio Personarum*.<sup>27</sup>

While this is true of all human acts that respect the dignity of the person, it is particularly true when we gift ourselves to another. In diaconal service, the deacon acts together with others, revealing himself in the freedom of his *diakonia*. In doing so he not only participates in the humanness of others, but allows others to participate in his own humanness, all the while experiencing each other’s inner-subjectivity. Together, the deacon and the one(s) he serves form a communion in which both discover anew their inherent dignity and find fulfillment.

The fact that *diakonia* possesses both divine and social dimensions sets the deacon apart from a mere social worker. Here the relationship is not simply between a servant and those being served, but rather between Christ the Servant who, acting through His deacon, serves the Church. This identification with Christ who, “came not to be served, but to serve” (Mt 20:28) means that the deacon takes on both Christ’s *Persona* and His mission. He, in certain respects, incarnates Christ Jesus through the exercise of his ministry. This taking on is radically possible because at his ordination, he has been configured on the ontological level to Christ the Servant. He is now capable of assuming this *Persona* and mission because, in a sacramental sense, he is Christ the Servant. He not only becomes the symbol that points beyond himself to a greater reality (Christ Himself), but mysteriously participates in that same reality thus making Him present in the world. As a result, the deacon relates to the Church as Christ relates to His Church, albeit in a limited and specific manner.

Practically speaking, if both the diaconate and marriage are a total gift-of-self each in their own way, questions of compatibility naturally arise. How can a married deacon give himself totally to both his vocation as husband/father and his vocation as deacon? This can certainly become problematic when diaconal service is reduced to specific ministries and these ministries conflict with family obligations. However, as we have already discussed, when the diaconate is embraced in the broader sense, obligations to family become an expression of *diakonia*. Indeed, because his wife and family are exclusively dependent upon him as husband and father for their physical, emotional, and spiritual well-being, they have a priority over a wider ecclesial expression of *diakonia*. Simply put, if ecclesial ministry encroaches on family life, then the deacon is obliged to cut back and serve his family first. Understood this way, being a good deacon makes the deacon a better husband/father, and being a good husband/father makes the husband/father a better deacon.<sup>28</sup> The two are mutually interdependent because they find their nexus in the one person who is both configured to Christ the Servant and joined to his wife in the bonds of Holy Matrimony. As Deacon Owen Cummings points out:

Self-gift, self donation to others, is the very essence of the diaconate, and the deacon is called to be a sacrament par excellence of self donation in his community. If the deacon is married, as the majority of permanent deacons are, he is called to en flesh this diaconal service to his spouse. His spouse, in turn, is called to en flesh this self-giving to him, so that as a couple their marriage becomes a mutual icon of what the deacon is called to demonstrate in his person.<sup>29</sup>

This complementarity is echoed in the *Directory for the Ministry and Life of Permanent Deacons*. There, the Congregation of the Clergy not only recognized the compatibility of marriage and the diaconate, it briefly explored its integration. Indeed, married life not only provides a deep source of inspiration for the deacon’s service, it also provides a stimulus for his ministry.

The Sacrament of Matrimony sanctifies conjugal love and constitutes it a sign of the love with which Christ gives himself to the Church (cf. Eph. 5:25). It is a gift from God and should be a source of nourishment for the spiritual life of those deacons who are married. Since family life and professional responsibilities must necessarily reduce the amount of time which married deacons can dedicate to the ministry, it will be necessary to integrate these various elements in a unitary fashion, especially by means of shared prayer. In marriage, love becomes an interpersonal giving of self, a mutual fidelity, a source of new life, a support in times of joy and sorrow: in short, love becomes service. When lived in faith, this family service is for the rest of the faithful an example of the love of Christ. The married deacon must use it as a stimulus of his *diakonia* in the Church.<sup>30</sup>

Returning to our analysis of the gift-of-self proper, we noted earlier that persons, by their very nature, are untransferable (*alteri incommunicabilis*). This being the case, the question arises as to how, if the deacon is incommunicable, can he surrender himself in sacred service? Commenting on this, Wojtyla observes that, "The very nature of the person is incompatible with such surrender. Indeed, in the natural order it makes no sense to speak of a person giving himself or herself to another, especially if this is meant in the physical sense."<sup>31</sup> Here the deacon cannot be considered another's property, something excluded by the *personalist norm*. However, Wojtyla argues, that what is excluded in the natural order is permitted in the order of love in a moral sense. He writes:

In this sense, one person can give himself or herself, can surrender entirely to another, whether to a human person or to God, and such a giving of the self creates a special form of love which we define as betrothed love. This fact goes to prove that the person has a dynamism

of its own, and that specific laws govern its existence and evolution.<sup>32</sup>

Thus, the sacred ecclesial service exercised by the deacon admits to a kind of paradox. In one respect, in the natural order, he cannot be transferred or ceded to another. Here, he is directed to the path of self-perfection and fulfillment which finds its locus in the "I." However, properly understood, this self-perfection makes progress only when the "I" unites with a "Thou" through selfless self-giving. It only comes about by freely offering another our inalienable and non-transferable "I". Wojtyla sees this as a two-fold paradox. In one respect, it is paradoxical in as much as it is possible to transcend the incommunicable "I," and in a second respect that in doing so, the "I" is not lost, obscured, or diminished, but discovered, revealed, and enriched. Herein lies the greatest mystery of sacred ecclesial service which, at its very essence, maintains a fundamental conviction that in surrendering the deacon's autonomy to those he serves, his own person is not lessened, but is profoundly enriched. Wojtyla calls this the "law of *ekstasis*" or the law of self-giving. Here the deacon, by giving himself, goes outside himself to find fulfillment in those he serves. It was Christ Himself who, in word and deed, gave expression to this paradox when he said: "He who finds his life will lose it, and he who loses his life for my sake will find it (Mt 10:39)." Indeed, the One who had power over life, gave His life so that others may live.

*Diakonia* is an expression of Christ's love for His Church. It is the result of a process within the deacon that assumes growth in both the spiritual and moral life. This, along with grace, capacitates the deacon to freely commit himself to his calling as one dedicated to sacred ecclesial service. It is only here, in the very giving of himself - in *diakonia* - that *diakonos* is truly discovered, not merely in some theoretic sense, but in a moral sense; not simply in a general sense, but in a practical sense. This is to say that, in the gift-of-self, the deacon himself comes to a deeper realization of who he is, not just Christ the Servant, but Christ the Servant revealed in his own personal identity.

Here, the ontological identity imparted at ordination is expressed, realized, and affirmed on a deeply personal level. This expression constitutes a unique crystallization of the whole deacon as a unique “I” determined to serve a “Thou” through selfless acts of love manifested in a thousand different ways. As a result, in the very giving, he establishes and affirms his own self-possession, for he cannot give what he does not already possess.

Having considered in some detail the mutual gift-of-self, let us once again return to our personalist definition of diaconal service and further unfold its meaning. As noted earlier, *diaconal service is grounded in a mutual gift-of-self founded on the dynamic pursuit of a common good that binds both the deacon and those he serves in a unique interpersonal relationship that fulfills and enriches both.* To say that the diaconate is founded on the dynamic pursuit of a common good means that it is rooted or grounded in the continued and ongoing attainment of that which benefits the deacon and the one(s) being served. Within the Catholic social tradition, the common good is understood as, “the sum total of all those conditions of social life which enable individuals, families, and organizations to achieve complete and effective fulfillment.”<sup>33</sup> This means that each person in the relationship must take into account the rights and aspirations of others, as well as the well-being of the whole human family, so as to allow individual members to achieve their potential in accordance with the moral order. Applied to the diaconate, this involves the three-fold *munera* of the *diakonia*, namely liturgy, word, and charity. The deacon exercises this through a gift-of-self which enables those he serves to realize a sense of fulfillment and perfection both spiritually and practically. He does so by respecting their rights, affirming their dignity and, above all, safeguarding the *personalist norm*. This pursuit of the common good binds the “I” s in an “I-Thou” relationship. Thus, as we have already seen, they are no longer a collection of individuals, but a *communio personarum*. Through *diakonia*, both the deacon and the one(s) he serves transcend their solitude by moving beyond their incommunicability to create an interpersonal relationship. This relationship between persons, bound by a common good,

is utterly unique and unrepeatable just as each of its members are utterly unique and unrepeatable. They form a historic first and a never-to-be-duplicated relationship. This relationship, if it respects the *personalist norm* and the moral order, allows each member to flourish, grow, and find fulfillment.

Our analysis of Lublin Thomism has thus far enabled us to abstract and apply personalist concepts to *diakonia* revealing unique insights. However, if Personalism is to advance a new theological approach to the diaconate, it should also be able provide some new insights into *diakonos*. Here we shall begin at the beginning, at ordination where sacramental character is imparted. In our metaphysical consideration in Appendix 1, we noted that God is the Efficient Cause of Holy Orders. We also noted that this sets up a new relationship between God and the ordinand; a relationship that began at his creation and was subsequently modified both at Baptism and Confirmation. Shifting back to Personalism, we can say that this relationship, because it exists between persons (albeit human and divine), is interpersonal. Moreover, properly understood, this relationship is not with a Divine Person, but Three Divine Persons comprising a consubstantial Trinity. Here, “the divine persons do not share the one divinity among themselves, but each of them is God whole and entire.”<sup>34</sup> Thus, God (Father, Son, and Spirit) is the *Communio Personarum* upon which all personhood flows. Of this, the Italian philosopher and theologian Cardinal Angelo Scola writes:

... perfect unity exists in the Trinity, three Persons who are the one God. The most appropriate word, coined by Christian thought, for indicating this impenetrable mystery is communion. *Communio personarum* exists in its perfection in the Three in One, because the Father gives Himself to the Son without keeping anything of his divine essence for Himself. The Father generates the Son. The Son Himself gives back the same, perennial divine essence. This exchange of love between the two is so perfect as to be fruitful in a pure state: it gives rise to another person, the Holy Spirit (*donum doni*).

Unity and difference co-exist in this perennial event of being and letting be, which (inconceivable to us) implies a difference in perfect identity.<sup>35</sup>

With regard to ordination, it is God who once again reasserts His “I” in the already established “I-Thou” relationship, by initiating a call through His Church. When this call is freely answered in the rite of ordination, an interpersonal encounter takes place between God and the ordinand. At this point God transcends His incommunicability, bridging heaven and earth, encountering the candidate at the core of his being through the ministry of the bishop. In this intimate encounter, Christ the Servant is manifested for the express purpose of configuring the deacon to Himself; loving him for his own sake. Here, Christ, at the moment of ordination, embraces the deacon-in-potency and in that very instance “impresses” him with His very self. In a singular act of love, He gifts Himself and, in this gift-of-self, activates and actualizes the candidate. This embrace is so intimate and so profound that Christ leaves something of His very self behind in an indelible and permanent manner. Insofar as this embrace is the result of an interpersonal encounter, and insofar as this interpersonal encounter takes place between persons who are utterly unique, the encounter and its effects are utterly unique.

In reflecting upon this encounter, Deacon James Keating makes a fascinating observation regarding the quality of this embrace. He says, “When Christ inflicts the ‘wound’ of diaconal ordination upon a man, it is to make him vulnerable to the mystery of his obedient service.”<sup>36</sup> It seems odd to speak of sacramental character as a “wound” unless this “wound” is understood as a sharing in the sufferings of Christ (1Pt 4:13; 2Cor 1:5). Here, the mystery of obedient service lies in a willingness to take on human pathos, to enter into the sufferings of those we serve such that we take on something of that suffering within ourselves (Gal 6:17). This way of thinking connects the character or “wound” we received at ordination with the “wounds” we receive in the exercise of our ministry. The relationship between the “wound” and the “wounds,” between character and ministry, can be expressed and deepened using

Eucharistic language. Insofar as we celebrate and participate in the one timeless eternal sacrifice made present in the Eucharist, can it not also be said that each time we are wounded in the exercise our sacred ministry, we celebrate and participate in the timeless eternal wound of our ordination? In this respect, that ordination, like the Eucharist, possesses a transhistoric quality making present in the now that which happened years earlier. Beyond this, such language also suggests a sacrificial and even salvific quality to diaconal service enabling the deacon to die-to-self at both the initial embrace of his ordination and each subsequent time he embraces in the exercise of his ministry.

The very interpersonal nature of this embrace at ordination means that once it is given, it can never be given to another in quite the same way. Since no two persons receive the same embrace, this renders it absolutely unrepeatable. This encounter forever changes the one embraced from deacon-in-potency to deacon-in-actuality. Here, the *Diakonos* (Christ the Servant) exercises His *Diakonia* (the service of Redemption) in the sacrament of Holy Orders and, in doing so, creates another *diakonos*. This new deacon now bears the image of One Deacon who embraced him, Christ the Servant, not merely upon his soul, but upon his entire personhood. In this way, the deacon does not simply reflect Christ the Servant, but is now radically capable of acting *in persona Christi servi*. He is radically capable of doing this, not because of his own merits, but because of God’s free and gratuitous love outpoured in a particular way, at a particular time, upon this particular person who, as deacon-in-potency was called for this divine embrace from the moment of his conception.

Having received the unmerited gift of Christ the Servant at ordination, and having experienced His embrace in a deeply personal and intimate way, the deacon is now motivated by love. This love is a response to a deeper recognition that, in the fullness of time, God became *Diakonos* through the *Logos*. That, through the incarnation, He fully took on human nature while fully maintaining His divinity; being like us in all things but sin. He not only exercises His *Diakonia* through His words and deeds, but when all seemed lost, died for us.

The personal recognition of this profound truth evokes a profound sense of gratitude in the heart of the deacon. Recognizing that without Christ he is nothing, and that in service to Christ the deacon finds fulfillment; he serves because love, in the form of gratitude, inspires him. His *diakonia* is an outward manifestation of who he is. Properly understood, this means that diaconal service is not simply something he does, but Someone he gives, Christ the Servant. The uniqueness of this gift arises from the fact that Christ the Servant is offered through him, through his particular and personal embrace, and because of this, his *diakonia* bears something of his very self as well. This sets the service of the deacon primarily within the context of an interpersonal relationship of which he is called, after having been configured to Christ the Servant at ordination, to incarnate Christ by giving his very self.

Through our exploration of Personalism as a hermeneutic to advance a new theology of the diaconate, we have discovered an innovative language by which we can better articulate what we already know. It has, even at this early stage in our investigation, yielded considerable fruits. While I believe much more can be said of the irreducible, subjectivity, uniqueness, the *personalist norm* and the gift of self by those more fluent in the Personalism, we have nonetheless formed a solid philosophical basis for a *novum theologia diaconati*. This new approach is not grounded in cold dispassionate philosophical distinctions seemingly removed from the world in which we live, but instead using the language of interpersonal love; it dwells in our world speaking to sacred service in much the same way that Christ the Servant speaks to us. As a result, it has profound relevancy to diaconal ministry as it is exercised in the life of the Church. In what follows, we will now conclude our study by considering some of the theological implications of Personalism.



## Chapter Five

### A New Theological Approach to the Diaconate

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Before considering some of the theological implications of our philosophical findings, let us summarize our progress thus far. As set out at the beginning of our investigation, our objective is to advance a theology of the diaconate through the use of a new hermeneutic. In our search for this hermeneutic, we examined three dominant world-views (classical, historical, and symbolic) and concluded that their convergence led to a personalist point of departure. Among the many personalist philosophies, we chose the Lublin Thomism of Karol Wojtyła because of its ability to integrate metaphysics. This was critical as it is the only form of Personalism that could accommodate the ontology of sacramental character; an element we identified as essential in our preliminary considerations. Because there is no metaphysics of the diaconate *per se*, and because metaphysics provides the necessary ontological underpinning to achieve our objective, it fell to us to develop a rudimentary metaphysics of *diakonos* (Appendix 1). This established, we went on to ground this new metaphysics in Thomistic anthropology since this too is presumed in Lublin Thomism (Appendix 2). From there, we explored some of the more common themes in Wojtyła's personalist thought and subsequently applied them in a

complementary manner to the metaphysics of *diakonos* already developed. This, in turn, enabled us to provide a philosophical grounding for a new theology of the diaconate, which is now our final charge.

As we begin this last chapter, we would do well to revisit the two questions posed at the start of our study. The first of these asked whether the hermeneutic chosen is a viable problematic to advance the state of the question. In other words, does Personalism in the form of Lublin Thomism provide the necessary philosophical grounding for a new theology of the diaconate? The second question sought to affirm that viability through the insights gleaned. The presumption here is that a tree is known by its fruits. Although we have only considered some of the implications of Personalism in our last chapter, by all accounts, it has revealed considerable new insights into the meaning of *diakonia* as expressed in the hermeneutic of gift. Returning to our analogy, the tree has borne some promising fruits, though they have yet to fully ripen. Still, at the end of our consideration, we were able to conclude that, properly understood, authentic *diakonia* is grounded in a free, unmerited and mutual gift-of-self by the deacon to another for the sake of the other. This gift, expressed in ecclesial service proper to his sacred office, is founded on the pursuit of a common good. In the seeking and realization of this good, the deacon and the other form a unique interpersonal relationship, a *communio personarum*, that fulfills and enriches both. In many respects, this description, grounded in philosophical Personalism, is a radical departure from the largely functional approach to the diaconate espoused by a number of contemporary authors. Thus, while we have yet to fully explore the theological implications of Personalism, we can conclude that it has already yielded profound insights into the diaconate by grounding sacred service in the interplay between divine and human love. In this regard, Personalism has demonstrated itself a viable problematic to advance a new theology of the diaconate. With this established, it is to the task of “ripening” that we now turn.

Before proceeding however, one final point is necessary. In pondering the theological implications of a personalist approach, it is

important to recall that our objective here is not to develop a completely systematic and fully integrated theology of the diaconate. As noted earlier, such efforts are bold, ambitious, and well beyond the scope of any particular study. Our objective, by comparison, is both modest in scope and restricted in scale. It is to advance, in its most elementary form, a new theology of the diaconate by beginning a fresh conversation concerning the nature and mission of this sacred office. Consequently, while we speak in terms of a *novum theologia diaconati*, and while in many respects this is true, what is really meant is a foundational theology; one which simply establishes the beginning of a brand new line of inquiry. Nonetheless, despite the inherent limitations present in any new theological approach, this effort will require for its authenticity not merely the satisfaction of the objective criteria already laid out, but that its conclusions reveal something essential about the diaconate. By essential, I mean some hitherto unknown aspect concerning the core meaning of this sacred office. Thus, in pursuit of this objective, and in consideration of our investigation thus far, our final chapter will explore some of the theological implications of a personalist approach upon which a new theology of the diaconate can emerge. While such an exploration can take off in many directions, we will limit ourselves in this study to an examination of the origins of the diaconate as it concerns the ontological beginnings of the office and therefore possesses a primacy in the order of causality.

To accomplish this final task, we will proceed along the following lines. First, insofar as any new theological approach requires for its authenticity a thorough grounding in Scripture, we will begin with a consideration of the origins of the diaconate as it has been traditionally held using a more conventional historical-critical approach. This “turn to the object” will establish the current state of the question and, in the process, address whether the institution of the Seven truly represent the origins of the diaconate as an order. Second, in anticipation of re-reading Acts 6 through a personalist perspective, we will provide an examination of Pope John Paul II’s exegetical method rooted in Phenomenology and expressed in the language of the body. Because this represents a significant excursus, it is placed in Appendix 3 enabling the reader to either read it then or move on with the study.

Third, with this methodology in hand, we will revisit the origins of the diaconate this time with a “turn to the subject” examining what it means *to serve at table*. Finally, our study will culminate with the Establishment Hypotheses; a theory that attempts to describe, in personalist language, the true origins of the diaconate as it relates to Christ’s total Gift-of-Self. This hypothesis will not only provide insights revealing a hitherto unknown aspect concerning the diaconate, it will also offer for the first time an integrated and organic understanding of the origins of all three levels of Holy Orders.

## I. The Institution of the Seven

Traditionally, the origin of the diaconate as an order has been attributed to the institution of the Seven found in Acts 6. Although this claim is not without debate within the wider theological community, its place within the patrimony of the Church cannot be denied. Because of this, Acts 6 cannot be easily dismissed and deserves, at the very least, serious consideration in any new theology of the diaconate. However, for this consideration to be truly serious, it must also engage the debate. Consequently, in our initial “turn to the object,” it will be necessary to move beyond a mere historical-critical analysis of Acts 6 and also give careful consideration to the objections concerning its place in the origins of the diaconate.

The election of the seven occurs in the very early days of the Church shortly after Jesus’ ascension. With the descent of the Holy Spirit at Pentecost, the Apostles began to witness boldly and, out of that witness, a new messianic sect arose within Judaism. As the community grew, practical problems emerged as a result of that growth; the first of which concerned the care of Hellenist widows. Here, Luke the Evangelist writes:

Now in these days when the disciples were increasing in number, the Hellenists murmured against the Hebrews because their widows were neglected in the

daily distribution. And the twelve summoned the body of the disciples and said, “It is not right that we should give up preaching the word of God to serve (*diakonein*) tables. Therefore, brethren, pick out from among you seven men of good repute, full of the Spirit and of wisdom, whom we may appoint to this duty. But we will devote ourselves to prayer and to the ministry of the word (*te diakonia tou logou*).” And what they said pleased the whole multitude, and they chose Stephen, a man full of faith and of the Holy Spirit, and Philip, and Prochorus, and Nicanor, and Timon, and Parmenas, and Nicolaus, a proselyte of Antioch. These they set before the apostles, and they prayed and laid their hands upon them. (Acts 6:1-6)

The rapid growth of believers gave rise to the Church’s first internal conflict. Luke calls these believers, “disciples” (*mathetia*), a term used numerous times to identify the Apostles and other followers of Jesus throughout the Gospels.<sup>1</sup> Within the wider Hellenistic culture of that time, the verb *manthano* was used to describe the manner in which one obtained theoretical knowledge. In this respect, a disciple was an apprentice or learner. It was someone who bound himself to a teacher or master for the purpose of acquiring a specific kind of knowledge. Discipleship, as it was later understood in the New Testament, was virtually unknown in the Old Testament.<sup>2</sup> Its emergence can be traced back to rabbinic Judaism which had its origins in the sixth century B.C. during the Babylonian Captivity. Influenced by Greek thought, this form of religious instruction grew out of a way to preserve the faith apart from the Temple during the Diaspora. Upon their return to Palestine generations later, Hellenized Jews brought with them rabbinic Judaism and, overtime, it was adopted by Hebraic Jews. As noted by the Anglican New Testament scholar Robert France, “Every Jewish teacher worth his salt had his circle of ‘disciples’ who ‘followed’ him (literally walking behind him as he rode or walked ahead), looked after his daily needs, and soaked up his teaching. Their teacher was the most important person in their

lives.”<sup>3</sup> Insofar as Jesus’ ministry arose within the context of this rabbinical tradition, He too had disciples. It would have been natural, after the ascension, for these followers to be “inherited” by the apostles. Acts of the Apostles records the first time the term “disciple” is applied to believers other than those who followed Jesus during his earthly ministry.<sup>4</sup> More than a mere pupil, a disciple of Christ is an adherent; one who imitates the Teacher (Jn 8:31; 15:8). Among the rabbinic schools of His time, Jesus’ disciples were distinctive in as much as they were called to share in both His destiny and His victimhood (Mt 10:38, Mk 8:34). As the Gospel was proclaimed, the early Church began to increase at a rapid pace. It has been estimated that there may have been as many as 5000 followers living in Jerusalem at the time of this conflict.<sup>5</sup> Naturally, as the disciples grew and diversified, their needs grew creating new challenges. These challenges would have the effect of increasing the responsibilities of the Apostles who, as leaders, were in charge of the community’s well-being. One of these responsibilities came in the care of Greek-speaking widows.

Within the body of believers at that time, two distinct groups emerged. The larger group, known as Hebrews (*hebraios*), were Aramaic-speaking Jews indigenous to Palestine. The smaller group, known as Hellenists, (*hellenistes*), were Greek-speaking Jews. The Hellenists were likely Jews of the Diaspora who were born and raised in the regions along the southern Mediterranean. Toward their later years, many returned to Palestine to end their life in Jerusalem. The Hellenists brought back with them certain customs that, while not heterodox, were nonetheless alien to Israel. They used a different form of the Sacred Scriptures (the Septuagint), and they worshiped in Greek-speaking synagogues. As a result, tensions arose between the two groups. Nationalist tendencies and the historic memory of the Maccabean revolt may have led to the perception that, while all Jews were equal, Hellenistic Jews were of “lesser equality”.<sup>6</sup> According to Guiseppe Riccotti, “A person not born in the Holy Land of Israel, and who did not speak her sacred language, had not the same dignity as a Palestinian Jew, even though the blood of Abraham flowed through his veins.”<sup>7</sup>

The increasing numbers of disciples, coupled with the tensions between the Greek-speaking and Aramaic-speaking converts, raised concerns over the treatment of some of the Hellenists. They complained (*egeneto goggysmos*) to the Apostles that the widows were being neglected at the daily distribution of food. In the Semitic culture of that time, widows were a particularly vulnerable group. Once their husbands died, and since they could not work outside the home, they had no means of support unless other relatives took them in. In the event that there was no one to provide for them, Jewish law made provisions through the Temple treasury (Mk 12:41-44). Typically, there were two ways this support was distributed.<sup>8</sup> The first, known as the *tambuy*, was a daily distribution of food among the indigent of Jerusalem. This would consist of bread, beans, fruit and, during Passover, a cup of wine. The second form of support, known as the *quppah*, was a weekly dole to the city’s poor consisting of food and clothing. Poor Jewish widows, including Hellenists, would have had access to these measures. However, both Greek and Aramaic-speaking converts identified more closely with the early Christian community than they did with the wider Jewish community. This may account for the reason that they did not avail themselves of either the *tambuy* or the *quppah*. Some have suggested that, because of their association with the followers of Christ, they may have come into conflict with Jewish Law and were banned from receiving aid.<sup>9</sup> Whatever the case, following the Jewish tradition, the early Christian community provided for the poor (Acts 4:34; Jas 1:27).<sup>10</sup> This was accomplished through a distribution of food each Friday to the destitute along with a special daily distribution to widows.<sup>11</sup> However, as the community increased in number, this task soon became difficult to manage.

The problem was brought before the Apostles by the Hellenists themselves. Being aware of their limitations in light of their primary mission (Mt 28:19-20), the Twelve took decisive action and assembled the community. It is important to note that the text does not ascribe blame to the Apostles for this oversight, nor does it suggest that the problem was malicious in nature. With the assembly in place, the Apostles say: “It is not right that we should

give up preaching the word of God to serve tables.” In this statement, the Twelve reiterate their primary role in the community and recognize that the growing need to “serve tables” would diminish their ability to spread the Gospel. The term “serve tables” can be interpreted in a number of ways. It could mean serving at a dining table, or to stand behind the tables and hand out rations, or even, in a more figurative sense, to hand out money.<sup>12</sup> Whatever the case, it is not clear from the text whether the Apostles actually distributed the food themselves or managed the task. On somewhat of a different note, James Barnett suggests that the waiting on tables, “signifies the attitude of the disciples of Jesus is to be ever one of humility in serving others.”<sup>13</sup> Regardless of the precise meaning, the solution to this problem seemed clear. The Apostles called upon the community to choose seven men of “good repute, full of the Spirit and of wisdom.” In the Semitic world view, the number seven is considered sacred.<sup>14</sup> It is used to describe a fullness or perfection. Some have suggested that its use may be a reflection of the number of provincial magistrates in Jewish towns. These administrators, like the administrators who would “serve tables,” were known as the, “Seven of the Town,” or the “Seven Best of the Town.”<sup>15</sup>

While it is the community who chose the Seven, it is the Apostles who determine the selection criteria and approved the choice. They must be men of good repute so that their conduct is above suspicion. Given their sensitive role in the handling of community funds, this was essential in securing the people’s confidence; a confidence no doubt shaken by the recent oversight. Beyond their reputation, these men were to be, “full of the Spirit (*pneuma*) and wisdom (*sophia*).” Unlike the term “filled with the Spirit” which is a momentary inspiration, to be “full of the Spirit” is to be in possession of the Spirit of God or, more accurately, to be possessed by the Spirit of God.<sup>16</sup> Furthermore, these men were also to have wisdom which can be understood in this context as profound insight, good sense, and sound judgment.

The community unanimously accepted the Apostles’ proposal and selected seven men. It is significant that all who were put forth had Greek names, though this in itself does not mean they were all Hellenists. The Apostles, Andrew and Philip, both from Bethsaida (Jn 1:44), had Greek names. Some of the Seven may have been born in Palestine of parents who were bilingual.<sup>17</sup> Among those chosen, Stephen is the first mentioned and the best known of the group. According to a fifth century tradition, the name *Stephanos* is a Greek equivalent for the Aramaic *Kelil* which means “crown.”<sup>18</sup> He alone is recognized as “a man full of faith and of the Holy Spirit.” Perhaps this unique designation among the other six is Luke’s way of introducing Stephen in anticipation of his trial and martyrdom (Acts 7:54-60).

Once selected, the Seven were brought before the Apostles who prayed over them and then laid hands on them. In the Judeo-Christian tradition, the “laying on of hands,” (*cheirotonein*) has a long and rich heritage. It was used to convey a blessing (Gen 48:14; Mt:13-15; Mk 10:13-16; Lk 18:15-17), offer sacrifice (Lev 3:1-2, 8,13; 4:4), select Levites (Num 8:10), commission successors (Num 27:18; Dt 34:9), heal (Mk 6:5; Lk 4:4; Lk 13:13; Acts 9:12-17; Acts 28:8), and invoke the Holy Spirit (1Tim 4:14; 2Tim 1:6; Acts 8:16-17; 13:3; 19:6). Although it could be argued that the “laying on of hands” signified, to a greater or lesser degree, all of these elements; each of these elements have one thing in common, permanence.<sup>19</sup> This group of Seven was not assembled for *ad hoc* temporary service, but instead, a service that had an enduring character. Beyond this, the “laying on of hands” implies a special connection between the Seven and the Twelve.<sup>20</sup> This connection reflected a transfer of responsibility which, in turn implies a shared mission, albeit inferior.<sup>21</sup>

While the verb “to serve” (*diakonein*) and the noun “service” (*diakonia*) are both found in the institution of the Seven, the term “servant” (*diakonos*) is not used. The absence of this term, and the lack of any direct Scriptural connection to 1Tim 3:8, has led some to

conclude that “Acts of the Apostles 6:1-6 is not the institution of the diaconate.”<sup>22</sup> Perhaps the most influential of these are the contributors to the *Theological Dictionary of the New Testament*. In their analysis of the word *diakonos* they note:

Appeal is frequently made to Acts 6 in explanation of the rise of the diaconate, though the term *διάκονος* is not actually used. On this view, the deacons undertake practical service as distinct from the ministry of the word. It is to be noted however, that the Seven are set alongside the Twelve as representatives of the Hellenists, and that they take their place with the evangelists and apostles in disputing, preaching and baptizing. This fact shows that the origin of the diaconate is not to be found in Acts 6.<sup>23</sup>

The above analysis assumes a narrowly construed literal sense rooted exclusively in historical criticism. Its consideration of the text as such is sound, but its conclusions are severely limited by its presuppositions. These presuppositions fail to take into account the wider literal sense and spiritual senses. Consequently, the absolute nature of the conclusion, “that the origin of the diaconate is not to be found in Acts 6,” is an overstatement completely unsustainable within the context of the broader biblical tradition. The authors H. W. Beyer *et. al.* would have been better served to qualify their conclusion by saying, “Based on a strict literal sense, the origin of the diaconate is not to be found in Acts 6.” This, of course, would assume that they understand the other senses to be a valid hermeneutic, which does not appear to be the case. Others, such as the Catholic philologist Lawrence Hennessey, recognize that Acts is written sometime after the actual events. In this regard, he argues that the lack of the term “deacon” does not rule out that, “Luke’s readers may well have seen (even if anachronistically) the Seven as *diakonoi*, deacons in the later sense of ‘holders of the office of deacon.’<sup>24</sup>

Although there are differing opinions among contemporary biblical scholars, the Catholic theological tradition has long ascribed the origins of the diaconate order to the institution of the Seven.<sup>25</sup> As early as the third century, St. Irenaeus of Lyons (d. 203 A.D.) wrote, “There is Stephen too, again, who was chosen by the Apostles first Deacon...”<sup>26</sup> The Council of Neo-Caesarea (315 A.D.) bears witness to the ancient tradition of limiting the number of deacons in Rome to seven and attributes the reason for this to the institution of the Seven. There the Council Fathers write, “The deacons ought to be seven in number, according to the canon, even if the city be great. Of this you will be persuaded from the Book of the Acts.”<sup>27</sup> In his *History of the Church*, Eusebius of Caesarea (d. 341 A.D.), makes this same connection as he observes, “And there were appointed to the diaconate, for the service of the congregation, by prayer and the laying on of the hands of the Apostles, approved men, seven in number, of whom Stephen was one.”<sup>28</sup> During the Council of Trent (1545-1563 A.D.), it was affirmed that, “Sacred Scriptures make distinct mention not only of the priests, but also of the deacons (Acts 6:5; 1 Tim. 3:8 f.; Phil. 1:1), and teach in the most impressive words what is especially to be observed in their ordination.”<sup>29</sup> In 1920, while proclaiming the deacon Ephraem of Syrian a Doctor of the Universal Church, Pope Benedict XV wrote: “If, conscious of his lowliness, he did not dare to rise to the priesthood, he nevertheless showed himself a most perfect imitator of St. Stephen in the lower rank of the diaconate.”<sup>30</sup> Nearly 50 years later, in his *motu proprio* reinstating the permanent diaconate, Pope Paul VI observed:

Finally, after issuing these norms the desire springs spontaneously from our heart that deacons in performing their arduous functions in the modern world follow the examples which we propose for their imitation; the example of St. Stephen the protomartyr, who as St. Irenaeus says “was the first chosen for diaconal service by the Apostles.”<sup>31</sup>

In his 1993 encyclical on the moral life, Pope John Paul II, calling on the witness of Stephen, makes the same observation as he writes, “In the New Testament we find many examples of followers of Christ, beginning with the deacon Stephen (cf. Acts 6:8-7:60)”<sup>32</sup> The most recent reaffirmation of the connection between the Seven and the office of deacon is the 1998 instruction written jointly by both the Sacred Congregation for the Clergy and the Sacred Congregation for Catholic Education. In their common introduction, they write:

The service of deacons in the Church is documented from apostolic times. A strong tradition, attested already by St. Irenaeus and influencing the liturgy of ordination, sees the origin of the diaconate in the institution of the “seven” mentioned in the Acts of the Apostles (6:1-6).<sup>33</sup>

Despite this constant tradition, James Barnett observes that while many of the early Fathers of the Church saw the institution of the Seven as the origin of the diaconate, this was not completely universal.<sup>34</sup> To illustrate this, Barnett cites a homily on Acts 6 delivered by St. John Chrysostom (d. 407 A.D.) as quoted by the Council of Trullo nearly three centuries later.

Was it that of deacons? But this office did not yet exist in the churches. But was it the dispensation of the presbyter? But there was not yet any bishop, but only apostles, whence I think it clear and manifest that neither deacons nor of presbyters was there then the name.<sup>35</sup>

In his analysis of this passage, Chrysostom raises a question concerning the ecclesial rank or office of the Seven. He concludes that, since neither presbyters nor deacons existed at that time, these Seven cannot be designated as such. However, it does not follow that simply because the Seven cannot be designated “deacons,” they do not

represent the origins of the diaconate in an incipient form. As Robert Nowell points out:

The difficulty comes really from forgetting that the early Church was an organic growth: we are apt to expect to find already precisely formulated at a very primitive stage structures and offices that only developed gradually in response to circumstances and needs. It seems safer to start from the assumption that the diaconate developed gradually.<sup>36</sup>

Nowell’s point is well taken. An organic model assumes a movement from a lesser stage of development to a more advanced stage. The fact that John the Baptist *in utero* looked nothing like himself some thirty years later does not, by that very fact, mean that he is not the same person, albeit at different points in his life. Indeed, although he acquired the name John at his circumcision, a name which he was known by throughout history, that same name can be legitimately used to identify him in his mother’s womb before his birth. Thus, when the question is asked, who leaped in Elizabeth’s womb when Elizabeth heard Mary’s greeting (Lk 1:41)? Only one response is possible, John. This is not an anachronism in the sense of something belonging to a time other than that in which it exists. John did not come into being when he was named. He pre-existed his name by some nine months. In this regard, his name, like all names, possesses a transhistoric character, such that when it was given by Zechariah, it could be applied to the whole of his existence; past, present, and future. Nearly every biblical commentary from the Church Fathers to contemporary exegetes, when considering Lk 1:41, called the infant in Elizabeth’s womb “John” knowing full well that he would not be named John until after his birth.

A more closely related analogy might serve to better illustrate this point. Although the term appears only nine times in the Gospels, there is no record of Jesus ever designating the Twelve with the name

“Apostle.” Whenever this term is used, it is used as part of the narrative by the sacred authors. Applying the logic of the Chrysostom quote, as cited by Barnett, since the office of Apostle did not formally exist at that time, these Twelve cannot be designated as “Apostles”. But that is precisely what the sacred authors do. Matthew, Mark, and Luke (the term is not found in John) faithfully do not put the word “Apostle” in the mouth of Jesus, but use it freely to describe the Twelve. Whatever the Twelve were called during their time with Jesus, at least by the time the Gospels were committed to writing, the early Church understood this to be “Apostle” and universally applied it to them.<sup>37</sup> The same could also be said of deacons. Whatever the Seven were called during their time with the Apostles, at least by the time St. Irenaeus commits his work to writing, the early Church understood this to be “deacon” and universally applied it to them. In this regard, the term “deacon,” like all names, possesses a transhistoric character, such that when it was given to the office by the Church, it could be applied to the whole of its existence; past, present, and future.

This universal application appears to be challenged by one of the most influential Fathers of the Church. However, a closer look at St. John Chrysostom’s homily reveals something quite different. In his quote, Barnett, faithfully following the text of the Council of Trullo (629 A.D.)<sup>38</sup>, omits the last clause in the final sentence.<sup>39</sup> In its entirety, that sentence should read, “Whence I think it clearly and manifestly follows, that neither deacons nor presbyters is their designation: *but it was for this particular purpose that they were ordained* (emphasis mine).”<sup>40</sup> Grammatically, the coordinating conjunction “but” introduces a second clause which significantly modifies the meaning of the sentence. The term “but” is used to cite an exception to the first clause. Thus, the sentence can be re-read to mean: “I think it is clear and follows they (the Seven) were not called deacons or presbyters, but it was for this very purpose (the diaconate) that they were ordained.” In a commentary on this very quote, translators George Stevens *et. al.* concludes that from Chrysostom’s text:

There is no sufficient ground to doubt that this narrative describes the formation of the diaconate, which

we find existing later in apostolic age (Phil 1:1; 1Tim8:3). Although the word *διάκονος* does not occur here we have the corresponding verb *διάκονεῖν* and abstract noun *διάκονία* (Acts 1:2). The chief grounds of this opinion are: (1) the substantial identity of the duties here described and those of the later diaconate; (2) the almost universal testimony of patristic tradition to their identity; (3) the continuance for centuries of the number seven in the diaconate of churches (like that at Rome) where more than seven would naturally be required, out of deference to the apostolic mode.<sup>41</sup>

It is of interest to note that the editor of Barnett’s English source for Chrysostom’s actual homily footnotes the truncated sentence with a curious explanation. He writes, “I have not followed the Oxford translation, which seems to me to have reversed the point.”<sup>42</sup> In omitting what he believes to be an inconsistency, an inconsistency not recognized and “corrected” by the Oxford translator, the editor significantly modified the meaning of the text apparently reversing Chrysostom’s original intent.

In order to strengthen the case, and demonstrate a further lack of universality, Barnett points out that Chrysostom’s quote was later quoted in Canon 14 of the Council of Trullo (629 A.D.).<sup>43</sup> The Council of Trullo, also known as the Quinisext Council, was held in Constantinople under Emperor Justinian II and attended almost exclusively by oriental bishops. Because of issues concerning clerical celibacy and fasting, the 102 disciplinary canons were never recognized by the western Church.<sup>44</sup> Pope Sergius rejected the Council and, even under threat of arrest by Justinian, refused to sign the canons.<sup>45</sup> Because of this rejection, the Council of Trullo does not have ecumenical authority.<sup>46</sup> Consequently, while the Council is part of the Catholic tradition, because it was not accepted in the West, it is not part of the universal tradition and does not enjoy the status of an ecumenical council. Still, the Council of Trullo does provide early historical insights as to how Acts 6:1-6 might have been interpreted by

the post-Nicene Church. After using Chrysostom's quote, the Trullo Fathers wrote:

But on this account therefore we also announce that the aforesaid seven deacons are not to be understood as deacons who serve at the Mysteries . . . but that they were those to whom a dispensation was entrusted for the common benefit of those who were gathered together.<sup>47</sup>

Though they distance the Seven from the deacons who serve at the liturgy, the Council Fathers call both groups "deacons" (*diakonoi*). A close reading of the text reveals a distinction of task, not office. By the seventh century, the term deacon was a well-established clerical office in both the east and west. Without any other distinctions or qualifications, taken on its own merit, the text affirms the continuity of the office through the use of the common designation "deacon", while implicitly recognizing a development.

Having considered the universality of the tradition, the question still remains, why are scholars divided on the connection between the institution of the Seven and the deacons referred to by Paul in his first letter to Timothy? A close analysis reveals that these differences arise as a result of scholars asking two almost identical questions from two distinct points of view. The narrower perspective considers the question from the view of a restricted literal sense. From here, as we have already seen, the question is posed whether there is a direct scriptural connection affirming the institution of the Seven as the origins of the diaconate.<sup>48</sup> Given the lack of direct textual evidence, the answer must be categorically "no." Other than the cognate terms *diakonein* and *diakonia*, there is nothing directly linking Acts 6 to 1Tim 3:8-13. If however, the question is restated from a broader perspective, one that takes into account the entire tradition, a completely different answer is possible. From here, the question is posed whether the Church regards the institution of the Seven as the origins of the diaconate. Given the substantial evidence from such sources as the patristics, scholastics,

and the Magisterium, the answer is categorically "yes." Where a direct scriptural connection considers the question from a narrow perspective relying on a restricted literal sense, the Catholic Church must also consider all of the senses along with the witness of sacred tradition, especially when this tradition is affirmed by the Magisterium.<sup>49</sup>

Returning to the text itself (Acts 6: 1-6), it is important to note that, while the Apostles commission the Seven *to serve tables* (*diakonein*), nowhere in the Scriptures is this charge, in its restricted literal sense, fulfilled.<sup>50</sup> This is not to assert that service at the table was not historically exercised. It is, instead, to assert that care for the poor appears to be only one aspect of early ministry. Indeed, the initial requirements for the office far exceeds what would be needed for dispensing material assistance. Although the Apostles would have needed men of good repute (*martyroumenos*) since, in the handling of the community's resources, they would have to be above suspicion; they would not have necessarily needed to be full of the Spirit and wisdom. To be full of the Spirit (*plérés pneuma*) implies a mature faith and the ability for prophetic ministry (Num 11:16-17, Acts 2:4). Wisdom (*sophia*) could represent organizational talent, but when used in conjunction with "full of the Spirit" suggests spiritual authority.<sup>51</sup> Moreover, the laying on of hands (*cheirotonein*), as already noted, went well beyond what was needed for the material care of the Hellenist widows. In considering this very question, the Jesuit Denis Lynch points out:

It was far more than the distribution of alms . . . For such things there is no need of so elaborate a choice and of spiritual gifts so rare and lofty as a condition of ministry. Immediately, too they are dowered with new and astonishing gifts; and as we have noticed, outran the Apostles in their emphatic proclamation of the equality of Jews and Gentiles in the New Law.<sup>52</sup>

If one holds the meaning of service at the tables (*diakonein*) in a strict literal sense, the apparent disparity in Acts between what

the Seven were instituted for, and what they actually did, is puzzling and irreconcilable. However, if Luke intended it in a broader extended sense as ministry to the non-Palestinian Jews (*hellenistes*) or Gentiles, the contradiction becomes a contrary. In the exercise of their diaconal ministry, both Stephen (Acts 6: 8-12) and Philip (Acts 8: 26-40) are engaged with Hellenists and Gentiles, though not to the exclusion of Palestinian Jews (Acts 7: 1-60). This abrupt and immediate shift in ministry, which includes not only signs and wonders (Acts 6:8), but preaching, baptisms and exorcisms (Acts 8:36-40), makes no sense unless it was either originally intended by the Apostles or it quickly developed from their original intent. If it did develop, then, by the lack of any conflict to what up to now was apostolic ministry, it is reasonable to conclude that this development must have had at least the tacit approval of the Apostles.

The theory of a broader, more extended understanding has support within the text itself. As pointed out by the Australian scholar John Collins, one of the difficulties with holding for a strict literal interpretation is the manner in which Luke uses *diakonia*. Beyond its use for the Seven (Act 6: 2), he uses it consistently to describe the apostolic ministry of proclaiming the Good News (Acts 6:4), and, more specifically, the ministry of Peter (Acts 1:17,25) and Paul (Acts 20:24; 21:19).<sup>53</sup> It is within this framework, within Luke's world view, that *diakonia* must be interpreted. Consequently, the contextual meaning as it is used elsewhere in Luke needs to be considered in interpreting Acts 6:2. In a careful analysis of *diakonia* as it is used to describe the work of the Seven, Collins also observes that a more accurate English translation is not "waiting at tables," but instead, "waiting tables." For Collins, this distinction is crucial. These Seven were not called to look after the material well-being of the Hellenists, but rather to proclaim the Good News to them as they eat in common. Luke, Collins concludes, "intends us to understand that the Twelve will not be ministering to these small groups of women on the occasion of their gathering around the table."<sup>54</sup> This way of thinking is further advanced by Lawrence Hennessey who, following H. W. Beyer, suggests that this

ministry may have also included being an attendant at the Eucharist.<sup>55</sup> He writes:

The original meaning of *diakonein*, 'to wait at table,' reflected quite clearly the sayings and example of Jesus. Following Jesus, earliest Christianity made this practical *diakonia* the symbol of all loving care for others. Precisely here was to be found the source of the living connection between the ideal of *diakonia* and the office of *diakonos*: the office came to be rooted in the service at the common meal – waiting at table – which was at the heart of the community's love, i.e., the Lord's Supper and the attendant *agape*.<sup>56</sup>

Thus far in our analysis of Acts 6, we have considered the text in a conventional manner with a "turn to the object." In this regard, we simply gathered together some of the more commonly accepted scholarly observations within the biblical tradition. While this does not particularly advance our understanding of the diaconate *per se*, it does help us to appreciate the state of the question from a scriptural perspective as a basis for a new theology of the diaconate. To move beyond this, it will be necessary to revisit the manner in which Acts 6 reveals the *institution of the order* from a phenomenological perspective with its "turn to the subject." This will be accomplished using Pope John Paul II's exegetical method and in particular his extended use of the literal sense; a full exposition of which can be found in Appendix 3.

## II. To Serve at Table

Based on our earlier analysis of Acts 6, we have noted that *to serve at table* can be interpreted in either a restricted literal sense or a figurative (expanded literal) sense. While the figurative sense has support within the wider context of Acts, the two are not mutually exclusive. In fact, this mutual inclusivity can be expressed in two ways. First, the preaching (Acts 7:2-56, 8:7), catechetical (Acts 8: 5), and

sacramental ministries (Acts 8:38) exercised by the Seven in Acts by no means omit the material care of widows. These are complementary ministries and, as such, can exist in harmony. In this case, the strictly literal and figurative ways of serving at table, though quite distinct, enjoy an extrinsic relationship with one another. This is to say that both charitable acts (feeding widows) and ministerial acts (preaching, catechizing, and baptizing) all fall under the category of sacred service (*diakonia*). This functional complementarity is certainly affirmed in Acts itself and the later diaconate tradition. Second, these two ways of serving at table, the literal and figurative, can also be said to enjoy an intrinsic relationship. By intrinsic, I mean something more than a side-by-side complementary existence, but a shared existence in which each says something essential about the other. In this regard, the literal meaning reveals something critical about the figurative meaning and the figurative meaning, in turn, reveals something critical about the literal meaning. In other words, each implies something indispensable about the other such that, apart they reveal a significantly diminished understanding of what it means *to serve at table*. Consequently, we would miss something quite vital about diaconal ministry as a whole if we abandoned too quickly the literal image of charitable works in favor of a wider expanded meaning which itself would be impoverished without the literal. Indeed, it is only in-and-through the literal that we can more fully appreciate the figurative, and from this broader understanding construct a new theology of the diaconate. This quasi-sacramental approach relies on symbolic consciousness in which the narrow literal meaning points to and makes present the wider figurative meaning. While this intrinsic understanding represents a new approach, alone it is not sufficient to reveal a new theology of the diaconate. For reasons already established, this will require that we revisit Acts 6 with a “turn to the subject,” one which will complement and advance our already objective consideration.

Returning to the literal meaning of Acts 6, we encounter a problem in which the Greek-speaking widows were neglected in the daily distribution of food. This neglect, if it persists, will necessarily result

in the widows going hungry. In its most basic sense, hunger is the physical sensation associated with the desire for food. Food is an essential requirement for human life such that its complete absence can bring about death. While this situation describes an extreme, malnutrition, its lesser form, can significantly impair human health. If the Hellenist widows had no familial assistance as implied by their need for communal assistance, and if they could no longer avail themselves of either the *tambuy* or the *quppa* implied by that same need for assistance, then without the help of the early Church, they would likely experience hunger. While this hunger, in the plain sense, expresses the need for food; symbolically it can express a more primal need, the need for spiritual sustenance. In other words, this hunger of the stomach for material food (the literal meaning) may also express a hunger of the soul for spiritual food (the figurative meaning). In this case, the outward visible reality expresses a more primal inward invisible spiritual reality.

This, of course, is nothing new. The gospels are replete with examples of Jesus using visible realities to point to invisible realities. One example is found in Luke’s Gospel with the story of the paralytic (Lk 5:17-24). In this case, Jesus wanted to demonstrate, in no uncertain terms, that He had the power to forgive sins. In doing so, He used an outward reality (healing the paralytic), to reveal a more primal inward reality (forgiveness of sins). Here, a visible reality reveals a deeper invisible reality making it present in a concrete and tangible way. This way of making the unseen seen follows the paradigm of the Incarnation in which the invisible God is made visible through the taking on of human nature. It follows then that what is revealed in the hunger of the widows may go well beyond their need for physical sustenance, but also points to a more primal need for spiritual sustenance. This indicates that what is at stake is not merely the potential loss of human life, but the loss of eternal life.

This was precisely the message Jesus was sending in the Bread of Life Discourse (Jn 6:22-71). A brief examination of this passage will shed further light on our treatment of the phenomenology of hunger

in Acts and its place in diaconal ministry. Having just preached the Beatitudes and fed 5000, Jesus satisfied the crowd's spiritual hunger and then, to reinforce this invisible satisfaction, He satisfied their physical hunger by multiplying the fish and loaves. Where the physical corresponds to the body, the spiritual corresponds to the soul. Together, they constitute the whole person, body and soul. As such, Jesus' message is deeply personal inasmuch as it is meant to address the totality of our being having both temporal/material and eternal/spiritual consequences.

After this, Jesus crossed the Sea of Galilee alone, but was later discovered the next day by the crowds who followed Him. Upon finding Him, they asked Him when He arrived. He responded by saying, "Amen, amen, I say to you, you are looking for me not because you saw signs but because you ate the loaves and were filled. Do not work for food that perishes but for the food that endures for eternal life, which the Son of Man will give you (Jn 6:26-27)." Jesus' words are instructive as He speaks of "signs." One of the signs He was referring to was the feeding of the 5000 the day before. Signs signify. They point beyond themselves to greater realities. The crowd became fixated on the sign itself without moving beyond it. Jesus attempts to move them from the sign itself to that which the sign points, to the food that lasts forever. Despite this, they continue in their obstinacy asking for more signs having to do with physical food. Undaunted, Jesus draws them deeper into the mystery of His words by saying, "I am the bread of life; whoever comes to me will never hunger, and whoever believes in me will never thirst (Jn 6:35)." What was implicit is now made explicit. This spiritual food, the very thing the physical food points to, is not something, but instead, Someone. It is not some truth among other truths, but the Truth personified in Jesus Christ. Once again we encounter a personalist dimension for when one is being fed, whether physical or spiritual, the feeding takes place between two persons, the one who feeds and the one who is hungry. It is an act of tender care in which the one who feeds concerns himself with the health and wellbeing of the one being fed. It involves time and effort. It involves the gathering and preparation of food recognizing at the

outset that not any food will do. It must be the kind of food that the one being fed can digest. In some cases it may require literally spoon feeding the hungry. In this act, the one feeding does not simply offer food, but in the very offering of food, offers his very self. This is nothing less than an act of love. The phenomenology of hunger and feeding, as expressed in the institution of the diaconal order (Acts 6:3), reinforces the personalist approach to the diaconate discussed earlier.

Returning to the Bread of Life Discourse, the connection between the sign and that which the sign signifies requires a leap of faith; a leap the crowds were unwilling to take (Jn 6:36-3, 47). To challenge them to take this leap, the language becomes far more literal and far more emphatic. Jesus says to them, "Whoever eats my flesh and drinks my blood has eternal life, and I will raise him on the last day. For my flesh is true food, and my blood is true drink (Jn 6:54-55). The Evangelist John, writing in *Koine* Greek, now shifts from the word *phago* (Jn 50-53) which means "to eat" to the word *trogo* (Jn 6:54,56-58) which means "to gnaw or chew". Because it gets into the actual mechanics of eating, *trogo* is not typically used in a figurative, metaphoric or symbolic sense. Thus, by shifting to *trogo*, the sacred author intensifies the literal meaning rendering Jesus' words even more unequivocal. The Tradition has long recognized this passage (among others) as providing the scriptural basis for the Catholic understanding of the Eucharist and, more specifically, the dogma of the Real Presence. As such, it has its ultimate meaning in an encounter with Christ Jesus that brings about intimate communion (Jn 6:56) having both a limited temporal sense which, in turn, anticipates a fuller eternal sense. Consequently, we can say that just as physical hunger is satiated with physical food such as loaves and fish, spiritual hunger is satiated by Christ Himself. However, Jesus no longer walks the earth and has passed on this responsibility of feeding to his Church (Mt 16:18-19, 28:18-20; Lk 10:16). While this is accomplished by all of the faithful, it is done so in a preeminent way through the ordained ministry. By making Christ the High Priest and Servant (Mk 10:45) present, the priesthood and diaconate feed the Church by way of the Eucharist and sacred ecclesial service. In doing so they, each and in their own

way, act in the Person of Christ by offering themselves as food for the hungry.

Despite Jesus' continued efforts to draw the crowd into the deeper reality concerning the Bread of Life, most are unwilling to take this leap of faith and leave him. Remaining with our Lord are the Twelve of whom He asks, "'Do you also want to leave (Jn 6:67)?" Simon Peter, speaking for the group says in reply, "Master, to whom shall we go? You have the words of eternal life. We have come to believe and are convinced that you are the Holy One of God (Jn 6:68-69)." In Peter's confession, we see the fruit of a faith grounded not so much in what Jesus said, but in Jesus Himself. At this stage of His ministry, our Lord's words must have been somewhat confusing, even to the Apostles. They had yet to experience Christ's passion, death, and resurrection in light of the Passover meal. They had not yet received the Holy Spirit at Pentecost. Nonetheless, having lived with Him, having heard Him preach, and having witnessed His miracles, they believed in Him. He had credibility with the Twelve in a way He did not yet have with the crowds. Peter and the others were in essence saying, "We're not exactly sure of what you mean, but because we believe you are the Holy One of God, we believe you."

Hunger is a universal phenomenon. It is not limited to a particular time or culture because it is linked to the one constant that exists throughout all times and in every culture, human beings. To be human is to experience, to a greater or lesser degree, hunger. In the case of Acts 6, this hunger is attributed to Greek-speaking widows. It is generally accepted that Luke, in both his Gospel and Acts, is writing to a predominantly gentile audience and, because of this, goes to great lengths to demonstrate the universal call to salvation in Christ. The fact that the widows and the Seven are Hellenistic underscores the universality of this call. Hunger, whether physical or spiritual, arises deep within all of us without exception as a result of a privation of a necessity, a lack of a due good. This privation presses upon the whole of the person to satiate that which is lacking in order to preserve our existence. Because this necessity occurs each and every day of our lives, the satisfaction

of that appetite is a constant and lifelong task; the neglect of which is catastrophic.

This phenomenological observation gives rise to four initial conclusions. First, the "table" is the place where hunger is satisfied. It provides a three-way nexus between the ones being fed, the ones feeding and, of course, the food itself. Though a table is not needed to feed the hungry, it nonetheless provides a convenient and efficient way to consume food. In this regard, it is a kind of metaphor for the Church, the place where we are fed. Nowhere is this more richly illustrated than when we gather at Mass around the table of the Lord.

Second, hunger can have a sobering effect. In the parable of the Prodigal Son, only when the younger son longed to eat his fill of the pods on which the swine fed did he come to his senses (Lk 15: 16-17). Hunger has a way of reminding us, in a visceral sense, what is really important and what is not. It can redirect our focus and prioritize our values. The same is true of spiritual hunger. This is the emptiness within that longs to be filled by the only thing that can fill it. We know intuitively that this hunger is spiritual and that it will require spiritual food, but such food comes with a cost, a leap of faith and a change of habit. Unwilling or unable to make this leap and the subsequent change that follows, we instead try to satisfy this hunger with material things, but to no avail. The hunger remains continually churning in our gut until we surrender and allow ourselves to be fed.

Third, the food we eat not only sustains us, but is necessary for further growth and development. It sustains us inasmuch as its presence keeps us alive and its absence can result in death. Beyond this, without adequate sustenance, we will never truly realize our potential. Food has the capacity to maintain health and fuel growth, thus enabling us to realize greater potential. In a similar way, spiritual food does not merely sustain our existence, it also enhances that existence. This allows for a growth in holiness and a deeper appreciation of the love poured out on us in Christ Jesus.

Finally, while we can satiate the appetite by eating, the satisfying affect is only temporary. In other words, the relief we experience lasts for only a limited period of time, after which, the hunger returns. Consequently, the process of satisfaction must be repeated each day throughout our lives in order to sustain our existence. The same is true with spiritual food. It requires that we “take and eat” throughout the whole of our lives. At the same time, this temporal satisfaction, particularly when it fades, gives rise to a certain futility. This is to say that, when the hunger returns, it reveals the insufficiency of the temporal satisfaction and the longing for something more permanent. After Jesus fed the five thousand, He slipped away from the crowd, but they followed Him. Once they found Him, He said to them, “Amen, amen, I say to you, you are looking for me not because you saw signs but because you ate the loaves and were filled. Do not work for food that perishes but for the food that endures for eternal life (Jn 6: 26-27).” Our Lord is telling them that, in their desire to be filled, they must work for food that completely satisfies. “So they said to him, ‘Sir, give us this bread always.’ Jesus said to them, ‘I am the bread of life; whoever comes to me will never hunger, and whoever believes in me will never thirst (Jn 6: 34-35).’” Jesus Christ is the Sole Satisfier. He and He alone can eradicate hunger for all time such that, in Him our appetite is completely filled and we desire nothing else. Thus, not any food will do. It must be a food made for us or, perhaps more precisely, a Food we were made for. Of course, this eternal satisfaction is an eschatological reality. We must therefore content ourselves with temporal food and all of its benefits until we are deemed ready to partake in the heavenly banquet (Rev 19: 5-9).”

While these phenomenological observations on feeding the hungry with its “turn to the subject” provides insights on the call to *serve at table*; they are not in themselves particularly diaconal. By this I mean that the call to feed is not exclusive to the diaconate and can fall to others in the Christian community as well. In light of this, we can ask, what makes the diaconal *service at table* so very different from that of other Christians? The difference here, I suspect, arises out of the nature of the relationship between the feeder and the ones being

fed. This is merely another application of the maxim *agere sequitur esse* previously examined. To illustrate this application consider, by way of analogy, a hungry child. Christian charity requires that, to the extent possible, all Christians should seek to alleviate this hunger. That said, the primary responsibility to feed the child falls first to the parents. By virtue of the gift of life bestowed upon them by God, they acquire with that gift certain corresponding powers and obligations. This is to say that parents, precisely because they are parents, have the duty to feed their children. It is their God-given vocation and as such finds its origins and strength in a divine call. This does not mean that they necessarily become the exclusive feeders as others such as family members and friends can assist the parents at times. Nonetheless, parents have the primary obligation to feed their child and that obligation means that the child has a right to be fed by his parents. Ordinarily, the community may never supplant the parent’s responsibility though they may well supplement it. Only in extreme circumstances, when the parents are either unwilling or unable to fulfill their responsibility, may the community step in a take over the parental role. Where the parent’s obligation is grounded primarily in the virtue of justice, the community’s obligation is grounded primarily in the virtue of charity. Here we see a divinely instituted order based on the nature of the one feeding and the one being fed.

The above analogy can be applied to the diaconate. In responding to the question of what makes the diaconal *service at table* so very different from that of other Christians, we can respond by considering the nature of the relationship between the feeder and the ones being fed. Charity requires that, to the extent possible, all Christians are called to serve those in need. That said, the primary responsibility to serve the needy, be it spiritual or material, falls first to the diaconate. By virtue of the gift of their sacred office bestowed upon them by Christ the Servant, they acquire with that gift certain corresponding powers and obligations. This is to say that deacons, precisely because they are deacons, have the duty to serve those in need. It is their God-given vocation and as such finds its origin and strength in a divine call. This does not mean that they necessarily become the exclusive servants as others,

such as members of the community, can assist the deacon in serving the needy. Nonetheless, deacons have the primary obligation to *serve at table* and that obligation means the faithful have a right to be served by the diaconate. Ordinarily, lay ministers may never supplant the deacon's responsibility though they may well supplement it. Where the deacon's obligation is grounded primarily in the virtue of justice, the community's duty is rooted primarily in the virtue of charity. In the case of the diaconate, they have a vocation to serve which, as we have already seen, possesses a quality of permanence and is therefore obligatory. Laity, on the other hand, have a ministry to serve which is not permanent and therefore not obligatory. Where a layperson can step down from a ministry, a deacon cannot step down from a vocation; at least not ontologically. Here we once again see a divinely instituted order based on the nature of the one feeding and the one being fed.

At this point in our reflection, we would do well to temporarily suspend our phenomenological analysis and explore that which directly follows the election of the Seven, the martyrdom of Stephen. Just as this passage extends the previous narrative, so too will it enable us to enhance and extend our phenomenological reflection on hunger as it relates to the diaconate.

And Stephen, full of grace and power, did great wonders and signs among the people. Then some of those who belonged to the synagogue of the Freedmen (as it was called), and of the Cyrenians, and of the Alexandrians, and of those from Cilicia and Asia, arose and disputed with Stephen. But they could not withstand the wisdom and the Spirit with which he spoke. Then they secretly instigated men, who said, "We have heard him speak blasphemous words against Moses and God." And they stirred up the people and the elders and the scribes, and they came upon him and seized him and brought him before the council, and set up false witnesses who said, "This man never ceases to speak words against this holy place and the law; for we have heard him say that

this Jesus of Nazareth will destroy this place, and will change the customs which Moses delivered to us." And gazing at him, all who sat in the council saw that his face was like the face of an angel. (Acts 6:8-15)

In the above passage, Stephen emerges as a dominant figure described by Luke as "full of grace and power." Note that this description contains two components corresponding to *esse* (full of grace – *plērēs charis*) and *agere* (power – *dynamis*). Because Stephen was full of grace, he possessed the power to perform great signs and wonders among the people. Because these signs and wonders are used in Acts to describe both the activities of Jesus (Acts 2:19, 22, 5:12) and the Apostles (Acts 2:4, 4:30, 14:3, 15:12), Stephen is portrayed by Luke as participating in the apostolic ministry which finds its source in Jesus. His ministry caught the attention of those who attended the synagogue of the Freedmen.<sup>57</sup> They engaged him in debate but, because of Stephen's wisdom and eloquence, it was to no avail. Proving no match, they then incited the crowd with false charges and took him before the Sanhedrin. At this point, Luke begins to use language that parallels Jesus' own trial before Caiaphas (Mt 26:61, 27:40, Mk 14:58, 15:29).<sup>58</sup>

Stephen is falsely accused of speaking against the Temple, blaspheming against Mosaic Law, and threatening that Jesus will destroy the Temple. As these accusations are lodged, the crowd's eyes are fixed on him and his face radiates like that of an angel. This demeanor suggests religious awe (Jg 13:6). Stephen is then asked by the high priest to affirm these charges. Instead of responding directly, he begins a long discourse of salvation history (Acts 7:1-50). In doing so, Stephen describes the great mercy shown by God to Israel throughout her history and, at the same time, Israel's ingratitude toward God. The discourse concludes with indictment accusing the Jews of murdering the Righteous One (*tou dikaiou*) whose coming was foretold by the prophets.

"You stiff-necked people, uncircumcised in heart and ears, you always resist the Holy Spirit. As your fathers

did, so do you. Which of the prophets did not your fathers persecute? And they killed those who announced beforehand the coming of the Righteous One, whom you have now betrayed and murdered, you who received the law as delivered by angels and did not keep it." Now when they heard these things they were enraged, and they ground their teeth against him. (Acts 7:51-54)

This stinging indictment aroused the fury of the crowd. At this point, Stephen gazes toward heaven, indicating a divine vision (Lk 3:21-22, Acts 10:11), and bears witness before the Sanhedrin to the resurrected Christ saying, "Behold, I see the heavens open, and the Son of Man standing at the right hand of God (Acts 7:57)." Apart from Jn 12:34, this is the only time in the New Testament that the title "Son of Man" is used by someone other than Jesus. The title is used to convey a kind of identification with humanity and its suffering along with God's vindication.<sup>59</sup> In Stephen's vision, Jesus is seen as "standing" at the Father's right hand. Jesus foretold in His own trial before the Sanhedrin that he would be "seated" at the Father's right hand (Lk 22:69), however, in Stephen's vision, He is "standing." This difference in posture would seem to indicate that, just as Stephen is bearing witness to Jesus, Jesus standing indicates that He is bearing witness to Stephen and affirming the truth of his discourse.<sup>60</sup> Stephen also bears witness, much to the consternation of the High Council, to Jesus' authority and that they themselves killed an innocent man. This conviction further infuriates them. Although there is no formal judgment by the Sanhedrin (Jn 18:31), the crowd, now angered, rushed him and took him outside the city to stone him (Lev 24:10-16). This drama parallels Jesus' own experience (Lk 4:29) and further links the two. Indeed, this connection now becomes explicit as Stephen is put to death. There, following the example of Jesus (Lk 23:46; Lk 23:34), he utters, "Lord Jesus, receive my spirit." and, "Lord, do not hold this sin against them." Luke's connection between the death of Jesus and the death of Stephen is unmistakable. Summing this up, James Dunn notes: "Stephen is identified with Jesus in his prophet-like rejection,

his martyr-like suffering, his calm trust in the face of death and in his readiness to forgive his enemies."<sup>61</sup>

The martyrdom of Stephen occurs within the context of his ministry *to serve at table*. As we have already seen, in an expanded literal sense, this would not be limited to charitable works but, in this particular instance, extends to preaching. Stephen's lucid words reveal a presence of mind; a presence that would have no doubt given him an awareness of the consequence of his actions. He knew on a visceral level what this same court did to his Lord not long ago. If the Sanhedrin actively contributed to the death of Jesus, they would be even more inclined to put to death one of His followers, especially one who dared to accuse them of infidelity. As a result, it is reasonable to conclude that Stephen understood what he was doing along with its inevitable consequences. Despite this, he incarnates Christ the Servant in a powerful way and, as a faithful disciple, picked up his cross and followed his Master. In this very act, Stephen reveals that the highest form of service is sacrifice expressed in a total gift-of-self. This sacrifice participates in the timeless eternal sacrifice of Christ on the Cross which is the Gift-of-Self upon which all gifts can be measured. Indeed, insofar as Christ's sacrifice was salvific bringing about the redemption of the world, and insofar as Stephen's sacrifice is a participation in that one sacrifice, it follows that *to serve at table* has as its ultimate goal to perpetuate Christ's salvific activity. This, I believe, gets to the theological heart of *diakonia*. It reveals *diakonia* as not merely a gift-of-self that wills the good of the other for the sake of the other, but as a gift-of-self that finds its definitive character in sacrifice. Sacrifice, as the etymology of the word implies, is to make holy, to set aside for a special purpose. When a gift-of-self is expressed sacrificially, when it cost something of the giver, it becomes a consecrated gift, one which reflects the gift of Christ's love for us on the Cross. It is precisely here that the gift of the deacon in the exercise of his ministry and the Gift of Christ's love converge revealing in the very process the salvific meaning of the sacred service.

In establishing the criteria for a new theology of the diaconate at the beginning of this study, one element cited was the necessity of a

corresponding ecclesiology. Insofar as theology studies divine revelation, and insofar as this revelation is articulated and transmitted in, through and for the Church; authentic theology is, by its very nature, ecclesial. Our treatment of feeding the hungry within the context of serving at table reveals the ecclesiological dimension of this new personalist approach. This feeding, while accomplished in a preeminent way through the diaconate, possesses a second ecclesial effect. Diaconal service, when it truly embodies Christ the Servant, has the accompanying grace and by that, the transformative power to inspire those fed to become feeders. In other words, the authentic exercise of diaconal service has the real ability to create a diaconal Church by inspiring the faithful to become, in a certain sense, “deacons” within their own vocations. This enables sacred service to move beyond the diaconate itself positively impacting the laity, religious, the priesthood and even the episcopacy. In this way, the diaconate, by manifesting Christ the Servant through the exercise of sacred service expressed in a salvific gift-of-self, fulfills in a unique way the necessary ecclesiological requirement of a sound theological approach.

### III. The Establishment Hypothesis

Earlier we noted that, if Personalism is to advance a new theological approach to the diaconate, it should be capable of revealing fresh insights into this sacred office. We have already demonstrated some of these insights through our treatment of metaphysics as it relates to character and through our application of Lublin Thomism particularly as it relates to service as a gift-of-self. While these insights represent modest gains laying a foundation for further study, we would do well to conclude our investigation by revisiting the origins of the diaconate and further apply these insights. Given what we have already covered, this approach would seem somewhat redundant. However in our “first pass” we considered the origins of the diaconate from the perspective of *diakonia* as it related to *service at the table*. Now, in our “second pass,” we will move from *diakonia* to *diakonos*. This movement may appear to be a distinction without a difference as the

origins of the diaconate and the origins of the diaconate order are often treated as one in the same thing. While they are certainly related, a closer examination shows they are quite distinct. Their distinctiveness is bound up in the more fundamental distinction of act (*agere*) and being (*esse*). In our consideration of the metaphysics (Appendix 1), we observed that for something to act it must first exist. Applied here, for there to be *diakonia*, there must first be *diakonos*. In fact, only when one is *diakonos (esse)* can he exercise *diakonia (agere)*. In what follows we will explore the ontological beginnings of the diaconate as it was initially revealed by Christ through what I have termed the Establishment Hypothesis.

Before proceeding however, we would do well to make an initial observation concerning the indispensability of logic in any hermeneutic. It may seem rather evident, but all forms of biblical interpretation, regardless of their variation, depend upon the structures of language. By language, I simply mean the human capacity for acquiring and using complex systems of communication. These systems, which are always culturally and historically conditioned, all possess one universal. They all require for their intelligibility, logic. This is to say that they must make use of certain structures of reason to craft a cogent statement. Simply put, what we say must make sense; sense to ourselves and others to whom we wish to share our thoughts and insights. Thus, underlying all forms of biblical interpretation, by virtue of the language used to formulate these interpretations, is logic.<sup>62</sup> It is assumed and presupposed as an indispensable and necessary component in the transmission of any clear thought. Because of this, its import is easily overlooked requiring us, at times, to make explicit that which is implicit. In doing so, language becomes more intelligible, arguments become more coherent, and the biblical interpretations that rely on these become more effective. Logic then is a fundamental building block of all human discourse and, as such, makes possible the kind of discourse that speaks to the interpretative sciences including that of biblical exegesis. In this regard, it stands as a kind of meta-hermeneutic such that its absence in any hermeneutic undermines that hermeneutic. Understood this way, the use of logic

enables us to deduce specific presupposition inherent in the text. For example, logic dictates that an institution must precede, if only by an instant, enrollment into that institution. To say, for instance, that Joseph and Mary were married requires that the institution of marriage pre-exist their marriage otherwise the statement that they were married loses its intelligibility. It becomes meaningless. This distinction may seem slight and almost insignificant, but nonetheless, it is derived logically out of a metaphysical necessity. Something must first exist before something else that exists can be a part of it. The institution of marriage must first exist before Mary and Joseph could be married.

The above observation regarding the indispensability of logic can now be applied to the origins of the diaconate giving rise to the distinction between *officium* (office) and *ordo* (order). In its most basic sense, an office denotes a position within a larger organization that carries with it a specific function. Today, for example, we speak of the office of the Prefect of the Sacred Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith. Here the officeholder occupies a particular place within the curia whose function and scope of authority is determined by the Church. Of course, this understanding of office is nothing new. The Bible is replete with various officeholders from priests to prophets, from judges to kings. In the New Testament, the Apostles were identified with an office (Acts 1:20), as were bishops and deacons (1Tim 3:1-13), along with presbyters (1Tim 5: 17-25). They, each in their own way, occupy a particular place with the early Church whose common function was determined by that same Church. When a particular office is shared by two or more, and when this sharing is recognized by the Church as permanent and perpetual, a body of officeholders is formed constituting an order. Consequently, when Matthias was elected to the office of apostle, he was, at the same time, enrolled (at least implicitly) in the order of apostles. Peter says as much when he states of Judas' replacement, "May another take his office (Acts 1:20). After his election, Matthias shared that apostolic office in common with other apostles and together they constituted an order. Likewise, when Stephen was elected to the diaconate office he was, at the same

time, enrolled (at least implicitly) in the order of deacons. He shared that diaconal office in common with the other six deacons and together they constituted an order. These ecclesial offices, while sharing certain similarities with their secular counterparts, differ from the latter in four distinct ways. First, they are divinely instituted. Second, they are apostolic in nature. Third, they have an ontological effect expressed in what would be later called sacramental character. Fourth, they confer on the one being ordained a specific grace (power) to effectively carry out the office.

In all of this, it is important to bear in mind that the distinction between office and order is not derived exegetical, but instead from logic arising out of a literal sense of the text. In this regard however, we are not seeking to discover, using the hermeneutic tools of historical criticism, whether the sacred authors intended for the readers of their time to understand the distinction between office and order. In fact, it is fair to say that there is no direct evidence in the texts themselves to suggest such a distinction was operative at the time. Instead, in our observation of key texts concerning the diaconate, we are recognizing certain logical categories implicit within the text to describe a situation in which an office is conferred and an order, based on that office, is formed. Even if the terms "office" and "order" *per se* are not used in the Scriptures to specify these realities, they nonetheless exist in their substance. Moreover, as the tradition developed under the guidance of the Holy Spirit, the terms "office" and "order" would eventually become commonplace to describe these very same things.

In its most basic sense, the Establishment Hypothesis maintains that at the Last Supper the Apostles received not only the priesthood, but the fullness of what would later be called Holy Orders. This is grounded in the premise that one cannot give what one has not first received. In order to confer the episcopal, presbyteral and diaconal offices, those offices must be held, at least implicitly, by the conferrer. We know that the priesthood was established at the Institution based on the actions of Christ and His command, "Do this in memory of me

(Lk 22:19).” However, there was another command given that evening not found in Synoptics, but in John’s account. After the washing of the feet, Jesus says, “. . . so that as I have done for you, you should also do (Jn 13:14-15).” In this one event, we have two dominical commands, one unmistakably sacerdotal in nature and the other unmistakably diaconal in nature. Where the episcopate and presbyterate share in the hierarchical priesthood of Christ, the diaconate shares in His sacred service. Furthermore, we know that the Apostles perpetuated their office primarily through the episcopacy and secondarily through the priesthood and diaconate.

It should be noted that the *Mandatum* in John’s Gospel and the Institution Narratives in the synoptics are not without their chronological difficulties. While all four Gospels maintain that Jesus died on Good Friday (Mt 26:17-20, Mk 14:12-17, Lk 22:7-16), John’s Gospel indicates that the Jewish authorities celebrated the Passover on the night of Good Friday (Jn 18:28; 19:14). This discrepancy has perplexed biblical scholars for centuries leading to a number of interesting theories.<sup>63</sup> For our purposes, it is not necessary to treat these theories here as what is at stake in the Establishment Hypothesis is not so much when the Passover took place, but only that it took place. It is merely sufficient to acknowledge the discrepancy and establish that, regardless of when Jesus celebrated the Passover, it was celebrated and that the *Mandatum* and Institution took place in the one event; an event which itself is inextricably tied to the total Gift-of-Self as expressed in Christ’s passion, death and resurrection.

One objection to the Establishment Hypothesis is likely to come from the traditional belief that the origin of the diaconate is commonly attributed to Acts 6 with the selection of the seven proto-deacons. I explored this earlier in some detail from the Fathers through the scholastics and into the modern period and addressed some of the concerns raised by contemporary scholars. From this consideration, I concluded that none of these concerns were significant enough to diminish the tradition and maintained that the selection of the Seven represent, in seminal form, what would later be called the diaconate.

That said, the Establishment Hypothesis can be reconciled with this tradition through the distinction between *officium* and *ordo*. Where the *Mandatum* established the office of deacon, the selection of the Seven and laying on of hand in Acts 6 represents the institution of the order. There is some implicit evidence for this process in the Scriptures. We know, for example, that the office of priesthood was established at the Last Supper. However, the presbyterate order was instituted sometime after as witnessed by Timothy. Likewise, we can say that the episcopate office (the fullness of orders) was also established at the Last Supper. However, the episcopal order was instituted sometime after as again witnessed by Timothy. If this is true of the presbyterate and episcopate, then it is reasonable to conclude that it is also true of the diaconate.

Our consideration of the distinction between office and order reveals an essential aspect concerning the origins of most things. When we speak of the origins of this or that, we are referring to the point or place where something new begins to exist; when, in the ontological sense, it comes into being. However, upon closer inspection, what we sometimes identify as the origins of something is not so much when it comes to be, but instead when our knowledge of its existence begins. For instance, it was once thought that a human life originated at the quickening. The term “quickenings” was used to describe the moment in pregnancy when a mother starts to perceive her baby’s movement. However, with the development of modern embryology, we have now identified conception as the origins of a particular human being. When the gametes of the father and mother, neither of which constitutes a human being, come together, they form something completely different. This “something different” constitutes a new existence, in this case a new and completely unrepeatable human being. Thus, what was thought to be the origins of a human life in the quickening was actually the knowledge of an already existing human life.

Keeping the above in mind, and returning to the distinction between office and order, where Christ’s total and complete Gift-of-Self through the Pascal Mystery represents the true origins of the diaconate

expressed at *Mandatum*, the institution of the Seven represents our coming to know that existence. These two moments, though quite different are nonetheless inextricably linked inasmuch as the institution of order is ontologically dependent on the establishment of the office. Because of this, they can be easily conflated such that the institution of the order is seen as the origins of the diaconate. This misidentification is quite understandable. It arises because the term “origins” can be used in both a metaphysical or epistemological sense. In a metaphysical sense, we speak of it as an ontological beginning. In an epistemological sense, we speak of it as the moment we come to know of an existence. While quite different, the two senses are so closely related that we often confuse the metaphysical sense with the epistemological sense. For example, we celebrate Christ coming into the world on the Feast of the Nativity. While this is certainly true in the sense that He was made known to the world at His birth, it is not true on the ontological sense. The Incarnation represents the ontological coming together of an already existing divine nature and a completely new human nature in the one Person Jesus Christ. It was then and only then that the Word became flesh and dwelled among us (Jn 1:14). This took place not on the day of Christ’s birth, but instead at the Annunciation in the womb of the Blessed Virgin Mary. Nonetheless, Christmas represents a kind of public knowing of what the world could not see nine months earlier. It was the first outward visible manifestation of an inward invisible reality. In this respect, Christmas is a kind of sacramental representation of the Incarnation in which the sign expressed in the Christ Child points to and makes preeminently present the Incarnation.

The same can be said of the diaconate. As we have already seen, the Church traditionally holds the origins of the diaconate at the institution of the Seven. While this is certainly true in the epistemological sense that the office was made known to the world at this moment, it is not true in the metaphysical sense. The Establishment Hypothesis maintains that the *Mandatum* represents the ontological beginnings of sacred service. It was then and only then, through Christ’s total Gift-of-Self that the fullness of Holy Orders was given to perpetuate

the salvation of the world. This took place not with the institution of the Seven, but instead at the Last Supper. Nonetheless, the institution of the Seven represents a kind of public knowing of what the world could not see earlier. It was the first outward visible manifestation of an inward invisible reality. In this respect, Acts 6 is a kind of sacramental representation of a diaconate already established. The institution of the order is a sign which points to a deeper reality, the establishment of the office, making that reality preeminently present.

In some respects, the Establishments Hypothesis is not new. James Keating writes, “The foot washing scene at the Last Supper is an expression of the institution of the diaconate by Christ, since it reflects the doctrinal truth of the unity of Holy Orders. There is symmetry between the ‘*Do this in memory of Me*’ (Lk 22:19) charge to the Apostles and his other Apostolic charge ‘so that as I have done for you, *you should also do*’ (Jn 13:14-15).”<sup>64</sup> In making this claim, Keating cites Cardinal Walter Kasper who in a paper asserts:

We have seen that without *diaconia* there cannot be a Church, because Christ himself is one who serves (Lk 22:27). Therefore, at the Last Supper...he not only established the idea of priesthood, but, in principle, also *laid the foundation of the diaconal ministry*. By the washing of feet he gave us an example, so that we also do, as he did to us (John 13:15). In these words one can see the foundation of the diaconate.”<sup>65</sup>

Both Keating and Kasper observe what they believe to be obvious in the sense that it is there for anyone willing to look. The difficulty is that few have looked and therefore the obvious is not so obvious. I suspect that part of the reasons few seem to see what is so clear to others has to do with the Last Supper’s intrinsic connection to the institution of the Eucharist and the establishment of the priesthood of Christ. This priestly association, which cannot be denied, coupled with a historic de-emphasis of the diaconate, tends to elevate sacrifice at the cost of sacred service. This, I believe, is a theological mistake;

one which demonstrates how very little the theology of the diaconate has entered into the sacramental conversation regarding Holy Orders. Properly understood, the Last Supper and indeed the entire Pascal Mystery, did not downplay service to sacrifice, deacon to priest, but indicated their complementary, albeit subordinate relationship. Jesus makes this very clear when He says, “The Son of Man came not to be served but to serve, and to give His life as a ransom for many (Mt 20:27-28).” Based on the personalist approach discussed earlier, we can assert that both sacrifice and service are bound up in a single gift-of-self, as complementary, each necessary for the other’s intelligibility. Without service, sacrifice is rendered meaningless and without sacrifice, service is emptied of its purpose. Understood within the context of the Gift-of-Self which would be later expressed in the language of the body on the Cross, this unity and complementarity was precisely the message Jesus was conveying at the Last Supper in His dual commands. Thus, while in a limited sense the Establishments Hypothesis is not new, what is new here is its theological grounding in a personalist approach. The hypothesis is not simply the assertion that the fullness of Holy Orders was given to the Apostles at the Last Supper but, perhaps more importantly, the philosophical and theological reason why it was given. It is Personalism alone that provides the analytical language of discourse to speak of the absolute contribution of Christ’s Gift-of-Self and how that Gift was expressed in the totality of Holy Orders.

This total and complete Gift-of-Self, by which Christ gave everything so that we might have everything, cannot be overestimated. It is the Gift by which all other gifts are measured. For us to begin to appreciate this Gift and how it relates to the Establishments Hypothesis we must understand it in both its objective and subjective dimensions using a human analogy. There are two essential aspects to any gift that is given. There is the objective dimension which involves the gift itself and the subjective dimension which involves the giver. For example, in gifting the *Summa Theologica* to the Church, the *Summa* represents the gift and St. Thomas represents the giver. From a personalist perspective, the value of the gift is

based on the extent to which the gift represents the giver or, to use more sacrificial language, the extent to which the giver is poured out in the gift. The *Summa* represents a great gift because it is so totally Thomas, because it represents the uniqueness of his intellect and the depths of his spirituality. Therefore, Thomas’ gift obtains its real value because it possesses something of Thomas; the value of which arises out of his ontological dignity and the manner in which that dignity is realized in him. This means that, to the extent that the gift represents the giver is the extent that it participates in the value that is the giver and, as a result, possesses the radical ability to share that value with another. This is why we find touching those artistic gifts given to us by our children. Impressed, so to speak, within these gifts is something precious, their very selves. Consequently, we treasure those little trinkets. Even though their material value is very little, the spiritual and emotional value of the gift far surpasses anything the child could have purchased. That said, the very same trinket given to a stranger will not be received and valued in the same way that a parent received and valued it. This is not because the stranger is not grateful for the gift. It is because, as the child’s parent, the mother or father knows the child and therefore knows the extent to which the gift represents and participates in the unique dignity of their child. They can, therefore, better appreciate the value of the gift because they better appreciate the value of the giver. Drawing upon our earlier consideration of the I-Thou relationship, we can say that the value of any gift is always understood within the context of the relationship in which it was freely given and freely received.

In applying this way of thinking to the Gift-of-Self given by Christ, we must first recognize that the Last Supper is inextricably bound to our Lord’s passion, death and resurrection. As such, it represents different aspects of one salvific event expressed liturgically each year in the *Triduum*. In considering the objective dimension of the Pascal Mystery, the offer of eternal communion with God is the greatest gift that can be given. As the Sole Satisfier, in His intimate and eternal embrace no other gift is desired as we will be

completely fulfilled in Him. While, from the objective dimension, this has certainly a great value in itself, its true value is bound up in the subjective dimension. At the Last Supper, using the Theology of the Body, Jesus ties the offer of salvation directly to the Gift of Himself when He says, “Take and eat, this is my body . . . Take and drink, this is my blood.” Properly understood, the Gift of salvation is not something, but Someone and because this Gift reflects and represents the Giver, it participates in the value of the Giver. Indeed, because the Giver is the Absolute Being, the Gift is by that very fact, an absolute Gift. Jesus Himself indicates as much when he says, “Greater love has no man than this, that a man lay down his life for his friends (Jn 15:13).” Notice how the notion of a divine love outpoured is associated with a gift-of-self expressed in sacrifice. Only Jesus, as the God-Man, possessed Himself fully and because of this, only He can give Himself fully. Such was this fullness, that in this singular event, the Gift is indistinguishable from the Giver. Here, and only here, the Gift and the Giver are One in an absolute sense. In a profound irony, the humanity of Christ made possible the gift of His divinity. Thus, the value of this Gift is priceless. This is because, to the extent that the Gift represents the Giver is the extent that it participates in the value that is the Giver and, as a result, possesses the radical ability to share Himself with another.

In this Gift, Jesus shares who He is, love through and through, with a fallen humanity and, in doing so, reveals the final element in assessing the value of His Gift. As noted above, the subjectivity of any gift is not limited to merely the giver, but extends to the one being gifted. For example, the gift of food to a hungry man far exceeds the value of that same food gifted to a man who is not hungry. Those of us who know we are spiritually hungry, to the extent we know we are sinners, appreciate the value of the gift of spiritual food. This means that as we grow in an awareness of our sinfulness, we grow in appreciation of the Gift-of-Self that can save us. Consequently, our perception of the value of the Gift is not static, but dynamic. It is not once given and once received, but continually

given and continually received. Our analysis of the objective and subjective dimensions of Jesus’ Gift-of-Self to humanity reveals its absolute, total and complete nature. As the God-Man, He could not attenuate this Gift any more than a perfume can withhold its fragrance or a flower its beauty. This is what happened at the Pascal Mystery and this is why the fullness of Holy Orders, the very means by which our Lord perpetuated His offer of salvation, was given to the Apostles at the Last Supper.

Another way Personalism supports the Establishments Hypothesis while at the same time deepening its Christological roots is through a consideration of the irreducibility of Christ. Just as a fuller understanding of the person requires a, “pause at the irreducible,” so too does a fuller understanding of Jesus require this same pause. Where the classical Christological approach tends to reduce Him to the otherwise helpful Aristotelian-Thomistic categories such as the hypostatic union and consubstantiality, the initial datum of human experience reveals the entire concrete Jesus as a whole. Here He is revealed not simply in terms of ontological classifications or a contrived division between the historic Jesus and the Christ of faith, but first and foremost as a self-experiencing subject; as the “I” of His own existence. This fundamental revelation means that Jesus cannot be boiled down to objective categories or functions, no matter how insightful these might be. To do so would be to examine the parts at the expense of the whole. Any consideration of Jesus that reduces Him to general categories of being or functionality, passes over that which is most human, “since the *humanum* expresses and realizes itself as the *personale*.”<sup>66</sup> Thus, by pausing at the irreducible, a more complete picture of Jesus emerges.

Beginning with the irreducibility of Jesus as our fundamental premise, we shall now explore the Establishment Hypothesis through a consideration of two similar titles that describe how He is manifested through ordained ministry. These titles are: *in Persona Christi Capitis* applied to bishops and priests, and *in Persona Christi Servi* applied to deacons.<sup>67</sup> These two phrases come together in the one Person

of Christ who, in describing His mission (*agere*), described Himself (*esse*). As we have already seen, Jesus says as much when He tells His Apostles that He has come not to be served, but to serve and to give His life as a ransom for many (Mt 20:28). Jesus identifies Himself as *Diakonos* (He came to serve), and only after that as *Sacerdos* (give His life in ransom). Through an application of the Latin maxim, *agere sequitur esse*, Jesus sees in this statement service as, in some way, preceding sacrifice. It anticipates and participates in the sacrifice to come. If, as we believe, that Jesus is Priest *par excellence* and thus the *typos* or paradigm of the New Covenant priesthood, and if in His irreducibility we find the intrinsic connection between service and sacrifice, then does it not follow that *diakonos* and *sacerdos* are inherently connected? Is not sacrifice, as we have already seen, the highest expression of service?

If the above is true, and I believe it is, then great care needs to be exercised not to conflate service to sacrifice since no amount of diaconal service, no matter how sacrificial, can by that fact raise the deacon to the priesthood. Instead, just as service anticipates and participates in the sacrifice to come without obliterating the nobility of the service that preceded it, so too does the diaconate anticipate and participate in the priesthood. Thus, in the exercise of diaconal ministry, *diakonos* points to and finds its fulfillment in *sacerdos* thereby revealing the *totus Christus* and with Him the complementarity of the orders.

In our previous consideration of service and sacrifice, we observed that both are bound up in a total Gift-of-Self expressed in the Pascal Mystery and thus necessary for the other's intelligibility. This understanding now combined with our examination of the irreducible, reveals even more profoundly how service and sacrifice are intrinsically related. In essence, both find their nexus in the one Person of Jesus Christ who saw sacrifice as the highest form of service. In this regard, we cannot separate Christ the Priest from Christ the Servant. The priesthood and the diaconate express the *totus Christus*, the whole Christ given in His entirety. While these two aspects of His person

can be distinguished much the same way we can distinguish His divinity and humanity, they cannot be separated any more than we can divide His natures. Though helpful, great care must be made in using this analogy because the hypostatic union bespeaks Christ's natures and the priesthood and diaconate involve aspects of His Person and therefore both participates both in His humanity and in His divinity. Nonetheless, in a certain sense, any attempt to separate the diaconate from the priesthood beyond the distinctions cited above would simply result in an artificial separation, a false dichotomy. Such an approach would have the effect of a "split" Jesus whose priestly and diaconal ministry are only tenuously associated. This "split" would have profound Christological implication undermining the identity of Christ and with it His mission.

If the above is true, then the Establishment Hypothesis can provide new insights not simply into the diaconate itself, but even more important, into how the diaconate and the priesthood relate to one another. The total and absolute Gift-of-Self of the irreducible Christ means that the complementary relationship between these two offices and their corresponding orders are organically connected in the one Person of Christ. Each one in its unique way participates not only in the mission of the Christ, but more fundamentally in Christ Himself.

This way of thinking can be advanced a little further. The complementarity of the three-fold hierarchy is not to be understood as merely existing as separate and distinct offices. To be sure, a deacon once ordained is merely a deacon, nothing more. However, should that deacon be ordained a priest, his diaconate is not obliterated by his priesthood. The nature of his diaconal character is indelible and thus it remains eternally intact. The priest is still, in a certain sense, a deacon. However, his diaconate has been raised to a new level such that the *diakonia* he now exercises is sacerdotal in nature. Put another way, the servant mysteries so essential to diaconal identity are sublimated into the sacrificial mysteries which are, in their own way, essential to priestly identity.<sup>68</sup> This sublimation reorients the new

priest and his ministry which, while retaining a diaconal character, takes on an overarching sacerdotal quality identifying him in a primary way as priest. Concerning this two-fold identity, Pope Pope Benedict XVI observes:

Every priest, of course, also continues as a deacon and must always be aware of this dimension. For the Lord Himself became our minister, our deacon. Recall at the act of washing of the feet, where it is explicitly shown that the teacher, the Lord, acts as a deacon and wants those who follow Him to be deacons and carry out the ministry for humanity, to the point that they even help us to wash the dirty feet of the people entrusted to our care. This dimension seems to me to be of paramount importance.<sup>69</sup>

This understanding is further intensified should that same man be raised to episcopacy. Now, as a successor to the Apostles, he possesses the fullness of orders. Nonetheless, he remains deacon and his *diakonia* is taken up into his episcopacy such that his episcopacy is an expression of sacred service. Understood this way, the transitional diaconate is much less an accident of history, or an adoption of Roman practice, or even a discipline of the Church, but the emergence of a profound truth yet to be fully realized in the life of the Church. Just as in the Old Testament priests were drawn from the Levites who served in an official capacity at the Temple, so too are modern day priests drawn from the diaconate. This practice, both old and new, reveals that for a priest to be more fully a priest he must first be a servant, he must first act *in persona Christi servi*. The intrinsic relationship between *sacerdos* and *diakonos* is expressed liturgically in the foot washing when the bishop exercises his option to wear the dalmatic. Pope Francis accentuates this connection when, before the foot washing, he rearranges his stole, the mark of his priestly rank, to resemble that of a deacon. Though the Holy Father is the great high priest (*Pontifex Maximus*) he is, in the foot washing, exercising his diaconal ministry, albeit in a sacerdotal way.

He is acting both in *persona Christi capitis* and in *in persona Christi servi*. In doing so, as the *servus servorum Dei*, he represents and embodies the *totus Christus*. Thus, both the priesthood and the diaconate find their definitive character in the one person of Christ who is both deacon and priest.

If the above is true, then another related question follows. Why establish a permanent diaconate if the diaconate is implicit in the priesthood? I suspect the reason for this is that, while sacrifice is the highest form of service, there are other forms of service that need to be accentuated in the life of the Church, such as those expressed in the three-fold *munera* proper to the diaconate (charity, word, and liturgy). If service were to be conflated with sacrifice and the distinction lost, Christian service would deny its breath for the sake of its height. This would result in a diminishment of the divinely revealed truth linking service and sacrifice in the one Person of Christ. Thus, service and sacrifice are not mutually exclusive, but remain, like the priesthood and diaconate, one element incomprehensible without the other. Though they are not equal in kind or degree, the priesthood and diaconate nonetheless form two complementary parts of the same whole revealing together what they cannot reveal apart.<sup>70</sup>

The Establishment Hypothesis gives rise to a final observation. According to the *Catechism of the Catholic Church* there are two participations in the one priesthood of Christ: the hierarchical priesthood and the common priesthood.<sup>71</sup> Where the hierarchical priesthood describes the participation of bishops and priests, the common priesthood describes the participation of the laity. Absent is any mention of the diaconate. The diaconate does not fall under the hierarchical priesthood insofar as this priesthood requires enrollment in the sacerdotal office. As affirmed by the Fathers of the Second Vatican Council in the Dogmatic Constitution on the Church: “At a lower level of the hierarchy are deacons, upon whom hands are imposed not unto the priesthood, but unto a ministry of service.”<sup>72</sup> Likewise, the diaconate does not fall under the common priesthood insofar as this participation is proper to laity and deacons are clerics.<sup>73</sup> The Code of Canon

Law states: “Through the reception of the diaconate, a person becomes a cleric and is incardinated in the particular church or personal prelature for whose service he has been advanced.”<sup>74</sup> Since all of the faithful participate in the one priesthood of Christ,<sup>75</sup> and since the diaconate, as part of the faithful, neither corresponds to the hierarchical nor common priesthood, then it is reasonable to conclude that there must be a third participation in the one priesthood of Christ: a diaconal participation. To suggest otherwise means that the diaconate is the only vocational state that does not participate in the one priesthood of Christ. Given the irreducibility of Christ, this conclusion is untenable. However, to argue for a diaconal participation begs the question: How do deacons participate in the one priesthood of Christ? Pope John Paul II addresses this very issue when he said:

The catechesis I have given on the diaconate, to complete the picture of the ecclesiastical hierarchy, highlights what is most important in this order, as in those of the presbyterate and the episcopate: *a specific spiritual participation in the priesthood of Christ* (emphasis mine) and the commitment to a life in conformity to him by the action of the Holy Spirit. . . . Therefore, deacons are called to participate in the mystery of the cross, to share in the Church’s sufferings, and to endure the hostility she encounters, in union with Christ the Redeemer. This painful aspect of the deacon’s service makes it most fruitful.<sup>76</sup>

Here Pope John Paul indicates that there is in fact, a unique diaconal participation in the one priesthood of Christ. Insofar as a priest is one who offers sacrifice, the deacon’s gift-of-self in the exercise of his *diakonia* is a gift that takes on the form of sacrifice. Moreover, insofar as Christ is both priest and victim (*Iesu, Sacerdos et Victima*),<sup>77</sup> when the deacon acts *in Persona Christi Servi*, he offers the sacrifice of ecclesial service through his body for the good of another. If this gift-of-self is truly sacrificial, he not only makes Christ the Servant present, but because this Christ is irreducible, he also makes visible the invisible crucified and risen Christ, the Christ who offered Himself in ransom

for the many. This manifests to the one being served, in a deeply intimate way, his or her own dignity, a dignity worth dying for.

While fascinating, it is important to bear in mind that the Establishment Hypothesis is just that, a hypotheses. As such, it is merely a proposed explanation of the origins of the diaconate and its relationship to the sacerdotal orders made on the basis of limited evidence. It is offered here, as is this entire study, as a starting point for further investigation. To be given serious consideration as a *novum theologia diaconati*, it must go beyond the reasoning given thus far and submit itself to the ecclesial and scholarly community for evaluation and critique. Nonetheless, as we shall see, it does stand up well to the objective criteria cited earlier for a new theological approach to the diaconate and does provide rich insights into the nature of what it means to be a deacon and how he is to minister.



## Conclusion

### Deacons, Become What You Are

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By responding to a divine call, the deacon enters into a new and more intimate relationship with Christ the Servant. In this relationship, he finds not only his identity (*diakonos*), but also his mission (*diakonia*). Inspired by the Gift-of-Self he received at his ordination, God empowers him to exercise his ministry in a way that actualizes his identity through sacred ecclesial service; the definitive characteristic of which is a salvific gift-of-self that wills the good of the other for the sake of the other. Thus, each deacon finds within himself a summons that he cannot ignore; one that specifies his *relationship to*, his *identity in* and his *mission for* Christ the Servant. It is a summons that can be expressed and realized in the phrase, “Deacons, become what you are.”<sup>1</sup> If authentic renewal of the permanent diaconate is to take place, if deacons are to become what they are, it must begin with a rediscovery of diaconal identity rooted in a more comprehensive theology of the diaconate. Indeed, insofar as theology is in service to the spiritual life, this theology, when personally appropriated, can only serve to deepen the deacon’s interior communion with Christ the

Servant further refining his identity and, in the process, rendering his ministry more effective.

This study has been an attempt to respond to the Church's call for a more developed theology of the diaconate. In doing so, we sought to begin a new conversation. At the outset, we stated that such a conversation would require for its authenticity the satisfaction of objective criteria. In many respects, this requirement has been realized insofar as we have grounded our study in *ressourcement*, represented all three world views, accommodated the ontological nature of sacramental character, demonstrated a corresponding ecclesiology and, most essentially, established its Christocentricity. Beyond this, we indicated that a new theological approach should reveal something essential about the diaconate; that is, some hitherto unknown aspect concerning the core meaning of this sacred office. This was accomplished in a "turn to the object" through metaphysics (Appendix 1) followed by a corresponding "turn to the subject" through Personalism. In our "turn to the object," we were able to construct, for the first time, a rudimentary metaphysics of *diakonos*. Here we concluded that the diaconate is a supernatural universal accidental predication that stands in an inherent relation to a primary substance. From here, we were able to demonstrate that the change from non-deacon to deacon is a permanent supernatural alteration and that only deacons-in-potency can become deacons-in-act. Finally, based on the maxim *agere sequitur esse*, we demonstrated that there exists an intrinsic relationship between what a deacon is (*diakonos*) and what he does (*diakonia*).

While these metaphysical conclusions laid the necessary ontological foundation for a new approach to the diaconate, they do not in themselves constitute a new theology. What was needed was a complementary "turn to the subject" which was accomplished through the appropriation and application of Lublin Thomism. Here, based on our consideration of key themes found in the work of Pope John Paul II, we were able to re-envision the diaconate as a salvific gift-of-self that wills the good of the other for the sake of the other. This

mutual gift is founded on the dynamic pursuit of a common good that binds both the deacon and those he serves in a unique interpersonal relationship fulfilling and enriching each other. The implications of a new approach not only led to a better understanding of diaconal ministry through our consideration of what it means *to serve at table*, it also suggested a whole new way of perceiving the origins of this order through the Establishment Hypothesis.

What is presented in this study is simply a foundational theology from which it is hoped that a new dialogue can spring concerning the meaning of the diaconate and its mission in the Church. Because of this, it is subject to all of the limitations inherent in a new approach. Its strengths and weaknesses will be tested within the larger theological community and, perhaps even more so, within the diaconal community as we seek to live out our diaconate. These tests are good and necessary as they can help refine and even advance the work done here. I look ahead with great anticipation for others to join in this conversation so that together, under the inspiration of the Holy Spirit, deacons can become more fully what they are, acting in the person of Christ the Servant.

Finally, this work would not be complete without commending it to the intercession of the Blessed Virgin Mary. Her example of humble service bore Christ the Servant giving the diaconate its perfect model. Beyond that, insofar as she is the mother of Christ the Servant, and insofar as deacons are configured to that same Christ, she is not only His mother in the order of sacred service, but ours as well. With this in mind, to her many titles one more can be added, *Mater Diaconati* (Mother of the Diaconate). Joining our voice to hers, let us always respond to the call of the Holy Spirit by saying, "We are the servants of the Lord, let it be done to us according to His word." *Sancta Maria, Mater Diaconati, ora pro nobis.*



## Appendix 1

### A Metaphysics of *Diakonos*

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In a personalist approach that relies heavily on historical consciousness, consideration of metaphysics would, at first glance, seem anachronistically out of place. After all, as a remnant of classical consciousness whose focus is the nature of being and first principles, metaphysics would appear at the opposite end of the philosophical spectrum. While this is certainly true in the sense that Personalism and metaphysics occupy different philosophical space, they need not be mutually exclusive. As we have shown both historically and logically, they can provide alternate and complementary ways of approaching the same truth each along its own ideological lines. Yet, it must be admitted that simply because these two philosophical approaches are complementary is not reason enough for their combined use in our study. For this dual use, we need to return to one of the assumptions laid out in Chapter One. There, we maintained that, in the spirit of *ressourcement*, for theology to advance it must always “go backward into the future.” That, despite their inherent limitations, the metaphysical insights that served theology so well during the Scholastic Period did not erode as it passed through the corridors of history. Just as

*ressourcement* holds that the Church cannot meet the exigencies of modern times without a return to its sources, so too, a new theological approach to the diaconate cannot meet these same exigencies without a return to its sources, and one of those sources is metaphysics.

The return to metaphysics will not be an exercise in archeology concerned simply with uncovering the past for its own sake. Instead, it will creatively engage the past with the present. In this regard, we will seek to do what was not possible for the scholastics. Moreover, because Lublin Thomism builds upon Thomistic metaphysics, it will be necessary to lay the foundation of our study at the feet of Aristotle and Aquinas. Here we will reexamine sacramental character as it pertains to the diaconate and arrive, for the first time, at a rudimentary metaphysics of *diakonos*. In doing so, we will establish the ontological foundation for a personalist approach to the diaconate. Before proceeding however, it should be noted that such a foundation, while applied to the diaconate here, can be applied equally to the episcopate and presbyterate. All three levels share in the sacrament of Holy Orders and all three receive character, albeit in different ways. Thus, much of what can be said metaphysically of the diaconate can likewise be said metaphysically of the episcopate and presbyterate.

## I. The Importance of Metaphysics

In our consideration of sacramental character and the diaconate, the first and perhaps most obvious reality confronting us is one of change. Prior to ordination, the diaconal candidate is not a deacon, and then, after ordination, he is. At that moment, something so radical happens to him that he is profoundly different at the very core of his being. He is, now and forever, a deacon. Sacramental character, whether it is considered primarily as a mark or as a relationship, is an effect of something having already occurred. This change, as we shall see, modifies the deacon's mode of being such that he gains, in a certain sense, a new identity and mission. Beyond this, he now possesses the powers necessary to carry out that mission. Since ordination is the ontological

origins of a non-deacon becoming a deacon, it represents the beginning of our inquiry and underscores the absolute necessity of a metaphysics of the diaconate. Indeed, just as it is difficult to grasp the true nature of humanity from an objective point of view without first providing a metaphysical framework, so too is it equally difficult to apprehend the true nature of the sacramental character and the diaconate from an objective point of view without first grounding it in metaphysical principles. Consequently, metaphysics represents the most fundamental and indispensable basis for a theological investigation of the diaconate; the lack of which will significantly limited its advancement.

Today many of the more popular works on the diaconate proceed from what can best be described as simple metaphysics.<sup>1</sup> This is often an implicit common sense kind of metaphysics characterized by a lively curiosity about such things as the diaconate's origins and structures, accepting, perhaps without knowing, the first principles that underlie the pursuit. While this approach has yielded useful and even penetrating insights regarding the diaconate, and while this approach is sufficient for a popular study, it lacks the kind of ontological rootedness and systematic specificity to provide a significant theological advancement. Such a rigorous endeavor requires scientific metaphysics.<sup>2</sup>

Scientific metaphysics, or more commonly metaphysics, is not scientific in the sense of the modern physical sciences. Its scope is far more sweeping and includes natural theology and philosophy. It is not knowledge arrived at by pure empirical analysis examined through the process of hypothesis which, after repeated experimentation, acquires general acceptance and becomes law. This particular approach, which dominates western thought, understands reality by an explanation of a particular phenomenon that can be carefully observed and consistently verified so as to attain certain facts.<sup>3</sup> Scientific metaphysics, on the other hand, attempts to attain knowledge and better understand reality by systematically examining the ultimate cause of a thing so as to discover certain truths. Here the focus is not merely to explain a thing, but to comprehend the underlying realities of that thing. The principal subject of metaphysics is *esse qua esse*, or

being understood as being. It explores what can be said about anything that exists by the mere fact that it exists.<sup>4</sup>

Central to the science of metaphysics is the doctrine of analogy or shared abstraction.<sup>5</sup> To explain being *qua* being, ancient Greek philosophers concerned themselves with the meaning of certain things in relation to other things. An analogy is a logical instrument, a means by which two objects are compared and form a reciprocal thought. Here, we compare two different things on the basis of something in common such as an idea, pattern, effect or attribute. Taken together, these objects convey that which cannot be conveyed by either of the terms taken alone. They form a new interrelated concept revealing rich insights into the nature of things. One of the most common of these analogies is that of the body and soul. As separate objects, body and soul form two distinct, but related concepts. Alone, they merely state something about themselves. However, when considered together, they form an interrelated concept that gives rise to insights the two alone could not; an insight into personhood. This same way of thinking implies that, by applying metaphysical analogies to sacramental characters and the diaconate, it is reasonable to expect that they will also reveal rich insights to this field of study. In what follows, we will examine three fundamental analogies in metaphysics: substance and accidents, change and permanents, as well as potency and act. This examination is by no means meant to be exhaustive, nor will it venture into disputed areas. It is simply intended as a general overview whose purpose is to establish a rudimentary metaphysics of *diakonos*.

## II. The Analogy of Substance and Accidents

We began this chapter with the observation that one of the most obvious realities confronting us in our consideration of the diaconate is change. Broadly speaking, this change is a change in the mode of being from non-deacon to deacon. In his consideration of change, Aristotle observes that change requires three fundamental principles: (1) something before the change that passes away, (2) something after the change that comes to be and, (3) something that persists and survives throughout

the change. Because all three principles presuppose an understanding of the “something,” and because this “something” must exist for it to be “something,” our study of change from non-deacon to deacon will begin with an examination of being as it relates to sacramental character.

In many respects, to ask about being is to ask two interrelated questions: Does “something” really exist and if it does, what kind of “something” is it? This dual question is bound up in the distinction between existence and essence. Where existence considers the “thatness” of a thing, essence considers its “whatness.” Applied to the diaconate, we are asking whether it exists (thatness) and if it does, what kind of thing it is (whatness). We often presuppose the first question insofar as the “something” is perceived by our senses as real. It can be seen and touched in the here and now. We know, for example, through our sense experiences that something exists called the deacon. Were it not apparent to us, either directly or indirectly, it could not be an object of inquiry because we would not be aware of its existence. Consequently, on a subjective level, the individual thing is only an individual thing, only an existing reality, because it is first revealed to our sense as “something.” Likewise, on a subjective level, the individual deacon is only an individual deacon, only an existing reality because he too is first revealed to our sense as “something.” This revelation enables the intellect to grasp immediately that the “something” I perceive with my sense is an existing “something.” It is really there. Once I perceive the “thatness” of the thing, the second question almost simultaneously and unconsciously arises in terms of the “whatness.” Is it a deacon or is it a bishop? Thus, the intelligibility of a thing, its ability to be understood and shared, requires that we distinguish it from other things. The ability to make first broad and then narrower distinctions relies on common categories such that we move from a general to a more specific understanding of the realities we encounter. In doing so, we separate out the thing from its distinctive features through abstraction.

For example, at a diaconal ordination, after the essential rite, we perceive something upon which hands have been laid. For this something to

be intelligible, for us to comprehend what it is, we must distinguish it from other things. We know based on the categories we have come to accept, that this something is, in fact, a man. While this distinction lends some intelligibility to the situation, alone it is insufficient to grasp the greater reality, for there are many men before us. We then must distinguish this man from the man with the miter who laid hands on him. Again searching almost unconsciously the categories we possess, we conclude that the man to whom the hands were laid is now a deacon as distinguished from the man who laid hands on him, who is the bishop. In this regard, the deacon is not merely an existing being, but an individual kind of being independent and distinct from other kinds of beings.

Inasmuch as Lublin Thomism was chosen as our problematic and inasmuch as Thomism is rooted in the mind of Aristotle, our consideration of being will follow Aristotle's thought. His metaphysics was developed out of a response to Plato's theory of forms. Both philosophers were concerned with what exists most fundamentally trying to reconcile an eternal unchanging world with a changing real world. Yet, at the very same time, both differed with what actually constitutes this existence and how the seemingly unchanging world changed. These differences are masterfully illustrated by the



Figure 5. Close Up of the School of Athens

Italian Renaissance artist Raphael (d. 1520 AD) in his fresco, *The School of Athens*. As illustrated in Figure 5, at center of the fresco stand two distinct and undisputed men, the teacher Plato on the left and his student Aristotle on the right. Both are engaging in philosophical

dialogue. In their left hands, each hold bound copies of their works while with their right, they gesture. Plato is portrayed as an old wise man with bare feet. Aristotle, by contrast, is a handsome well-dressed middle-aged man wearing sandals. Where Plato gestures upward with his free hand as if to say, "It's in the heavens," Aristotle extends his hand horizontally with palm down as if to say, "It's right here." It is commonly held that these two gestures reflect central aspects of their respective philosophies. While occupying the same philosophical space in terms of what is being, what really exists, they come from two radically different perspectives.

True reality, for Plato, was upward in the higher realm of eternal ideals or forms. In both his dialogues and in his general speech, he maintains that there exists a form for every concrete object in reality. These forms are the essences or perfections of various objects. They make a thing the kind of thing it is. For instance, there are innumerable books in the world, but the form of "bookness" is at the core of all of them. Forms, according to Plato, are both *atemporal* and *aspatial*. They are *atemporal* insofar as they exist outside of time and *aspatial* insofar as they do not occupy physical space. In this respect, forms are objective and immutable templates or blueprints of perfection which can only be grasped by the mind. For Plato, the concrete book in your hand is a mere shadow or rough reflection of the perfect form which exists only in a higher realm. As such, the individual book is a kind of momentary participation in the form "bookness" manifested under different circumstances. Aristotle rejects this understanding of reality and instead argues that what is truly real that which is found in concrete particulars, in the here and now, in time and in space. He thought Plato too removed from the empirical world, a world Aristotle took as his starting point for metaphysics. It is precisely in this particular book, Aristotle would argue, the one you physically hold in your hand, that we find the form "bookness." In this regard, he does not deny forms as such; he simply sees them as existing within an individual concrete object and not in some external realm. Consequently, Aristotle rejects Plato's dualism between the intelligible and sensible realms. For him, reality exists in the particular things you can touch and interact.

In his *Metaphysics*, Aristotle observes that being can be understood in many ways, but that the primary sense of being is the sense in which it is a substance.<sup>6</sup> By substance he means that which really exists. Where Aristotle also examines being as *per accidens* and *per se*, being as true and false, as well as being as potency and act, they all presuppose the study of substance as the primary subject of metaphysics.<sup>7</sup> Derived from the Greek word, *ousia*, a cognate of the verb, “to be;” primary substances are individual concrete sensible objects. In his *Categories*, Aristotle distinguishes between two very broad and general kinds of substances. He writes:

Substance, in the truest and primary and most definite sense of the word, is that which is neither predicable of a subject nor present in a subject; for instance, the individual man or horse. But in a secondary sense those things are called substances within which, as species, the primary substances are included; also those which, as genera, include the species. For instance, the individual man is included in the species ‘man’, and the genus to which the species belongs is ‘animal’; these, therefore, that is to say, the species ‘man’ and the genus ‘animal,’ are termed secondary substances.<sup>8</sup>

Note that Aristotle not so much defines substance, but instead describes its characteristics or essential qualities by separating all substantial being into one of four classifications. These are the basic ontological distinctions that cut across all categories of being according to whether they do or do not have one of two properties: being *said of* a subject and being *present in* a subject.<sup>9</sup> This means, according to Aristotle, that any being is either *said of* another or is not *said of* another. Likewise, any being is either *present in* another or is not *present in* another. These distinctions will now be considered.

***Said of a Subject:*** To better appreciate what Aristotle means by “said of” (also known as predication), we can turn to familiar grammatical terms. In traditional syntax, a simple sentence is comprised of a subject

and a predicate. Where the subject points to something that exists, the predicate says something about that something that exists. For instance, we can say that, “St. Ephraem is a man.” Where the subject “St. Ephraem” is the something that exists, the predicate “man” says something about him; for Ephraem is indeed a man. Subjects, for Aristotle, are primary substances and therefore constitute that which is most real. The subject “Ephraem” is more real than the predicate “man” because “Ephraem” can be perceived and known by the senses. This is not to deny that the concept “man” exists, but it exists in a secondary sense because, unlike “Ephraem,” it is not a particular thing you can touch and interact.

To be *said of* a subject requires a relationship between a kind (man), and a thing that falls under that kind (Ephraem).<sup>10</sup> A predicate is what a statement says about a subject, and a subject is what a statement is about. All subjects are bearers of predication in the sense that they can receive predication, but cannot be predicates themselves. The etymology of the term “predicate” gives us insight into its ontological use. Predicate is derived from the Greek word *katêgoroumenon* from where we get our English word “category.” As illustrated in Figure 6, to say that something is *said of* a subject is to say that the subject fits within the category of that predicate. As such, it admits to a fundamental ontological classification between a kind of thing and the thing it falls under. Returning to our example, to say, “St. Ephraem is a man” is to say that man (*homo*) is *said of* St. Ephraem.<sup>11</sup> That is, “man” is the kind of thing (the category), “St. Ephraem” falls under. Since all species fall under their respective genus, then a genus is *said of* all species within that genus. For instance, “Man (*homo*) is an animal.” Animal (genus) is *said of* man (species) in that man falls under the category of animal. This is known as a transitive relationship which is expressed logically in the syllogism: if “X” is *said of* “Y”, and “Y” is *said of* “Z”, then “X” is *said of* “Z”. As described in Figure 6, this means that if man is *said of* St. Ephraem, and animal is *said of* man, then animal is *said of* St. Ephraem. Here, St. Ephraem is not *said of* anything since, as a particular individual being, he is not the genus of a lower species; nothing falls under him. Thus, each higher kind (genus) is *said of* the lower kinds (species) within that respective category. This predication is necessary and

essential to the subject. In other words, for Ephraem to be Ephraem he must be a man; and for a man to be a man, he must also be an animal. Where *said of* subjects are universals, not *said of* subjects are particulars. Universals are simply types, properties, or relations that are common to their various particulars. A particular is an individual instance of a universal. In this case, St. Ephraem is a particular of the universal man.




Figure 6. Predication and Transitive Relationship

**Present In a Subject:** As noted earlier, a *said of* subject says something about the whole of the primary substance. Both the predicates “man” and “animal” say something about the whole of St. Ephraem. *Present in*, on the other hand, describes an aspect of the subject and depends on the subject for its existence.<sup>12</sup> Color, for example, must be *present in* a physical object for its existence since color cannot exist on its own apart from a concrete object which embodies it. For example, “St. Ephraem is white.” For white (in the sense of being pale) to have existence, it must be “contained in” St. Ephraem. Unlike Plato, in Aristotle’s metaphysics, white, as such, does not exist in a pure state as an ideal apart from concrete reality. Instead, he maintains that a particular instance of whiteness, “is in a subject, the body, but is not said of any subject.”<sup>13</sup> Here, white is not a kind that St. Ephraem falls under (*said of*), but instead is found in (*present in*) him. For white to be, for it to exist, it must stand in an inherent dependent relationship to a subject. In a similar manner, the property of wisdom must be *present in* a person to exist, and wisdom cannot exist on its own apart from a person. Consider the statement, “St. Ephraem is wise.” For wisdom

to be, for it to have existence, it must be “contained in” St. Ephraem. Aristotle maintains that the properties such as whiteness and wisdom are accidental. By accidental, he means that neither whiteness nor wisdom are essential to Ephraem being Ephraem. In other words, Ephraem can be pale or tan, wise or foolish, but these properties are accidental to who he is. He is still Ephraem regardless of the degree to which he possesses these properties. In this regard, an accident is a property which has no necessary relationship to the essence of the thing it describes. Thus, the substance that is Ephraem, while remaining numerically one, is capable of contrary qualities.

By identifying this unity and diversity within a subject, Aristotle is addressing the question of how a thing can change while still being the same. Things that are *said of* cannot change since they are essential to the thing being the thing that it is. For Ephraem to be Ephraem, he must be of the species man and the genus animal. This cannot change without Ephraem ceasing to exist. However, that which is *present in* Ephraem can change. Long days in the Syrian sun can tan Ephraem’s skin changing its color. Likewise, the absence of this solar exposure can change his skin color back to white. In a similar way, Ephraem as an adolescent can be foolish, but after maturity, become wise. Should Ephraem, for whatever reason, fail to exercise the virtue of wisdom, he can become foolish again. Thus, the property of being *present in* a subject reveals the subject as a primary substance capable of contraries. Contraries are what we typically think of when we consider opposites like hot and cold, good and evil, healthy and sick. They can each be *present in* a subject, but not in the same time and in the same respect. Ephraem, following the ontological principle of non-contradiction, cannot be both white and tan at the same time and in the same respect. He must either be tan or white at any given moment.

Since everything that is, must either be or not be *said of* and/or *present in* a subject, there are just four possible types of being for Aristotle as illustrated in Figure 7. These four types are derived from a combination of Aristotle’s two kinds of beings in both their positive and negative variations. These are: (1) not *said of* and not *present in* [particular substances],

(2) not *said of* and *present in* [particular accidents], (3) *said of* and not *present in* [universal substances] and, (4) *said of* and *present in* [universal accidents]. In what follows, we will examine each of these four types of being and consider their application to the diaconate. This will involve, by necessity, some redundancy since we are examining the same reality from different perspectives. Such an approach will not only serve to reinforce what we already know of Aristotle's kinds of being, but will also advance our understanding of the metaphysics underlying the diaconae.




Figure 7. Aristotle's Metaphysical Categories

(1) **Not *Said of* and Not *Present in a Subject***: Those things that are not *said of* and not *present in* are known as primary substances or subjects and, in Aristotle's schema, these hold pride of place. As we have already seen, primary substances are distinct things that exist in themselves. They are, for Aristotle, substance, "in the truest and primary and most definite sense of the word." In this regard, they are neither predicable nor accidental and, as such, they are neither a kind another falls under, nor are they dependent on other things for existence. Primary substances are essential unities; "Things that are individual and numerically one."<sup>14</sup> They are concrete particulars (proper nouns) as in this individual man or that individual book.<sup>15</sup> Primary substances are the ontological bedrock of all other things for without them nothing else would exist.<sup>16</sup> Commenting on this, St. Thomas Aquinas observes that some substantial beings enjoy a superior mode of being over other substantial beings. This is

particularly true of human beings who, in the exercise reason and free will, reveal a more profound kind of substance. He calls this kind of intellectual substance "person." In his treatment of man he writes:

In a more special and perfect way, the particular and the individual are found in rational substances, which have dominion over their own actions, and which are not only made to act, as others are, but act out of themselves; for actions belong to singulars. Therefore, individuals of a rational nature even have a special name among other substance: and this name is person.<sup>17</sup>

(2) **Not *Said of* and *Present in a Subject***: Those things which are not *said of* and *present in* are known as particular non-substances. They are non-substances in the sense that they are present in, and ontologically dependent on, primary substances. These particular non-substances are accidents which describe the perceptible qualities of an object such as a color or shape. For example, when Aristotle indicates a particular instance of whiteness is in a subject, he is not referring to white in the abstract conceptual sense, but instead an individual instance of the color white in a specific concrete object. The same can be said of knowledge. Like the color white, knowledge is another example of a particular non-substance *present in* a subject. We can say, for example, that, "St. Ephraem and St. Lawrence are knowledgeable." Here, as in the case of color, we are not referring to what the subject is, but rather what the subject has. The knowledge of St. Ephraem, and the knowledge of St. Lawrence, are the same in the sense that it is knowledge, but each saint has a different individual instance of that same knowledge. Therefore, we might designate St. Ephraem as having knowledge<sup>A</sup> and St. Lawrence as having knowledge<sup>B</sup> even though both instances are knowledge. The awkwardness here is one of language. Without qualification, we lack the specific terms that would designate the particular instance of knowledge Ephraem possesses from the particular instance of knowledge Lawrence possesses.

(3) *Said of and Not Present In a Subject*: Those things which are *said of* and not *present in* are known as secondary substances.<sup>18</sup> Secondary substances are the kinds to which primary substances belong. As we have already seen, they are simply the ways in which the primary substances are fundamentally classified within the category of substance and, as such, they are essential characteristics of primary substances. For instance, man, as secondary substance, is the kind that St. Ephraem, as a primary substance, belongs.<sup>19</sup> Man, as a secondary substance, makes the primary substance, St. Ephraem, to be a unified member of that given kind (man). As such, secondary substances are universals. They are common nouns designated by an indefinite article (eg.: a man, an animal).

(4) *Said of and Present In a Subject*: Those things which are *said of* and *present in* are known as universal non-substances. They are non-substances in the sense that they are present in primary substances. Non-substances that are *said of* and *present in* differ from non-substances that are not *said of* and *present in* in that they are universal. Here, we are not speaking of a particular instance of white or knowledge in terms of their concrete physical presence. Instead we are speaking of whiteness or knowledge as an accidental universal. Universals are simply types, properties, or relations that are common to their various particulars.

BEING	Not Said of a Subject (individual, particular)	Said of a Subject (universal)
Not Present in a Subject (substance)	<b>1</b> Primary Substances (Ephraem)	<b>3</b> Secondary Substances (man, animal)
Present in a Subject (non-substance)	<b>2</b> Particular Non-Substances (Ephraem's knowledge and color)	<b>4</b> Universal Non-Substances (knowledge and color)

Figure 8. Summary of Aristotle's Four Types of Being

In the above four-fold distinction illustrated in Figure 8, two kinds of questions are being asked: what a thing is and what makes that thing what it is?" Accordingly, Aristotle observes:

For if anyone should render an account of what a primary substance is, he would render a more instructive account, and one more proper to the subject, by stating the species than by stating the genus. Thus, he would give a more instructive account of an individual man by stating that he was man than by stating that he was animal, for the former description is peculiar to the individual in a greater degree, while the latter is too general. Again, the man who gives an account of the nature of an individual tree will give a more instructive account by mentioning the species 'tree' than by mentioning the genus 'plant'.<sup>20</sup>

In answering the question: "What is a thing?" Aristotle refers to the proximate species of a thing. So, to the question, "What is St. Ephraem?" Aristotle would respond, "St. Ephraem is a man; a rational animal." Here, as we have already seen, man (secondary substance) is *said of* Ephraem (primary substance), thus classifying him according to the species. This certainly tells us something about Ephraem, but not an awful lot. It does not really tell us what makes him what he is and not something else. It does not differentiate him from St. Lawrence since man is *said of* both. It simply provides his essential predication, what he is most fundamentally, a rational animal. But Ephraim is also a deacon, one of the most prominent of the Fathers of the Syrian Church, and a prolific author. These are accidents or accidental predations. As a member of the species human and the genus animal, Ephraem might or might not have been any of these things. In fact, it is precisely through his accidents that he is distinguished from others and is knowable. Where primary substances are what is not *said of* and not *present in*, accidents (non-substances) are what is both *said of* and *present in*. This distinction reflects the structure of reality. We never encounter any substance without some accidents, nor do we encounter any accident that is not the accident of some substance. Thus, all being is a compound of substance and accidents. As we shall later see, the accidents of substances are always changing, and substances themselves come to be and pass away.

Taking into account the four kinds of substance Aristotle identified, he further divides these (which are applied cross-categorically) into ten distinct classifications. These are used to identify both the subject and the predicate of a proposition. It is generally agreed that Aristotle's categories involve the assumption that there is some system of classification such that all being can be separated into a specific number of ultimate classes.<sup>21</sup> These classes are enumerated as follows: substance, quality, quantity, relation, place, time, position, state, action, and affection. Here he again distinguishes between primary and secondary substances. Primary substances correspond to the category of substance, and the remaining nine correspond to the secondary substances or accidents. According to Aristotle, each and every part of a verifiable proposition falls into one and only one of these categories. For instance, consider the following statement. The holy (quality) and portly (quantity) St. Thomas (substance) knelt (position) in front of the Blessed Sacrament (relation) in the church (place) that morning (time), pleased (affection) with the graces he received (action), and blessed (state). This example demonstrates that Aristotle's categories not only represent the highest kinds, but also represent various complex relations between words and different aspects of reality.

In his *Categories*, Aristotle discusses at length only the first four categories (substance, quantity, quality, and relation) merely describing the remaining six. For reasons that will later be made clear, our study requires that we now focus on the category of quality which, as we have noted above, characterizes the inherent nature of an object. Aristotle writes, "By 'quality' I mean that in virtue of which people are said to be such and such."<sup>22</sup> Observing that quality can be understood in many senses, he then divides quality in the following manner: habits and dispositions, natural capabilities and incapacities, affective qualities and affections, as well as shape.<sup>23</sup> Habits and dispositions are inclinations or tendencies of which knowledge and virtue are examples. Habits differ from dispositions in that they are more lasting and more firmly established. In this respect, habits are a more permanent kind of disposition. They abide in character and are not easily displaced. Conversely, dispositions are easily changed and give

way to opposites. Thus, a disposition to the virtue of justice might easily give way to the disposition of injustice (opposite). Another sort of quality that Aristotle considers is that of natural capabilities and incapacities. This simply refers to the inborn capacities or incapacities to do something with or without ease. St. Stephen, for instance, was an eloquent speaker (Acts 7:2-53). He possessed a certain inborn capacity to speak well. Conversely, Moses was not an eloquent speaker (Ex 4-10, 6:12). He did not possess a certain inborn capacity to speak well. The third kind of quality identified by Aristotle is affective qualities and affections. Here he considers such qualities as sweet and bitter, heat and cold, light and dark. These qualities are capable of producing a perceptible affection. As a result, they correspond to the senses: sweetness to taste, heat to touch, and light to sight. The fourth and final quality is shape. This is the figure or physical form of a thing such as a straightness or curvedness.

**The Implications of Substance and Accidents to the Metaphysics of Diakonos:** Having examined Aristotle's treatment of substance and accidents, it is now time to consider its application to the diaconate. Here, we will return to the proposition, "St. Ephraem is a deacon." Using the distinction between *said of* and *present in* we can now examine the kind of thing a deacon is in relation to St. Ephraem. In the above proposition, the subject "St. Ephraem" represents the primary substance. He is what the proposition is about. He exists distinct and in himself as an essential unity and is neither *said of* nor *present in* something else. As a particular substance, his being is a metaphysically fundamental entity. With this established, we now turn to the predicate (deacon) which is what the proposition says about the subject (St. Ephraem). In order to narrow down which of Aristotle's four categories the predicate "deacon" falls, we shall employ a process of elimination.

(1) *Not Said of and Not Present In:* "Deacon," as we have just demonstrated, is not a primary substance in the proposition. It is not a thing that exists in itself and it is not individual and numerically one. That distinction belongs to Ephraem and Ephraem alone.

On the contrary, the predicate “deacon” admits to an ontological dependence as it cannot exist in space or in time without being in an inherent relationship to the primary substance Ephraem. Thus, insofar as primary substances are the bearers of predication and not predicates themselves, and insofar as the usage of “deacon” in the proposition demonstrates a kind of predication, it follows that “deacon” is not the kind of substance that is not *said of* and not *present in*.

(2) **Not *Said of* and *Present In*:** “Deacon” is also not a particular non-substance in the proposition. It is not a thing that is present in Ephraem the same way he possesses his color or his wisdom. These properties describe perceptible qualities received by the senses in space and time. We can see his skin pigment and hear his sagacity. They are manifested in the here and now ontologically dependent upon Ephraem himself. Thus, insofar as particular non-substances are accidental properties instantiated and perceptible in the subject, and insofar as the usage of “deacon” in the proposition does not admit to a perceptible instantiation, it follows that “deacon” is not the kind of substance that is not *said of* and *present in*.

(3) ***Said of* and Not *Present In*:** “Deacon” is also not a secondary substance. Secondary substances, as we have seen, are the kinds to which primary substances belong. They are simply the ways in which the primary substances are fundamentally classified within the category of universal substance and, as such, represent essential characteristics of primary substances. The secondary substance of St. Ephraem is man (*homo*). It describes an essential characteristic in the sense that Ephraem cannot be Ephraem if man were not predicated of him. In this regard, the category designates a necessary ontological underpinning and, because of this, is considered essential. Conversely, the predicate “deacon” is not essential inasmuch as Ephraem was still Ephraem before his ordination to the diaconate. Thus, insofar as secondary substances are categories that describe essential characteristics, and insofar as the usage of “deacon” in the proposition is not a category that describes an essential characteristic,

it follows that “deacon” is not the kind of substance that is *said of* and *not present in*.

(4) ***Said of* and *Present In*:** Finally, we come to the classification of universal non-substances. As we have seen, universal non-substances are the kind of non-substantial beings (not existing in space and time) that are types, properties, or relations common to their various particulars. Like color and wisdom, they are universal accidents. They are universal in the sense they express what particular things share in terms of characteristics or qualities. Because of this, they are recurrent entities that can be instantiated in many concrete things. They are accidents in the sense that they represent a kind of ontological dependency that is not essential.

Returning to the proposition that “St. Ephraem is a deacon,” deacon is *said of* St. Ephraem. This is to say that the subject (St. Ephraem) falls under the category of the predicate (deacon). Of course, St. Ephraem is also a man and, in this way, man is predicated of him. This transitive relationship can be expressed as follows: if deacon is *said of* St. Ephraem, and man is *said of* deacon, then man is *said of* St. Ephraem. Here, St. Ephraem is not *said of* anything since, as a particular individual being, he is not the genus of a lower species; nothing falls under him. This kind of predication differs from *said of* and *not present in* inasmuch as it is accidental, not essential. Being a deacon is not essential for Ephraem to be Ephraem.

As a universal non-substance, deacon is also *present in* St. Ephraem. It exists as a kind of non-substance that has ontological dependency on a primary substance. “Deacon” cannot exist as a non-substance without being “contained in” St. Ephraem. Here, there is an inherent relationship between the primary substance (Ephraem) and the accident (deacon) resulting in an accidental predication. Since all being is a compound of substance and accident, the proposition “St. Ephraem is a deacon” can be understood in the following manner: St. Ephraem (primary substance) + Deacon (universal non-substance) = Deacon Ephraem (particular non-substance). Thus, as illustrated in

Figure 9, insofar as universal non-substances are categories that describe accidental predication, and insofar as this predication admits to a kind of ontological dependency on the primary substance, it follows that “deacon” is the kind of substance that is *said of* and *present in*.

<b>BEING</b>	<b>Not Said of a Subject</b> (individual, particular)	<b>Said of a Subject</b> (universal)
<b>Not Present in a Subject</b> (substance)	<b>1</b> <b>Primary Substances</b> (Ephraem himself)	<b>3</b> <b>Secondary Substances</b> (man)
<b>Present in a Subject</b> (non-substance)	<b>2</b> <b>Particular Non-Substances</b> (Deacon Ephraem)	<b>4</b> <b>Universal Non-Substances</b> (deacon)

Figure 9. Applying Aristotle’s Types to What a “Deacon” Is

As an accidental predication, it is now necessary to determine which of Aristotle’s ten categories the term “deacon” falls under. The most obvious category is that of quality as quality is that which characterizes the inherent nature of an object. Within this category, “deacon” most properly falls under that of natural capabilities and incapacities. This simply refers to the inborn capacities or incapacities to do something with or without ease. Ordination to the diaconate, as we have already seen, capacitates the recipient to do something that was not possible prior to ordination. Here the deacon (*diakonos*) serves (*diakonia*) in a specific capacity. This service, as we shall see more fully in our treatment of Personalism, is different in both kind and degree from the service the deacon rendered as a non-deacon. As a kind of quality characterized by capabilities and incapacities, “deacon” differs from Aristotle’s description of capabilities and incapacities in one significant way. He spoke of *natural* inborn capacities. Deacon cannot be understood in this manner since it is not of the nature of men to be ordained deacon. Here nature is also understood in the theological sense of a fallen nature. However, because this nature has been redeemed, it possesses a supernatural quality (by virtue of its union with God) bringing with it supernatural capabilities. This is what enables a priest to confect the Eucharist and a deacon to serve in a sacramental capacity. Given all that is said, deacon is the kind of non-substance that

can be metaphysically described as a supernatural universal accidental predication that stands in an inherent relation to a primary substance.

### III. The Analogy of Change and Permanence

For Aristotle, particular substance has real existence. The first act of any being is the act of existence, and because this is an act, it presupposes the end of a causative movement. As we have already observed, the origins of a deacon involves a change from one state or mode of being to another; from being-non-deacon to being-deacon. The ontological basis for any change is rooted in the transcendental unity of being. A thing is what it is, and not something else. This logic is expressed in the principle of non-contradiction which Aristotle defines as, “It is impossible for the same thing to belong and not to belong at the same time to the same thing and in the same respect.”<sup>24</sup> Simply put, just as a child is not an adult, a non-deacon is not a deacon.

If change is possible (a child to an adult, a non-deacon to a deacon), then something must account for that change. In his examination of reality, Aristotle was fascinated with change which he called motion.<sup>25</sup> He was already familiar with the work of earlier philosophers who took up this universal phenomenon. Two, in particular, deserve brief mention. Heraclitus (circa 500 B.C.), a Greek metaphysician from Ephesus, maintained that the material world undergoes constant change. For him, absolutely everything changes and absolutely nothing remains the same. Conversely, Parmenides of Elea, also a Greek philosopher and contemporary of Heraclitus, held that nothing in reality changes. He argued that what appears to change in our perception of reality is an illusion and that the reality of the world is “One Being.” As such, it is a permanent, immutable, and indestructible whole. Reflecting on his experience of the world, Aristotle found these two positions irreconcilable.<sup>26</sup> He observed that some things in the world change, while other things do not. In his consideration of motion, Aristotle maintained that in every change

there must be three principles. These are, as we have already seen: (1) something before the change that passes away, (2) something after the change that comes to be and, (3) something that persists and survives throughout the change. These constitute a pair of opposites and a subject as illustrated in Figure 10. The opposites can be either between contradictories or contraries. In a logical proposition, contradictories are two opposites that express a simple denial of the comprehension of the other. For example, persons and non-persons are contradictories. To deny that something is a person is to affirm that it is a non-person. In contradictories there is no middle ground. If a thing is not one of the opposites, then it must be the other opposite. Contraries, on the other hand, are opposites that represent two extremes among an object of a series such as the colors black and white. Unlike contradictories, one opposite of a contrary can be denied without affirming the other opposite. To affirm that something is not black is not to affirm that it is white. It could be another color. Properly understood, contraries must be opposed in the appropriate manner. This is to say they must be a species under the same genus as black and white are under the genus color. Along with a pair of opposites, change also requires a subject that survives the change when one opposite replaces the other. Here something must persist. Some part of the pre-existing entity must survive the process otherwise it is not a change, but destruction. In his analysis of the three principles of change, Aristotle calls the opposites “form” and “privation” and the subject “matter.”<sup>27</sup>




Figure 10. Aristotle's Understanding of Change

To appreciate Aristotle's notion of change, it is first necessary to understand substance as a hylomorphic compound of form and matter.<sup>28</sup> Matter is pure potentiality and the substrata of substance. It is the stuff that things are made of. Form is the way in which the matter is arranged so as to become what it is. Every substance is composed of a determinate knowable form and particularizing matter. These two elements are homogeneously composed together such that matter cannot exist without form, and form cannot exist without matter. Unlike Plato who held that forms really exist as ideals, Aristotle maintained that a form can only exist separately from actual existence in the mind of a rational being who abstracts the form from its instance. For example, in experiencing trees through our senses, we are able, through inductive reasoning, to arrive at the form of tree or treeness. This form or essence does not exist in concrete reality, but simply as an abstract. As a result, because of its form, a substance is knowable. Thus, all substance has matter (or the material of which it is composed) and form (the manner the matter is arranged). However, it is the form of a thing that makes it what it is. When someone builds a table of wood, the wood is the matter and the shape of the table is the form. The table comes to be a table when the matter (the wood) is arranged in the shape of a table (the form). Change takes place because the same matter can be arranged in different ways. When the table is destroyed, the matter (the wood), remains. Consequently, in change it is the form that changes while the matter remains the same. Change comes about when the arrangement of the matter is modified; when it moves from one form to another.

In his *Physics*, Aristotle identifies four specific types of change.<sup>29</sup> These changes can occur either naturally or artificially. A natural change is one that takes place as a result of a thing's nature. It is within the nature of a child to grow into an adult. Consequently, this kind of change is natural. An artificial change is one that comes about as a result of some intervention and not in accord with a thing's nature. The use of anabolic steroids to accelerate the muscular development of an athlete is an example of an artificial change. These kinds

of artificial changes are also called violent because they violated the natural tendencies of things.

Aristotle calls his first kind of change local motion. Local motion involves a change of place. It is simply the spatial movement of an object in relation to other objects. This can occur naturally as when the moon orbits the earth or artificially as when a train moves from one station to another. The second kind of change, which Aristotle calls alteration, involves a qualitative change in characteristics. This can occur naturally as in the ripening of a pepper from green to red or artificially as when someone paints their house from green to red. The third type of change Aristotle calls quantity which involves a change in size or amount. This can occur naturally as when flowing water wears down rock or when stalactites grow inside a cave. The fourth and final type of change is the most radical of all. Aristotle calls this change coming to be and passing away. It is the most radical because it involves not simply a change within a being, but either the generation of a new being or the destruction of an existing being. This can occur naturally as when someone dies of old age or artificially as when someone is killed. Where motion, alteration and quantity are accidental changes, coming to be and passing away (generation and destruction) is a substantial change. Consequently, if a table were to experience motion (moving to the other side of the room) or alteration (painted) or quantity (made bigger by the addition of a leaf), it would still be a table. These are mere accidental changes. If, however, a table is made by the carpenter (generation) and then later consumed by fire (destruction), it would first come to be and then cease to be.

As noted earlier, all change is caused. Broadly speaking, a cause is that which brings about an effect. Aristotle identifies four senses in which a cause can be spoken. These senses constitute the principles by which each particular thing experiences change. They are independent factors in any change, all of which must be operative for change to take place. The first of these principles is the material cause which Aristotle describes as, “that out of which a thing comes to be and which persists, is called ‘cause’, e.g. the bronze of the statue, the

silver of the bowl, and the genera of which the bronze and the silver are species.”<sup>30</sup> The material cause is the “stuff” or that *of which* something comes into being and which remains present in it. In the above example, bronze is the stuff used to cast the statue. Moreover, despite the change into the statue, the bronze remains bronze. It survives the change. The second cause, according to Aristotle, is the formal cause. This cause pertains to the essence or “archetype” of something.<sup>31</sup> The formal cause is that *into which* something comes into being. It makes known what a thing is in terms of its essence. In the example given above, it is the shape of the statue itself that reveals the statue to be a statue. The third cause identified by Aristotle is the efficient cause. This is, “the primary source of the change or coming to rest; e.g. the man who gave advice is a cause, the father is cause of the child, and generally what makes of what is made and what causes change of what is changed.”<sup>32</sup> The efficient cause is that *by which* something comes into being. This is the primary source of change and implies an agent of change whether nonliving or living. In the example of the bronze statue, the efficient cause is the artisan who sculpted and cast it. The fourth and final type of causation according to Aristotle is the final or essential cause. This is a cause, “in the sense of end or ‘that for the sake of which’ a thing is done, e.g. health is the cause of walking about.”<sup>33</sup> The final cause is for *the sake of which* something comes into being. This is the cause of something in terms of its conceived end, goal, or purpose.

**The Implications of Change and Permanence:** As noted above, the origins of a deacon involves a change from one state or mode of being to another; from being-non-deacon to being-deacon. As we have already seen in our examination of the tradition, one of the effects of Holy Orders is the imparting of an indelible character to the soul of the recipient. This permanent mark or seal is an effect of something which has already taken place; a change having already occurred. With this ontological reality in mind, we can begin our analysis by considering the kind of change that comes about at ordination. In applying Aristotle’s categories, we begin by eliminating the obvious. The first type of change Aristotle spoke of is local motion or a change in spatial

movement. A simple movement of the non-deacon from one point in space to another cannot account for him becoming a deacon. No matter where he moves, he remains a non-deacon and while his position changes, he does not with respect to the diaconate. Another kind of change Aristotle identified is that of quantity which involves a change in size or amount. A simple growth or diminishment of the non-deacon cannot account for him becoming a deacon. No matter how portly he gets or how thin he shrinks, he remains a non-deacon and, while his size changes, he does not with respect to the diaconate. Another kind of change Aristotle identified is the most radical of all. He called this change coming to be and passing away. As we have seen, this is the most radical kind of change because it involves either the generation of a new being or the destruction of an existing being. The radical nature of this kind of change is such that the coming to be or passing away of the non-deacon cannot account for him becoming a deacon. Despite his conception and death, he remains a non-deacon and while his state of being changes, he does not with respect to the diaconate.

By eliminating the above three types of change we are now left with the fourth and final change to consider, that of alteration. This type of movement involves a qualitative change in characteristics. Proceeding in Aristotelian fashion from what we know to what we do not know, non-deacons do experience certain alterations. Some of these alterations occur physically as they grow old. Their hair can change to white and their skin can wrinkle. Other changes can be of a non-physical nature. They can grow in knowledge and their intellectual skills can sharpen rendering them capable of abstract thought. While these alterations admit to a certain kind of permanency, they are not permanent in the absolute sense. Hair can be dyed and skin can be stretched. Knowledge can be forgotten and cognitive abilities can diminish. Sacramental character, which is an effect of ordination, can be said to be a kind of metaphysical alteration, a qualitative change, but unlike the examples above, it admits to an absolute permanence and incorruptibility. This absolute permanence suggests that beyond the metaphysical alterations manifested in increased knowledge and intellectual prowess, there is a deeper reality taking place in Holy

Orders. Insofar as incorruptibility is a perfection over corruptibility, and permanency is a perfection over change, the alteration brought about by those sacraments that impute character possess a certain perfection over all other alterations. Indeed, because these alterations and the soul are incorruptible, these permanent alterations can be said to belong to the soul in a unique and exclusive manner.

To be sure, such things as knowledge and intellectual skill also belong to the soul, but not in the same way. Even after death, the beatified soul, free of the effects of sin, grows in knowledge and intellectual skill. Life, whether on earth or in heaven, is dynamic. It is in a constant state of becoming and while it is possible to understand the beatific vision as a state of human perfection in one respect, in another respect, it is not. It is perfect in the sense that, in seeing God in the face, our earthly life has reached its perfection. It is imperfect in the sense that we have just begun our eternal life. In this new relationship born out of Divine Love, there exists a kind of dynamism proper to love in which the finite soul continues to develop with respect to that relationship. Growth in love presupposes growth in knowledge of the other. Growth in love also presupposes growth of the intellect since we cannot love what we do not understand. Thus, all other alterations differ from sacramental character in that only sacramental character admits to an absolute perfection the others do not.

As we have already seen, all of Aristotle's changes are either natural or artificial. Where natural change takes place as a result of a thing's nature, an artificial change comes about as a result of some intervention apart from a thing's nature. The nature of the non-deacon is human. It now needs to be considered whether the absolute alteration brought about by Holy Orders is natural or artificial? As its name implies, if the a particular change is natural to human beings, then that change would be possible for all who share the nature human. Applied to Holy Orders, if ordination is a natural alteration for human beings, then all human beings would have a natural tendency toward the clerical life just as they have the natural tendency to grow old and acquire knowledge. But, as we shall see in our consideration

of potency and act, this is not the case. If it were, then it could be held that only those who have received Holy Orders realized this perfection and all others possess a kind of privation or lacking.

In considering whether this change is artificial, let us return to the earlier example. Recall that a change can occur naturally as in the ripening of a pepper from green to red or artificially as when someone paints their house from green to red. In the case of an artificial alteration, a certain intervention was required for the change to take place. Unlike the ripening of the pepper, it would not come about apart from that intervention. Since Holy Orders and the character it imparts does not come about naturally in the sense of flowing from human nature, then some intervention is required. Although this will be treated more thoroughly in our examination of efficient causality, it is sufficient to say that the efficient cause of a non-deacon becoming a deacon is God. In an act of personal divine intervention for the good of the Church, He calls (*vocare*) the non-deacon to become a deacon through the mouth of the Church. This call is also recognized and affirmed canonically by the Church, who acting as an exclusive intermediate agent, ordains the non-deacon. Thomas calls this type of ecclesial participation instrumental causality (*causa instrumentalis*).<sup>34</sup> An instrumental cause is a secondary intermediate cause that depends on the efficient cause (God) for the effect. Both the efficient and instrumental cause rely on a common finality such that there exists a necessary end to which they are both directed. In commenting on this, the Jesuit theologian Stephen Fields adds:

It is important to emphasize that an agent does not become an instrumental cause because the principle agent constitute its efficient cause. An agent functions as an instrumental cause because it achieves a final cause that it could not achieved through its own innate power, the power of the instrument acting alone. The instrumental cause achieves the final cause because the principle agent has some form that it can transfer to the instrumental cause. When this form is transferred the

instrumental cause participates in the power of this form. The principle agent acts through the instrumental cause; thus, both the principle agent and the instrumental cause constitute a sense one cause. The single cause is the finality that originates in the principle agent, who intends to realize a goal by means of an instrumental cause.<sup>35</sup>

From the very beginning, God used human agency to articulate and transmit Divine Revelation. This participation continues today through the Church and, in a special way, through her sacraments. Consequently, while God is the efficient cause, the Church stands as the instrumental cause of the sacraments fulfilling a necessary secondary role. Because God is the efficient cause, this type of intervention neither fits Aristotle's category of natural nor artificial change; though it certainly bears a similarity to both. It is natural in the limited sense that the change is consistent with the deacon's human nature and not natural in the sense that it requires a particular intervention. Conversely, it is artificial in the sense that it requires intervention, but not artificial insofar as artificial change is understood as man-made (*artificialious*). Significant here is the element of divine intervention which implies that such a change is supernatural. Thus, to Aristotle's natural and artificial kinds of change, a third may be added, supernatural change. Thus, given all that has been said, the change from non-deacon to deacon represents a kind of permanent supernatural alteration. It is permanent in that it is indelible and incorruptible. It is supernatural in that it requires a divine intervention, and it is an alteration because it is a qualitative change.

The above metaphysics of change, in light of our relational point of departure, suggests a number of significant insights. God, as the Efficient Cause of our being, by the fact that He is the efficient cause of our being, is ontologically related to us (Gen 1:26). He and He alone brought about our coming to be and we have dependency on Him in being. This relationship with God is the most fundamental of all human relationships and is the foundation of any modification

to this relationship. From Divine Revelation, we know that this relationship was wounded, obscured, and diminished by Original Sin and restored through the passion, death, and resurrection of Jesus Christ. This restored relationship is decisively realized in the life of the believer through Baptism which finds its completion in Confirmation and its deepest expression in the Eucharist. Like ordination, Baptism and Confirmation impart character, which as we have seen is a permanent supernatural alteration. These particular sacraments represent a kind of modification or perfection of the original relationship forged in our coming to be. This progression reveals a dynamic relationship between God and humanity on the metaphysical level. Moreover, because God is Person *par excellence*, and because He created us as persons, the character of this relationship from the beginning is personal.

#### IV. The Analogy of Potency and Actuality

Another key way Aristotle considers being and its capacity to change is through the analogy of potency (*dýnamis*) and actuality (*enérgeia* or *enteléxeia*).<sup>36</sup> Here, as in the case of substance and motion, we will only endeavor to layout Aristotle's basic schema as it pertains to our narrow investigation of the diaconate. As two distinct and fundamental modes of being, potency is understood as capacity, and actuality is understood as fulfillment. Potency is the radical power of a virtual reality to be realized in actuality.<sup>37</sup> It is the aptitude to change. For Aristotle, potency is not nothing (non-being). It is real.<sup>38</sup> The reality it possesses is not being-in-act, but instead being-in-potency. This being-in-potency admits to a privation or lack of a perfection which, when changed or acted upon, receives some new determinism. Actuality then is the fulfillment of potency and, as such, determined being.<sup>39</sup> Conversely, potency is unfulfilled actuality and, as such, determinable being. Thus, potency always pertains to some future perfection, which at present, only exists seminally, and actuality refers to the corresponding perfected reality. Actuality is what really is, and potency may become actuality. These terms are mutually exclusive as potency lacks a particular determination and actuality

possesses that same determination. All beings, with the exception of God (*Actus Purus*), are a combination of potency and actuality in as much as all beings seek their perfection or the full development of their form.<sup>40</sup> In this sense, potency and actuality are correlative terms. As the metaphysician and Thomistic scholar Herman Reith points out:

Thus act is known as a correlative potency - not correlative on the plane of existence, like a biological correlative, male and female, but on the plane of the more perfect related to the imperfect, the achievement related to the capacity, for act and potency are two states of being within the same genus.<sup>41</sup>

In his consideration of potency, Aristotle distinguishes between two senses: passive and active potency. Passive potency is the ability to be acted upon. It is that: "which is the source of change in another thing or in another aspect of the same thing, for there is a passive power residing in anything acted upon which is the source of its undergoing change through the action of some other things or through its own activity upon itself."<sup>42</sup> For Aristotle, a thing can be acted upon because it possesses an originative source which allows it to be acted upon. For example, oil can be burned because it contains a certain originative source that allows it to be burned. Likewise, wheat can be crushed because it contains a particular originative source that allows it to be crushed. Aristotle calls this process of change (burning, crushing) *kinêsis*.

Active potency, on the other hand, is the ability to effect a change in something else or itself.<sup>43</sup> In the making of wine, yeast interacts with the sugars in the fruit to create an alcoholic beverage. Yeast possesses the active potency as it effects a change in the juice from the crushed grapes. The juice possesses the passive potency in that it has the capacity to be fermented and produce alcohol. Unlike passive potency, active potency is not related to *kinesis*, but to actuality (*enérgeia*).<sup>44</sup> For Aristotle, active potency is more primary than passive

potency since passive potency implies active potency in much the same way as the thing moved implies a mover. Where active potency is the agent of change, passive potency is the recipient or patient of change.<sup>45</sup> Both active and passive potency can reside in the same subject when the subject of that change is both the thing acted upon and the thing acting. Aristotle further distinguishes between two kinds of active potency, non-rational and rational. Non-rational active potency is the capacity to effect change in a necessary way when the agent and patient come together. When a bee pollinates a flower, it possesses the active potency and the flower possesses the passive potency. The active potency possessed by the bee is non-rational in that the outcome of the change is necessary and cannot be something else. Here the bee, as the agent of change, cannot act otherwise. As long as it carries the pollen, the flower will be pollinated. Conversely, rational active potency is the capacity to effect change which is not necessary. The beekeeper can either check the activity in the hive or collect the honey. He or she can choose between two contraries and is not necessitated to act in a particular way.

Actuality, as we have already seen, is understood as the fulfillment of potency. In his consideration of actuality, Aristotle observes that actuality can be understood in two ways. In the first sense, sometimes called first act, the proximate end in a change is sought. In the second sense, sometimes called second act, the remote end in a change is sought. Where first actuality describes a movement or process, second actuality describes a completion or perfection. Take, for example, the potency to learn. This potency is actualized in two ways. In first act, it is actualized by the gaining of certain knowledge. This is really an end, but not the ultimate end as knowledge is always sought for some other purpose such as truth. First actuality is a process or movement that implies incompleteness, as such, like its corresponding potency, it possesses a privation. However, unlike its corresponding potency, that privation is realized to a greater extent. Some thing (knowledge) is obtained toward that end (truth). Second actuality is the complete actualization of potency. Here potency is perfected and the final end is attained. In this case, the truth sought.

A corollary to potency and act, and one that is particularly germane to our investigation, is the relationship between act (*agere*) and being (*esse*). In the *Summa Theologica*, Thomas, following Aristotle, considers the relationship between the way a thing behaves and its mode of existence. Where being corresponds to potency, act corresponds to actuality; although in this case its meaning also extends to a particular action or set of actions. The action is the realization or perfection of being understood in a limited sense. Medieval scholars expressed this corollary in the maxim *agere sequitur esse* that is, “to act is to follow being.”<sup>46</sup> Action, Thomas argues, is the key to discovering the potencies of any being, and, in the end, a being’s nature. Put another way, this principle essentially means that the way a thing is (*esse*) determines how it will act or behave (*agere*). For example, a tree cannot engage in rational discourse (*agere*) because its being (*esse*) is not rational. Conversely, a human being can engage in rational discourse (*agere*) precisely because his or her being is rational. Thus, by observing the actions of a being (*agere*), be it rational or non-rational, it is possible to deduce its nature (*esse*). This is simply an application of the natural law which understands human nature as the basis for human acts. In short, Thomas is saying that the cause is somehow found in the effect such that, an examination of the effect can reveal something of the cause. Thus, *agere sequitur esse* means that there is an organic and indissoluble link between an act and being. This understanding is later echoed in the work of the Polish philosopher and future pope, Karol Wojtyla (d. 2005 A.D.) whose thought will be explored in greater detail later in this study. In *The Person: Subject and Community* (*Osoba: Podmiot i Wspoinota*), he writes: “If *operari* results from *esse*, then *operari* is also - proceeding in the opposite direction - the most proper avenue to knowledge of that *esse*.”<sup>47</sup>

**The Implications of Potency and Actuality:** Having briefly examined potency and actuality as found in Aristotle, it is now time to consider the implication of these insights on the diaconate. In exploring potency, we begin by examining the subject of change. With regard to ordination, whether episcopal, presbyteral, or diaconal, the subject of change is a man. Man is understood here not in the sense

of a secondary universal substance (a member of the human race), but a primary particular substance as in the case of a specific individual having male gender (*vir*).<sup>48</sup> While men are the subject of change, not all men possess the potency to change. If this were the case, then those who are not ordained possess a privation, a lack of a due good. As the sacred steward of God's revelation, the Church has long recognized *semper ubique ab omnibus* (always, everywhere, by all) that only certain men are called (*vocare*). This means that only certain men possess potency to ordination and others do not. For those who do possess this potency, not being ordained is a privation, and for those that do not possess this potency, not being ordained is merely a simple absence. This distinction is important. For example, the absence of the intellectual powers in human beings are privations. The capacity to reason and will ought to be there because human beings are, by their very nature, rational animals. Conversely, the absence of the intellectual powers in dogs are simple absences since it is not of the nature of dogs to reason and will. Thus, only certain men are the subjects of change and possess the potency to change.

Potency, as we have already noted, is the radical power of a virtual reality to be realized in actuality. Passive potency, which is the ability to be acted upon, resides in the subject of change. This subject is not simply a non-deacon, but a deacon-in-potency (those called). Here, the deacon-in-potency has a power within himself which, when acted upon, enables him to undergo a change (*kinêsis*). He can be acted upon because he has an originative source which allows him to be acted upon. Because this potency is prior to its activation, the question arises as to when this potency comes to be in the non-deacon. Here, only two possibilities exist. This potency to become a deacon either comes into existence at some moment during the life of the non-deacon, or it comes to be when he came to be. If it comes into being at some point in his existence, then the question is: When? One could posit that Baptism or Confirmation might be the source since they too effect an ontological change. One could also posit that this potency comes into being when the non-deacon senses the call to be a deacon. All of these possibilities have one thing in common, no matter when one posits

the initial presence of this potency, it begs the question whether there was a prior potency for this new potency to exist. In other words, for this diaconal potency to exist in the non-deacon, there had to be an earlier privation to allow that potency to come to be. Even if earlier potency could be identified, the question can go on *ad infinitum* backing us into the only reasonable possibility. The man becomes a deacon-in-potency when he comes to be. This is to say that, at the very moment of his conception, when all of his potency was established as a person, his diaconal potency was also established. Where such things as sight, intellect, and skill are natural potentials seminally present in a man, the diaconate is a supernatural potential seminally present in the deacon-in-potency. Here, God, as the Efficient Cause, the Unmoved Mover, in choosing certain men to become deacons, is the Active Potency. Only He has the ability to activate the passive potency in the deacon-in-potency to become deacon-in-act. In this case, because the deacon-in-potency also possesses the powers of reason and will, he is free to either allow or not allow the Active Potency to actualize him. Thus, unlike a non-rational being that is determined and must act out of necessity, when active potency meets passive potency, a rational being has the power to either participate or not participate in his diaconal activation. Insofar as there exists a privation in him (a lack of a due good), and insofar as choice is perfected in the attainment of the good, in choosing the good, the deacon-in-potency becomes deacon-in-act and, in the process realizes a certain perfection.

In distinguishing between first and second act, Aristotle notes that in actualization, both proximate and remote ends are sought. Applying this analogically to the deacon-in-potency, the first actuality is ordination, an effect of which is sacramental character. This is the process or movement that ontologically changes the deacon-in-potency to deacon-in-act. However, a deacon is not ordained a deacon simply to be a deacon. It is not an end in itself. There still remains in this first actuality an implied imperfection. This privation is perfected, and continually perfected, in the second act; sacred service. As we shall see in the institution of the diaconate, the very purpose, the ends sought by the Apostles when they instituted the diaconate is

service. Thus, we can say that where *diakonos* corresponds to first act, *diakonia* corresponds to second act.

The maxim *agere sequitur esse* can also be applied to the relationship between first actuality and second act, between *diakonos* and *diakonia*. In the first act, diaconal character “marks” the soul of the recipient to reflect and manifest Christ in a specific way. Here, the deacon-in-act is changed on the deepest level of his being. This change, as we have seen in our consideration of substance, is a supernatural universal accidental predication that stands in an inherent relation to a primary substance. This accidental predication reconfigured the new deacon for a particular purpose. This purpose, which is the second act, is sacred ecclesial service (*diakonia*). Consequently, since *diakonia* (*agere*) flows from *diakonos* (*esse*), by carefully examining the development of the diaconate in the life of the Church, it is possible to deduce something about how diaconal character was understood at least implicitly.

Based on the metaphysical analogy of actuality and potency as it is applied in the maxim *agere sequitur esse*, the relationship between *diakonos* and *diakonia* is intrinsic and mutually inclusive. These are two parts of the same whole whose meaning and purpose cannot be grasped apart from their inherent union. Like the soul and body, any serious consideration of *diakonos* apart from *diakonia* (and vice versa) would not only diminish each element of the composition, it would also result in an ontological dualism.

At this point, we would do well to summarize the progress made thus far. We began our consideration with the premise that, since ordination is the ontological origins of the non-deacon becoming deacon, it represents the beginning of our inquiry and underscores the necessity of a metaphysics of the diaconate. Through a brief analysis of Aristotle’s analogies of being, we have established: (1) that the substance of *diakonos* is a supernatural universal accidental predication that stands in an inherent relation to a primary substance, (2) that the change from non-deacon to deacon is a permanent supernatural alteration, (3) that, on an ontological level, a relationship has been

established between God, who is the Efficient Cause of the change and man in whom the change takes place, (4) that only deacons-in-potency can become deacons-in-act and, (5) based on the maxim *agere sequitur esse*, that an intrinsic relationship exists between what a deacon is (*diakonos*) and what he does (*diakonia*). Though by no means exhaustive, these conclusions provide a rudimentary metaphysics of the diaconate laying the philosophical foundation for a new theology grounded in a personalist framework.

Our consideration of metaphysics prompts a final observation. Some, particularly those unfamiliar with ontology, might ponder the practical significance of this metaphysical investigation. Indeed, they may view this part of our study as merely an intellectual exercise with little or no contribution to our understanding of the diaconate. While I can certainly appreciate why one might arrive at such a conclusion given a world view dominated by historical consciousness, I believe that this conclusion is fundamentally erroneous. It is erroneous because it is based on a dualism between *esse* and *agere*; between a metaphysical reality expressed in the classical world view and its corresponding pragmatic reality expressed in a historical world view.

Earlier, in the introduction, I spoke of this dualism as a “reduction to the pragmatic” which tends to judge reality in practical terms (*agere*) such that anything not practically relevant (*esse*) is simply dismissed as unnecessary and superfluous. In their reduction to the pragmatic, critics of metaphysics are taking a standard from one approach and artificially superimposing it on another and, because of this, draw an erroneous conclusion. To superimpose a practical standard upon a metaphysical approach is like superimposing a material standard on something immaterial. Things material and things immaterial represent two aspects of reality, each with standards proper to their respective realities. When these things come together in a single substance, as they do in a person, things immaterial (the soul) cannot be judged using the same standard as things material (the body). Similarly, when these things come together in a single substance, as they do in the diaconate, things immaterial (metaphysics) cannot be judged

using the same standard as things material (pragmatics). Understood this way, the value of metaphysics to the diaconate cannot be assessed in terms of its practical contribution to the order; for this is to impose a false standard. Instead, the value of metaphysics must be assessed in terms of its ontological contribution. In this regard, both a pragmatic approach to the diaconate and a metaphysical approach form two complementary parts of the same whole. Each one of these expresses reality from its respective viewpoints and, when considered together, provides a more comprehensive grasp of reality.

To better appreciate this point, consider Aquinas' treatment of substance and accidents as applied to the Eucharist. Using the structures found in Aristotelian metaphysics, he provided the Church with the ontological language to begin to grasp the mystery of how Christ can be truly present, Body, Blood, Soul and Divinity in what appears to be a simple piece of bread. Yet, it can be argued that, from a practical perspective, one can still grasp the Real Presence without understanding the doctrine of transubstantiation. Indeed, the Church did so for nearly twelve centuries before Thomas. Nonetheless, in developing this new ontology of the Eucharist, Thomas helped us wrap new words around a reality in which all words fall short. In this regard, transubstantiation does not so much enhance our practical understanding of the reality of Christ's Presence, but instead enhances our appreciation of that reality on an ontological level. This is because, even with seemingly archaic language, we can penetrate this mystery in a way that other legitimate approaches cannot.

The same can be said of the diaconate. Using the structures found in Aristotelian metaphysics, we have sought language to begin to grasp the mystery of what it means to be a deacon on the ontological level. Yet, it can be argued that, from a practical perspective, one can still grasp the diaconate without understanding it as a supernatural universal accidental predication or as a result of a permanent supernatural alteration. Indeed, this study is the first to apply such language to an order that spans two millennia. Nonetheless, in developing this new ontology of the diaconate, I am endeavoring to

wrap new words around a reality in which all words fall short. In this regard, phrases like supernatural universal accidental predication and permanent supernatural alteration do not so much enhance our practical understanding of the diaconate as a reality, but instead enhance our appreciation of that reality on an ontological level. This is because, even with this seemingly archaic language, we can penetrate this mystery in a way that other legitimate approaches cannot. Moreover, given the ontological nature of sacramental character, and the essential place of character to any new theology of the diaconate, metaphysics is uniquely suited to this pursuit. Beyond this, it can be reasonably argued, based on the maxim *agere sequitur esse*, that pragmatics and metaphysics are inextricably linked together revealing a more comprehensive understanding of the diaconate.



## Appendix 2

### The Anthropology of St. Thomas

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Lublin Thomism, as the name suggests, is deeply rooted in the thought of St. Thomas Aquinas. Consequently, to appreciate the potential contribution of Lublin Thomism toward a fuller understanding of sacramental character and the theology of the diaconate, it is first necessary to provide a brief excursus on some of the key points found in Thomas' writings. As our point of departure is personal, our focus will narrow to his anthropology as found in the *Summa Theologica*.<sup>1</sup> In this present work, it will not be necessary to examine Thomas' treatment in great depth. Nonetheless, such concepts are worth presenting, even if only briefly, as they provide a firm contextual background. With a basic understanding of Thomas in place, we will then demonstrate how Lublin Thomism not only builds and expands upon this anthropology, but on the metaphysics of *diakonos* already established.

After examining the nature of God and the angels in his *Summa Theologica*, Thomas turns his attention to the next level in the order of being, man. He begins with an analysis of the soul which, in a general sense, is the life principle, that which actualizes the body. Against all dualisms that tend to magnify and thus distort the distinction

between soul and body, Thomas stresses the intrinsic union of both principles such that the form (the soul) demands integration with matter (the body). Following Aristotelian metaphysics<sup>2</sup>, the soul is the substantial form that makes the material body a specific kind of body, be it plant, animal, or man.<sup>3</sup> Plants and animals have material souls, not in the sense that the soul is material *per se*, but in the sense that plant and animal souls have dependency in being on their material bodies. When they die, their souls cease to exist. The human soul, on the other hand, is a non-bodily substance. It is a spiritual substance and is extrinsically dependent on the material body. This extrinsic dependency, unlike the intrinsic dependency in plants and animals, means that when the human soul is separated from the material body as in death, it continues to exist and perform its operations. Thus, where material souls (plants and animals) are incomplete non-subsistent, that is to say incapable of an existence independent of their material bodies; human souls are subsistent, that is to say completely capable of an existence independent of their material bodies.<sup>4</sup> Although a human soul is subsistent, it is in itself not a complete being. Rather, the complete human being is comprised of a single compound of body and soul (*compositum humanum*) which form an intrinsic union and a harmonious relationship. Moreover, because man's soul is a spiritual substance, it cannot erode or decay for it contains no materiality. Thus, the human person is constituted when a spiritual soul, which is the substantial form, is joined to undifferentiated primal matter.

Because man's soul is intellectual, it is capable of acquiring knowledge through senses which, by way of the intellect, is capable of understanding, judging, and exercising discursive thought.<sup>5</sup> The soul possesses certain powers or faculties capacitating it to exercise specific life operations proper to its nature. These faculties are distinguished from one another by both their respective operations and by the objects they seek to achieve. The human soul performs not only the higher operations, but all the operations pertaining to the lesser degrees of life. As a result, it is responsible for the operations of the faculties of the vegetative life (growing, reproducing), and the

sensitive life (sensible knowledge), as well as intellectual faculties. The intellectual faculties are powers of the soul represented by the intellect and will.<sup>6</sup> As noted above, the intellect receives knowledge through the senses and renders it intelligible. It is capable of understanding by connecting a series of points in a logical step-by-step fashion; a process which Thomas called discursive thought. While sensible knowledge deals with particular and concrete realities, the intellectual faculties transcend the realm of the particular and are capable of grasping the universal. They can abstract from particular instances and form universal concepts. Thus, when a man points his finger in a given direction, a dog, relying only on sensible knowledge proper to his nature, simply looks at the finger responding only to the physical movement of his master. The canine is radically incapable of understanding (abstracting from the particular) some universal (look in that direction) because it does not possess the intellectual faculties. However, it is precisely because of these intellectual faculties that humans are capable of taking in the sense data (the pointing finger) and abstracting from it something deeper (look in this direction). This capacity to grasp universals reveals a seemingly unlimited world of knowledge allowing human beings to relate to objects on a completely different order.<sup>7</sup> This act or operation of the intellect is called reason.<sup>8</sup> Thomas then distinguishes between speculative and practical reason. Speculative reason performs two distinct, but related functions. The first is apprehension which is to know things by abstraction from the things themselves. This is nothing less than the ability of man to appropriate the truth of real things. Thus, when one perceives a grape, one knows it to be a grape precisely because grapeness (the universal) is abstracted from the grape itself (the particular). The second function of speculative reason is to move from naturally-known self-evident principles to the more specific determination of certain matters. This knowledge is not imparted by nature, but acquired through the use of reason. Consequently, if one wants to extend the use of grapes beyond their normal life, one develops a process to make wine. The process of making wine is not imparted by nature, but acquired through the exercise of reason. Speculative reason is concerned with necessary things and its object is truth. Practical

reason, on the other hand, is interested with singular and contingent things; with doing “this” or avoiding “that.” Its object is the good with regard to a specific act at a specific time. Speculative and practical reason are not two distinct faculties of the intellect, but instead two functions of the same faculty.<sup>9</sup>

After his consideration of the intellect, Thomas then turns to examine the other intellectual faculty, the will. This is done within the context of the appetites which are the tendencies or inclinations to seek good and to shun evil.<sup>10</sup> For Thomas, all things tend according to their nature. Things that lack knowledge exhibit natural appetites or tendencies like the wind to blow and the sun to rise. However, things that possess knowledge, like animals, and man have cognitive appetency which exists on two orders. The first of these is the order of the senses which inclines sentient creatures (animals and humans) on the sense level to seek what is sensed as good and avoid what is sensed as evil. Sensible goods are that which appeal to emotion and are related to any of the five senses. Thus, we eat when we are hungry and seek warmth when we are cold. The second of these cognitive appetites is the order of the intellect which is only proper to rational creatures (angels and humans). It inclines them to seek the intelligible good and avoid the intelligible evil. Intelligible goods are various perfections such as: life, health, truth, and beauty. The will then, is a faculty of the soul which is the rational appetency; the appetite that comes from intellectual knowledge.<sup>11</sup> It is a dynamic, an inclination towards actual possession of a good as opposed to the mere cognitive possession proper to the intellect. It is said to be free in the sense that it is not determined by any cause outside itself.

In the world outside of the person, everything is determined by causal necessity and, as a result, there is no true liberty.<sup>12</sup> The wind blows because it must. The sun shines because it must. The will, on the other hand, is not determined by causal motives, it is independent of these causes. This is not to deny certain necessities associated with the lower faculties. We eat because we must. We sleep because we must. However, in the exercise of the intellectual faculties, human beings exhibit a kind of freedom completely unknown to mere

animal and vegetative beings. Where the intellect is the cognitive faculty of the distinctively human rational soul, the will is its appetitive faculty. They are the faculties of the soul; the very means through which it operates. The intellect has for its object the knowledge of universals, and functions by judging and reasoning. The will is understood as free such that it is not determined or necessitated by any particular good, but instead determines itself. That said, Thomas does not view the intellect and will as co-equal. Instead, he holds that, in a certain sense, the intellect has primacy because the intellect attains its object by knowing it, while the will only tends toward its object, so for him the will follows the intellect. However, in another sense, the will possesses a certain superiority over the intellect. When a good is greater than the soul itself as in the *Summum Bonum* (Highest Good = God), it is more excellent to will it (love it) than to simply know it.<sup>13</sup>

Steeped in classical consciousness, Thomas developed his anthropology within a metaphysical plane, a continuum of being in which God stands at the top infinitely separated from all of His creation. Thomas, like Aristotle before him, defines “man” in terms of his proximate genus and species. While he occasionally used the term *persona* for man, he preferred *homo* reserving *persona* for his treatment of the Trinity and the Incarnation.<sup>14</sup> Here he adopted the classic definition by the Roman philosopher Boethius’ (d. 524 A.D.) who described the person as: *naturæ rationalis individua substantia* (an individual substance of a rational nature).<sup>15</sup> The person is, as we have already seen, an individual substance in the sense that he cannot be subdivided and his mode of existence is “self-contained and independent of any subject.”<sup>16</sup> Moreover, the designation of this being as “rational” means that *persona* can only be applied to God, angels, and humanity. While Thomas embraces Boethius’ definition, he explains it in such a way that it practically constitutes a new definition. In his treatment of the Christ’s hypostatic union, Thomas makes a crucial distinction:

The individual substance, which is included in the definition of a person, implies a complete substance

subsisting of itself and separate from all else (*substantiam completam per se subsistentem separatim ab aliis*); otherwise, a man's hand might be called a person, since it is an individual substance; nevertheless, because it is an individual substance existing in something else, it cannot be called a person; nor, for the same reason, can the human nature in Christ, although it may be called something individual and singular.<sup>17</sup>

One of the most frequent quotes attributed to Thomas concerning man has to do with his value. He wrote, "Person refers to that which is most perfect in the whole of nature, namely, to that which subsists in rational nature."<sup>18</sup> He went on to say:

. . . we correctly speak of substances as individuals. . . Now, particularity and individuality are more specially and perfectly present in rational substances who control their actions . . . For it is proper to individuals or singular substances to act. So a special name is given among all other substances to individual beings having a rational nature, and this name is "person."<sup>19</sup>

Thomas' anthropology, deeply rooted in classical consciousness, relies largely on Aristotelian metaphysics. He points to, with great precision, particular aspects of the person identifying both their function and object. However, as we shall now see in our consideration of Lublin Thomism, while Thomas' analysis is absolutely essential, alone, it is insufficient. While he identifies the primacy of personhood, the structures of the classical world view, which examine the objective dimension of the person, prevent him from adequately exploring the subjective dimension. It is simply outside the realm of his hermeneutical approach. Lublin Thomism assumes all of Thomas' anthropology and builds upon it through the use of Personalism. In this regard, it synthesizes the world views (classical and historical) in such a way so as to maintain the object/subject duality so very

necessary for a more complete picture of reality. This, in turn, will allow for a more holistic problematic enabling us to arrive at a new theology of the diaconate that avoids the extremes of a purely classical or historical approach.



## Appendix 3

### Wojtyla's Exegetical Method

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Pope John Paul II has the propensity to transition, almost seamlessly, between his Personalism and his *Theology of the Body*. Given our earlier discussions of the relationship between philosophy and theology, it is quite reasonable to understand these transitions as dual access points to a truth, one natural the other supernatural, whose joint purpose is to arrive at a more holistic vision of that same truth. In the last section, we focused primarily on his Personalism, though not without a foray into his *Theology of the Body*. In this section, we will focus more on his *Theology of the Body* as it is applied to the diaconate. That said, we will inevitably find ourselves grounding this theology in philosophy, requiring a few trips back into Personalism. In his shift to the *Theology of the Body* with its reliance on divine revelation, Pope John Paul makes measured use of the Scriptures. Like much of his thought, his theological interpretation of the texts, though not entirely unique, is hardly conventional. Therefore, it will be necessary before proceeding to examine the manner in which he interprets biblical texts and the implication of this interpretation to our pursuit of a new theology of the diaconate. Here, as in our consideration of Lublin Thomism, the objective of our study does not require an extensive treatment,

but simply an overview identifying some of the more relevant characteristics. Before proceeding however, we need to place these characteristics against the backdrop of the biblical tradition from which they emerged.

The Church has long recognized that many passages in the Bible admit to layers of meaning. Each layer represents a partial unpacking of the transcendent mystery revealing something of who God is and His plan for our salvation. These layers can be seen in the many commentaries written by the early Church Fathers such as Origen, John Chrysostom, and Augustine who never saw themselves bound to any one understanding of the text, but instead, allowed the texts to unfold in various ways. In many respects, these layers correspond to what the biblical tradition calls, "the four senses of Scripture." The origins of the four senses, the literal, allegorical, moral, and anagogical, can be traced to the writings of the fourth century monk and mystic John Cassian (d. 335 A.D.). Cassian expressed these senses in the following manner, "The one Jerusalem can be understood in four different ways, in the historical (literal) sense as the city of the Jews, in allegory as the Church of Christ, in anagoge as the heavenly city of God 'which is the mother of us all' (Gal 4:26), and in the tropological (moral) sense as the human soul."<sup>1</sup> The literal sense, as later articulated by Aquinas, concerns the meaning or signification of the words themselves.<sup>2</sup> In this respect, Scripture can be studied like any other literary work. This is not to suggest that Thomas or any of the other Scholastics understood the Bible as merely an example of ancient literature. It is, however, to assert that the sacred texts, because of their human authorship, employ many of the same literary forms as other texts, ancient and contemporary. As a result, these texts can be studied using the literary tools at hand. In Thomas' time, these tools were quite modest and he would no doubt delight in the manner in which they later developed. For him, the literal sense concerned the meaning of the words in terms of what they signify, what they point to. For example, the word "apple" is just that, a word. It is not an apple itself. Nonetheless, the combined letters (a-p-p-l-e), when taken as a single meaning, signify a particular fruit. They point beyond

themselves, almost sacramentally, to a deeper reality; to the reality of an actual apple making it present in the mind to the person hearing or reading the word. Understood this way, words, whether written or spoken, are signs of mental images, ideals or concepts grasped by the intellect. These ideals or concepts further point beyond themselves to the actual realities they signify. Thus, to grasp the literal sense is to grasp the reality as intended by the author of those words. Words then are not ends in themselves, but mediate something else, and that something else is rooted in reality.<sup>3</sup> According to Thomas:

Now, even though spiritual things are conceived using the images of corporeal things, nevertheless what the author intends to reveal about spiritual things through sensible images do not pertain to the mystical sense, but to the literal sense because the literal sense is what is first intended by the words whether properly speaking or figuratively.<sup>4</sup>

It is important to recognize that Thomas, along with most medieval scholars, did not understand the literary sense in terms of a strict literal meaning. He includes in the literal sense such things as metaphors and hyperboles. When Jesus tells Nicodemus that one cannot enter the Kingdom of God without being born again, He is not speaking literally, but metaphorically (Jn 3:3).<sup>5</sup> In this case, "born" does not mean a physical rebirth, but a spiritual birth. Likewise, when Jesus says, "if your right hand causes you to sin, cut it off," He is not speaking literally, but using hyperbole (Mt 5:30).<sup>6</sup> Here He is not advocating self-mutilation, but the need to rid ourselves of that which causes us to sin. Thus, the literal meaning, as used by most fundamentalists today, would have been quite alien to Thomas and his contemporaries.

Thomas understood the literal sense as having two specific tasks. First, he recognized it as the only basis for sound theological argumentation. This is to say that a theological argument must necessarily take into account the words in the sacred texts and what these words signify. His reasoning behind this has to do with his understanding

of theology as *scientia sacra* consisting of reasoned arguments. Cogent and compelling arguments are grounded in authority and, within the discipline of theology, Scripture holds a certain pride of place among these as the *norma normans non normata*. Thus, the literal sense, because it reveals this authority through the words of the biblical text and what they signify, is essential to the development of sound theological argumentation.<sup>7</sup> Second, Thomas saw the literal sense as the necessary basis for the three spiritual senses. Where the literal sense focuses on the things the words signify, the spiritual senses focus on what the things the words signify, further signify. For Thomas, things signify other things; that things as particular persons, certain events, and even specific objects can point beyond themselves signifying even greater realities. When, for instance, Moses speaks of the lamb sacrificed at the Passover, we understand it to be just that, a young sheep. The word “sheep” signifies a particular kind of animal to be sacrificed. This is the literal sense. Simply put, it is the grammatical meaning of the word. However, Scripture also contains other layers of meaning and these other layers are revealed in the spiritual senses; that is, what the literal sense, in turn, signifies. In this case, the word “lamb” reveals more than the kind of sacrificial animal it is; it further signifies Christ in terms of His passion and death. Thomas, taking up an earlier tradition, divides that spiritual sense into three distinct, but related categories within a Christocentric framework. These, as we have already seen, are called: the allegorical, moral, and anagogical senses. The Scandinavian Dominican, Augustinus de Dacia (d. 1285 A.D.), captured the meaning of the literal and spiritual sense in a short verse. He wrote, “The letter teaches the events; allegory what you should believe; morality what you should do, anagogy what you should be aiming for.”<sup>8</sup> The spiritual senses, which rely on the literal, are summed up in the *Catechism* this way:

Thanks to the unity of God's plan, not only the text of Scripture but also the realities and events about which it speaks can be signs. (1) The *allegorical sense*. We can acquire a more profound understanding of events by recognizing their significance in Christ; thus the

crossing of the Red Sea is a sign or type of Christ's victory and also of Christian Baptism. (2) The *moral sense*. The events reported in Scripture ought to lead us to act justly. As St. Paul says, they were written “for our instruction”. (3) The *anagogical sense* (Greek: *anagoge*, “leading”). We can view realities and events in terms of their eternal significance, leading us toward our true homeland: thus the Church on earth is a sign of the heavenly Jerusalem.<sup>9</sup>

While these four senses remain a mainstay of Catholic biblical scholarship to this day, by the mid-twentieth century, a development began to take place. In his 1943 encyclical, *Divino Affante Spiritu*, Pope Pius XII opened the door to the use of the historical-critical methods as a hermeneutic tool for biblical interpretation.<sup>10</sup> This openness was not meant to supplant the four senses, but to supplement the literal sense. The historical-critical method, also known as higher criticism, emerged in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries influenced by the rationalism of Baruch Spinoza, Hermann Reimarus, and D.F. Strauss. It was later taken up and advanced by such Protestant scholars as Julius Wellhausen, Albert Schweitzer, Rudolf Bultmann, and Gerhard von Rad. Because of its grounding in rationalism and its Protestant influence, the historical-critical method was initially viewed with suspicion among Catholic biblical scholars. Slowly, however, there arose within the Church a sense that these methods, when applied within the context of the Catholic biblical tradition, could generate another level of meaning in the text, hitherto unknown. Its value as a hermeneutical tool, in the right hands, soon became undeniable. Pope Pius XII's encyclical provided the necessary ecclesial approbation to explore this new hermeneutic as an authentic element of biblical scholarship within the Catholic tradition.

Properly understood, the historical-critical method is not one method, but instead a number of methods whose common purpose is to interpret the text within in a historical and literary framework

revealing the intent of the sacred author. It is an interdisciplinary work employing such fields as cultural anthropology, archeology, sociology, as well as linguistics and theology. The opening by Pope Pius enabled Catholic scholars to more freely use this interdisciplinary approach with its various new tools to better explore the literal meaning of the text.<sup>11</sup> The validity of this approach was affirmed in both *Dei Verbum* in 1965 and later in the Pontifical Biblical Commission's 1994 report entitled, *The Interpretation of the Bible in the Church*.<sup>12</sup> Over the years, the historical-critical method has proven itself an effective exegetical tool. One of its principal advantages is that it contextualizes our understanding of the sacred text against the rich backdrop of history giving rise to new insights.

Pope John Paul II was well versed in higher criticism and understood its importance. At the same time, influenced by Phenomenology and its focus on the subjective dimension of human experience; he realized that, within the literal sense, yet another layer of meaning could be found. That, not only is there an objective dimension to the literal sense, but an unexplored subjective dimension as well. For example, in his *Theology of the Body*, the pope considers the verse, "The man and the woman were both naked, yet they felt no shame (Gen 2:25)." Based on the traditional understanding of the literal sense, the words "naked" and "shame" describe being without clothing and feelings of humiliation caused by foolish behavior. If we look for the spiritual sense of this verse, we would be hard-pressed to find anything allegorical or analogical, although a case could be made for the moral sense. But this is not where John Paul goes, at least not directly. Instead, he conducts a phenomenological analysis of the meaning of the words "naked" and "shame" and, in doing so, uncovers the extended literal sense or what might be called the subjective literal sense. The pope points out that Adam and Eve's unashamed nakedness before the Fall reveals a consciousness of innocence and purity. Here, our first parents experienced an absolute defenselessness in each other's presence precisely because their dignity was not threatened by the look of the other. Lust as a self-seeking sexual desire had not entered the world. Of this first look, Pope John Paul writes:

Seeing each other, as if through the mystery of creation, man and woman see each other even more fully and distinctly than through the sense of sight itself, that is, through the eyes of the body. They see and know each other with all the peace of the interior gaze, which creates precisely the fullness of the intimacy of persons.<sup>13</sup>

Insofar as the body bespeaks the person, and insofar as each person had not yet engaged in any evil that would weaken and diminish their nature, their bodies reflected this original innocence. Thus, before the Fall, Adam could look at Eve and not see her as an object of sexual use. Instead, he could see her as someone to be loved for her own sake; not the sake of his own self-pleasure which the pope calls lust. However, once sin entered the world, a profound change took place. A sacred trust between God and humanity was violated. A primal relationship was gravely wounded. So egregious was this violation, so deep was this wound, that its consequences negatively impacted not only humanity's relationship with God, but with one another as well. The covering up with fig leaves is an outward expression of the inward humiliation. For John Paul, Gen 2:25 and its analysis of nakedness and shame provides the "precise key" for a full understanding of God's original plan for humanity.<sup>14</sup> This, by all accounts, is a bold claim to be made on a single verse that the Judeo-Christian tradition has pondered for thousands of years. Yet that is just what the pope does. He sees in this passage a fundamental truth revealed in the language of the body. Because man is created in the divine image, God's original plan, that is, the state of affairs before the Fall, is inscribed into his very being and this being is manifested in and through the body. Nakedness without shame reveals a certain consciousness, an awareness of a state of being and how that being is perceived by another. In their original innocence, Adam and Eve were able to see each other as God sees them, to love each other as God loves them, albeit in a human manner. The Fall represents a self-inflicted violation of that innocence which had the effect of rupturing their relationship with God and one another. The consequence of this rupture is further revealed in shame. In many

respects, Gen 2:25 is a concise summary of creation and the Fall as “stamped,” in each person and revealed, if one examines closely, in the language of the body. While this is merely a summary of John Paul’s treatment of nakedness and shame, it does serve to exemplify how his “turn to the subject” results in an extended literal sense. This extended sense reveals yet another layer of meaning further unpacking the transcendent mystery hidden within the text.

In his concise and well written piece on the pope’s use of Scripture in the *Theology of the Body*, the Jesuit biblical scholar, Fr. Williams Kurz uses a distinction found in the writings of David Williams to help further describe John Paul’s extended use of the literal sense.<sup>15</sup> Though his book, *Receiving the Bible in Faith: Historical and Biblical Exegesis* does not address John Paul’s work specifically, Williams nonetheless provides a helpful distinction. In attempting to reconcile the apparent conflict between historical exegesis and theological interpretation among many scholars, he proposes a nuanced appreciation of the dual intentionality of Scripture (divine and human) as it is applied to contemporary issues. Williams is relying on a traditional distinction summarized in *Dei Verbum*. There the Council Fathers wrote, “In composing the sacred books, God chose men and while employed by Him, they made use of their own powers and abilities, so that with Him acting through them, they as true authors consigned to write everything and only those things which He wanted.”<sup>16</sup> From this, the question arises as to how we might determine the divine intentionality of a given text. Following the tradition, William’s answers, “Just as we can attend to the whole Bible only by acquiring a careful knowledge of the individual parts, so also we distinguish God’s authorial intention only by understanding the human authors together as an ensemble.”<sup>17</sup> Here, the literal sense of Scripture is not limited or reduced to the intention of the human author as discovered through the use of historical-critical exegesis. That, just as God is revealed in a human way through His Word Jesus Christ, so too is His written word revealed through the human author.<sup>18</sup> This means that the human authors transmit not merely their own intent in the literal sense but, in and through their

words, God’s intent as well. Moreover, just as the human author’s intent is arrived at through its contextualization within the particular book and within the whole of the canon, so God’s intent is realized within that same progressive context. Kurz, commenting upon Williams observation says, “This seems a significant change, at least in emphasis, from most Catholic scholarship and probably also from most understandings of the *Pontifical Biblical Commission’s Interpretation of the Bible in the Church*.”<sup>19</sup> In this observation, Kurz is referring to the tendency among many contemporary biblical scholars, Catholic and Protestant alike, to reduce the literal sense to the intention of the human authors using, almost exclusively, the historical-critical method. If this is true, and I believe Kurz is correct, then the literal sense undergoes a reduction of sorts creating a dualism of intent between the human and divine. Here there is no argument that, to some degree, and not without difficulty, the two can be distinguished. That said, great care is required not to separate them in terms of the revelation they convey. There exists within the sacred text homogeneity between this dual intentionality such that God speaks with one voice, albeit in two ways. The Fathers of the Second Vatican Council affirmed this when they taught that the human authors, “consigned everything to writing *and only those things which He wanted* [emphasis mine].”<sup>20</sup> Understood this way, the human intent reveals divine intent because the entire Bible possesses a unity and coherency marked by detectable patterns and trajectories. These, when closely studied, can be traced back to reveal the intention of a Divine Author. In this respect, Scripture as the Word of God and Jesus as the Word Made Flesh share a fundamental commonality. Where our Lord’s humanity points to and participates in his divinity, so too does the human intent point to and participates in the divine intent. Both are incarnational realities that, through symbolic consciousness, use the visible to make present the invisible giving rise to divine revelation and with it the unfolding of mystery.

Understood correctly, this incarnational reality, by no means, diminishes the human contribution assuming all of the cultural and historical influences. Rather, it is in-and-through these cultural and

historical influences, as they appear within the context of the wider canon, that divine intentionality is revealed. This is precisely why it is difficult at times to know where the divine intent ends and the human intent begins. It is similar to discerning the dividing line between Christ's natures or, more practically, His wills. We know it is there, but its exact theological location eludes us.<sup>21</sup> In many respects, this is nothing new as witnessed by the criteria for biblical interpretation offered in *Dei Verbum*.<sup>22</sup> What is new, or perhaps made more explicit, is that along with human intentionality, divine intentionality is expressed in the literal sense and not merely relegated to the spiritual senses.

All of this is not to suggest that the pope rejects the value of the historical-critical method. While he does exhibit a general awareness of this method, he uses it very sparingly. An insight as to why he seldom relies on it may be found in a talk he gave to members of the Pontifical Biblical Commission in 1989 where he said:

Of late not a few Christians have been heard to complain that exegesis has become an exercise in subtlety with no relation to the life of God's People. Obviously such a complaint can be challenged. In many cases it is not justified. Still, one must be on one's guard. Fidelity to the task of interpretation should lead an exegete not to be content with studying secondary aspects of biblical texts but to place in evidence their principal message which is a religious message, a call to conversion and good news of salvation, capable of transforming each person and human society as a whole by introducing it to communion with God.<sup>23</sup>

A basic survey of his writings reveals that the pope engages Scripture not as a biblical exegete in the strict scholarly sense, but as a pope with a particular philosophical approach to a specific pastoral dilemma.<sup>24</sup> He sees the historical-critical method as merely a tool among tools and, based on his philosophical and pastoral concerns,

uses it as needed. That said, in characterizing his work as pastoral, we ought not to confuse the term "pastoral" with "non-technical." John Paul is anything but non-technical and, as we have already noted, this renders a cursory read by one not versed in his style somewhat challenging. In this regard, it is fair to observe that he is pastoral in substance, but not in style. This is to say that, in addressing certain practical problems within the Church (pastoral), he does so using sophisticated language (technical). In fact, even in one of his most pastoral teachings, *Familiaris Consortio*, we can see him reaching back into the personalist language of *Love and Responsibility* and the phenomenological language of *The Acting Person*. This approach, I suspect, is deliberate as the pope is writing for the entire Church and is teaching for future ages. As a result, he must be precise and precision requires the use of technical language. By this I mean language with minimal ambiguity. Thus, in addressing contemporary pastoral questions, the pope seeks to be technical inasmuch as such language most accurately transmits the meaning he intends.

This approach has drawn a number of critics, especially those involved in biblical scholarship, who see the pope as "cherry picking" some aspects of historical criticism while ignoring others.<sup>25</sup> Although this is certainly true in some respects, it fails to take into consideration that, unlike many contemporary biblical scholars, John Paul does not reduce exegesis to the historical methods. He is about a fundamentally different task. The inability to perceive this different task and hence a different methodological approach lies in the fact that these critics first fail to perceive something even more fundamental. Because the *Theology of the Body* is an exercise of the ordinary Magisterium, the pope teaches not as Karol Wojtyla, a private theologian, but as Pope John Paul II, the successor of Peter. He is pastor of the universal Church who must consider the pastoral implications of his theology so that the faithful grasp its relevance. This ecclesiological distinction makes what the pope does quite different from what many private theologians and biblical scholars do. I say "many" and not "all" because, while the pope exemplifies this pastoral approach, many theologians write theologically with

little attention to the pastoral implications. This is not a negative criticism. It is simply to recognize a difference in focus resulting in two very distinct teaching modes that call for two distinct methodological approaches. By not recognizing this essential distinction, many of the pope's critics judge his approach to Scripture using the wrong yardstick. They impose the standard of contemporary biblical scholarship, often narrowly defined in historical-critical terms, over a theological interpretation with pastoral implications. From this skewed perspective, John Paul's work may seem to some unscholarly and anachronistic. It does not fit the contemporary academic mold and so its insights are dismissed by some and its conclusions disregarded by others.

While the above analysis gets to the different tasks, and while this may account for John Paul's scant use of the historical-critical methods, it does not address the "why." In other words, what is it specifically about the pope's pastoral approach that would limit a method the Church herself sees as good? The answer to this, I suspect, lies not so much in John Paul's pastoral approach itself, nor in the historical-critical method itself, but rather how the two relate. Nothing in any of the pope's work, pre-papal or papal, suggests that he takes any issue with the advances made by *Divino Affante Spiritu* or *Dei Verbum*. Indeed, he was the one who called for and received the Pontifical Biblical Commission's report *The Interpretation of the Bible in the Church* which affirmed the validity of higher criticism. His use of Scripture in his Magisterial documents such as *Laborem Exercens*, *Evangelium Vitae*, and *Veritatis Splendor* reveals a use of these methods, albeit in a limited form. In this regard, it is reasonable to say that John Paul sees biblical criticism as an indispensable exegetical tool. At the same time, the strengths of these methods in a specific exegetical application prove themselves a weakness in other pastoral applications. As pointed out by Kurz:

Moreover, restriction of the literal sense to the results of historical exegesis has less than optimal pastoral

consequences. In effect, it freezes the literal meaning wholly within the ancient past of the time of the writing. The gap between this ancient literal meaning and contemporary life and belief of the Church remains too great from most teachers and preachers to effectively bridge.<sup>26</sup>

When the literal sense is reduced to a historical-critical approach, the focus on the historic situatedness is so intense that we can leave the text entombed in the past rendering it incapable of speaking to us today. We might discover, for instance, something fascinating about Jonah's message of repentance to the Ninevites or Elijah's confrontation with Ahab. However, unless we grasp what this message and that confrontation mean for us in the here-and-now, these passages are simply relegated to the status of an archeological dig; interesting, but less than relevant to our own historic situatedness. The passages become tightly locked in their own time and inextricably trapped in their own culture. This reduced literal sense is highly problematic for Pope John Paul's pastoral approach insofar as it seeks to convey the relevancy of the Scriptures to a contemporary audience. This challenge is further compounded by the historical-critical method's hyper-emphasis on human authorship. Taken to its logical conclusion, it can lead to a disintegrated sense of Scripture. Here, each book seems to possess its own distinctive meaning and finality isolated and independent from the others. For example, we have Matthew's Christology, Mark's Christology, Luke's Christology and John's Christology – but not God's Christology as revealed across the whole of the Gospels.

Though it is well beyond the scope of our pursuit to provide an in-depth analysis of the pope's treatment of Scripture in the *Theology of the Body*, two observations can be made at this point. First, his extended use of the literal sense is based on a recovery of the full literal sense which includes both divine and human intentionality. Thus, while accepting the value of the historical-critical method, he does not allow it to dominate his approach. Second, his application

of a phenomenological hermeneutic reveals another layer of meaning within the text rooted in human consciousness. These combine to push the envelope of the literal sense which in turn reveal deeper theological assumptions imbedded in the text.

## Endnotes

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### Introduction

<sup>1</sup> *General Instruction to the Roman Missal*, 182.

<sup>2</sup> The *dubium* and subsequent response were reprinted in: Dominic Cerrato, "Canon 910§1 Dubium on Deacon as Ordinary Minister of Holy Communion," *Roman Replies and CLSA Advisory Opinions 2011* (2011): 28-29.

<sup>3</sup> George H. Tavard, *A Theology of Ministry* (Wilmington, DE: Michael Glazier, 1981), 91. The reference to "Parkinson's Law" is the maxim originated by Cyril Northcote Parkinson as part of the first sentence of a humorous essay published in *The Economist* in 1955. Parkinson states that work expands so as to fill the time available for its completion.

<sup>4</sup> Leon-Joseph Suenens, *The Church in Dialogue* (Indiana: Fides Publishers, 1965), 84.

<sup>5</sup> Both Lublin Thomism and Theology of the Body will be taken up and explained in Chapter 4.

<sup>6</sup> Pope Benedict XVI, Meeting with the clergy of the Diocese of Rome, February 7, 2008.

## Chapter One

<sup>1</sup> William Ditewig, *The Emerging Diaconate: Servant Leaders in a Servant Church* (New York: Paulist Press, 2007), 124-125.

<sup>2</sup> Congregation for Catholic Education, *Basic Norms of the Formation of Permanent Deacons* (Vatican City: Libreria Editrice Vaticana, 1998), #3.

<sup>3</sup> *Lumen Gentium* #29.

<sup>4</sup> Dom Augustinus Kerkvoorde OSB, "The Theology of the Diaconate," in *Foundations for the Renewal of the Diaconate*, trans. David Bourke, et. al. (Washington D.C.: United States Catholic Conference, 1993), 91-92.

<sup>5</sup> International Theological Commission, *From the Diakonia of Christ to the Diakonia of the Apostles* (Chicago: Hillenbrand Books, 2003), 92.

<sup>6</sup> James H. Provost, "Permanent Deacons in the 1983 Code," *Canon Law Society of America Proceedings*, 46 (1984), 175.

<sup>7</sup> William Ditewig, *The Emerging Diaconate*, 13.

<sup>8</sup> William Ditewig, "Charting a Theology of the Diaconate," in *Theology of the Diaconate: The State of the Question* (New York: Paulist Press, 2004), 34.

<sup>9</sup> United States Catholic Conference, *A National Study on the Permanent Diaconate of the Catholic Church in the United States*, #16.

<sup>10</sup> Richard Lennan, "From the Diakonia of Christ to the Diakonia of the Apostles," *Compass: A Review of Topical Theology* 39, no. 1 (Autumn 2005) accessed September 2008, <http://compassreview.org/autum05/8.html>.

<sup>11</sup> International Theological Commission, *From the Diakonia of Christ to the Diakonia of the Apostles*, 91-110.

<sup>12</sup> Joseph Ratzinger, *Milestones: Memoirs 1927-1977* (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1998), 128.

<sup>13</sup> Ibid. 128-129. Rahner espoused a form of neo-scholasticism known as Transcendental Thomism which seeks to bring together Thomism with a Cartesian subjectivist approach to knowledge in general and Kantian epistemology in particular.

<sup>14</sup> Marcellino D'Ambrosio, "Ressourcement Theology, Aggiornamento, and the Hermeneutics of Tradition," *Communio International Catholic Review*, 18 (Winter 1991), 530.

<sup>15</sup> Mark T. Schoof, *A Survey of Catholic Theology 1800-1970*, trans. N. D. Smith (New Jersey: Paulist, 1970), 18.

<sup>16</sup> Marcellino D'Ambrosio, *A Ressourcement Theology, Aggiornamento, and the Hermeneutics of Tradition*, 530.

<sup>17</sup> Aidan Nichols, *The Thought of Pope Benedict XVI, An Introduction to the Theology of Joseph Ratzinger* (Great Britain: Continuum International Publishing Group - Burns & Oates, 2006), 295.

<sup>18</sup> George Weigel, *God's Choice, Pope Benedict XVI and the Future of the Catholic Church*, (New York: Harper Collins Publisher, 2005), 171.

<sup>19</sup> Ibid., 172.

<sup>20</sup> Some have interpreted Ratzinger's espousal of *ressourcement* as a repudiation of *aggiornamento*. See: David Gibson, *The Rule of St. Benedict: Pope Benedict XVI and His Battle with the Modern World* (New York: Harper Collins Publishing, 2006), 166. Such a position fails to take into account Ratzinger's carefully nuanced position.

<sup>21</sup> David Gibson, *The Rule of Benedict: Pope Benedict XVI and His Battle with the Modern World* (New York: HarperCollins, 2006), 164.

<sup>22</sup> Pope Benedict XVI, *2005 Address of His Holiness Benedict XVI to the Roman Curia Offering Them His Christmas Greetings*, accessed August 3, 2012, [http://www.vatican.va/holy\\_father/benedict\\_xvi/speeches/2005/december/documents/hf\\_ben\\_xvi\\_spe\\_20051222\\_roman-curia\\_en.html](http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/benedict_xvi/speeches/2005/december/documents/hf_ben_xvi_spe_20051222_roman-curia_en.html).

<sup>23</sup> Ibid.

<sup>24</sup> Ibid.

<sup>25</sup> This was first presented by Pope John XXIII in his speech inaugurating the Council on October 11, 1962 and later by Pope Paul VI in his Discourse for the Council's conclusion on December 7, 1965. See: [http://www.vatican.va/holy\\_father/paul\\_vi/speeches/1965/documents/hf\\_p-vi\\_spe\\_19651207\\_epilogo-concilio\\_en.html](http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/paul_vi/speeches/1965/documents/hf_p-vi_spe_19651207_epilogo-concilio_en.html).

<sup>26</sup> Ibid.

<sup>27</sup> Karl Rahner SJ., "On the Diaconate," in *Foundations for the Renewal of the Diaconate*, trans. David Bourke et. al. (Washington, D.C.: National Conference of Catholic Bishops, 1993), 198. Even though Rahner simply provides a systematic exposition, his approach is largely speculative and philosophical.

<sup>28</sup> “Pope Supports “Hermeneutic of Continuity” Approach to Vatican II in Letter,” last modified November 15, 2013, <http://www.zenit.org/en/articles/pope-supports-hermeneutic-of-continuity-approach-to-vatican-ii-in-letter>.

<sup>29</sup> Étienne Gilson, review of *Augustine et théologie moderne* and *Le Mystère du surnaturel*, by H. de Lubac, in *La Croix* (18-19 July 1965), quoted by Étienne Gilson, *Letters of Étienne Gilson to Henri de Lubac*, trans. by Mary Emily Hamilton (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1988), 179.

<sup>30</sup> Charles Péguy, from a preface to the *Cahiers de la Quinzaine* of 1 March 1904, repr. in his *Oeuvres Complètes* (Paris: N.R.F., n.d.), 12: 186-192.

<sup>31</sup> *Aeterni Patris*, 24.

<sup>32</sup> Catholic Church, *The Rites of the Catholic Church: Volume Two* (Collegeville: Liturgical Press, 1991), 33-35.

<sup>33</sup> Augustine, “On Baptism,” trans. Marcus Dods, in *A Select Library of the Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers of the Christian Church*, ed. Philip Schaff, vol. IV (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans Publishing Co., 1979), I.

<sup>34</sup> *Catechism of the Catholic Church*, 1570.

<sup>35</sup> International Theological Commission, *From the Diakonia of Christ to the Diakonia of the Apostles*, 93-94.

<sup>36</sup> As a kind of self-refuting argument, the existence of world views can only be rejected by accepting a world view.

<sup>37</sup> G. K. Chesterton, *Heretics*, in “The Complete Works of G. K. Chesterton,” ed. David Dooley, vol. 1, (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1986), 41.

<sup>38</sup> Bernard J. Lonergan, S.J., “The Transition from a Classicist World View to Historical-Mindedness,” in *A Second Collection*, ed. William F. J. Ryan, S.J. and Bernard J. Tyrrell, S.J. (Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1967), 1-9. Lonergan’s use of the term “consciousness” is equated to a world view.

<sup>39</sup> In metaphysics, there is wide debate over the existence of universals and because of this, wide debate over color as a universal form. The difficulty arises out of attempts to account for the phenomenon of similarity such as in the case of red pens, red cars, and red hats. These

objects agree in similarity, namely in having the attribute of redness. The challenge for metaphysics has been how to account for this kind of agreement in attributes among objects. In response to this challenge, three philosophical views emerged: realism, nominalism and conceptualism. Where realists hold for the existence of independent abstract universals to account for attribute agreement, nominalists reject the existence of universals asserting that they are not necessary to explain attribute agreement. Conversely, conceptualists deny the independent existence of universals maintaining they only exist in the mind. Augustine, anticipating this, spoke of universals as existing in the mind of God. See: Aurelius Augustine, *Eighty-Three Different Questions*, trans. David L. Mosher in *The Fathers of the Church: A New Translation*, vol. 70 (Washington, DC: The Catholic University of America Press, 1982), 79f. It is not the intention of this study to enter this debate but to assume, for the sake of better illustrating a characteristic of world views, a more Augustinian view of color as universal forms existing in the mind of God. These universals are made know to humanity by illumination. See: Aurelius Augustine, *The Trinity*, trans. Stephan McKenna in *The Fathers of the Church: A New Translation*, vol. 45 (Washington, DC: The Catholic University of America Press, 1963), 366.

<sup>40</sup> Where Plato saw these forms or ideals as existing in the realm of ideas apart from the reality we experience, Aristotle understood forms or universals to subsist in the matter. In either case, whether read is a Platonic ideal or an Aristotelian hylomorphism, the analogy between the color red and world views demonstrate a kind of ontological dependency. It is not the intention of this study to enter this debate but to assume, for the sake of better illustrating a characteristic of world views, a more Augustinian view of color as universal forms existing in the mind of God. These universals are made know to humanity by illumination. See: Aurelius Augustine, *The Trinity*, trans. Stephan McKenna in *The Fathers of the Church: A New Translation*, vol. 45 (Washington, DC: The Catholic University of America Press, 1963), 366.

<sup>41</sup> The historical analysis of sacramental character is provided in Chapter Two.

<sup>42</sup> Lonergan by no means originates this awareness of “consciousness” or “world views” (which he use interchangeably). Its seeds can be found in the work of Immanuel Kant particularly in his *Critique of Judgment* in which he describes the importance of world views as expressed in the term, “*weltanschauun.*”

<sup>43</sup> Detailed accounts of Lonergan thought on this matter can be found in: Bernard J. Lonergan, S.J., “The Scope of Renewal,” in *Philosophical and Theological Papers: 1965–1980*, ed. Robert C. Croken and Robert M. Doran. Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan 17 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2004), 283–85. Bernard J. Lonergan, S.J., *Insight: A Study of Human Understanding*, rev. and aug. repr., ed. Frederick E. Crowe and Robert M. Doran, Collected Works of Bernard Lonergan 3 (London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1957; Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1990).

<sup>44</sup> Bernard J. Lonergan, S.J., “Theology in its New Context,” in *Ibid.*, 57-59.

<sup>45</sup> Bernard J. Lonergan, S.J., *Method in Theology* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1994), 326-327.

<sup>46</sup> Bernard J. Lonergan, S.J., *Understanding and Being*, 222.

<sup>47</sup> Bernard J. Lonergan, S.J., *Method in Theology*, 351.

<sup>48</sup> Bernard J. Lonergan, “Theology in Its Context,” in *Renewal of Religious Thought*, ed. L. K. Shook, *Theology of Renewal*, vol. 1 (New York: Herder and Herder, 1968), 34-46.

<sup>49</sup> Bernard J. Lonergan, S.J., “The Transition From a Classicist World-View to Historical Mindedness,” in *A Second Collection* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1996), 5-6.

<sup>50</sup> Bernard J. Lonergan, “The Transition from a Classicist World View to Historical-Mindedness,” 7-8. Lonergan would later characterize human consciousness as a “polyphony” because of its variety of distinct voices. Thus, while there are aspects of classical and historical consciousness that are mutually exclusive, there are also complementary aspects as well. “Religious Knowledge,” in *A Third Collection*, ed. Frederick E. Crowe (New York: Paulist Press, 1985), 132.

<sup>51</sup> David Tracy, *The Achievement of Bernard Lonergan* (New York: Herder and Herder, 1970), 207-208. David Bohr, *Catholic Moral Tradition* (Indiana: Our Sunday Visitor, 1999), 83.; John M Finnis,

“Historical Consciousness and Theological Foundation” in *Religion and Public Reason: Collected Essays* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), 140 ff.

<sup>52</sup> David Bohr, *Catholic Moral Tradition*, 83-87.

<sup>53</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>54</sup> For a clear and concise analysis of the images, symbols, motifs, metaphors, figures of speech, and literary patters of the Bible see: *Dictionary of Biblical Imagery*, eds.: Leland Ryken, James C. Wilhoit, Tremper Longman II, (Illinois: InterVarsity Press, 1998) xiv-xvii.

<sup>55</sup> Craig L. Blomberg, *Interpreting the Parables*, (Illinois: InterVarsity Press, 1990), 37.

<sup>56</sup> *Ibid.*, 45-46.

<sup>57</sup> Jean-Louis Aragon, “The Apocalypse,” in *The Jerome Biblical Commentary*, eds. Raymond E. Brown, Joseph A. Fitzmyer, Roland E. Murphy (New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, 1968) 467.

<sup>58</sup> James A. Kleis. ed., “The *Didache*,” in *Ancient Christian Writers* (New Jersey: Newman Press, 1948) 15-18.

<sup>59</sup> “Pastor of Hermas,” trans. F. Crombie, in *The Ante-Nicene Fathers: Translations of the Writings of the Fathers Down to A.D. 325*, ed. Alexander Roberts, vol. II, (Edinburgh: The Christian Literature Publishing Co., 1885). 49. “Pastor” of Hermas (lib. III, Simil., IX, cc. 6, 16, 17, 31).

<sup>60</sup> Prior to the Enlightenment and well after in Catholic thought, philosophy was so closely identified with metaphysics that it was often reduced to metaphysics. See: Benedict Ashley, *Thomism and the Transition from the Classical World-View to Historical-Mindedness*, in *The Future of Thomism*, Deal W. Hudson and Dennis W. Moran, eds. (Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1992), 112-114. In European Protestant circles this overemphasis produced a reaction which provoked, “recurrent waves of metaphysics and anti-metaphysics” (130). See: Fredrick Copeston, S.J., *The Nature of Metaphysics in On the History of Philosophy and Other Essays* (New York: Barnes and Noble/Harper and Row, 1979), 116-130.

<sup>61</sup> Symbolic consciousness is not universally accepted as a particular world view. Some may suggest that it is merely a synthesis of classical and historical consciousness. While there is truth to this, the

synthesis, by virtue that it is a synthesis, represents a *tertium quid* and, as such, a world view distinct and separate from its two derivatives.

<sup>62</sup> *Catechism of the Catholic Church*, 1131. In the singular case of the Eucharist, as expressed in the doctrine of the Real Presence, the symbol of bread and wine (the accidents) are so fundamentally “connected” to the deeper reality of Christ’s presence (the substance) that the symbol not simply points to this reality, but participates in it such that Jesus is really present, Body, Blood, Soul, and Divinity. *Catechism of the Catholic Church*, 1373 – 1377.

<sup>63</sup> *Catechism of the Catholic Church*, 390.

<sup>64</sup> David Bohr, *Catholic Moral Tradition*, 83. Cf.: Joseph Ratzinger, *Introduction to Christianity* (New York: Herder and Herder, 1970), 38.

## Chapter Two

<sup>1</sup> The approach here will be familiar to anyone acquainted with the nature of a human act (*actus humanus*) within the Catholic moral tradition. Points A, B, C, and D are instrumental ends/goods with point E being our final end/good.

<sup>2</sup> Congregation for Catholic Education, *Basic Norms for the Formation of Deacons*, (Boston: Pauline Books & Media, 1998), 10.

<sup>3</sup> John Laux, *Church History* (Illinois: Tan Books and Publisher, 1989), 73-74.

<sup>4</sup> Andrew Louth, ed. *Eusebius of Casarea, The History of the Church from Christ to Constantine* (New York: Dorset Press, 1965), book VII, chapters 2:4-5. This is also cited by Lactantius, *De Mortibus Persecutorum*, book XII.

<sup>5</sup> The structure of the Roman tetrarchy, which ironically enough was conceived and implemented by Diocletian himself, meant that the persecution was limited to his territory in the east, along with Maximian in Italy. Constantius Chlorus continued to extend toleration to the Christians under his jurisdiction. See: Charles Merivale, *General History of Rome* (New York: Harper Brothers, 1886), 579.; E. Glenn Hinson, *The Church Triumphant: A History of Christianity up to 1300* (Georgia: Mercer University Press, 1995), 96.

<sup>6</sup> Thomas Bokenkotter, *A Concise History of the Catholic Church* (New York: Image Press, 1979), 49.

<sup>7</sup> The persecution had such an impact on Christians that the Church of Alexandria used the beginning of Diocletian’s reign (284) as the period for their Era of Martyrs. Among those martyred were: Pope Marcellinus, Philomena, Sebastian, Afra, Lucy, Erasmus of Formiae, Florian, George, Agnes, Cessianus, and Saint Dujam.

<sup>8</sup> This word “*traditor*” became a technical expression to designate those who had given up the Scriptures. Eventually it was applied to those turned over sacred vessels and even other Christians.

<sup>9</sup> Tertullian, *The Writings Of Tertullian: Ante Nicene Christian Library Translations Of The Writings Of The Fathers Down To Ad 325*, 1872, ed. Alexander Roberts (Edinburgh: T. and T. Clark, 1972), 213-57. I, III, IV, V, VIII, IX, XII, XIII.

<sup>10</sup> Augustine, *Christian Doctrine*, trans. Marcus Dods, in *A Select Library of the Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers of the Christian Church*, ed. Philip Schaff, vol. II (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans Publishing Co., 1979), 519-57. III, 9.13.

<sup>11</sup> *Ibid*, *City of God*, 183. V. 5.

<sup>12</sup> Augustine, “On Baptism,” trans. Marcus Dods, in *A Select Library of the Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers of the Christian Church*, ed. Philip Schaff, vol. IV (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans Publishing Co., 1979), I.1.

<sup>13</sup> Gerhard Kittel and Gerhard Friedrich, eds. “*χαρακτη*,” in *Theological Dictionary of the New Testament*, trans. Geoffrey W. Bromiley (Grand Rapids: W.B. Eerdmans, 1985). Hebrews uses this term to describe Christ as, “He reflects the glory of God and bears the very stamp (*charassein*) of his nature (Hb. 1:3).”

<sup>14</sup> Augustine, “Against Parmenian,” trans. Marcus Dods, in *A Select Library of the Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers of the Christian Church*, ed. Philip Schaff, vol. I (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans Publishing Co., 1979), II.13.28.

<sup>15</sup> Although popularly attributed to Augustine, he never actually used the phrase “*ex opere operato*.” It was used for the first time by Peter of Poitiers (d. 1205 A.D.), and later by Innocent III (d. 1216

A.D.; de myst. missae, III, v), and by St. Thomas (d. 1274 A.D.; IV Sent., dist. 1, Q.i, a.5).

<sup>16</sup> While Augustine acknowledges this character even when baptism is administered by the Donatists, he is quick to distinguish between validity and efficacy. Schismatics can validly confect Baptism, however its effect (in this case the forgiveness of sins) is withheld until they return to the Church.

<sup>17</sup> Augustine, "Epistle 185," in *The Fathers of the Church, Vol IV* (New York: Parson's, 1955), 164.

<sup>18</sup> Clement, "Second Epistle of Clement to the Corinthians," accessed September 3, 2012, <http://www.earlychristianwritings.com/2clement.html> VII. Although this letter is commonly attributed to Clement, its actual authorship is unknown.

<sup>19</sup> Hermas, "Pastor of Hermas," trans. F. Crombie, in *The Ante-Nicene Fathers: Translations of the Writings of the Fathers Down to A.D. 325*, ed. Alexander Roberts, vol. II, *Fathers of the Second Century* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1903), 49. III, 9, 16.

<sup>20</sup> Clement of Alexandria, "Excerpta Ex Theodoto," in *Studies and Documents*, trans. Robert Pierce Casey (London: Kirsopp and Silva Lake, 1934), 86. *Excerpta Ex Theodoto* is a collection of notes made by Clement of Alexandria concerning the teachings of the Valentinian Theodotus.

<sup>21</sup> Hippolytus, *De Christo et Antichristo*, 6.

<sup>22</sup> Cyril of Jerusalem, "The Catechetical Lectures of S. Cyril, Archbishop of Jerusalem," in *A Select Library of the Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers of the Christian Church*, ed. Philip Schaff, II, vol. VII (Edinburgh: T&T Clark Ltd., 1893), 6.

<sup>23</sup> For a general discussion see: Northrop Frye, *The Great Code: The Bible and Literature* (Florida: Harcourt Inc., 1982), 49-83; Francis M. Young, *Biblical Exegesis and Formation of Christian Culture* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 154-55.

<sup>24</sup> Many of the earlier Greek philosophers were troubled by the apparent immoral of their gods. In order to "save" the gods from these charges, they decided that their depravity must be hiding deeper truths beneath their dubious exteriors. Ernst Robert Curtius wrote that the allegorizing of myth, "was in harmony with one of the basic

characteristics of Greek religious thought: the belief that the gods express themselves in cryptic form - in oracles, in mysteries." Ernst Robert Curtius, *European Literature and the Latin Middle Ages*, trans. Willard R. Trask, (New York: Harper, 1963), 205.

<sup>25</sup> The rabbinical approach, known as allegorism, was established by Philo of Alexandria (d. 50 A.D.) who used allegory in an attempt to harmonize Greek and Jewish philosophy.

<sup>26</sup> Henri de Lubac (d. 1991) argued against those who attributed "allegorical interpretation" to the influence of Greek philosophy on the Fathers. He points to St. Paul in his Letter to the Hebrews and other New Testament writers. See: "Hellenistic Allegory and Christian Allegory," in *Theological Fragments* (San Francisco: Ignatius, 1989), 165-6. While this is a valid observation, it is believed that Paul, as a Hellenized Jew, would have been classically trained and, as such, been exposed to Greek philosophy.

<sup>27</sup> Philip Schaff, "History of the Christian Church," vol.II, *Ante-Nicene Christianity, A.D. 100-325*, (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons 1883), 790.

<sup>28</sup> Cicero, *De Oratore*, ed. and trans. H. Rackham (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1948), book 9, chap. 2, section 46.

<sup>29</sup> Philip Cary, *Outward Signs: The Powerlessness of External Things in Augustine's Thought* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 48.

<sup>30</sup> M.J. Ryan, "Character" in *The Catholic Encyclopedia* (New York: Robert Appleton Company, 1908), accessed September 3, 2012, <http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/03586a.htm>.

<sup>31</sup> Hugh of St. Victor, *De Sacramentis Christianae Fidei*, trans. Roy J. DeFarrari (Cambridge: The Medieval Academy of America, 1951), I. 9, 2.

<sup>32</sup> Ibid.

<sup>33</sup> *Sententiarum Quatuor Libri*, b. 4, d. 1, c.7.

<sup>34</sup> Ibid., d.1, c.2.

<sup>35</sup> Ibid., d.53.

<sup>36</sup> Ibid., d. 24, c. 13.

<sup>37</sup> A commentary on the Sentences was the required work for anyone wanting to obtain the doctorate in theology during that period.

<sup>38</sup> Augustine, "On the Holy Trinity," trans. Arthur West Haddan, in *A Select Library of the Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers of the Christian Church*, ed. Philip Schaff, vol. III (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans Publishing Co., 1978), 217-20. XV, 19.

<sup>39</sup> St. Bonaventure of Bagnoregio, *Commentaria in Quattuor Libros Sententiarum, Liber IV Sententiarum*, dist. 1, pars 1, art. 1, q. 4, contra, pp. 24.

<sup>40</sup> These distinctions, while separate are nonetheless interconnected. As noted by Michael Dauphinais, "The three are related through the *res et sacramentum*, which is the *res* (reality) signified by the *sacramentum tantum*, while also being simultaneously the sacramental sign of the *res tantum*: thus, it is both the reality and the sign. Applied to the sacrament of Holy Orders, sacramental character (*res et sacramentum*) is the reality signified by the laying on of hands and the prescribed prayer (*sacramentum tantum*) while also being simultaneously the sacramental sign (*res tantum*) which the grace to perform the office and lead a life befitting it. See: Michael Dauphinais, "Christ and the Metaphysic of Baptism in the *Summa*," in *Rediscovering Aquinas and the Sacraments: Studies in Sacramental Theology*, eds. Michael Dauphinais and Matthew Levering, (Chicago: Liturgical Training Publications, 2009) 18.

<sup>41</sup> *Summa Theologica IIIa*, q. 60, art. 1.

<sup>42</sup> *Ibid.*, IIIa, q. 34, art. 4-5.

<sup>43</sup> *Ibid.*, IIIa, q. 62, art. 1.

<sup>44</sup> *Ibid.*, IIIa, q. 62, art. 2.

<sup>45</sup> *Ibid.*, III, q. 63, art. 1-6.

<sup>46</sup> *Ibid.*, III, q. 63, art. 1.

<sup>47</sup> *Ibid.*, III, q. 63, art. 3.

<sup>48</sup> Thomas introduces the term "configuration" a derivative from the term "figure" taken from Hb 1:3. *Ibid.* III, q. 63, art. 1.

<sup>49</sup> *Summa Theologica*, III, q. 63, art. 5.

<sup>50</sup> Although it is one sacrament, Holy Orders is dispensed in three degrees. The receiving of a second or third degree, as in the case of a deacon being ordained a priest or a priest being ordained a bishop, does not constitute the reception of the sacrament a second or third time. It is merely a reception of a second or third degree and a new level of participation in the priesthood of Christ.

<sup>51</sup> *Summa Theologica*, III, q. 63, art. 6.

<sup>52</sup> *Ibid.*, IV, q. 35, art. 2.

<sup>53</sup> Norman Tanner ed., *Decrees of the Ecumenical Council*, vol. 4. (London: Sheed and Ward, 1990), 542.

<sup>54</sup> Martin Luther, "Lectures on Romans," in *Luther's Works*, ed., Jaroslav Pelikan (St. Louis: Concordia, 1972), 234-35.

<sup>55</sup> *Ibid.* 143-144.

<sup>56</sup> Martin Luther, "Concerning Ministry," in *Luther's Works*, ed., Jaroslav Pelikan (St. Louis: Concordia, 1958), 19.

<sup>57</sup> John Calvin, *Institutes of the Christian Religion* (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans Publishing Co, 1845), book 4, parts 22-33.

<sup>58</sup> Charles Hodges, *Systematic Theology*, vol. III (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans Publishing Co, 1940), 358; David Bagchi ed., *The Cambridge Companion to Reformation Theology* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 87-88.

<sup>59</sup> Henry VIII, King of England, "Excerpt from *Assertio Septem Sacramentorum*," in *English History in the Making*, vol I. William Sachse, ed. (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1967).

<sup>60</sup> It is generally accepted by historians that Henry's role was minimal in the writing of the *Defense of the Seven Sacraments*. Two of its major contributors were St. Thomas More and St. John Fisher both of whom would be martyred in the Tower of London by Henry in 1535.

<sup>61</sup> According to Canon Law at that time, the pope could not issue a decree of nullity on the basis of a canonical impediment previously dispensed. Henry had previously received a papal dispensation to marry Catherine who was his cousin.

<sup>62</sup> G. R. Elton, *The Tudor Constitution: Second Edition* (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1982), 364-5.

<sup>63</sup> "Articles of Religion" in, *Book of Common Prayer* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1979), article XXV.

<sup>64</sup> Council of Trent (Sess. VII, can. ix), July 15, 1563; (Sess. XXIII, can. iv), March 3, 1562.

<sup>65</sup> Council of Trent (Sess. XVIII), February 26, 1562.

<sup>66</sup> Council of Trent (Sess XXIV, "De Ref.," c. vii), November 11, 1563.

<sup>67</sup> *The Catechism of the Council of Trent*, 1566, trans. John McHugh and Charles J. Callan (Rockville: Tan Books, 1982), 159, 337.

<sup>68</sup> *Ibid.*, 328.

<sup>69</sup> Joseph Hornef, "The Genesis and Growth of the Proposal," in *Foundations for the Renewal of the Diaconate*, ed. Bishops Committee on the Permanent Diaconate (Washington D.C.: National Conference of Catholic Bishops, 1961), 6.

<sup>70</sup> Although some consideration was given by Trent to optional celibacy for minor orders, in the end, there was concern that the Reformers might believe that the Catholic Church was beginning to yield ground on the question of clerical celibacy. As a result, everything remained as it was before.

<sup>71</sup> G. Von Mann, "Der Cariasdiakonat und seine Erneuerung," in Caritas (Freiburg, Germany, July/August 1936). Hanns Schuetz. "Diakonie der Liebe" in Caritas (Freiburg, Germany, July/August 1936).

<sup>72</sup> Paul Berben, *Dauchau, 1933-1945: The Official History* (London: Norfolk Press, 1975).

<sup>73</sup> George Anderson, *With Christ in Prison: Jesuits in Jail from St. Ignatius to the Present* (New York: Fordham University Press, 2000).

<sup>74</sup> Wilholm Schamoni, "Cellblock 26: Experiences of the Priestly Life in Dachau," in *Stimmen der Zeit* (October 1947), quoted in homily by Most Reverend Harry J. Flynn, "I Have Not Come to Be Served, but to Serve: A Reflection on 25 Years of the Ministry of the Diaconate in the Archdiocese of Saint Paul and Minneapolis 1989," accessed September 3, 2012, [http://www.archspm.org/html/pastoral\\_1.html](http://www.archspm.org/html/pastoral_1.html).

<sup>75</sup> Joseph Hornef, "The Genesis and Growth of the Proposal," in *Foundations for the Renewal of the Diaconate*, ed. Bishops Committee on the Permanent Diaconate (Washington D.C.: National Conference of Catholic Bishops, 1961), 10-11.

<sup>76</sup> This would be the first of many such "Circles" in Germany. Kramer would be one of the first deacons ordained after the Second Vatican Council restored of the diaconate.

<sup>77</sup> Joseph Hornef, "The Order of the Diaconate in the Roman Catholic Church," in *The Diaconate Now*, ed. Richard Nolan (New York: Corpus Books, 1968).

<sup>78</sup> Wilholm Schamoni, *Married Men as Ordained Deacons* (London: Barns & Oats, 1955).

<sup>79</sup> Committee on the Permanent Diaconate in Canada, "Guidelines of the Episcopal Committee on the Permanent Diaconate," (Ottawa, Canada: Canadian Conference of Catholic Bishops, 1967), 5-6.

<sup>80</sup> Pius XII, "Quelques Aspects Fondamentaux de L'apostolat Des Laics," in *Acta Apostolicae Sedis*, Vol. 49 (1957), 924-25.

<sup>81</sup> Karl Rahner, ed., *Diaconia in Christo; Über die Erneuerung Des Diakonates* (Freiburg am Breisgau: Bese Wien, 1962).

<sup>82</sup> Karl Rahner, "The Theology of the Diaconate," in *Foundations for the Renewal of the Diaconate*, ed. Bishops Committee on the Permanent Diaconate (Washington D.C.: National Conference of Catholic Bishops, 1993), 139-81. The original article appeared in: Karl Rahner "The Theology of the Restoration of the Diaconate," *Theological Investigations V* (1966): 268-314. Although no specific publishing date was provided for the article in either source, the fact it anticipates the Council decision on the diaconate would evidence that it was originally written just prior to the Council.

<sup>83</sup> Deacon Circle, "Formal Request to Restore the Diaconate as a Permanent Order," in *Sacrament of Service*, Appendix II, Patrick McCaslin and Michael Lawler, (New York: Paulist Press, 1986), 146.

<sup>84</sup> Cardinal Leo Josef Suenens, *Coreponsibility in the Church* (New York: Herder and Herder, 1968), 155.

<sup>85</sup> Xavier Rynne, *The Second Session; the Debates and Decrees of Vatican Council II: September 29 to December 4, 1963* (New York: Farrar, Straus and Company, 1964), 99-100.

<sup>86</sup> Milton Bracker, "Spellman Opposes Council Suggestion on Lay Deacons," *New York Times* (New York), October 5 1963, 1.

<sup>87</sup> Cardinal Leo Josef Suenens, "The Theology of the Diaconate," in *Council Speeches of Vatican II*, ed. Hans Küng, Yves Congar and Daniel O'Hanlon (New Jersey: Paulist Press, 1964), 105.

<sup>88</sup> *Ibid.*, 104.

<sup>89</sup> For a full account see: Gerard Philips, "History of the Constitution," *Commentary on the Documents of Vatican II*, 5 vols. (New York: Herder and Herder, 1967-1969) 116-130.

<sup>90</sup> *Lumen Gentium* 29.

<sup>91</sup> *Ad Gentes* 16.

<sup>92</sup> The assumption here by most observers at the time was that *Lumen Gentium* 29 was a response to the shortage of priests in certain regions of the world. This perception was derived from the conciliar discussion by bishops of the third-world.

<sup>93</sup> *Humanae salutis*, AAS 54 (1962) 5-13.

<sup>94</sup> James C. O'Neill's report in *Council Daybook: Vatican II - Session 2*, ed. Floyd Anderson (Washington, D.C.: National Catholic Welfare Conference, 1965), 104-5.

<sup>95</sup> *Catechism of the Catholic Church*, 1558, 1563, 1570.

<sup>96</sup> *Pope Paul VI, Sacrum Diaconatus Ordinem*, Introduction.

<sup>97</sup> *Codex Iuris Canonici*, can. 1009 '1.

<sup>98</sup> Congregation for the Clergy, *Direcorium Pro Ministerio et Vita Diaconorum Permanentium* (Boston: Pauline Books and Media, 1998) par. 45.

<sup>99</sup> *Catechism of the Catholic Church*, 1570.

<sup>100</sup> *Summa Theologica* III, q. 63, art. 3.

<sup>101</sup> Congregation for the Clergy, *Directory on the Ministry and Life of Priests* (Boston: St. Paul Books, 1994) 5.

### Chapter Three

<sup>1</sup> This philosophical approach, which sees personhood as the supreme value, in no way conflicts with a Catholic theological approach. Because God is a Trinity of Persons, and because humanity is created in His image as persons, Personalism, properly qualified, can complement and enhance an approach rooted in the Catholic theological tradition.

<sup>2</sup> In 1947, the French philosopher Jacques Maritain quipped that there are at minimum of a dozen personalist doctrines, which at times have nothing more in common than the word "person."

<sup>3</sup> *Fides et Ratio* 65.

<sup>4</sup> Thomas Aquinas, *Commentary on Boethius' De Trinitate*, I.2.3, accessed November 2012 at <http://dhspriority.org/thomas/BoethiusDeTr.htm#23>.

<sup>5</sup> Christopher West, *Theology of the Body Explained*, (Boston: Pauline Books and Media, 2003), 44.

<sup>6</sup> This distinction originates with Augustine, "*Aliud sunt ea, quae creduntur, aliud fides qua creduntur.*" (*De Trinitate*, XIII, 2. 5).

<sup>7</sup> Rocco Buttiglione: Karol Wojtyła: *The Thought of the Man Who Became Pope John Paul II* (Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 1997), 354.

<sup>8</sup> Jerry Kalinowski, *La Philosophie a L'heure Du Concile* (Paris: Société d'Éditions Internationales, 1965), 147.

<sup>9</sup> In his 1914 Motu Proprio entitled, *Doctoris Angelici*, Pope Pius X required that all philosophical programs should teach the principles of St. Thomas and that the *Summa Theologica* be used as a major textbook in Catholic academic institutions and seminaries.

<sup>10</sup> George Williams, *The Mind of John Paul II* (New York: Seabury Press, 1981), 96.

<sup>11</sup> Etienne Gilson, *Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas*, 1937, trans. Edward Bullough, ed. G. A. Elrington, (New York: Books for Libraries Press, 1971).

<sup>12</sup> Thomas Aquinas, *On Being and Essence*, 1252-1256, trans. Armand Augustine Maurer (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1949).

<sup>13</sup> Jaroslaw Kupczak, *Destined for Liberty: The Human Person in the Philosophy of Karol Wojtyła/John Paul II* (Washington D.C.: Catholic University Press, 2000), 48.

<sup>14</sup> This is not to be confused with the existentialism advanced by the French philosopher Jean-Paul Sartre in his 1946 work *Existentialism is a Humanism*.

<sup>15</sup> John Locke, *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, 1690, ed. Raymond Wilburn, Abridged (New York: Dutton, 1947).

<sup>16</sup> Immanuel Kant, *Opus Postumum*, ed. and trans. Eckart Forster, Cambridge (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1993).

<sup>17</sup> George Weigel, *Witness to Hope* (New York: Harper Collins Pub., 1999), 131-32.

<sup>18</sup> Jaroslaw Kupczak, *Destined for Liberty: The Human Person in the Philosophy of Karol Wojtyła/John Paul II*, 52.

<sup>19</sup> Piotr Jaroszynski, *A Brief Overview of Lublin Thomism*. (<http://www.hyoomik.com/lublin/jarosz1.html>, 1999).

<sup>20</sup> By modifying Husserl's notion of intentionality in the context of phenomenological realism, Wojtyla was able to avoid the ontological idealism which the later characterized Husserl's thought. Cf.: Hans Köchler, "The Phenomenology of Karol Wojtya: On the Problem of the Phenomenological Foundation of Anthropology," in: *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research*, Vol. 42 (1982), pp. 326-334.

<sup>21</sup> Jaroslaw Kupczak, *Destined for Liberty: The Human Person in the Philosophy of Karol Wojtyla/John Paul II*, 2.

<sup>22</sup> Mieczyslaw Malinski, *Pope John Paul II: The Life of Karol Wojtyla* (New York: Seabury Press, 1979), 159; George Huntston Williams, *The Mind of John Paul II: Origins of His Thought and Action* (New York: Seabury Press, 1981), 86-87.

<sup>23</sup> At the time Wojtyla studied in Rome, there was a requirement among pontifical universities that, before awarding a doctorate, students had to publish their dissertation. Because he could not afford to do this, he later submitted his dissertation to the Jagellonian University. After faculty review, he was granted a doctorate in theology in 1948.

<sup>24</sup> Ibid., 116.

<sup>25</sup> Ibid., 135-136.

<sup>26</sup> Jaroslaw Kupczak, *Destined for Liberty: The Human Person in the Philosophy of Karol Wojtyla/John Paul II*, 59.

<sup>27</sup> For a concise analysis of why Wojtyla did not consider himself a phenomenologist cf.: Andrew Woznicki, *A Christian Humanist: Karol Wojtyla's Existential Personalism* (Connecticut: Mariel Publications, 1980), 19-22.

<sup>28</sup> George Weigel, *Witness to Hope*. 129.

<sup>29</sup> Karol Wojtyla, "The Problem of the Will in the Analysis of the Ethical Act," in *Karol Wojtyla, Person and Community: Selected Essays*, trans. Theresa Sandok, OSM (New York: Peter Lang, 1993), 20.

<sup>30</sup> Pope John Paul II, *Crossing the Threshold of Hope* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf Inc. 1994) 38.

<sup>31</sup> Karol Wojtyla, "Thomistic Personalism," *Person and Community: Selected Essays*, 70.

<sup>32</sup> Karol Wojtyla, "Thomistic Personalism," *Person and Community: Selected Essays*, 170.

<sup>33</sup> Michael Walsh, ed., *Butler's Lives of the Saints: Concise Edition* (New York: HarperCollins, 1991), 29-30.

<sup>34</sup> Karol Wojtyla, *Love and Responsibility* (New York: Farrar, Straus and Company, 1995), 168.

<sup>35</sup> Ibid., 179.

<sup>36</sup> In all fairness, it would be anachronistic to too harshly criticize Thomism for its lacking. Wojtyla does not do this. Thomas and those who would follow him were bound up in a classical world view. Because of this, they were unable to grasp the relevance of subjective dimension of human experience. They were living in their time using the philosophical tools of their time. In this respect, we can appreciate their particular contributions without holding them accountable to insights not yet available.

<sup>37</sup> Karol Wojtyla, *The Acting Person*, ed. by Anna-Teresa Tymieniecka, trans. by Andrzej Potocki (Dordrecht, Holland: D. Reidel Publishing Company, 1979), 3.

<sup>38</sup> George Williams, *The Mind of John Paul II*, 147.

<sup>39</sup> John Avery Dulles, *John Paul and the Mystery of the Human Person*, America, Feb 2, 2004, 10.

<sup>40</sup> Ibid., 165.

<sup>41</sup> Ibid., 170.

<sup>42</sup> Ibid.

<sup>43</sup> Thomas D. Williams, "What is Thomistic Personalism?" *Alpha Omega* VII, no. 2 (2004): 164.

<sup>44</sup> Henri de Lubac, *At the Service of the Church* (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1993), 171-72.

<sup>45</sup> George Weigel, *Witness to Hope*. 174.

<sup>46</sup> Ibid.

<sup>47</sup> In the presentation of these themes it will only be necessary to present them in a general manner and not to plumb their depths. Though tempting, this will easily divert the direction of this investigation away from its intended end. Still, a general presentation will be sufficient to enable the reader to grasp Wojtyla insights and demonstrate their legitimate applicability to this study.

<sup>48</sup> Although it is beyond the scope of this investigation, a critique of the strength and weakness of Wojtyła's thought can be found in: Jaroslaw Kupczak, *Destined for Liberty: The Human Person in the Philosophy of Karol Wojtyła/John Paul II*, 76-81.

<sup>49</sup> Karol Wojtyła, Subjectivity and the Irreducible in the Human Being in *Person and Community: Selected Essays*, 209-210.

<sup>50</sup> Karol Wojtyła, *The Acting Person*, chapter 1, page 8.

<sup>51</sup> Karol Wojtyła, Subjectivity and the Irreducible in the Human Being in *Person and Community: Selected Essays*, 213.

<sup>52</sup> Karol Wojtyła, *The Acting Person*, chapter 1, page 1.

<sup>53</sup> Karol Wojtyła, The Person: Subject and Community in *Person and Community: Selected Essays*, 221.

<sup>54</sup> Karol Wojtyła, Subjectivity and the Irreducible in the Human Being in *Person and Community: Selected Essays*, 210.

<sup>55</sup> Consciousness is understood here not in the sense of a world view as previously discussed, but as a state of self-awareness.

<sup>56</sup> Karol Wojtyła, *The Acting Person*, chapter 2, page 1.

<sup>57</sup> Karol Wojtyła, Subjectivity and the Irreducible in the Human Being in *Person and Community: Selected Essays*, 215.

<sup>58</sup> Ibid., 213.

<sup>59</sup> Ibid., 214.

<sup>60</sup> Karol Wojtyła, *Love and Responsibility* (New York: Farrar, Straus and Company, 1995), 22.

<sup>61</sup> Jaques Maritain, *The Person and the Common Good* (Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1985), 41.

<sup>62</sup> Karol Wojtyła, *Love and Responsibility*, 23.

<sup>63</sup> Ibid.

<sup>64</sup> Karol Wojtyła, The Person: Subject and Community in *Person and Community: Selected Essays*, 221.

<sup>65</sup> The "I(s)" are understood here as the plural of the pronoun "I." It is used instead of the form "we" to philosophically emphasize a union of unique individuals.

<sup>66</sup> In his *Between Man and Man*, Buber categorizes the modes of consciousness, interaction, and being through which a persons engages with other persons and material objects. Of interest here is the distinction he makes between "I-Thou" (*Ich-Du*) and "I-it" (*Ich-Es*). The

difference between these two relationships is not the nature of the objects which relate to one another, but the manner in which they relate. Thus, for example, a person who acts in a depersonalized manner to another exhibits an "I-it" relationship as his actions treat the other as a thing. Though Wojtyła makes this same distinction, he does not use this terminology. Cf.: Martin Buber, *Between Man and Man*, trans. Ronald Gregor-Smith (New York: Routledge, 2002) 256- 257.

<sup>67</sup> Karol Wojtyła, The Person: Subject and Community in *Person and Community: Selected Essays*, 245.

<sup>68</sup> Ibid. 247.

<sup>69</sup> Colin B. Donovan, "The Thought of Pope John Paul II," *Tu Es Petrus*" (<http://www.ewtn.com/jp2/papal3/thought.htm>, 2006)..

<sup>70</sup> Karol Wojtyła, Subjectivity and the Irreducible in the Human Being in *Person and Community: Selected Essays*, 213.

<sup>71</sup> Hans Urs von Balthasar, "On the Concept of Person," *Communio: International Catholic Review* 13 (Spring 86 1986): 18.

<sup>72</sup> Thomas D. Williams, "What is Thomistic Personalism?" 181.

<sup>73</sup> John F Crosby, *The Selfhood of the Human Person* (Washington D.C.: Catholic University Press, 1996), 50. Crosby speaks of incommunicability as a type of scale where God is the Supreme Incommunicability and things like newspapers are the weakest incommunicability. As one ascends the scale of being, incommunicability becomes stronger. Ibid., 43.

<sup>74</sup> Karol Wojtyła, *Love and Responsibility*, 24.

<sup>75</sup> Although Wojtyła develops his understanding of love within the context of marriage, certain universals can be gleaned from this and applied to all interpersonal relationships. What will be considered here are only those universals.

<sup>76</sup> Also presupposed here is the metaphysical anthropology of St. Thomas Aquinas.

<sup>77</sup> Note that this end is really a proximate end as cutting down a tree is not done for its own sake but for the sake of something else such as to clear land or obtain firewood. These would be considered the remote end of the act as opposed to the use of the ax which is the proximate end. However, it suffices for our purposes merely to describe, in simple terms, the relationship between the means and the ends.

<sup>78</sup> In his second formulation of the moral imperative, Kant states that the person is: “the basis of all maxims of action” and “must be treated never as a mere means but as the supreme limiting condition in the use of all means, i.e., as an end at the same time.” Immanuel Kant, *Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals*, trans. Lewis White Beck, ed. Robert Paul Wolff (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1969), 437B8.

<sup>79</sup> Karol Wojtyła, *Love and Responsibility*, 27.

<sup>80</sup> Ibid. 26.

<sup>81</sup> Ibid. 28-29.

<sup>82</sup> Ibid. 30.

<sup>83</sup> Although Wojtyła is working solely within a philosophical framework, implicit in his thought is concupiscence or the tendency to sin as a result of a fallen yet redeemed human nature. It is this tendency to “use” the other that love diminishes and overcomes.

<sup>84</sup> Karol Wojtyła, *Love and Responsibility*, 30.

<sup>85</sup> Ibid. 34.

<sup>86</sup> Jeremy Bentham, “Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation,” in *A Collected Works by Jeremy Bentham*, eds. J. H. Burns and H. L. Hart (London, Oxford University Press, 1996), 11.

<sup>87</sup> John Stuart Mill, *Utilitarianism* (London: Longman, Green, Roberts, Longman and Green, 1864), 1-10.

<sup>88</sup> The *principle of extent* is also known as the *principle of proportionality*. It is this third principle that differentiates utilitarianism from pure hedonism. Where hedonism determines the moral quality of an act based solely on increasing the pleasure of the agent making the choice, utilitarianism determines the moral quality of an act based on the maximum the good (pleasure) for the greatest number.

<sup>89</sup> Karol Wojtyła, *Love and Responsibility*, 36. Here Wojtyła also expresses concern over the *consequentialist principle* which attempts to determine and quantify pleasure and pain prior to the act. This, he argues, is impossible to anticipate with any real degree of accuracy.

<sup>90</sup> Ibid. 37.

<sup>91</sup> Ibid. 42.

<sup>92</sup> Ibid. 123.

<sup>93</sup> Ibid. 126-127.

<sup>94</sup> The *Theology of the Body* can be, for those unfamiliar with John Paul’s phenomenological approach, challenging. A more accessible explanation of his work can be found in: Christopher West, *Theology of the Body Explained* (Boston: Pauline Books and Media, 1994).

<sup>95</sup> *Novo Millennio Ineunte*, 23.

<sup>96</sup> Pope John Paul, *Theology of the Body* (Boston: Pauline Books and Media, 1997) 175.

<sup>97</sup> Papal biographer George Weigel describes the *Theology of the Body* as, “one of the boldest reconfigurations of Catholic theology in centuries.” It is, he explains, “a kind of theological time bomb set to go off with dramatic consequences, sometime in the third millennium of the Church.” Weigel maintains that *Theology of the Body* has barely begun to “shape the Church’s theology, preaching, and religious education,” nonetheless when it does, “it will compel a dramatic development of thinking about virtually every major theme in the Creed.” George Weigel, *Witness to Hope* (New York: HarperCollins, 1999), 336, 343, 853.

<sup>98</sup> *Gaudium et Spes* 24.

<sup>99</sup> Pope John Paul, *Theology of the Body*, 63-66.

<sup>100</sup> *Summa Theologica*, I-II, q. 26, a. 4.

<sup>101</sup> Pope John Paul, *Theology of the Body*, 65.

<sup>102</sup> Ibid., 63.

<sup>103</sup> Ibid., 71.

<sup>104</sup> Ibid., 65.

<sup>105</sup> *Catechism of the Catholic Church*, 757, 772, 796, 808, 823, 867, 1089.

<sup>106</sup> Pope John Paul, *Theology of the Body*, 331.

<sup>107</sup> Pope John Paul II, *Letters to the Families*, n.19.

<sup>108</sup> While the nuptial meaning is most fully expressed in the total gift-of-self found exclusively in spousal love, all love participates in God’s love to a greater or lesser degree.

<sup>109</sup> Pope John Paul, *Theology of the Body*, 330.

<sup>110</sup> *Catechism of the Catholic Church*, 35.

<sup>111</sup> Ibid., 1131.

<sup>112</sup> Pope John Paul, *Theology of the Body*, 60-63.

<sup>113</sup> *Catechism of the Catholic Church*, 458, 460.

<sup>114</sup> This occurs most fully in spousal love, though other forms of love certainly share in God's divine love. Humanity is created in the image of God (male and female) and the complementarity of the genders reflects the eternal exchange of love within the Trinity like no other image. Pope John Paul, *Theology of the Body*, 45-48.

<sup>115</sup> *Ibid.*, 76.

## Chapter Four

<sup>1</sup> International Theological Commission, *From the Diakonia of Christ to the Diakonia of the Apostles*, 91.

<sup>2</sup> Council of Trent, Canons on the Sacraments in General, Session 7, Canon 1, (March 3, 1547).

<sup>3</sup> Congregation for Catholic Education, *Basic Norms of the Formation of Permanent Deacons* (Vatican City: Libreria Editrice Vaticana, 1998), #4-5.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>5</sup> *Summa Theologica* III, qq. 34-40.

<sup>6</sup> Aristotle, *De Anima*, trans. J.A. Smith (London: Oxford University Press, 1966), b. II.; The term "proof" as it is used here is not understood in the empirical sense, but in the reasonableness of its existence.

<sup>7</sup> Karol Wojtyła, The Person: Subject and Community in *Person and Community: Selected Essays*, 221.

<sup>8</sup> Consciousness is understood here not in the sense of a world view as previously discussed, but as a state of self-awareness.

<sup>9</sup> Karol Wojtyła, Subjectivity and the Irreducible in the Human Being in *Person and Community: Selected Essays*, 215.

<sup>10</sup> Pope John Paul II, *Deacons Are Configured to Christ the Servant*, Address to Those Taking Part in the Plenary Assembly of the Congregation for the Clergy, November 30, 1995.

<sup>11</sup> James Monroe Barnett, *The Diaconate: A Full and Equal Order* (Valley Forge, Pennsylvania: Trinity Press International, 1995), 132.

<sup>12</sup> Karol Wojtyła, *Love and Responsibility* (New York: Farrar, Straus and Company, 1995), 25-30.

<sup>13</sup> Pope Francis, Homily on Priestly Ordination (Vatican City: [http://www.vatican.va/holy\\_father/francesco/homilies/2013/documents/papa-francesco\\_20130421\\_omelia-ordinazione-presbiterale\\_en.html](http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/francesco/homilies/2013/documents/papa-francesco_20130421_omelia-ordinazione-presbiterale_en.html), April 21, 2013).

<sup>14</sup> William Ditewig, "Charting a Theology of the Diaconate," in *Theology of the Diaconate: The State of the Question* (New York: Paulist Press, 2004), 57.

<sup>15</sup> *Gaudium et Spes*, 22

<sup>16</sup> *Redemptoris Hominis*, 7-9..

<sup>17</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>18</sup> *Ibid.*, #10.

<sup>19</sup> Karol Wojtyła, *Love and Responsibility*, 98.

<sup>20</sup> *Catechism of the Catholic Church*, 1638-1640. *Familiaris Consortio*, 11. *Codex Iuris Canonici*, can. 1134.

<sup>21</sup> The exclusive relationship between Christ and the Church, what Augustine called that "*Totus Christus*," does not preclude the reality of other close relationships any more than spousal love excludes other kinds of love. Just as married couples can love another, say their children or their parents, so too can Christ's love extend beyond the Church. Nonetheless, His relationship to the Church admits to a unique quality and reciprocity that the others do not.

<sup>22</sup> *Codex Iuris Canonici*, can. 1057 '1. The consent of the parties, legitimately manifested between persons qualified by law, makes marriage; no human power is able to supply this consent.

<sup>23</sup> *Sacrosanctum Concilium* 7.

<sup>24</sup> Wojtyła often speaks of marriage as a *communio personarum*, however *communio personarum* is not exclusive to marriage. Although the term is most properly applied to describe the inner life of the Blessed Trinity, and although marriage reflects this inner life, it can also be applied to any interpersonal relationship in which the dignity of persons are respected.

<sup>25</sup> Karol Wojtyła, *The Acting Person, A Contribution to Phenomenological Anthropology* (New York: Springer Publishing. Co., 1979), 261-300.

<sup>26</sup> *Ibid.* 264.

<sup>27</sup> Christopher West, *Theology of the Body Explained* (Boston: Pauline Books & Media, 2003), 115.

<sup>28</sup> Cf.: United States Conference of Catholic Bishops, *National Directory for the Formation, Ministry and Life of Permanent Deacons in the United States* (Washington D.C.: USCCB, 2005), #68.

<sup>29</sup> Owen Cummings, *Deacons and the Church*, (Mahwah, N.J. : Paulist Press, 2004), 94. It is interesting to note Cummings's use of personalist language in this passage. However, in his chapter on Diaconal Marriage he makes no further use of this language, instead focusing on the work of: Anglican Bishop Jeremy Taylor, novelist Alan Paton, and the Danish philosopher Søren Kierkegaard.

<sup>30</sup> Congregation of the Clergy, *Directory for the Ministry and Life of Permanent Deacons* (Boston: Daughters of St. Paul, 1998), #61.

<sup>31</sup> Karol Wojtyła, *Love and Responsibility*, 96.

<sup>32</sup> Ibid. 97.

<sup>33</sup> Pope John XXIII, "Mater et Magistra" in *The Social Thought of John XXIII*, ed. Jean-Yves Calvez, trans. George J. M. McKenzie (Chicago, H. Regnery Co. 1965) #74.

<sup>34</sup> *Catechism of the Catholic Church*, 253.

<sup>35</sup> Angelo Scola, *The Nuptial Mystery in Ressourcement: Retrieval and Renewal in Catholic Thought*, trans. Michelle K. Borrás (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans Publishing Company, 2005), 131-132.

<sup>36</sup> James Keating, "The Character of Diaconal Ordination," *Ignatius Insight*, August 17, 2010, accessed April 8, 2014, [http://www.ignatiusinsight.com/features2010/jkeating\\_diaconate\\_aug2010.asp](http://www.ignatiusinsight.com/features2010/jkeating_diaconate_aug2010.asp).

## Chapter 5

<sup>1</sup> This term may have also been applied to the mission of the Seventy (some manuscripts Seventy-Two) in Lk:10:1-24. Jesus' appointment of the Seventy "others" (*heteros*) are understood within the context of "other disciples." See: Carroll Stuhlmueller, "The Gospel According to Luke," in *Jerome Biblical Commentary*, ed. Raymond Brown et. al. (London: Prentice Hall International, 1968), 143.

<sup>2</sup> K. H. Rengstorff, "Mathetes," *Theological Dictionary of the New Testament*, Edited by Gerhard Kittel and Gerhard Friedrich (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1967), IV, p. 426-427.

<sup>3</sup> R. T. France, *I Came to Set the Earth on Fire* (Downers Grove: InterVarsity Press, 1976), p. 50.

<sup>4</sup> Simon J. Kistemaker, *Acts* (Grand Rapids: Baker Books, 1990), 220.

<sup>5</sup> Ibid.

<sup>6</sup> Denis Lynch, *The Story of the Acts of the Apostles* (New York: Benziger Brothers, 1917), 54. James D.G. Dunn, *The Acts of The Apostles* (Valley Forge: Trinity Press International, 1996), 80-85.

<sup>7</sup> Giuseppe Ricciotti, *The Acts of the Apostles* (Milwaukee: Bruce Publishing Company, 1958), 110.

<sup>8</sup> Gerd Ludemann, *Early Christianity According to the Traditions in Acts* (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1987), 74.

<sup>9</sup> Hans Conzelmann, *Acts of the Apostles* (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1963), 45.

<sup>10</sup> William H. Willimon, *Acts* (Atlanta: John Knocks Press, 1988), 59. Later widows would form a special order 1Tim 5:3-16.

<sup>11</sup> C.S.C Williams, *The Acts of the Apostles* (London: Henry Chadwick, 1964), 96.

<sup>12</sup> French Arrington, *The Acts of the Apostles* (Massachusetts: Hendrickson Publications, 1988), 65.

<sup>13</sup> James Monroe Barnett, *The Diaconate: A Full and Equal Order* (Valley Forge: Trinity Press International, 1995), 19.

<sup>14</sup> Richard B. Rackham, *The Acts of the Apostles* (London: Methuen Press, 1947), 83.

<sup>15</sup> Ernst Haenchen, *The Acts of the Apostles* (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1971), 263.

<sup>16</sup> C.S.C Williams, *The Acts of the Apostles*, 118.

<sup>17</sup> Henry Alford, *Alford's Greek Testament: An Exegetical and Critical Commentary, Vol 2* (Grand Rapids: Baker Books, 1976), 63.

<sup>18</sup> Charles L. Souvay, "St. Stephen," in *The Catholic Encyclopedia*, ed. Charles Herbermann, et. al., vol. 14, (New York: The Encyclopedia Press, Inc., 1912), 286.

<sup>19</sup> Giuseppe Ricciotti, *The Acts of the Apostles*, 111.

<sup>20</sup> FF Bruce, *Commentary on the Acts of the Apostles* (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans Publishing Co., 1981), 130.

<sup>21</sup> John Kilgallen, *A Brief Commentary on the Acts of the Apostles* (New York: Paulist Press, 1988), 47.

<sup>22</sup> International Theological Commission, *From the Diakonia of Christ to the Diakonia of the Apostles* (Chicago: Hillenbrand, 2004), 10.

<sup>23</sup> H. W. Beyer, "Diakonos," in *Theological Dictionary of the New Testament*, ed. H. von Gerhard Kittle, vol. II (Stuttgart: W. Kohlhammer Verlag, 1964), 90.

<sup>24</sup> Lawrence Hennessey, "Diakonia and Diakonoï in the Pre-Nicene Church," in *Diakonia: Studies in Honor of Robert T. Meyer*, eds. Thomas Halton and Joseph Williman, (Washington, D.C: Catholic University Press, 1986) 70.

<sup>25</sup> For an in depth analysis see: Andre Lemaire, "The Ministries in the New Testament: Recent Research", in *Biblical Theology Bulletin* 3, no. 2, June 1973, 133-166. After listing several authors, concludes, "It is the result of these studies that the diaconate is not yet an institution completely fixed in the New Testament."147.

<sup>26</sup> Irenaeus of Lyon, "The Five Books of Irenaeus of Lyon: Against Heresies" in *Library of the Fathers of the Holy Catholic Church*, trans. John Keble, (London: James Parker and Co.,1872) 248. Adv. Haer., III, xii, 10.

<sup>27</sup> "The Council of Neocaesarea," in *Nicene and Post Nicene Fathers of the Christian Church*, ed. Paul Shaff and Henry Wace, vol. XVI, *The Seven Ecumenical Councils* (Grand Rapids: Wm. B. Eedrmans Publishing Co, 1977), 86.

<sup>28</sup> Eusebius, *The History of the Church from Christ to Constantine*, trans. G.A. Williamson, (New York: Dorset Press, 1965) 71.

<sup>29</sup> Council of Trent (Sess. XXIII, cap. ii), July 15, 1563.

<sup>30</sup> *Principi Apostolorum Petro* 8.

<sup>31</sup> *Sacrum Diaconatus Ordinem* 36.

<sup>32</sup> *Veritatis Splendor* 91.

<sup>33</sup> Congregation for Education and Congregation for Clergy, *Basic Norms for the Formation of Deacons and Directory for the Ministry and Life of Permanent Deacons* (Boston: Pauline Books and Media, 1998), #2.

<sup>34</sup> James Monroe Barnett, *The Diaconate: A Full and Equal Order*, 32.

<sup>35</sup> Ibid. For a better English translation see: John Chrysostom, "Homilies of John Chrysostom on the Acts of the Apostles," in *Library of the Fathers of the Holy Catholic Church*, (London: F. and J. Rivington, 1851), 198-199 (Homily XIV).

<sup>36</sup> Robert Nowell, *The Ministry of Service*, 19.

<sup>37</sup> For an analysis of the use of the term, *Apostoloi* see: Andre Lemaire, "The Ministries in the New Testament: Recent Research" 142.

<sup>38</sup> James Monroe Barnett, *The Diaconate: A Full and Equal Order*, 32, n. 26. Barnett further states that Chrysostom, "was quoted with approval by the Council of Trullo." To call the use of Chrysostom's quoted an "approval" is a bit of an overstatement. The Council merely used it to illustrate a point. Moreover, the Council Fathers also truncated the quote. See: Philip Shaff and Henry Wace, eds., "The Seven Ecumenical Councils of the Undivided Church," in *A Select Library of the Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers of the Christian Church*, ed. Philip Shaff, vol. XIV, (Grand Rapids: Eeddmans Publishing Co., 1979) 373.

<sup>39</sup> James Monroe Barnett, *The Diaconate: A Full and Equal Order*, 32. The International Theological Commission shares Barnett's conclusion. See: International Theological Commission, *From the Diakonia of Christ to the Diakonia of the Apostles*, 38.

<sup>40</sup> John Chrysostom, "Homilies of John Chrysostom on the Acts of the Apostles," in *Library of the Fathers of the Holy Catholic Church*, 198-199 (Homily XIV). John Chrysostom, "Homilies of John Chrysostom on the Acts of the Apostles and the Epistle to the Romans," in *A Select Library of the Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers of the Christian Church*, ed. Philip Shaff, (Grand Rapids: Eeddmans Publishing Co., 1979) 90-91 (Homily XIV).

<sup>41</sup> John Chrysostom, "Homilies of John Chrysostom on the Acts of the Apostles and the Epistle to the Romans," in *A Select Library of the Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers of the Christian Church*, 90-91 n.\*.

<sup>42</sup> Philip Shaff, "The Seven Ecumenical Councils of the Undivided Church," in *A Select Library of the Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers of the Christian Church*, 373, fn 2.

<sup>43</sup> James Monroe Barnett, *The Diaconate: A Full and Equal Order*, 32, n. 26. Barnett further states that Chrysostom, “was quoted with approval by the Council of Trullo.” To call the use of Chrysostom’s quoted an “approval” is a bit of an overstatement. The Council merely used it to illustrate a point. Moreover, the Council Fathers also truncated the quote. See: Philip Shaff and Henry Wace, eds., “The Seven Ecumenical Councils of the Undivided Church,” in *A Select Library of the Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers of the Christian Church*, ed. Philip Shaff, vol. XIV, (Grand Rapids: Eedmans Publishing Co., 1979) 373.

<sup>44</sup> H.J. Schroeder, ed., *Disciplinary Decrees of the General Councils*, (Missouri: Herder and Herder, 1937) 128.

<sup>45</sup> Leo Donald Davis, “The First Seven Ecumenical Councils (325-787),” in *Theology and Life Series*, (Delaware: Michael Glazier, 1987) 286.

<sup>46</sup> Philip Shaff, “The Seven Ecumenical Councils of the Undivided Church,” in *A Select Library of the Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers of the Christian Church*, 356.

<sup>47</sup> Ibid.

<sup>48</sup> By “direct scriptural connection” what is meant is a scriptural source that explicitly links Acts 6:1-6 with Tim 3:8. However, as will be discussed shortly, there is evidence to suggest an indirect connection. See: John N. Collins, *Are All Christian* (New South Wales: E.J.Dwyer, 1992).

<sup>49</sup> *Catechismus Catholicae Ecclesiae*, 80-82.

<sup>50</sup> C.S.C Williams, *The Acts of the Apostles*, 118.

<sup>51</sup> “Deacon,” in *The New Interpreter’s Bible*, ed. Leander Keck et. al., vol. X (Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1994), 202.

<sup>52</sup> Denis Lynch, *The Story of the Acts of the Apostles*, 55.

<sup>53</sup> John N. Collins, *Are All Christian*, 39.

<sup>54</sup> Collins, *Are All Christian*, 39.

<sup>55</sup> H. W. Beyer, “Diakonos,” in *Theological Dictionary of the New Testament*, vol. II, 82.

<sup>56</sup> Lawrence Hennessey, “*Diakonia* and *Diakono*i in the Pre-Nicene Church,” in *Diakonia: Studies in Honor of Robert T. Meyer*, 73-74.

<sup>57</sup> There is some debate regarding this synagogue. It could have been that the “Freedmen” were former slaves who have come

from various parts of the Roman Empire. They could have been “Libertines” which would mean that the synagogue was built for Jews dwelling in Libertum (a Jewish community in Africa). They may have also been Jews living in Rome who had been made slaves by the Romans under Pompey but afterward were set free and built a synagogue.

<sup>58</sup> Ernst Haenchen, *The Acts of the Apostles*, 274, 295.

<sup>59</sup> Richard N. Longenecker, “The Acts of the Apostles.” in *The Expositor’s Bible Commentary*, (Grand Rapids: Zondervan Pub, 1981) 305.

<sup>60</sup> Oscar Cullmann, *The Christology of the New Testament*, (Philadelphia: Westminster, 1963) 157-158. FF Bruce, *Commentary on the Acts of the Apostles*, 168.

<sup>61</sup> James D.G. Dunn, *The Acts of The Apostles*, 101.

<sup>62</sup> Among the methods in higher criticism, it would seem most reasonable to categorize the use of logic as a component of literary criticism because its studies, among other things, the structures within language. However, the observation made here is more fundamental and applies to all human discourses. Because of this, all methods of biblical exegesis must necessarily rely on logic for their intelligibility.

<sup>63</sup> For a synopsis of the leading theories, see: “The Gospel of John,” in *Ignatius Study Bible*, ed. Scott Hahn and Curtis Mitch (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 2003), 44.

<sup>64</sup> James Keating, *The Heart of the Deacon* (New York: Paulist Press, 2014), 56.

<sup>65</sup> Cardinal Walter Kasper, *The Deacon offers an ecclesiological view of the present day challenges in the Church and Society* (Paper given at IDC Study-Conference, Brixen, Italy, October, 1997), [http://deaconsplace.org/index.php?option=com\\_content&task=view&id=57](http://deaconsplace.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=57).

<sup>66</sup> Karol Wojtyla, *Subjectivity and the Irreducible in the Human Being in Person and Community: Selected Essays* (New York: P. Lang, 1993), 215.

<sup>67</sup> For *in Persona Christi Capitis*, see: *Catechism of the Catholic Church* 1548. For *in Persona Christi Servi*, see *Catechism of the Catholic Church* 1570. There it says, “Deacons share in Christ’s mission and grace in a special way. The sacrament of Holy Orders marks them with an imprint (“character”)

which cannot be removed and which configures them to Christ, who made himself the “deacon” or servant of all.” Though it can be argued that the Catechism infers the phrase *in Persona Christi Servi*, it does not explicitly use it. However, the phrase can be found in: International Theological Commission, *From the Diakonia of Christ to the Diakonia of the Apostles* (Chicago: Hillenbrand, 2004) 95-96.

<sup>68</sup> I was introduced to the notion of “servant mysteries” by James Keating in private conversations. If I understand him correctly, Keating sees the “servant mysteries” as instances in divine revelation where Christ humbled Himself to share in our humanity illuminating the true meaning of sacred service. To be a deacon then is to participate in these mysteries by being personally vulnerable and permanently available.

<sup>69</sup> Pope Benedict XVI, Meeting with the clergy of the Diocese of Rome, February 7, 2008.

<sup>70</sup> In the above analysis, we have only employed one personalist theme, that of the irreducible. Much of what has already been written regarding love and the *personalist norm* can also be applied further validating the personalism as a viable hermeneutic to advance the theology of the diaconate. However, since this would result in a significant redundancy, it will not be included here.

<sup>71</sup> *Catechism of the Catholic Church* 1546 - 1547.

<sup>72</sup> *Lumen Gentium* 29.

<sup>73</sup> *Catechism of the Catholic Church* 901.

<sup>74</sup> *Codex Iuris Canonici*, can. 266 ‘1.

<sup>75</sup> *Catechism of the Catholic Church* 1456.

<sup>76</sup> Pope John Paul II, *Deacons Are Called to a Life of Holiness*, General Audience, October 20, 1993.

<sup>77</sup> *Summa Theologica* III, q. 22, art. 2.

## Conclusion

<sup>1</sup> The phrase “Become what you are” is an echo and reapplication of the charge Pope John Paul II gave to families in his Apostolic Exhortation *Familiaris Consortio*.

## Appendix I

<sup>1</sup> For some examples see: Patrick McCaslin and Michael Lawler, *Sacrament of Service* (New York: Paulist Press, 1986); Owen E. Cummings, William T. Ditewig, and Richard R. Gaillardetz, *Theology of the Diaconate: The State of the Question* (New York: Paulist Press, 2004); James Monroe Barnett, *The Diaconate: A Full and Equal Order* (Valley Forge: Trinity Press International, 1995).

<sup>2</sup> “Scientific metaphysics” is a common term used to describe an inquiry into reality and the knowledge of being.

<sup>3</sup> Bruce Aune, *Metaphysics: The Elements* (Minnesota: University of Minnesota Press, 1985), 10.

<sup>4</sup> Claudia Baracchi, *Aristotle’s Ethics as First Philosophy* (Massachusetts: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 222-225.

<sup>5</sup> For a more in depth analysis of analogies see: E. J. Ashworth, “Signification and Modes of Signifying in Thirteenth-Century Logic: A Preface to Aquinas on Analogy,” in *Medieval Philosophy and Theology* (1991), 1: 39-67; Ralph McInerny, “Aquinas and Analogy,” *Philosophical Topics*, (1992), 20/2: 103-124.

<sup>6</sup> Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, trans. W. D. Ross (London: Oxford University Press, 1966), 1028b 4. Thomas would later reiterate the primacy of substance in a number of his own works. cf.: *Summa Theologica*, I, q. 3, art. 5, ad 1. *Commentaries on the Sentences* I, d. 8. q. 4, a. 2, ad 2.; II, d. 3, q. 1, art. 5, corpus. *Summa Contra Gentiles*, I, 25, 10. *On the Power of God*, q. 7, art. 3, ad 4.

<sup>7</sup> For a thorough analysis of being as substance cf.: Joseph Owens, *The Doctrine of Being in Aristotelian Metaphysics* (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1957), 189-198.

<sup>8</sup> Aristotle, *The Categories*, trans. Harold P. Cooke (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1962), 2a 14-15.

<sup>9</sup> *Ibid.*, 1a 20-b9.

<sup>10</sup> Aristotle, *On Interpretation*, trans. Harold P. Cooke (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1962), 17a 38-b 1.

<sup>11</sup> The term “man” is used here is used not in the sense of gender (*vir*), but in the sense humankind (*homo, hominis*). This usage

is deliberate as it is essential to capture the distinction between Aristotelean-Thomas treatment of “man” and Wojtyła’s treatment of “person” and to avoid any potential anachronisms by conflagrating the terms.

<sup>12</sup> *Categories*, 1a 24-25.

<sup>13</sup> *Ibid.*, 1a 27-28.

<sup>14</sup> *Ibid.*, 1b 6.

<sup>15</sup> *Ibid.*, 1a 20, 2a 11.

<sup>16</sup> *Ibid.*, 2a 35-2b 7.

<sup>17</sup> *Ibid.*, I, q 29, art. 1, c.

<sup>18</sup> *Ibid.*, 2a 11-18.

<sup>19</sup> *Ibid.*, 1a 21.

<sup>20</sup> *Ibid.*, 2b 9-15.

<sup>21</sup> Aristotle’s categories has been the cause of considerable debate among scholars. Cf.: Michael Frede, “Categories in Aristotle” in *Studies in Aristotle*. (Washington: Catholic University Press, 1981) 1-25. Here, Frede points out that while there is a general consensus that these categories represent categories of being, there is no consensus, “as to the basis and nature of this classification, nor is there an agreement as to how the categories themselves are related to these classes of entities.”

<sup>22</sup> *Categories*, 8b 25.

<sup>23</sup> Like the categories themselves, enumeration of the sense of quality has been the cause of considerable debate among scholars.

<sup>24</sup> *Metaphysics* 1005b 19B20.

<sup>25</sup> Aristotle treats change in other ways. Cf.: Mary Louise Gill, *Aristotle on Substance* (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1989), 83-110. It will suffice for our purposes to simply focus on his treatment of motion.

<sup>26</sup> *Physics*, 198a 15-30.

<sup>27</sup> 189a 31-b 8.

<sup>28</sup> *Metaphysics* 1033a 24-1033b 19.

<sup>29</sup> *Physics* 194b 24-36.

<sup>30</sup> *Physics* 194b 24-25.

<sup>31</sup> *Ibid.* 194b 26-27.

<sup>32</sup> *Ibid.* 194b 29-30.

<sup>33</sup> *Ibid.* 194b 31-34.

<sup>34</sup> *Summa Theologica*, III, q.64 a.1-4.

<sup>35</sup> Stephen Fields, *Being as Symbol: On the Origins and Development of Karl Rahner’s Metaphysics* (Washington D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2000), 41. Cf.: Thomas Aquinas, *Commentary on the Sentences*, 4, 19, 1,2, sol 1.

<sup>36</sup> *Metaphysics* 1045b 26-30.

<sup>37</sup> *Ibid.* 1046a 10-29.

<sup>38</sup> Cf.: *Physics* 201a 10, 206a 14. *Metaphysics* 1026b 1, 1047a 18-20.

<sup>39</sup> *Ibid.* 1047a 30-1074b 2. Here “act” is primarily understood not in the popular sense of action or operation, but in terms of actual existence.

<sup>40</sup> *Physics* 194a 27-33.

<sup>41</sup> Herman Reith, *The Metaphysics of St. Thomas Aquinas* (Milwaukee: The Bruce Publishing Company, 1958), 89.

<sup>42</sup> *Ibid.* 1046a 12.

<sup>43</sup> Aristotle believes that active potency, as such, could not be defined so he merely provides examples. Cf.: *Metaphysics* 1048a 37.

<sup>44</sup> *Ibid.* 1048a 25.

<sup>45</sup> *Ibid.* 1048a 20ff.

<sup>46</sup> *Summa Theologica* I, qq. 75-91.

<sup>47</sup> Karol Wojtyła, Subjectivity and the Irreducible in the Human Being in *Person and Community: Selected Essays* (New York: P. Lang, 1993), 223. The maxim *agere sequitur esse* is also expressed as *operari sequitur esse*.

<sup>48</sup> This study will assume the reservation of ordination exclusively to men (*vir*). Cf.: *Codex Iruis Canonici* 1024. *Catechism of the Catholic Church*, 1577. Aimé Georges Martimort, *Deaconesses: An Historical Study*. (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1986) 243-247.

## Appendix 2

<sup>1</sup> *Summa Theologica*, Ia, q. 75-83.

<sup>2</sup> Aristotle employs his matter and form distinction to answer the question, “What is soul?” At the beginning of Book II in *De Anima*

he says that there are three sorts of substance: (1) matter, which he equates to potentiality; (2) form, which he equates to actuality and; (3) the compound of matter and form. Cf.: *De Anima* 412a 1-11.

<sup>3</sup> *Summa Theologica*, Ia. q. 75. a.1.

<sup>4</sup> *Ibid.*, Ia. q. 75. a.4.

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*, Ia. q. 76. a.5.

<sup>6</sup> *Ibid.*, Ia. q. 77. a.3.

<sup>7</sup> Thomas, citing Aristotle held that the soul is capable of relating to all things by knowing them (*Anima est quodammodo omnia*).

<sup>8</sup> The term “reason” is also used to describe the combination of intellect and will.

<sup>9</sup> *Summa Theologica*, Ia. q.79. a.11.

<sup>10</sup> *Ibid.*, Ia. q.80. a.1-2.

<sup>11</sup> *Ibid.*, Ia. q.82. a.1.

<sup>12</sup> *Ibid.*, Ia. q.83. a.1-4.

<sup>13</sup> *Ibid.*, Ia. q.82. a.3.

<sup>14</sup> *Ibid.*, Ia. q.85. a.7.; For Trinity cf.: *Ibid.*, Ia. q.27-43., and for Incarnations cf.: *Ibid.* IIIa. q.1-26.

<sup>15</sup> *Ibid.* IIIa. q.2 a.3., Although quoted by various scholastic writers, this definition does not appear verbatim in the text of *De persona et duabus naturis*, c. ii., however it has become an accepted paraphrase.

<sup>16</sup> Roy J Deferrari, *A Latin-English Dictionary of St. Thomas Aquinas* (Boston: Daughters of St. Paul, 1986), 1003.

<sup>17</sup> *Summa Theologica*, IIIa. q.16. a.12.

<sup>18</sup> *Ibid.*, Ia. q.29. a.3.

<sup>19</sup> *Ibid.*

### Appendix 3

<sup>1</sup> John Cassian, *Conferences*, trans. Colm Luibheid (New York: Paulist Press, 1985), 106.

<sup>2</sup> *Summa Theologica*, Ia. q. 1. a.10.

<sup>3</sup> Thomas Aquinas, *Commentary on Galatians*, c.4, lect. 7, Accessed January 2013, <https://sites.google.com/site/aquinasstudybible/>

[home/galatians/st-thomas-aquinas-on-galatians/chapter-1/chapter-2/chapter-3/chapter-4](http://home/galatians/st-thomas-aquinas-on-galatians/chapter-1/chapter-2/chapter-3/chapter-4).

<sup>4</sup> Thomas Aquinas, *Commentary on the Book of Job*, c.1, 6. Accessed January 2013, <http://dhspriority.org/thomas/SSJob.htm#011>.

<sup>5</sup> Thomas Aquinas, *Commentary on the Gospel of St. John*, c.3, 1, 434. Accessed January 2013, <http://dhspriority.org/thomas/John3.htm>.

<sup>6</sup> Thomas Aquinas, *Commentary on the Gospel of St. Matthew*, trans. Paul M. Kimball (U.S.: Delarosa Press. 2012) 192-193.

<sup>7</sup> *Summa Theologica*, Ia. q. 1. a.10.

<sup>8</sup> Henri de Lubac, *Medieval Exegesis: The Four Senses of Scripture*, trans. Mark Sebanc (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1998), 271. The verse can be found in the *Rotulus pugillaris* published in 1206 by Augustinus de Dacia.

<sup>9</sup> *Catechism of the Catholic Church*, 117.

<sup>10</sup> *Divino Afflante Spiritu*, 23.

<sup>11</sup> *Ibid.*, 33.

<sup>12</sup> *Dei Verbum*, 12. Pontifical Biblical Commission, “The Interpretation of the Bible in the Church,” (Alabama: EWTN, 1994), accessed January 2013, Section I.

<sup>13</sup> Pope John Paul, *Theology of the Body* (Boston: Pauline Books and Media, 1997) 57.

<sup>14</sup> *Ibid.*, 52.

<sup>15</sup> William Kurz, et. al., ed. John Gavin and John M. McDermott, “The Scriptural Foundations of the Theology of the Body,” in *Pope John Paul II on the Body: Human, Eucharistic, Ecclesial* (Philadelphia: St. Joseph’s University Press, 2007), 27-46.

<sup>16</sup> *Dei Verbum* 11.

<sup>17</sup> David M. Williams, *Receiving the Bible in Faith: Historical and Theological Exegesis* (Washington Catholic University of America, 2004) 194-195.

<sup>18</sup> *Catechism of the Catholic Church*, 109.

<sup>19</sup> William Kurz, “The Scriptural Foundations of the Theology of the Body, 30.

<sup>20</sup> *Dei Verbum*, 11.

<sup>21</sup> David M. Williams, *Receiving the Bible in Faith: Historical and Theological Exegesis*, 183.

<sup>22</sup> *Dei Verbum*, 12.

<sup>23</sup> AAS 81 [1989] 1124.

<sup>24</sup> Archbishop Prendergast makes the observation that the pope's minimal use of the historical method arises out of a predominantly pastoral approach to the text. See: Terrence Prendergast, S.J., "A Vision of Wholeness: A Reflection on the Use of Scripture in a Cross-Section of Papal Writings," *The Thought of Pope John Paul II*, ed. John McDermott (Rome: Gregorian, 1993), 69-97.

<sup>25</sup> Luke Johnson, an American New Testament scholar and historian, argues that the pope selects and interprets particular text without sufficient grounding. He maintains that John Paul does not treat all of the relevant texts proper to the subject matter, avoids addressing the difficult questions within those texts and, derives ontological conclusions from the narrative. See: Luke Timothy Johnson, "A Disembodied 'Theology of the Body': John Paul II on Love, Sex, and Pleasure," *Commonweal* 128, 2 (January 26, 2001): 11-17.


<sup>26</sup> William Kurz, "The Scriptural Foundations of the Theology of the Body, 30.



Deacon Dominic Cerrato, Ph.D. has taught theology at Franciscan University and Duquesne University. Ordained the first permanent deacon in the Diocese of Steubenville in 1995, he is currently on assignment in the Diocese of Richmond where he serves as full-time Director of Adult Faith Formation at St. Bede Catholic Church, a 3700 family parish in Williamsburg, Virginia. Deacon Cerrato and his wife Judith have been married for 32 years and they have seven children.

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**St. Ephraem Press**  
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ISBN: 150253486X  
ISBN 13: 9781502534866  
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